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LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN

(1869—1939)

The late Prof. Louis de la Vallée Poussin

The inexorable hand of death has extinguished one of the luminaries in the firmament of the present day oriental studies, Louis de la Vallée Poussin, whose contributions to explorations in a field in the history of Buddhism are unique and probably in some respects unsurpassed.

Louis de la Vallée Poussin was born at Liege on the new year's day of 1869, a rather remarkable date of birth. He belonged to a family of scholars, one of whom, Charles de la Vallée Poussin, is well-known as a mathematician. He had his early education at the College of Saint-Servais at Liege, where he had a brilliant academic career. He learnt Greek from Father Bodson who had at one time been a missionary at Chota Nagpur, and studied the works of Ovid with Father Auge Durand. He completed his education at the University of Liege (1884-1888), where he studied Philology with Louis Roersch and developed a taste for Dialectics from Prof. Delbœuf. In 1888, he was admitted to the degree of doctorate in philosophy and literature. On reading the *Asiatic Studies* by Charles Lyall, he made up his mind to study oriental subjects. He went to Louvain, and studied there the rudiments of Sanskrit, Pali and Zend, the principles of Linguistics with Charles de Harlez and Philippe Colinet, both of whom were much impressed by the earnestness and intelligence of the young student. He commenced studying oriental subjects in 1891-93 at Sorbonne at l'École des Hautes Études as a pupil of Sylvain Lévi and Victor Henry. He received also encouragement and scholarly help from Auguste Barth and Emile Senart. In 1893-94, he went to Leyden to study the Gatha dialect with the distinguished scholar of the time Prof. H. Kern. At this stage of

his education, he commenced studying Tibetan and Chinese as he realised that knowledge of these two languages was essential for a correct survey and interpretation of the ancient Buddhist traditions.

In 1893 he became a Professor at the University of Ghent, where he taught Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin. He served in this University for about 35 years rising to its highest office as the Vice-President of the Academic Council. In 1929 when the University came under Flemish control, he retired and preferred to carry on his researches quietly at his home. At this time one or two students from India went to him for Buddhistic studies and this gave him some solace as his scholarship though not fully appreciated at home was being valued by students from abroad. Some of his countrymen did not fully realise the value of his scholarship and became curious as to why students from India should come to him to learn Buddhist Sanskrit.

During the last European war (1914-1918) he came as a refugee to Cambridge. He organised there a course of studies for the young Belgian refugees, prepared a Catalogue of Jaina manuscripts deposited in the Cambridge Library, and an Inventory of Tibetan documents preserved in the India Office (Stein Collection). He utilised this opportunity of his forced stay at Cambridge by copying out the whole of Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā ṭikā* which later on formed the basis of his epoch-making work, the French translation of *Abhidharmakośa* replete with valuable notes. Besides the *Kośa*, he also copied out with his own hand a few other Buddhist Mss. During his stay in Cambridge, he edited the Pali text *Mahāniddesa* jointly with Dr. E. J. Thomas.

Together with Ph. Colinet he edited and published *Le Muséon* up to 1914. Two issues of this periodical were printed at the Cambridge University Press. He delivered also a short course of the Hibbert Lectures (Oxford 1918) and the Forlong Lectures of the London School of Oriental Studies.

After the war, he resumed his duties at the University of Ghent. Besides his official duties and his own researches, he found time to impart training to young aspirants for research in the field of Buddhism. To name a few among those who derived substantial benefit from such training, we may mention J. Mansion, H. Ui, Akanuma, Yamabe, J. Rahder, P. Vaidya, N. Dutt, Miyamoto and E. Lamotte. He taught them both Tibetan and Chinese besides Buddhist Sanskrit texts like he *Kośa, Mādhyamikavṛtti* and *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. He specialised so much in the restoration of original Sanskrit from Tibetan and Chinese that very often he held the Tibetan and Chinese texts before him and read them out in Sanskrit as if he was reading the Sanskrit original.

In 1921, he organised the Société belge d'Études orientales, which published many important works on oriental subjects under his guidance. Under the title *Bouddhisme: Notes et Bibliographie* he started reviewing the newly published works which were of interest to the indologists in general and to the students of Buddhism in particular. He directed the edition of the *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, in which several of his valuable papers were published. He collaborated also in the publication of the *Bibliographie Boudhique* of Paris, which essayed to give a synopsis of all the works and papers published all over the world on Buddhistic topics. He published papers in several oriental journals of note, among which may be mentioned *Bulletin de l'Academic royale de Belgiques, Bulletin de l'École française d'Extreme Orient, Indian Historical Quarterly, Journal Asiatique, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Revue d'Histoire des religions, Rocznik Orjentalistyczny.**

His special field of study was Sanskrit Buddhism (Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna); he was in fact a pioneer in this particular branch of

* Much of the information given here has been taken from the Obituary Notice written by the Professor's principal disciple *M.* l'abbé E. Lamotte and published in the *Revue due Cercle des Alumni de la Fondation Universitaire*, 1938.

Buddhistic studies. His interest in Pali, Brahmanic philosophical literature and general history of ancient India was not so keen as was his interest in Sanskrit Buddhism. In this field, his noted predecessors were Burnouf, Hodgson, Rajendralal Mitra, Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, and Sarat Chandra Das, but the works of all these scholars belong to a period when very little of Buddhism was known or understood. The actual difference between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna was hardly realised and *Śūnyatā* was usually interpreted as Nihilism (see *Journals of the Buddhist Text Society*). Among the scholars who could be regarded as the elder contemporaries of Prof. Poussin and who worked in this field were the late Prof. Sylvain Lévi and Prof. Stcherbatsky with both of whom he was associated in his studies. To be more particular, Prof. Poussin's scholarship lay in a line different from that of Lévi or Stcherbatsky. He loved editing original texts and making their translations. His command over the Sanskrit language was remarkable. He edited among other works the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and *Mādhyamikavṛtti* with such accuracy that very rarely an error can be detected. This accuracy was partly due to his mastery over Tibetan and Chinese and his ability in restoring texts in these languages to original Sanskrit.

His epoch-making contribution to the studies of Buddhism is his French translation of Hiuen Tsang's version of the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* in 7 parts. Before the publication of this work, very little was known of the Sarvāstivādins and their doctrines—a school of Buddhism which was popular all over Northern India. The work is not a mere translation. It is replete with valuable notes which can be written only by a scholar who had thoroughly digested the whole of the Pali Piṭaka. In short, it was Prof. Poussin who placed before the world of scholars for the first time the ethical and philosophical teachings of the Sarvāstivādins.

Another voluminous and equally arduous work is his translation of Hiuen Tsang's Chinese version of the *Vijñaptimātra-*

tāsiddhi. It is a commentary on Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā* published by Sylvain Lévi with the commentary of Sthiramati. Hiuen Tsang's work is a translation of the commentary of Dharmapāla and nine other commentators, and contains extracts from the treatises of Asaṅga, Dignāga, Vasubandhu and others. The Professor has not merely translated Hiuen Tsang's work but added to it valuable notes throwing a flood of light on the obscure points of Yogācāra philosophy. Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā* is so terse and difficult that even with Sthiramati's commentary it would have remained unintelligible if the *Siddhi* had not been published by him.

He has contributed several articles on Buddhist topics to the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. Each of them is really valuable, giving all the important matters that could be given within a short compass in a work like the *Encyclopædia*.

His work on *Nirvāṇa*, a brochure in 194 pages, contains the interpretation of Nirvāṇa from both Hīnayāna (Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika) and Mahāyāna standpoints. He has included in it also the opinions of a few other Hīnayāna sects and of the distinguished mediæval teachers.

In his *La Morale du Bouddhique*, he has dealt with the ethical aspects of Buddhism—a subject in which he did not feel much interest.

Very recently, he started writing on the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts in Chinese, which unfortunately remains incomplete, and will remain so for several years to come, as we find none at present capable of dealing with the same.

In his early days, he took some interest in Tāntrik treatises. He edited the *Ādikarmapradīpa* and *Pañcakrama* in 1898, but it seems that he lost his interest in this branch of Buddhistic studies. In the last days of his life, at the importunate request of his friend Monsieur E. Cavaignac, he wrote the *Political History of India*, in two volumes, but this was also not to his liking. Evidently his interest

lay in exploring the Buddhist Sanskrit works and their Chinese and Tibetan versions. This he did in a thorough manner and his contributions will ever remain invaluable documents for the study of Buddhism. His varied interest and contributions will be apparent from his works, a list of which is appended to this paper. India has lost in him a genius and an explorer in an exceedingly difficult field of Buddhistic studies, and the gap created by his demise is, we are afraid, not likely to be filled up in the near future. We can do no better than repeat the words of the *Mahāvaṃsa:*

'Thero pi so matipadīpahatandhakāro||
lokandhakārahananamhi mahāpadīpo||
nibbāpito maraṇaghora-mahānilena||
tenāpi jīvitamadaṃ matimā jaheyyā ti.'||

[The teacher, who has removed darkness by the light of knowledge —he, the great torch in destroying the darkness of the world— is extinguished by the dreadful wind of death, and so the wise should renounce taking pleasure in life].

Before I conclude, I should mention that I had the good fortune of meeting the savant at his house in Brussels in 1931. Our meeting was so very cordial that I feel sad to remember that he is no more in this mortal world. His personal library was full of works on Buddhism and every book contained marks of his close study, and cross-references to other works. His method of making notes and preparing index-cards was a revelation to me. His notes in every text and the index-cards are still invaluable, and any scholar with a certain amount of knowledge of the Buddhist texts will be able with the help of these notes and index-cards to produce valuable works. I wish that his students specially *M.* Lamotte will utilise them and give us the benefit of the labours of the savant.

NARENDRA NATH LAW

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Louis de la Vallée Poussin Memorial Volume

Lāmā Tāranātha's Account of Bengal[1]

The Tibetan historian Lāmā Tāranātha was born in 1573 A.D. and completed his famous work History of Buddhism in India in the year 1608 A.D. His main object was to give a detailed account of the Buddhist teachers, doctrines and institutions in India during the different periods. He has, however, always taken care to add the names of the kings under whose patronage, or during whose regime, they flourished. In this way he has preserved a considerable amount of Buddhist traditions regarding the political history of India. That these traditions cannot always be regarded as reliable data for the political history of India, admits of no doubt. At the same time there is equally little doubt that they contain a nucleus of historical truth which neither Indian literature nor Indian tradition has preserved for us. This fact, which will be illustrated in the following pages, makes it desirable to give a short summary of the political history and geography of Bengal which may be gleaned from the pages of Tāranātha.

Political history

The only kingdom in the east, of which Tāranātha gives the names of successive generations of kings, is Bhaṅgala, which may

1 The account is based on the German translation of Tāranātha's *History of Buddhism* by A. Schiefner (*Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien, aus dem Tibetischen ubersetzt von Anton Schiefner*, St. Petersburg 1869. Figures within bracket refer to the pages of this book). Portions of this book were translated into English in *Indian Antiquary*, (vol. IV) but the translation is not always accurate as the following pages will show.

be taken to denote southern and eastern Bengal, but the exact significance of which will be discussed later.

According to Tāranātha, the Candra dynasty ruled in Bhaṅgala before the Pālas, and the names of all the kings mentioned by him prior to Gopāla end in Candra.

One of the earliest of these kings was Vṛkṣacandra whose descendants, king Vigamacandra and his son king Kāmacandra, ruled in the east during the time of Śrī-Harṣa (i.e. the emperor Harṣavardhana) (p. 126). Next we hear of king Siṃhacandra, of the Candra family (presumably the one founded by Vṛkṣacandra), who flourished during the reign of Śila, son of the emperor Śrī-Harṣa (p. 146). Bālacandra, son of Siṃhacandra, being driven from Bhaṅgala (presumably by the powerful king Pañcama Siṃha of the Licchavi family whose kingdom extended from Tibet to Triliṅga and Benares to the sea) ruled in Tirahuti (i.e. Trihut in N. Bihar) (pp. 146,158). Bālacandra's son Vimalacandra, however, retrieved the fortunes of his family and ruled over the three kingdoms Bhaṅgala, Kāmarūpa and Tirahuti. He married the sister of king Bharthari (Bhartṛhari?) of the Mālava royal family, and was succeeded by his son Govicandra about the time when Dharmakīrti, the famous Buddhist teacher, died (p. 195). Govicandra was succeeded by Lalitacandra, his relation on the father's side, who ruled for many years in peace (p. 197).[2] After referring to the reigns of Govicandra and his successor Lalitacandra, both of whom attained *siddhi* (spiritual salvation) Tāranātha remarks:

> "Thus Lalitacandra was the last king of the Candra family.[3] In the five eastern provinces, Bhaṅgala, Oḍivisa (Orissa) and the rest, every Kṣatriya,

2 S. C. Das gives a different version of this account (*JASB.*, 1898, p. 22).

3 In spite of this clear statement of Tāranātha Dr. M. Shahidullah writes that according to Tāranātha Govicandra was the last king of the dynasty, and Gopāla was elected king of Vaṅga some years after the abdication of Govicandra (*IHQ.*, VII, 530, 533). He leaves out of account the reign of Lalitacandra "who ruled for many years in peace." Hence his chronological theory does not deserve serious consideration.

Grandee, Brāhmaṇa, and merchant was a king in his own house (in the neighbourhood) but there was no king ruling over the country[4] (p. 197)."

Then follows a long account of the Buddhist teachers of the period. Continuing the historical narrative in the next chapter, Tāranātha first tells us how a Tree-god begot a son on a young Kṣatriya woman[5] near Puṇḍravardhana, how this son became a devotee of the goddess Cundā, how directed by the goddess in a dream he went to the Vihāra of Ārya Khasarpaṇa, and, having prayed there for a kingdom, was directed to proceed towards the east (p. 202). Then occurs the following queer story:

"At that time the kingdom of Bhaṅgala had been without a king for many years and people were suffering great miseries. The leaders gathered and elected a king in order that the kingdom might be lawfully ruled. The elected king was, however, killed that very night by a strong and ugly Nāga woman who assumed the form of a queen of an earlier king (according to some Govicandra, according to others Lalitacandra). In this way she killed every elected king. But as the people could not leave the kingdom without a king, they elected one every morning only to see that he was killed by her during night and his dead body thrown out at day-break. Some years passed in this way, the citizens being elected in turn as king for the day. At this time the devotee of the goddess Cundā came to a house, where the family was overwhelmed with grief. On enquiry he learnt that next day the turn of the elected king fell on a son of that house. He, however, offered to take the place of the son, on receiving some money, and the joy of the family knew no bounds. He obtained the reward and was elected king in the morning. When in midnight the Nāga woman, in the form of a Rākṣasi, approached towards him, he struck her with the wooden club (which he always carried) sacred to his tutelary deity, and she died. The people were greatly astonished to see him alive in the morning. He thereupon offered to take the place of others whose turn came next to be elected as kings, and he was elected king seven times in course of seven days. Then on account of his pre-eminent

4 The translation of this passage as given in *IA.*, IV, 365-66 *viz.*, 'In Oḍivisa, in Bengal and the other five provinces of the east.........etc.' is wrong. This has been followed in *Gauḍarājamālā* (p. 21) and *Bāṅglār Itihās* (p. 162) by R. D. Banerji. The original German passage is:

"In den fünf östlichen Ländergebieten Bhangala,
Oḍiviça und den übrigen............"

5 "A shepherdess" according to Buston (p. 156).

qualifications the people elected him as a permanent king and gave him the name Gopāla (pp. 203-4)."

This story is a fine illustration of historical myths. The anarchy and turmoil in Bengal, due to the absence of any central political authority, and the election of Gopāla to the throne by the voice of the people, undoubtedly form the historical background against which the popular nursery-tale of a demoness devouring a king every night has been cleverly set. Such a story cannot be used as historical evidence except where, as in the present case, the kernel of historical fact is proved by independent evidence. By a further analysis of the story it may be possible to glean a few more facts about Gopāla.

According to the story Gopāla was born near Puṇḍravardhana i.e. in Varendra, although he became king of Bhaṅgala which undoubtedly stands for Vaṅgāla or Vaṅga. This offers a solution of what might otherwise have been a little riddle. For whereas in the *Rāmacarita*, Varendra is referred to as *janakabhūḥ* (fatherland) of the Pālas, the contemporary inscriptions call them Vaṅga-pati or rulers of Vaṅga and refer to Gauḍa and Vaṅga as separate kingdoms. Tāranātha also uses the name Varendra, as distinguished from Bhaṅgala.[6] It may thus be assumed that the birth-place of Gopāla was in Varendra but the throne which was offered to him was that of Vaṅgāla or Vaṅga.

The question naturally arises, what was the extent and political importance of the kingdom of Bhaṅgala about this time. According to Tāranātha, Bimalacandra, father of Govicandra, ruled over the three provinces Bhaṅgala, Kāmarūpa and Tirahuti i.e. Northern Bihar, Vaṅga or Vaṅgāla and lower Assam,[7] and presumably his two

6 Cf. footnote 13 below, examples (2) and (3).

7 Cf. fn. 13 below. As will be seen from the extract quoted at the end of that footnote, Tāranātha distinguishes Kāmarūpa from Hasama which no doubt stands for Assam. Kāmarūpa, therefore, probably denotes lower or western Assam valley.

successors ruled over the same territories. Then ensued the anarchy "in the five eastern provinces, Bhaṅgala, Oḍivisa and the rest", as has been referred to above. These five provinces were presumably Bhaṅgala, Kāmarūpa, Tirahuti, Oḍivisa and Varendra, the last being named as a province in the east in connection with Candragomin.[8] It would appear, therefore, that according to Tāranātha, Bhaṅgala was the leading power in the eastern group, ruling over Tirhut and Kāmarūpa and presumably also Gauḍa or western Bengal,[9] while Oḍivisa and Varendra were independent territories. This also follows from the account of political history given by Tāranātha in the earlier chapters of his work. He generally begins with a short description of the important kingdoms of the west, the east and the centre, and their rulers, and then gives a detailed account of their religious activities and of the noted Buddhist teachers that flourished during their reigns. In this enumeration Bhaṅgala is the only eastern kingdom to which reference is made and in one case we are told that Bālacandra, son of Siṃhacandra, driven from Bhaṅgala, ruled in Tirahuti.[10] According to Tāranātha, therefore, Bhaṅgala was the leading kingdom in the east, under the powerful Candra dynasty, till the death of Lalitacandra, the last ruler of the family. Then followed a complete political disintegration in Bhaṅgala and the other eastern countries. It was at this stage that Gopāla, a native of Varendra, came to occupy the throne of Bhaṅgala and restored order.

Tāranātha says that although Gopāla commenced his career as ruler of Bhaṅgala he conquered Magadha towards the close of his reign (p. 204). In order to understand this properly we must consider Tāranātha's account of the gradual growth of the Pāla empire under the successors of Gopāla. According to Tāranātha, Gopāla

8 Tar., p. 148.

9 As noted below, in f.n. 13. Tāranātha refers to Gauḍa as a part of Bhaṅgala.

10 Tar., p. 158.

ruled for 45 years and was succeeded after his death by Devapāla (p. 208) who conquered Varendra (p. 209). Devapāla died after a reign of 48 years and was succeeded by his son Rasapāla who ruled for 12 years (p. 214). The son of the latter was Dharmapāla who ruled for 64 years and subjugated Kāmarūpa, Tirahuti, Gauḍa and other countries so that his empire extended from the sea in the east to Delhi in the west, and from Jālandhara in the north to the Vindhya mountains in the south (pp. 216-17).

Tāranātha's list of successive Pāla kings is obviously wrong, as we know from the copper-plate grants of the Pālas that the true order of succession was Gopāla, his son Dharmapāla and the latter's son Devapāla. Rasapāla is otherwise unknown, unless we identify him with Rājyapāla who is referred to as the son and heir-apparent of Devapāla in the Monghyr copper-plate grant of the latter. But even then, according to the copper-plate grants, he never succeeded his father as king.

As regards the conquests of these kings it is difficult to understand how Gopāla could conquer Magadha, while Gauḍa and Varendra were yet unsubdued. Again, the Khalimpur copper-plate clearly shows that Dharmapāla ruled over Varendra and it must have, therefore, been conquered before the time of Devapāla.

In spite, however, of these obvious discrepancies, we must hold that Tāranātha had access to some historical texts, now lost to us, and did not draw purely upon his imagination. For the election of Gopāla, the long reign and extensive conquests of Dharmapāla and the existence of a ruler named Devapāla with a long reign are known to us today only from the inscriptions of the Pālas, to which Tāranātha had no access. Similarly his account of the Candra dynasty may have some foundation of truth as will be shown later. Evidently he gathered his information from certain texts, and either these were wrong in many details, or he misunderstood them. Any one of these causes or both might account for the distorted version

of the Pāla history which we meet with in his book. It is, therefore, unsafe to rely upon his statements except where they are corroborated by other evidences, though it would be wiser to have them in view in so far at least as they are not unintelligible in themselves nor contradicted by more positive testimony.

As an instance we may refer to his description of the extent of Dharmapāla's empire which is not perhaps very wide of the mark. Then, again, Tāranātha gives us some data by which we can approximately determine the dates of events he relates. Thus he says that Govicandra ascended the throne about the time when the great Buddhist teacher Dharmakīrti died. As Dharmakīrti was a disciple of Dharmapāla (p. 176) who was a professor in Nālanda at the time when the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsang visited it,[11] Govicandra's reign may be placed in the last quarter of the seventh century A.D. As his successor Lalitacandra ruled for many years, his death and the end of the Candra dynasty may be placed about 725 A.D. Then followed the period of anarchy during which 'Bhaṅgala was without a king for good many years' (p. 203). If we assign twenty-five years to this period the accession of Gopāla may be placed about the middle of the eighth century A.D.[12] This fairly agrees with the Pāla chronology derived from independent data.

It is needless to pursue any further the historical account of Tāranātha as we have epigraphic data for the later history of Bengal.

Geography

As already noted above, Tāranātha uses the term Bhaṅgala (and never Vaṅga) to indicate the province where the Candras and

11 For date of Dharmakīrti cf. I-tsing, *Records*, pp. lviii-lix, 181. He is said to be a contemporary of the Tibetan king Sroṅ-tsan-gam-po who reigned from A.D. 630 to 698 (V. A. Smith—*Early History*, p. 359).

12 Dr. M. Shahidullah, working on these data places the end of the reign of Govicandra at about A.D. 700. Nevertheless he places the accession of Gopāla

the Pālas ruled. That he meant by this term, in a general way, the whole of southern and eastern Bengal, admits of no doubt. This is clearly proved by numerous passages scattered in his work.[13] It is, however, more difficult to trace the origin of the name. It has been generally assumed that Bhaṅgala is derived from Vaṅga and is equivalent to Bengal.[14] The latter assumption is certainly wrong, as Bhaṅgala did not denote the whole of Bengal but only a part of it. As regards the other assumption, the question is complicated by the fact that we know of two geographical terms Vaṅga and Vaṅgāla, used at least as early as the tenth century A.D. to indicate territories comprised within Tāranātha's Bhaṅgala. Phonetically Bhaṅgala may be more readily derived from Vaṅgāla than Vaṅga.

That Vaṅga and Vaṅgāla originally denoted two different countries is now generally admitted.[15] But the name Vaṅgāla, and

about 715 A.D., as he ignores altogether the long reign of Lalitacandra (*IHQ.*, VII, 530 ff.).

13 Attention may be drawn to the following passages: (1) In Oḍivisa, Bhaṅgala, and Rāḍha (p. 72); (2) In the land Puṇḍravardhana, lying between Magadha and Bhaṅgala (p. 99); (3) In Bhaṅgala and in Varendra (p. 211); (4) Vimalacandra ruled over the three provinces Bhaṅgala, Kāmarūpa and Tirahuti (p. 172).

In one passage Gauḍa is referred to as a part of Bhaṅgala (p. 82) but it is not clear whether it means that Gauḍa was included within the kingdom of Bhaṅgala, or formed geographically a part of it. The former seems to be the intended meaning.

Tāranātha's geographical notion is clearly indicated in the following passage:

"Eastern India consists of three parts: Bhaṅgala and Oḍivisa belong to Aparāntaka and are called its eastern part. The north-eastern provinces Kāmarūpa, Tripura and Hasama are called Girivarta, adorned with mountains. Proceeding towards the east near the Northern Hills are the provinces Nangata, Pukham on the sea coast, Balgu etc., Rakhang, Hamsavati and the remaining parts of the kingdom of Munjang; further off are Campā, Kamboja and the rest. All these were called by the general name Koki (p. 262).

14 Cf. for example the translation of the passage quoted in f.n. 4 above.

15 The point was first noted by Dr. H. C. Raichaudhury (*Studies in Indian Antiquities*, pp. 188 ff.) More evidences have since then come to light to support this view (*Early History of Bengal* by P. L. Pal, p. v). Mr. R. C. Banerji has discussed the question at length and located the Vaṅgālas, whom he considers different from the Vaṅgas, to the east of the Brahmaputra river (*IC.*, II. 755).

not Vaṅga, seems gradually to have been applied to the whole of the modern province of Bengal, specially by the foreigners.[16] An inscription in Nepal[17] refers to the invasion of that kingdom in 1346 A.D. by Sultan Shamasuddin (Shamsuddin Ilyas) with a huge Vaṅgāla army (*sūratrāṇa-samasdino vaṅgāla-vahulair-balaiḥ*). Here Vaṅgāla could not possibly have been used in a restricted sense. The *Tarikh-i-Firuzshahi* also applies the name Bangālah to the whole province,[18] and so do Ibn Batūtah,[19] Ma-Huan[20] and other later writers.

The name Bangālah also occurs in a poem of Hafiz sent from Shiraz to Sultan Ghiasuddin who reigned in Bengal in the fourteenth century A.D. Here also the name is applicable to the province rather than to a small part of it.[21]

The evidence of Abul Fazl is both interesting and instructive on this point. "The original name of Bangāl", says he, "was Bang. Its former rulers raised mounds measuring ten yards in height and twenty in breadth throughout the province which were called *āl*. From this suffix the name took its rise and currency".[22] Whatever we might think of the ingenious explanation about the origin of the name Vaṅgāla, it is obvious that in Abul Fazl's time Vaṅgāla was the more commonly used name, and it was not only regarded as identical with Vaṅga but also derived from it.

The name Bengala or Bengale used by the early European writers[23] must also have been derived from Vaṅgāla, made familiar

16 The name Vaṅgāla is also met with in early literature. Cf. Bhusuku's verse in *Caryācaryaviniścaya* where both Vaṅgāla and Vaṅgālī are used (H. P. Sastri, *Bauddha Gān O Dohā*, p. 73).

17 *JBORS.*, vol. XXII, pp. 81 ff.

18 Raverty, *Tabakat-i-Nasiri*, p. 590, fn.

19 Tr. by Gibb, p. 267.

20 Ma-Huan calls it Pan-ko-lo (=Baṅgāla) *JRAS.*, 1895, (p. 529).

21 *Proc. ASB.*, 1870, p. 110.

22 Jarrett, *Ain-i-Akbari*, p. 120. Jarrett uses the term Bengal in his translation but the original has Vaṅgāla.

23 The Portuguese writers and Ralph Fitch call it Bengala; Bernier calls it Bengale.

by the Muslim writers, and the present name Bengal is only a contracted form of Bengala. How the name Vaṅgāla came to denote, at first Vaṅga, and then the whole of the modern province of Bengal, it is not easy to explain. But some light may be thrown on this important and interesting problem by locating the original kingdom and tracing its early history.

Mr. R. C. Banerji, as noted above, places the original kingdom of Vaṅgāla to the east of the Brahmaputra. His conclusion rests upon the assumption that Govindacandra of the Tirumalai Rock Inscription is identical with Gopicand. This identity, however, is open to serious doubts.

As we have seen above, Tāranātha refers to a king Govicandra of Bhaṅgala, and certain details given by him make it more probable that he is identical with king Gopicandra of Indian legends.[24] But this is not material for our present purpose. What is more important is that it was the kingdom of this Govicandra which came into possession of Gopāla. It may, therefore, be presumed that the original kingdom of the Pālas is also to be located in the region where Govicandra ruled.

Now Tāranātha mentions in another work[25] that Chāṭigrāma, i.e. Chittagong, was the capital of Gopicandra, or at least quite close to it. There is no doubt that this Gopicandra is the same person as Govicandra king of Bhaṅgala mentioned by him in his History of

24 In a Hindusthani version of the ballad Gopicand is said to be the sister's son of Bharthāri. Tāranātha also says that the sister of Bharthāri, a member of the Mālava royal family, was the mother of Govicandra (p. 195). Besides, Jalandhari is named as the spiritual preceptor of Govicandra both by Tāranātha as well as in the popular ballads. Cf. al·o f.n. 26.

25 *Bkah-babs-bdun* or the Book of the Seven Mystic Revelations. The passage is quoted by Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Das in *JASB.*, 1898, p. 23. The references have been verified by Pandit Vidhusekhara Sastri. Cf. also Grunwedel, *Edelsteinmine* (p. 62) which is a German translation of this work.

Buddhism.[26] This would mean that according to Tāranātha, the capital of Bhaṅgala, and therefore also of Gopāla at least at the beginning of his reign, must have been either Chittagong or a place quite close to it.

If we admit this we have to attach the greatest importance to the city of Bengala referred to by early European writers. We have already seen that Bengala is the European corruption of Vaṅgāla, and if there was actually a city of this name near Chittagong which was referred to in later works as the capital of Vaṅgāla, or very near it, we may not unreasonably conclude that this city was the capital of Vaṅgāla and gave its name to the kingdom, or *vice versa*, and that in either case the old kingdom of Vaṅgāla must be located in the region round the city.[27]

As there has been some controversy over the city of Bengala we have to review the question at some length. In the foreign accounts of India of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, particularly those of the Portuguese, frequent reference is made to the 'city of Bengala'. Varthema (1510) speaks of taking his route to this city of Bengala though it is doubtful whether he actually went there. Duarte de Barbosa, one of the earilest Portuguese writers on Indian Geography, says that the (Bay of) Bengal is "a gulf which enters towards the north and at its inner extremity there is a very great city inhabited by Moors which is called Bengala, with a very

26 The names of the father and maternal uncle of both Govicandra and Gopicandra are the same.

27 Since my article was written I found that Dr. H. C. Raichaudhury long ago made this suggestion tentatively in a Bengali article (reprinted in *Studies in Indian Antiquities*, (1932), pp. 184 ff.). But in the absence of any corroborative evidence such as is furnished by Tāranātha's account it has not evidently drawn much attention so far. Mr. J. N. Gupta, who has quoted the passage in his second edition of *Vikrampurer Itihās*, just published, says that the city of Bengala is indicated in a map in the *Travels of Cornelius Le Bruyan* (published in 1701 A.D.) a copy of which he possesses (p. 215). Dr. H. C. Raichaudhury also states that 'Bengala' is shown in the map drawn by Gastaldi in 1651 A.D.

good harbour". Ovington (1696) remarks: "Teixeira and generally the Portuguese writers reckon that (Chatigam) as a city of Bengala; and not only so, but place the city of Bengala itself upon the same coast, more south than Chatigam".[28] Purchas says in his *Pilgrims* that "Gauro (Gauḍa), the seat royall and Bengala are faire cities". Rennell also mentions the town as being given "in some ancient maps and books of travels".[29]

In spite of all these references some writers hold that there was never any city of Bengala.[30] Even Blochmann subscribed to this view.[31] The main ground for his conclusion is that the town is not mentioned by the Muhammadan historians nor by Ibn Batūtah and many European travellers. This negative evidence cannot, however, be regarded as of much value in the face of express references to the city of Bengala mentioned above. On the other hand, I believe that the existence of a city called Bangāla may be reasonably inferred from the statements of Ibn Batūtah. He refers to Bangāla as a vast country (p. 267).[32] But in course of his description of the kingdom he says that 'Fakhr-ud-din revolted in Sudkawan and Bangāla' (p. 268). Further he remarks that "the Blue River is used by travellers to Bangāla and Laknawti" (p. 271). The use of Bangāla along with the names of two well-known cities of Bengal, viz., Saptagrām and Lakṣmaṇāvatī (Gauḍa) indicates that Bangāla in the last two expressions indicates a city of importance.

28 The above account is based on *History of the Portuguese in Bengal* by J. J. A. Campos, pp. 75-76.

29 *JASB.*, 1873, p. 233. Cf. also f.n. 27.

30 Ovington remarks: "A late French Geographer (Baudrand) has put Bengala into his Catalogue of imaginary Cities, and such as have no real Existence in the world; but I wish he had given us a more particular account of his Reasons" (J. Ovington, *A voyage to Suratt in the year 1689*, London 1696, p. 534.). (The passage is quoted in *Bengal Past and Present*, vol. XIII, p. 262).

31 *JASB.*, 1873, p. 233.

32 The pages refer to the translation of Ibn Batūtah's Travels by Gibb.

As regards the location of the city of Bengala, opinions vary between the city of Chittagong and Dianga, opposite it, on the southern bank of the river Karnaphuli. Lord Stanley points out that where Ortelius places Bengala, Hommanus places Chatigam or Chittagong. Yule also concludes from a chart of 1743 in Dalrymple that "Chittagong seems to have been the city of Bengala."[33] Ovington, however, as noted above, remarks that the city of Bengala was different from Chittagong, and to the south of it.[34] "In Blaev's map and the chart of the empire of the Grand Mogul by N. Sausson the city of Bengala is placed on the southern bank of the Karnaphuli more or less where Van den Broucke places Dianga. Vignorla in a map of 1683 assigns the same position to the city of Bengala. But in an old Portuguese map in Thevenot the city of Bengala is placed above Xatigan (Chittagong) or probably it is meant to be Chittagong itself."[35] The same appears to be the case in a map accompanying the Travels of Bernier in the edition published at Amsterdam in 1672.[36] In view of all these I feel inclined to agree with Hosten[37] that Dianga, opposite Chittagong, represents the

33 The views of Lord Stanley and Yule are taken from Campos, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

34 Campos observes: "Ovington, it must be remarked, reckons Chatigam or Chittagong as the City of Bengala" (*op. cit.*, p. 77). This is not correct. As the quotation in the text will show, Ovington regards Chatigam as a "city of Bengala" i.e. a city in the kingdom of Bengal, but immediately after distinguishes it from "the city of Bengala" which lay to the south of Chatigam.

35 Campos, *op. cit.*, p. 77. Blochmann, *JASB.*, 1873, p. 233.

36 *Bernier's Travels* (A. Constable, 1891)—Map facing p. 454.

37 *Bengal Past and Present*, vol. XIII. (Nos. 25-26), p. 262. Campos on the other hand regards Chittagong as the real City of Bengala (*op. cit.*, p. 77). Campos argues that "Dianga could not be the city of Bengala as it really formed a part of the kingdom of Arakan" (*op. cit.*, p. 77). But then, according to Ralph Fitch and *Ain-i-Akbari* Chittagong also was often in the possession of the king of Arakan (Foster, *Early Travels in India*, p. 26, Jarrett, *Ain-i-Akbari*, Tr. p. 119).

For an account of Dianga by Hosten Cf. *Bengal Past and Present*, vol. XIII, pp. 261-2. Hosten identifies it with the place now called Bandar, on the left bank and almost at the mouth of the Karnaphuli river. Fr. Fernandes in his letter written from Dianga on 22nd December 1599 calls Dianga a town in the port of Chittagong

site of the city of Bengala, though the probability is that originally both were included in the ancient city of that name and hence came to be called as such. But this point is not very material for our present purpose. Whether the city of Bengala or Vaṅgāla was Chittagong or Dianga or included both, it is a reasonable conclusion that the original kingdom of Vaṅgāla must be located in this region.

This identification also solves another interesting historical problem. It is well-known that in the account of India written by the Arab merchant Sulaiman about 851 A.D. reference is made to three important and rival powers *viz.*, the Juzr, the Balharās, and Rahma. The first two refer to the Pratīhāras and the Rāṣṭrakūṭas, and there has never been any doubt that the third refers to the Pālas, though the term Rahma and its connection with the Pālas could not be ascertained.[38] Now if we assume that the original kingdom of the Pālas was in the region round Chittagong we get a satisfactory explanation why the Pālas were called Rahma.

Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Das observed long ago that the country to the south of Tripura and north of Rakham (Arakan) was called Ramma (Sanskrit *Ramya*).[39] I have not been able to trace the evidence on which this statement is based. The passage in *Dpag-bsam-bjon-bzang*, on which S. C. Das presumably relies, merely includes Ramma in a list of countries surrounding Jambudvīpa.[40]

(Campos, *op. cit.*, p. 77). According to Hosten, Dianga was the first Portuguese settlement on the Gulf of Bengal and called by them Porto Grande, (*op. cit.*, p. 262). Campos denies this (*op. cit.*, p. 76). Blochmann identified Dianga with the Dakhindanga or the Brahmandanga, both on the Sangu river, south of Chittagong (*JASB.*, 1893, p. 233).

38 For a recent discussion of the whole question cf. S. H. Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Moslem History* (1939), pp. 4 ff. Hodivala's view that Rahma is a mistake for Dharma and that it stands for the kingdom of Dharmapāla, was suggested to me long ago by my friend Dr. Shahidullah. But this is improbable as the term continued in use long after Dharmapāla's death, and was later used to denote the kingdom of Pegu.

39 *JASB.*, 1898, p. 24.

40 For this information I am indebted to Pandit Vidhusekhara Sastri who, in a letter dated 20. 7. 38, has sent me the folliwng translation of the passage:

Fortunately, however, the statement of S. C. Das is confirmed by the accounts of the foreign travellers. Ralph Fitch, who visited India between 1583 and 1591 A.D., refers to a kingdom of Rame situated between Chittagong and Arakan, all three being subject to the same king.[41] A more detailed account is given by Manrique who visited the city of Ramu on July 5, 1630 on his way from Dianga to Arakan. It was then the seat of a governor of the king of Arakan who was at the head of the Chancery of Arakan, all Farmans having to be endorsed by him. Regarding the location of Ramu, Rev. Hosten supplies the following information in course of his annotation of the travels of Manrique: "Ramu must have been reached, not by the sea, but by the network of channels which connected it with Dianga. The Bengal Survey Map, (Sheet no. 425 1″ = 1 mile) identifies Ramu with Cox's Bazar. L. S. S. O'Malley says it is a village in the Cox's Bazar, on the continuation of the Arakan Road. It is a police outpost and an important market serving the south of the district. The map in O'Malley's *Gazetteer of Chittagong* shows Ramu east of Umkhali, and that seems to be the place visited by Manrique."[42]

It is permissible to infer that this Ramu, Rame or Ramya represents the kingdom of Rahma referred to by the Arabs.[43] It is perhaps because the home-kingdom of the Pālas was situated in this region that they designated them by this term. It is significant that later the term Rahma denoted the kingdom of Pegu, presu-

"Jambudvīpa is surrounded by thousands of small countries—Tibet, China, Khotan, Khasa, Ramma, Tokhar, etc".

41 Foster, *Early Travels in India*, (Oxford University Press, 1921), p. 26, fn. 5.

42 *Bengal Past and Present*, vol. XIII, pp. 229 ff., 268.

43 Yule suggested long ago the identification of Rahmi (or Ruhmi) of the Arab writers with "Ramu, which lies half-way between Chittagong and Akyab, a few miles east of Cox's Bazar in Arakan". *Travels of Marco Polo*, vol. II, p. 100). But he could not explain the connection between the Pālas and Ramu.

mably because it then formed a part of the later kingdom.[44] As Ramu and Vaṅgāla were on the sea-coast the assumption would further explain why the Pāla family was known as Samudra-kula i.e. family of the sea.[45]

Although the evidence cannot be regarded as conclusive, we should not, at the present state of our knowledge, ignore altogether the indications furnished by these data regarding the home-territory of the Pālas. It must be mentioned in this connection that even as late as the sixteenth century A.D. powerful kingdoms flourished in this region. We learn from *Ain-i-Akbari* that the king of Tippera had a force of 200,000 foot-men and a thousand elephants.[46] The kingdom of Arakan is also said to be a considerable tract, including the port of Chittagong.[47] The existence of the important kingdom of Pateikkara in this region during the eleventh and twelfth centuries A.D. is testified to by the Burmese chronicles and the Mainamati copper-plate of Raṇavaṅkamalla.[48] Further, it has been noted above, that according to Tāranātha a long line of kings, whose names ended in Candra, ruled in Bhaṅgala, from about the sixth century A.D. On the other hand we know from inscriptions, coins, and Burmese chronicles that a long line of kings with names ending in Candra ruled in the Arakan region before the tenth century A.D.[49] This indirectly supports the state-

44 Ferrand, *Relations de voyages et textes Geographiques Arabes, Persans et Turks relatifs a l'Extreme-Orient*, pp. 29, 36, 43 (fn. 2).

45 *Rāmacarita*, I. v. 4. Commentary.

46 Jarrett's Transl. p. 117.

47 *Ibid.*, p. 119.

48 *IHQ.*, vol. IX, pp. 284-5.

49 The traditional account of the nine Candra kings of Arakan ruling from A.D. 788 to 957, as preserved in the later chronicles, is given by Phayre in his *History of Burma* (p. 45). For the names of these kings and an account of the coins, cf. Phayre, 'Coins of Arakan, of Pegu, and of Burma' (*Numismata Orientalia*), pp. 43, 28-9. A brief account of the inscriptions found on the platform of the Shitthaung temple at Mrohaung is given on pp. 146-147 of the *Annual Report of the Archæological Survey of India* (1925-6). The names of eighteen royal predecessors of Ānandacandra are given in one inscription. The first king is Bālacandra, a name also occurring in Tāranātha's account. According to Mr. Hirananda Sastri

ment of Tāranātha and the location of Vaṅgāla in the Chittagong-Arakan region.

Now if we assume that the Pālas originally ruled over Vaṅgāla and gradually spread their power and authority over the rest of Bengal, it is not difficult to believe that their long and glorious reign is mainly responsible for the application of the name of their home-territory to the whole of the province.[50] It would appear from Tāranātha's account that in the first stage of this extension, Vaṅgāla denoted only the territories formerly comprised within Vaṅga and Vaṅgāla. The rule of the Pālas and Candras over this region and the similarity of the two names probably facilitated this earlier extended connotation. Later, the process continued, and perhaps thanks to the Pālas, Vaṅgāla came to denote the whole of the modern province of Bengal.

Such a phenomenon is, of course, not unknown and the name Gauḍa came at one time to be applied to whole of Bengal for similar

the oldest inscription is written in characters resembling those of the late Gupta script. The inscription recording the names of the Candra kings, mentioned above, is said to be 'many centuries older' than the temple which was built in the 16th cent. A.D.

The name Priticandra is found both on the coins as well as in the inscriptions. The name read by Phayre on the coin as Vammacandra is clearly Dhammacandra. The other name that can be read on the coins is Vīracandra. The alphabets on these coins are to be referred to the seventh or eighth century A.D. if not earlier.

50 The *Jāmi'-ul-Twarikh* of Fakir Muhammad places Bhāṭi (the coast strip from the Hughly to the Meghna; vide *JASB.*, 1873, p. 226) to the west of Baṅgāla. This supports the location of Vaṅgāla proposed in this paper. The same book also states that the territory which in after times was styled Bangālah, according to such writers as have written about it, consisted of Bihar, Gauḍa or Gaur Lakhanawati, Bang and Jajnagar (Orissa). (Raverty, *Tabakat-i-Nasiri*, English Transl., p. 592 f.n.). Thus practically the whole of the Pāla kingdom was called Bāṅgāla. It is evident from this passage as well as another in Afif's *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi* which refers to Bang and Baṅgāla (Bib. Ind. Edition, p. 114, f.n. 2) that the Muslim writers knew the name Baṅg but distinguished it from Vaṅgāla, and used it only to denote a part of Bengal, roughly Vaṅga. In *Tabakat-i-Nasiri* also Bang is used in this limited sense (*Ibid.*, p. 587) and neither Baṅgāla nor any other name indicating the whole province of Bengal is mentioned therein.

reasons. The process of Vaṅgāl-isation of the whole province must also have been very gradual. The name Vaṅga was ancient and sanctified by sacred texts, and hence its use did not altogether die out at least in literary documents. The similarity of the name Vaṅga and Vaṅgāla also often led to confusion, and at times, to the indiscriminate use of either for the other or the two combined. The important sea-port of Vaṅgāla (Bengala) may also have some influence in giving currency to the designation of the whole province by that name. In any case, gradually the name Vaṅgāla superseded Vaṅga in ordinary use and came to be the name of the province.

It is difficult to say how long the old kingdom of Vaṅgāla continued as a separate unit. For when we find references to a kingdom under this name we cannot always be certain whether it refers to the original kingdom or is used in its later meaning, denoting the whole province. Marco Polo's reference to Bangala (1290 A.D.) is an instance to the point. This Bangala is generally taken to refer to the province of Bengal as a whole. But his statements that it is "tolerably close to India"[51] and that Mien (Burma) and Bangala were under the same king,[52] rather point to the smaller province of Vaṅgāla. For the province of Bengal (or even old Vaṅga) could hardly be regarded as outside India, or at any time within the political jurisdiction of Burma. But both of these would be truly applicable to the Arakan-Chittagong region. For, the territories beyond the Brahmaputra and the Meghna rivers have not unoften been regarded as outside India proper, and we have reliable evidence that as early as the eleventh century A.D., the king of Burma established his authority over Arakan, and his kingdom was extended up to the Tippera district.[53] It is therefore not necessary to assume, with Yule, that Marco Polo confounded Bengal with Pegu.[54]

51 Yule, *Marco Polo*, vol. II, p. 97. 52 *Ibid.*, p. 81.
53 *Arch. Surv. Report, Burma 1923*, p. 31. Phayre, *History of Burma*, p. 37.
54 Yule, *Marco Polo*, vol. II, p. 82.

Even as late as the fifteenth century A.D. Nayacandra Suri mentions Vaṅga and Vaṅgāla side by side and presumably as names of two separate territorial units.[55] Unless this was due to a confusion of the author it may be regarded as an evidence that Vaṅgāla existed in his time as a separate province. This is quite probable, as Bengala, as noted above, is shown in the maps of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries A.D. The epithet Bāṅgāl, applied even today by the inhabitants of Western Bengal to those hailing from the eastern part of the province, is probably a reminiscence of the old province of Vaṅgāla. But we have no positive evidence of its existence as a separate territorial unit after the fifteenth century.

In conclusion a few words may be said regarding the origin of the name Vaṅgāla. Abul Fazl's explanation has been noted above. Modern writers derive it from Vaṅgālaya (i.e. Vaṅga + ālaya or home of Vaṅga).[56] These views rest upon the supposition that Vaṅga and Vaṅgāla are synonyms, both denoting the same country. As this assumption has been proved to be erroneous we need not seriously consider these views.

At the same time the proximity of the two localities and the resemblance of the names suggest that the name Vaṅgāla was derived from Vaṅga. It is important in this connection to bear in mind that some ancient Sanskrit texts mention side by side Vaṅga and Upa-Vaṅga as the names of two different but neighbouring provinces. It may be easily surmised that Vaṅga-Upavaṅga of old days correspond to Vaṅga-Vaṅgāla of later days. Now Upa-Vaṅga has been undoubtedly formed from Vaṅga by the addition of prefix *Upa*. According to rules of Sanskrit Grammar *Upa*, prefixed to nouns, "expresses direction towards, nearness, resemblance, relationship, contiguity in space, number, time, degree etc., but generally involving the idea of subordination or inferiority." Upa-Vaṅga

55 In Hammira Mahākāvya. Cf. *Ind. Ant.*, 1879, p. 58.
56 Grierson, *Linguistic Survey of India*, vol. V, part I, p. 11.

perhaps denoted one or more of these senses, specially nearness and inferiority. In any case the mention of Vaṅga and Upa-Vaṅga in old literature shows that from early times there were two provinces side by side which were regarded as Vaṅga Major, and Vaṅga Minor. The same condition seems to be reflected in the later nomenclature Vaṅga and Vaṅgāla.

The term Vaṅgāla seems to have replaced the Sanskritic Upa-Vaṅga by adding the termination *āla,* in place of the prefix *upa.* This *āla* may be derived from *āli,* as Abul Fazl supposes, but then it must have been used in a figurative sense, to denote that the territory called Vaṅgāla was regarded as the boundary wall or embankment of Vaṅga. But it is not necessary to speculate on these hypotheses. It is enough for our present purpose to know that probably Vaṅgāla was derived from Vaṅga and stood in the same relation to it, both in geographical position and literary meaning, as Upa-Vaṅga.

The discussion of Tāranātha's account has led us too far from the main subject. But several interesting facts have emerged from it—facts which have not hitherto received the attention they deserve. First, that the name Vaṅgāla, and not Vaṅga, came to be the general name of the province. Secondly, that Vaṅgāla originally denoted a small kingdom round modern Chittagong, and had as its capital the famous sea-port Vaṅgāla, called by the Europeans Bengala, which was either Chittagong or a place in its immediate neighbourhood. Finally, the modern name Bengal or Vāṅgālā (Vāṅgālī) is derived from Vaṅgāla and not Vaṅga.

RAMESH CHANDRA MAJUMDAR

The Lalitavistara and Sarvāstivāda

The position of the *Lalitavistara-sūtra* in its relation to Pāli Buddhism has been variously judged. The work was described by Rhys Davids some fifty years ago as, "a poem of unknown date and authorship, but probably composed in Nepal, and by some Buddhist poet who lived sometime between six hundred and a thousand years after the birth of the Buddha."[1] This illustrates the extraordinary misconceptions then prevailing, as well as the attitude of the Pāli school, which sought to reconstruct the early history of Buddhism from Pāli sources alone. But the *Lalitavistara* is not a poem, there is no probability that it was composed in Nepal, and it contains passages as old as anything in Pāli.

It was against this attitude of the Pāli scholars that the late L. de La Vallée Poussin protested in his *Buddhisme, études et matériaux* (pp. 2-4) where he wrote:

> "Pre-occupied in establishing the history of Buddhism and in starting by fixing its origin, the orientalists abandon the path so intelligently opened up by Burnouf; they relinquish the examination of the Northern sources, and take no account of them, they attach themselves passionately to the exegesis of the Southern Scriptures, which in appearance are more archaic and better documented. The results that these labours give us are of the highest importance, both for the history of religions in general as well as for that of Buddhist and Indian ideas. Oldenberg's book is a perfect exposition: Pāli Buddhism cannot be better described, its intellectual and moral factors more artistically demonstrated, or a more precise exposition given of the idea that a Singhalese doctor makes of his religion and his destiny. Oldenberg's error was to entitle his book, *Buddha, his life, his doctrine and his community*. He should have added, 'according to Pāli sources and the principles of the Singhalese Church."

And he went on:

> "Far from giving us the key to the origin of Buddhism and the understanding of its historical evolution, the examination of the canon and the Pāli

1 *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 197.

chronicles gives us information about only one of the sects of the Southern school. Further, these accounts have an absolute value only for an epoch relatively late in the history of this Church. To describe the fortunes of the community, the constitution of the Saṅgha, the formation of the Scriptures, and the life of the Master according to documents which date from the first or the fourth century of our era is an illusory undertaking. Consecrated by the faith and piety of the schools, learnedly elaborated, proud of a regularity (suspect, although exaggerated by certain authors), the Pāli canon boasts of an authenticity of little probability. Like the Buddhist monks of naïve piety and imperfect critical sense European scholars have not hesitated to admit this authenticity. It was only at a recent epoch that the books were fixed in writing; but does not India offer us in the fastidious preservation of the Vedas a marvellous example of memory and fidelity? This pious hypothesis does not hold against the facts."

These incisive words of the industrious scholar whose loss we are still deploring are not yet obsolete. They still stand as a protest against the idea that by excising the marvellous and the contradictory in the accounts of the Pāli school it is possible to arrive at a sound historical basis. It may be here remarked that the recent investigations of Mrs. Rhys Davids have been equally destructive of the theories of Oldenberg and T. W. Rhys Davids, though without advancing on the lines suggested by La Vallée Poussin.

Although this article is concerned with the doctrinal relations of the *Lalitạ-vistara* with the Sarvāstivāda school, it is necessary to say something about the structure of the sūtra. When the Sanskrit text was first published (1877-8) it was found to contain many verse passages embedded in the prose. The question was raised as to which was the older, the prose or the verse; but it was a futile proceeding to try and solve the problem by setting up rival theories of the structure of the sūtra without looking for the sources of the verse passages. It can now be seen that many come from the canon of the Sarvāstivādins. On the other hand, when we find a passage in *Śārdūlavikrīḍita* metre, it suggests a very late period of literary activity. But there is now no doubt that not only many of the verses but also many of the prose passages are textually taken from the

Sarvāstivādin scriptures. That there was such a canon was not even recognized when Childers declared, "the North Buddhist books have no claim to originality, but are partly adaptations of the Pāli sacred books, made several centuries after Gautama's time, and partly late outgrowths of Buddhism exhibiting the religion in an extraordinary state of corruption and travesty."[2]

The real facts have been stated by La Vallée Poussin. It should be almost self-evident that the most widely-spread group of schools in India, the Sarvāstivādins, a group that continued to flourish widely long after the Pāli school had been cut off from its Indian home, should have had a canon of its own. Although not entirely identical with the Pāli, the structure of the Āgamas and much of the wording is the same. As La Vallée Poussin said, "We speak in the singular of the canon. It is not doubtful that a considerable body of scriptures served as basis for the two canons of Sthavirian sects, the canon in the Pali language and the Sanskrit canon of the Sarvāstivādins. This body of scriptures may be referred to under the name of the Buddhist canon."[3] It is from the Sarvāstivādin source that the ancient passages both prose and verse, in the *Lalita-vistara* were taken. How the whole sūtra was compiled will need more detailed investigation. Here we have only to consider how the Mahāyāna compiler or compilers of the *Lalita-vistara* dealt with the doctrinal matters in the passages incorporated.

Although the metaphysical doctrines of Mahāyāna are not ignored, the whole interest is concentrated on the nature of a Bodhisattva and his attainment of Buddhahood, when he becomes an omniscient Tathāgata. The Bodhisattva-doctrine itself was not new, for all the schools recognized it, as well as the doctrine of a Tathāgata with his ten powers. But while according to the older doctrine the

2 Childers' *Dictionary, preface,* p. xii.

3 *Le dozme et la philosophie du Bouddhisme,* p. 97.

Bodhisattva in his last birth was a being who still had to learn the painful facts of old age, sickness, and death, in Mahāyāna he knew the essential doctrines already and had acquired all the qualities of a Buddha except those peculiar to a Tathāgata. At the very beginning of the actual sūtra (ch. 2) we are told how the Bodhisattva was dwelling in the excellent abode of Tuṣita. Then follow over four pages of epithets beginning thus:

> "Adored by adorable ones, having obtained his *abhiṣeka*, praised, lauded, and extolled by hundreds of thousands of gods, having obtained the *abhiṣeka* produced from his vow, having acquired the full and purified buddha-knowledge due to all the buddha-qualities, having won the highest perfection of skill in means, knowing the brahma-states of great friendliness, compassion, joy, and equanimity, having reached the peak of fulfilment of all the bodhipakṣika-dharmas consisting of the stations of mindfulness, the right efforts, the bases of psychic power, the faculties, the powers, the parts of enlightenment, and the way, having his body adorned with the marks and minor marks due to the accumulation of unmeasured merit." (*Lal.* p. 8).

Nor were these attainments lying dormant, for we are told that while the Bodhisattva was in his seraglio,

> "He was not deprived of hearing the doctrine, or deprived of meditating on the doctrine. Why was that: It was because the Bodhisattva had long shown reverence for the doctrines and reciters of the doctrine, he was eagerly earnest for the doctrine, delighting in the doctrine, unwearied in investigating the doctrine, exceedingly liberal in bestowing the doctrine, teaching it without reward, ungrudging in the gift of the doctrine, not having the closed fist of a teacher." (*Lal.* p. 215).

Yet the narrative retains the story as told in all schools, and when the Bodhisattva acts like an ordinary man of the world, it is repeatedly said that this is due to *lokānuvartanakriyādharmatā*, the rule of acting in accordance with the practice of the world. In the same way, when as an infant he was being taken to the temple, he knew that it was unnecessary as he was *devātideva*, but he consented to go "in accordance with the custom of the world."

When in the older story he first learns the dark facts of human life, he is distressed and returns to his palace in agitation of heart.

The *Lalita-vistara* retains the accounts of his asking what an old man, a sick man and the others were, but adds the words, *jānann-eva,* although he knew, for he was not really an ignorant youth, but a Bodhisattva already understanding the reality of existence, and he asked in accordance with the *dharmatā*, the rule of action followed by all Bodhisattvas.

These are instances of direct modification of the story, but the latter portion of the Sūtra gives examples of a different way of expressing the special teaching introduced into the narrative. The traditional course of events remains unchanged. The contest with Māra is recounted with the addition of much mythological detail, then the attainment of the four dhyānas, the divine eye, the remembrance of the former births, the chain of causation and the destruction of the āsravas, all given in the words of the older sūtras. The events at the Bodhi tree follow, the journey to Benares, and the first sermon. Most of the essential narrative is given in the words of the older texts and the Mahāyāna portions are distinct insertions. These display what may be called devotional Mahāyāna, for although *śūnyatā* and such Mahāyāna doctrines are taken for granted, no attempt is made to emphasise them or expound them. When the Bodhisattva is going to the Bodhi tree Brahmā Sahāmpati informs the gods, and his speech consists of a repetition of the Bodhisattva's achievements.

It might have been thought that after the recital of the chain of causation some explanation of the formula in the style of Nāgārjuna would have been given, but what follows is chiefly a series of *stutis* by various gods. In one of them Buddha replies, and gives a verse account of his enlightenment, but the nearest approach to any Mahāyāna metaphysics is where he says he has attained by enlightenment the void of the world (*jagacchūnyam*), which arises from the chain of causation, and which is like a mirage or a city of Gandharvas. That the standpoint is Mahāyāna can be seen from the

use of certain terms, such as *dharmatathatā, bhūtakoṭi, tathāgata-garbha,* and *śūnya.* Even *māyā* occurs, but in the sense of "deceit, and it merely illustrates the dependence on Sarvāstivāda, in this case on the Abhidharma.[4] The terms occur along with *mātsarya* and *īrṣyā,* and they also occur together in the Sarvāstivādin list of upa-kleśas, and here are mentioned among the forest of vices (*kleśāraṇya*) which Buddha had cut off.

The additions to the first sermon are more extensive, but still without any tendency to develop the doctrine. It is followed by a versified version of the chain of causation addressed to *Kauṇḍinya,* the first of the five disciples. Then Maitreya, one of the Bodhisattvas present asks Buddha for the sake of the Bodhisattvas present to expound how the Wheel of the Doctrine has been turned. But no exposition is given. What follows is little more than a string of epithets. Buddha replies;

> "Profound, Maitreya, is the Wheel, for it cannot be acquired by grasping; hard to perceive is the Wheel through the disappearance of duality........."

This list then passes into a description of the Tathāgata:

> "Even so, Maitreya has the Wheel of the Doctrine been turned by the Tathāgata; through the turning of which he is called Tathāgata; he is called fully enlightened Buddha; he is called Svayambhū; he is called Dharmasvāmī; he is called Nāyaka; he is called Vināyaka; he is called Pariṇāyaka; he is called Sārthavāha........."

This extraordinary list continues for over fourteen pages, and this, Buddha tells Maitreya, is the turning of the Wheel and a summary exposition of the virtues of the Tathāgata. If explained at length the Tathāgata might expound for a kalpa or the rest of a kalpa. Of real explanation there is nothing, although in a poem immediately following the turning of the Wheel is said to be *anutpādam.* This is the very word which forms the basis of the system of *Nāgārjuna* in his *Madhyamakārikās.* There can be little

4 *Lal.,* p. 486. *Māyā* is translated 'esprit de deception' by La Vallée Poussin in his translation of the *Abhidharmakośa,* vol. I, bk. ii, § 27. Cf. *Mahāvyutpatti,* 104.

doubt that this avoidance of points of difference and metaphysical subjects of dispute is due to the fact that the sūtra is intended for lay people. The compilers have aimed at harmonising the old accounts with the more exalted conception of the Bodhisattva. There is one place where a severe judgment is passed on the holders of other views. In the account of the Bodhisattva's passing from the Tuṣita heaven and being conceived Ānanda expresses his wonder, and Buddha replies that in the future there will be some who will disbelieve that the Bodhisattva passed through the processes of conception and birth. But those who reject the excellent sūtra, whether monks or lay people, will be hurled at death into the hell of Avīcī. Faith is needed, and Buddha illustrates by a parable:

> "It is as if, Ānanda, a certain man had a son, and the man was of fair speech, received presents, and had many friends. The son, when his father died, was not left desolate, but was well received by his father's friends. Even so, Ānanda, any of those who shall believe in me I receive as my friends—those who have taken refuge in me. The Tathāgata has many friends, and these friends of the Tathāgata, truth-speakers, not speakers of falsehood, I hand on. They that are truth-speakers are friends of the Tathāgata, the Arhats and perfect Buddhas of the future. Faith should be practised. Herein this is what I make you to understand."

But the basis of the faith has been changed. The sport, *lalita*, of the Bodhisattva is not merely his sport in the seraglio, but all the acts which as Bodhisattva he had to perform. His fight with Māra is expressly said to be done in sport, and finally the whole sūtra is said to be played (*vikrīḍita*) by the great Bodhisattva.

E. J. Thomas

Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivādin

Brāhmanic literature contrasts quite usually *śruti* to *smṛti*. The former term includes the revealed texts (Veda and Vedāṅga); while the latter the tradition contained in the Upaveda. Another classification, found in some late works, has been examined by L. Feer.[1] It is on the one hand *adṛṣṭārtha*, which includes Veda, Vedāṅga, philosophical systems, jurisprudence; and on the other, *dṛṣṭārtha* which refers to the Upaveda, that is to say what consituted formerly the *smṛti*. The notion of *dṛṣṭa*, what is "seen" or known through experience, has thus encroached upon that of *smṛti*. At first sight, it seems that the distinction between what is founded or what is not founded upon experience has replaced the former distinction between Tradition and Revelation.

This change must probably be ascribed to a novel theory of knowledge. The materialists used to put perception (*pratyakṣa*) at the source of knowledge, and denied *śruti*, intuition, any value. Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is thus opposed to intuition (*śruti*): and, in the same way, *dṛṣṭa* to *adṛṣṭa*. Finally, what we find in the classification of knowledge by *adṛṣṭārtha* and *dṛṣṭārtha*, is the contrast between *śruti* and *pratyakṣa*. The substitution of those two terms for the former categories named *śruti* and *smṛti* shows the progress of philosophical speculation. It throws light, moreover, on a part of the Buddhist terminology and, consequently, on some problems of religious and literary history.

In Buddhist thought the notion of *śruti* is far more important than is generally believed. It explains the frequently used term of *bahuśruta*, rendered literally in Chinese by *to-wen*, "who has much

1 *Trente deux récits du trône*, Intro., p. xxii-xxviii.

heard." The initial formula of the sūtra: *evaṃ mayā śrutam* not only alludes to the promulgation of the sacred texts by Ānanda when the First Council was held, but also indicates that those texts were revealed and that the whole of them constitutes the *śruti.*[2] And, just as *śruta* is opposed to *dṛṣṭa* or *śruti* to *pratyakṣa,* the former term implied, as compared to the latter, a knowledge of superior quality, *śruti* is opposed to *dṛṣṭi* in the Buddhist vocabulary. It seems easier now to understand why Pali *diṭṭhi* "view, opinion" is so frequently used deprecatingly with the meaning of "ill-founded or false opinion." When the word is used in good sense, it is necessary to insist upon the adjective *sammā* as in *sammā diṭṭhi;* this expression shows that, formerly, *diṭṭhi* must have been given a neutral and very general sense; the interpretation "false view" is a secondary one.

The contrast *śruti/dṛṣṭi* allows perhaps to explain two obscure terms which hold an important place in the controversies among the Buddhist sects. Masuda's work on the Vasumitra treatise[3] relates some traditions which might induce us to consider the Dārṣṭāntika and Sautrāntika sects as two sub-divisions of the Sarvāstivādin school. To my mind, these sects owe their respective names to two categories of texts: *dṛṣṭānta* and *sūtrānta. Dṛṣṭānta* is formed with *dṛṣṭa,* like *sūtrānta* with *sūtra.* If a *sūtra* is what has been "heard" (*śruta*), it is probable that the terms *dṛṣṭānta/sūtrānta* rest

2 It is true that, for Buddhaghoṣa, followed in this respect by the European scholars (Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism,* p. 2 quoted by de La Vallée Poussin, *Opinions,* p. 35), *evaṃ mayā sutaṃ* means *sammukhā paṭiggahitaṃ* (*Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī,* I, p. 31). But this interpretation, which is a late one, dates from a moment when one had to prove the authenticity of the texts, tracing them back to the Buddha through Ānanda, rather than to rank them with the Veda. In other words, the controversies between Buddhists had altered the mentality of the doctors: those of the earlier centuries were anxious, above all, to resist the Brahmins, whilst Buddhaghoṣa disputes with the people who recognize the Buddha's omniscience.

3 *Asia Major,* 1925.

finally upon the contrast *dṛṣṭi/śruti*. Let us examine this thesis in the light of the documents.

Since H. Lüders published the fragments of the *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā*, the attention of the learned world has been driven towards Kumāralāta, author of this collection and the founder of the Dārṣṭāntika school. Several Japanese and European scholars have endeavoured to gather some pieces of information concerning this school, and more particularly those supplied by K'ouei Ki, one of Hiuan-Tsang's most famous disciples. The most important texts will be found in the commented translation of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* by L. de La Vallée Poussin.[4] Before I bring forth K'ouei Ki's testimony, I will quote the learned scholar's translation, which, being exactly literal, forms a solid basis for discussion.

K'ouei Ki, *Vasumitra*, II, 9 b (Genealogy of the sects): "The comment of the Siddhi, iv, 1, 53 b says that the Sautrāntika are of three kinds: 1. Mūla (*ken-pen*), that is to say, Kumāralāta; 2. Śrīlāta; 3. in a vague way (*wei-fan*) the so-called Sautrāntika."

This text means probably that there are three kinds of Sautrāntika: 1. the Mūlasautrāntika, that is to say, Kumāralāta's followers; 2. Śrīlāta's disciples; 3. those who are called Sautrāntika without any other precision.

The comment of the *Siddhi*, alluded to in the above quotation, is a little more explicit:

"These (the Sautrāntika) are of three kinds: 1. Mūla, that is to say Kumāralāta; 2. Śrīlāta, who composed the *Sautrāntika-Vibhāṣā*, whom Saṅghabhadra calls "the Sthavira"; 3. the so-called Sautrāntika.[5] As the Mūlācārya composed the *Kie man louen*, the *Kouang chouo p'i yu*, he received the name of *Dārṣṭāntikācārya*, borrowing his name from what he said."

4 *Buddhica*, t. I, p. 221-224: K'ouei ki sur les Sautrāntikas.

5 I prefer this translation to another one, given in a dubious way by de La Vallée Poussin in a note.

This text, confirming the information given by the preceding one, adds that Śrīlāta, author of the *Sautrāntika-Vibhāṣā*, was also called the Sthavira and states that the Mūlācārya, that is to say Kumāralāta, was also called Dārṣṭāntika-ācārya. As a result Mūlasautrāntika, disciples of Kumāralāta and Dārṣṭāntika are three ways of describing the same group.

That Kumāralāta the famous author of a *Dṛṣṭāntapaṅkti* or *Dṛṣṭāntamālya* should have been called Dārṣṭāntikācārya, is not astonishing. We know by the colophons of the *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā* that this collection was a *Dṛṣṭāntapaṅkti* and that its author was precisely Kumāralāta. L. de La Vallée Poussin (p. 223) points out, after Schiefner that: "There is a *Dṛṣṭāntamālya* in the Tandjur." Referring to the Tibetan text, Sylvain Lèvi established without difficulty that the Tandjur *Dṛṣṭāntamālya* is a fragment of the *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā*.[6] K'ouei Ki's *Kie man louen* or *Yu man louen* is probably nothing else.[7]

K'ouei Ki (*Vasumitra* II, 9 b) tells us besides that Kumāralāta, the Dārṣṭāntikācārya, appeared during the first century after the disappearance of the Buddha, and that at the time there was no Sautrāntika yet. How is it possible to reconcile this assertion with another one given by the same text, according to which Kumāralāta would be the Sautrāntika-mūlācārya? It seems that the Sautrāntika separated from the Dārṣṭāntika at a late date; then the latter could have been looked upon as the Mūlasautrāntika and Kumāralāta, their founder, was really the Sautrāntika-mūlācārya because the Dārṣṭāntika bore in them the future Sautrāntika.

On the whole, whether it be a question of the properly so-called Sautrāntika, or of Śrīlāta's disciples, both groups can be con-

6 *JA.*, 1929, II, p. 270 ff.

7 For the different readings *Kie man louen, Yu man louen*, cf. La Vallée Poussin, *ibid.*, p. 221-222. About the equivalence *Yu man louen = Dṛṣṭāntapaṅkti* cf. Sylvain Lèvi, *JA.*, 1927, II, p. 100.

sidered as two branches sprung out of the original Dārṣṭāntika or Mūlasautrāntika.

Where does this name Dārṣṭāntika come from? K'ouei Ki admits that Kumāralāta was called Dārṣṭāntikācārya because of the *dṛṣṭānta* that he had composed. In fact, *dārṣṭāntika* derives normally from *dṛṣṭānta*. This term is the synonym of *avadāna*, as the Chinese translators render both the one and the other by *p'i-yu*[8] "example." In literature, the *dṛṣṭānta* is then opposed to the *sūtra* or *sūtrānta*, to which it is a kind of complement, or illustration.[9]

It seems strange that two names so different, Sautrāntika and Dārṣṭāntika should have served to describe Kumāralāta's followers. If *dṛṣṭānta* is opposed to *sūtrānta*, one does not see at first how names derived from these two terms could have meant the same school. This difficulty can be solved if one admits that the two names were used during different periods and in different places.

If *dṛṣṭānta* and *sūtrānta* mean texts of unequal value, it is scarcely probable that Kumāralāta's disciples should have called themselves *dārṣṭāntika*, because in so doing they would have recognized implicitly the superiority of the *sautrāntika*. The word *dārṣṭāntika* could only have been applied to them by their opponents. In the same way, the deprecative expression Hīnayāna was probably used only in the Mahāyāna school. We can therefore admit that at the time where Kumāralāta's disciples reserved for themselves the title of Mūlasautrāntika, they were called Dārṣṭāntika by their opponents.

Here is how things may be explained. After Kumāralāta composed the collections of *dṛṣṭānta*, he was given the name of Dārṣṭāntika-ācārya and his disciples were called Dārṣṭāntika. Later on, the latter name being regarded unfavourable, Kumāralāta's disciples reacted and took the title of Sautrāntika. In course of time, Kumāra-

8 Cf. *Mahāvyutp.* 62. 7; 139, 30; 200, 6.

9 Cf. *Rocznik Orjentalistyczny*, VIII, p. 14 ff.

lāta's school having been divided into several groups, the practice was made of describing as Mūlasautrāntika those who claimed to follow Kumāralāta, the other factions being called by the name of Śrīlāta, or described as Sautrāntika without any more precision.

The passage from the *Ta tche tou louen,* according to which the Vinaya of Mathurā and that of Kāśmīr differ considerably should probably be ascribed to the same period. At Mathurā, the Vinaya is composd of 80 chapters. There is besides a second part: the Avadāna and Jātaka in 80 chapters. At Kāśmīr we must distinguish between a text in 10 chapters and a *vibhāṣā* eight times bigger; Avadāna and Jātaka are excluded from this Vinaya.[10]

The Vinaya of Mathurā and that of Kāśmīr mark undoubtedly two successive stages in the evolution. The Buddhist tales are literary compositions, the authorship of which could not be ascribed to the Buddha. Theoretically these productions must therefore have been excluded from the Canon, and this course must have been followed at first. Later on, this strictness relaxed and the tales were included in the one or the other basket. The Kāśmīr school is faithful to the old exclusiveness, whereas the Mathurā school is inspired by the novel tolerance.

Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika, Mathurā or Kāśmīr schools, all these names refer, in the whole or in parts, to the great North-Western school, the texts of which were written down in Sanskrit and which was called Sarvāstivādin. The formula *sarvamasti* proves a liking for metaphysical subtlety that is foreign to primitive Buddhism. Likewise the refinement in the way of thinking and in the style of Aśvaghoṣa's writing is very far from the origins. However, we must not forget that some works, ascribed at a late date to Aśvaghoṣa, may have been composed long before his time.

10 Cf. 'Fables in the Vinaya-piṭaka of the Sarvāstivādin School,' *IHQ.*, V, March, 1929, p. 3 ff.

Since Ed. Huber translated into French the Chinese version of the *Sūtrālaṃkāra* ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa, the original was discovered in Central Asia by the German mission of Turfan, and published by M. H. Lüders under the title of: *Bruchstücke der Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā des Kumāralāta.* The following colophon can be reconstructed in it: *āryakaumāralātāyāṃ kalpanāmaṇḍitikā* [*yāṃ nāma dṛṣṭānta*] *paṃktyām.*[11] Nothwithstanding this discovery, Aśvaghoṣa's defenders have not deserted their own thesis. Sylvain Lèvi has supposed that Aśvaghoṣa was the author of the primitive work, which would have been remodelled later on by Kumāralāta, and this new edition of the *Sūtrālaṃkāra* would have been called *Dṛṣṭāntamālā* (or *paṅkti*).[12]

When I took up again in 1930 the study of this question, I showed that Kumāralāta was rapidly forgotten, whereas Aśvaghoṣa's fame kept on growing. It is incredible therefore that one of Aśvaghoṣa's works may have been ascribed at a late date to Kumāralāta. As indicated by the colophon of the original published by Lüders, Kumāralāta is the author of the collection of dṛṣṭānta (*dṛṣṭāntapaṅkti*) called *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā.* Later on, this work, remodelled, was given the name of *Sūtrālaṃkāra* and was ascribed under a new shape to the famous Aśvaghoṣa.[13]

In 1932, I insisted upon the fact that, against the opinion stated above, the Chinese title of the *Sūtrālaṃkāra*: *Ta tchouang king louen* stands for an original: *Mahā-sūtrālaṃkāra-śāstra.* This shows that at the time where the former *dṛṣṭāntapaṅkti* was given the title of *Sūtrālaṃkāra,* this text was considered as a *śāstra,*

11 The part in brackets is blotted out on the manuscript and, according to the editor, 6 akṣaras would be missing (*Bruchstücke,* p. 19). To fill up this void, H. Lüders has proposed °*yāṃ dṣṛṭānta,* which is too short. I suggest °*yāṃ nāma dṛṣṭānta,* exactly 6 akṣaras.

12 *Journal Asiatique,* Oct.-Dec. 1929, pp. 279-280.

13 Aśvaghoṣa et la Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā, *Bulletin of the section of Letters of the Royal Academy of Belgium,* sitting of Nov. 3, 1930, pp. 425-434.

which means that it was classified with the treatises of Abhidharma.[14]

Thus it appears that the Buddhist texts were submitted to frequent alterations. Neither the contents, the title nor the classification of the works were fixed. The literature was subject to perpetual transformations, like the composition of the canons, the grouping of the collections and the nomenclature of the sects.

The testimonies that we have just gathered have permitted us to place in three successive periods the activity of three doctors belonging to neighbouring groups: Kumāralāta, author of a *Dṛṣṭānta-paṅkti*, Śrīlāta, author of a *Sautrāntika-vibhāṣā*, Aśvaghoṣa, to whom the *Sūtrālaṃkāra* is ascribed. The mere title of these works indicates that the first doctor belonged to the Dārṣṭāntika school, the second to the Sautrāntika school; the third one is attached by tradition to the North-West of India and to the Sarvāstivādin school. We may then suppose that Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika, Sarvāstivādin are three successive names which correspond to the three phases in the development of the great North-Western school. From now on it seems presumable that the Mūlasarvāstivādin are the Mūlasautrāntika's successors, so they called themselves because they were connected with the teaching of the Mūlācārya Kumāralāta.

To the three stages that we have just noted correspond different doctrinal attitudes which are marked by some changes in the way the Scriptures are classified and the schools and texts are called.[15] *Dṛṣṭānta*, *avadāna* and *sūtrālaṃkāra* are three equivalent terms. It seems that the *dṛṣṭānta* was excluded at first from the Canon and this was reasonable: the *dharma*, being the word of the Buddha, could not include tales which were the works of a

14 'Sautrāntika et Dārṣṭāntika,' *Rocznik Orjentalistyczny*, VIII, p. 20.

15 Of course the appearance of a new term did not cause the former one to disappear everywhere, on the contrary it was liable to survive for a long time still in some spheres.

doctor. Later on, the basket of the Vinaya having separated from the Dharma, some schools, like that of Mathurā, inserted in it narrative texts which were called *avadāna* or *jātaka*. The authority recognized to the *sūtra* at the time explains the fact that several groups claim the title of Sautrāntika. Finally, during a third period, the activity of the theologians, of the prose-writers and of the poets is shown by the multiplication of the texts of every kind. One observes then the development of the Abhidharma. The liking for metaphysical discussion brings into favour the name of Sarvāstivādin; the use of poetical ornaments in order to enhance the style of the tales cause the latter to be described as the ornaments (*alaṃkāra*) of the sūtra, and these new texts are considered as *śāstra*, that is to say, classified by the side of the Abhidharmapiṭaka treatises.

On the whole, the evolution marked by the names Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika, Sarvāstivādin is parallel with the movement that ends in the codification of the Scriptures. At first, the dharma was an undistinguished mass. Later on, the two baskets of the Sūtra and of the Vinaya separated. Finally, a third basket formed which is the Abhidharma-piṭaka.

JEAN PRZYLUSKI

Remarks on the Khotanese Jātakastava

Among the treasures found in the cave of the Thousand Buddhas near Tun-huang is a complete manuscript, Ch. 00274, in Khotanese Saka, described by Sir Aurel Stein, *Serindia,* p. 915, as "a Buddhist text in thirty-nine folios, apparently complete, but as yet unidentified." The beginning, the verses of fol. 1, is reproduced in plate CL of the same publication.

In a paper read at the gathering of the German Orientalists in Bonn. 1936,[1] Professor H. W. Bailey gave the information that the title is *Jātakastava,* and that it is a poem in praise of the Buddha's deeds in various births, illustrating his power of endurance. A text with the same title is, he states, to be found in the Derge Tanjur.

Bailey has subsequently brought out a facsimile reproduction of the whole manuscript, with a short introduction, in which he says that an edition of the text is in preparation.[2]

In the introduction it is stated that the poem is dedicated to the great king Śrī Viśa Śūra, that it is the work of an ācārya in the Sāmanyā bhikṣusaṅgha, and that the colophon mentions a certain Kīmäśana, in Sogdian script Kymś'n. He further gives a list of 47 *jātakas* contained in the work.

Bailey has also succeeded in getting photographs of the Jātakastava of the Derge Tanjur, and published this text.[3]

It comprises fourteen lines of printed text in Tibetan script and contains the Sanskrit text, with an interlinear partial Tibetan gloss in smaller print, of a Jātakastava attributed to Jñānayaśa. "The literary type of this Jātakastava," he says, "is the same as that of

1 Published in German translation by Schrœdar, *ZDMG.*, 90, pp. 573 ff.

2 See his *Codices Khotanenses.* India Office Library Ch. ii, 002; Ch. ii, 008, Ch. 00274, in Monumenta lingvarum Asiæ majoris Ed. K. Grönbech, II, Copenhagen 1938.

3 *BSOS.*, IX, pp. 851 ff.

the Khotanese, but the contents are largely different. A less developed type is represented by the Pāli *Cariyā-piṭaka* and the verses of the *Rāṣṭrapāla-paripṛcchā*, p. 21 ff. Different too is the alternating prose and verse of the *Jātakamālā*.........The scribe has evidently at times misread his Sanskrit original, at times carelessly omitted letters and syllables. The Tibetan gloss, besides being literal in the usual way, is not always to be trusted to give a correct explanation."

The text contains 20 verses in *Śardūlavikrīḍita*, of which 5-18 give a short abstract of a jātaka followed by an eulogy of the Buddha.

Through these publications we have learnt to know a new type of Buddhist jātaka literature.

We have long known how great a rôle the tales about the Buddha's doings in former births played in early Buddhism, as themes for preaching and means of propaganda, and that collections of such stories were incorporated in the Canon. We also know that these Jātakas were largely taken from common Indian folk-lore, and only adapted to Buddhist notions, sometimes even rather loosely, and further that not all known Jātakas have been incorporated in the Canon. But we are not able to say how the oldest canonical collection was composed, or what was the original form of individual Jātakas in this collection.

It has sometimes been maintained that the short collection of 35 jātakas in the *Cariyāpiṭaka* represents an earlier stage in the development. But this view has not been accepted by leading scholars. There is rather a consensus of opinion to the effect that the tales of the *Cariyāpiṭaka* were solicited from the current stock of such tales in order to illustrate the Bodhisattva's practice of the Pāramitās. The narrative is quite short and there is no attempt to make it particularly attractive and interesting. There is more of learning than of propaganda, while the original aim in adapting such tales must have been to appeal to sentiment and imagination, in order to win as many as possible for the teaching of the Buddha.

Also in the *Jātakamālā* the object is the same, but here we have to do with a real *kavi,* versed in all the methods of the educated poet. The work is however of a learned character and not intended for common people. The case is different with the Pāli Jātaka book, where as many stories as possible have been put together, arranged according to the number of gāthās, and in a popular and interesting form. But then only the gāthās are canonical, and the *Aṭṭhakathā* is comparatively late, and, as is well known, full of misunderstandings.

It is *a priori* likely that the oldest canonical collection was a kind of summary, meant to be supplemented by word of mouth by the preacher, and that it was a large collection. Works like the *Cariyāpiṭaka* would then be based on this collection, and the *Jātakamālā* a poet's treatment of a selection made with a similar aim, under the influence of the tendency we know from the early centuries of our era to do everything to enable Buddhism to hold its own in the highest spheres of civilisation in contemporary India.

In the *Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā* short résumés of fifty Jātakas are put in the mouth of the Buddha, in a discussion of the dharmas of the Bodhisattva. Each Jātaka contains one stanza, with the exception of the last one, which has four. The case is similar with regard to the Jātakastavas. The stories are put together without any attempt at making them interesting as attractive tales and apparently without any systematic arrangement, in order to recall some more or less well-known event, and ending with the praise of the Buddha. The two Stavas are absolutely different. Though several Jātakas have found place in both, they cannot be derived from a common source. The common titles, on the other hand, point to the conclusion that we have to do with a type which was in favour at a certain period, just as we have more than one *Jātakamālā*.

The Tanjur text, just as the *Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā*, devotes one stanza only to each Jātaka. It is written in an artificial style and apparently presupposes a full knowledge of the stories. In the

summing up we are told about some lasting effect of what the Bodhisattva did. Thus the Hari jātaka ends with the remark: Therefore even now on earth your fame is to be observed in the hare sign in the Moon.

The Khotanese text is fuller, but does not contain more than indications of the principal traits, and more space is allotted to praise of the Buddha usually ending with some such sayings as: "therefore homage to you O Gracious One."

We have no indication of the age of the Tanjur text, but it is hardly old. It bears a similar relation to the Khotanese text as the jātaka passage of the *Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā* to the *Cariyāpiṭaka*. With regard to the Khotanese text Bailey states, as we have seen, that it was dedicated to the Khotan king Viśa Śūra, and it is perhaps possible to utilize this piece of information.

Before trying to do so I shall put together all the indications contained in the introduction. The first line runs *jauttiṣi mistä pramuhä sahemderä puṃñä*, where I take *sahemdera* to be a name and translate "the great leading *jyotiṣa*, the meritorious Sahendra." Of him it is said that he wanted to give expression to all that there is of praise (*stava*) of the Buddha's merits, as an attempt to reach Buddhahood. But the Jātakastava was difficult, and he wished to see it in Khotanese. He then summoned a great knower of the three Piṭakas, in the Sāmanyā monastery, named Vedyaśīla, well-versed in the *vyañjanas*, like a fisherman in water, asking him to translate it, for the benefit of king Viśaśūra, so that every trouble in the country might be removed; after further wishes the first tale about the Bodhisattva as the balacakravartin Mahājasabhāsa begins. Kīmäśana is then later on, in the colophon, mentioned as the person who caused the manuscript to be written. We accordingly learn that the Jātakastava is a translation, evidently from Sanskrit, and we can confidently say that Kīmäśana's manuscript is a copy of an older one.

Bailey[4] has found Viśaśūra's name in another manuscript, which contains a date from his fifth regnal year, but we do not know in which connection the date occurs.

Viśaśūra belongs to a series of Khotan kings, who all use the designation *viśa*, which Tibetan sources render as *vijaya*. Several of them are known from Tibetan annals and from Khotanese documents, but none of these sources are very old. Reference to the 'Vijaya'—dynasty are also found in the *T'ang-shu*[5] where we are told that the family name of the Khotan king was *Weih-chih*, which may be a rendering of *vijaya*, though the final vowel is suspicious. There is another Chinese form *fu-tu* (old pronunciation *buik* or *bicu*)-*zia*, and we also find *wei-chih fu-chih* (*biuk-*, or *bicu-*, *chi*). All these forms seem to be so many renderings of Khotanese *viśa*, i.e. *viźa*. But *viźa* does not exactly correspond to Sanskrit *vijaya*, which would be expected to result in *viźe;* cf. *prace* Sanskrit *pracaya*. On the other hand *viźa* can well be derived from *vijita* in the days of these kings, cf. Khotanese *ja*, older *jita* 'subdued', and Bailey has actually found the form *Vījittasagrrāma* for *Viśasaṃgrāma* in a Paris manuscript. When we, finally, bear in mind that *vijita* and not *vijaya* is the form this designation takes in the oldest known source, viz., in a Kharoṣṭhī document of the *Khotana maharaya rayatiraya hinajha dheva Vijidasiṃha*,[6] I think there can be little doubt that the dynastic 'title' was *vijita* and not *vijaya*.

Several kings of this line can be dated from the remarks in the *T'ang-shu*, and most of them belong to the 8th century, but some also to the 7th. Among the latter is Fu-tu Hiung, who visited China in A.D. 674. *Hiung* means 'virile, martial, brave', and might

4 *BSOS.*, VIII, p. 936.

5 Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou Kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux*, pp. 126 ff.; Thomas, *Tibetan Literary Texts and Documents concerning Chinese Turkestan*, i.e., specially pp. 162 ff.

6 Kharoṣṭhī Inscription discovered by Sir Aurel Stein in Chinese Turkestan, No. 661, and, with regard to the reading see my remarks *AO.*, IV, pp. 233 f.

be a translation of *śūra*, but it would be rash to take this for granted. On the other hand we do not seem to have any information of *vijita* kings later than the 8th century, and it is allowed to assume that the Khotanese Jātakastava was translated in the 7th or the 8th century. The Sanskrit text must consequently be older, since the jyotiṣa must have known it, but found it too difficult, but we cannot say how much older.

It is hardly possible to point out the original on which our Jātakastava is based. Our manuscript evidently contains several mistakes and is often difficult to understand. When Bailey, who is better acquainted with late Khotanese manuscripts than any other scholar, has brought out his edition, the matter will be different. In the remarks which follow I have been obliged to leave some words and short sentences untranslated, but I am confident that they are not essential for our review of the position of the Jātakastava with reference to other collection of Jātakas.

With regard to the relationship of our text to other collections I shall limit myself to some notes on the tale corresponding to Jātaka 537 of the Pali collection, *Cariyāpiṭaka*, iii, 12; *Jātakamālā*, 31.

Jātaka 537 gives a lengthy account of Sutasoma, the son of the Koravya rājā of Indapattana. He went to study in Sakkarita, and there became intimate with other princes, especially with prince Brahmadatta, the son of the Kāśī king. After having finished their studies, the princes returned to their respective countries, and Sutasoma gave them sound advice for the future. He had, we learn, some misgivings with regard to the Benares prince.

Brahmadatta became king of Benares. He always had meat for his dinner, and once his cook, having run short of supplies, prepared some flesh taken from a human corpse. The king at once took a liking to such food, according to the *Aṭṭhakathā*, because he had been a yakṣa in his last birth and eaten much human flesh. When this became known and all remonstrances proved useless, he retired

to the woods; killing human beings and eating their flesh. On one of his expeditions he was wounded, and he promised the rukkha-devatā to make her a *balikamma* with *ekasata* kṣatriyas, if she would heal him. He was healed, and went about bringing back *ekasata* kings, whom he tied up with ropes through their hands and left hanging from the branches. The tree god was distressed and was referred to Sutasoma as the only one who could help. He went to the man-eater, who took him to be one of the kings, who had escaped, and now went to fetch Sutasoma instead. Just then a brāhmaṇa had come to offer Sutasoma some *subhāṣitas,* knowing how fond he was of such. Sutasoma had no leisure to listen at once but took care that the brāhmaṇa was attended to till he returned, and went to perform his ablutions. Then the man-eater came and carried him off. He shed tears, what the man-eater misunderstood. As Sutasoma however convinced him that the reason was that he had promised the brāhmaṇa to come back to listen to him, he was finally allowed to do so, on the condition that he would return after having satisfied the brāhmaṇa. True to his word he did so, to the astonishment of the man-eater, who had in the meantime prepared everything for the performance of the sacrifice. Now he himself became interested and wanted to hear the precious sayings which Sutasoma valued so much. Sutasoma at last complied with his wish, and the stanzas made such an impression on him that he reluctantly promised to desist from the evil ways. Both went together to release the captured kings, who are described, as *kammāsapādena viheṭhita* harassed by *kammāsapāda,* a word which the commentator found in the gāthās but did not evidently, understand.[7] Then they all returned to their homes.

7 The commentary on gāthā 24, when the tree-god says: *na nāmagottaṃ parivattayāni,* he says: *yathā tvaṃ pubbe Brahmadatto hutvā taṃ nāmaṃ jahitvā porisādo hutvā idāni kammāsapādo jāto, khattiyakule jāto abhakkhaṃ bhakkheti, mahaṃ tathā nāmagottaṃ parivattayāmi.* Fausböll was evidently right in considering *kammāsapāda* as a noun and not as a name.

In the *Jātakamālā* we read that the Bodhisattva was born in the royal Kauravya lineage. As he was a son (*suta*), lovely to look at as the moon (*somapriyadarśana*), his father gave him the name Sutasoma. He was made *yuvarāja*, but his great predilection was *subhāṣitas*. When once a brāhmaṇa had come to communicate some such stanzas, and before he could be properly attended to, there rose a great uproar. Sutasoma was informed of the reason: The terrible *puruṣāda* Kalmāṣapāda Saudāsa had turned up. He was further told that this man-eater had been born to Sudāsa by a lioness, that he had been brought to the king, who took care of him, because he had no other son, and whom he succeeded as king. In consequence of his descent from a lioness he was addicted to human flesh, and when this became known, he had to leave his country. He made the vow to perform a *bhūtayajña* with 100 princes to the bhūtas who accept human blood and flesh as *bali*, if they would help him. Now he had carried off *rājakumāras* and came to fetch Sutasoma, who knew his perversity, and deciding to cure him went to meet him. Like a lion Saudāsa left everybody else alone and seized Sutasoma. The latter was distressed, because the brāhmaṇa expected him back. Then the account goes on much as in the Pali text, Saudāsa reflecting that he had already got hold of hundred rājakumāras. After Sutasoma's return we have the same development as above.

The *Cariyāpiṭaka* is based on a similar account. Seized by a *porisāda* king Sutasoma remembers his promise to the brāhmaṇa. After having starved *ekasata* kṣatriyas, through whose hands he had put strings, he (the *porisāda*) brought Sutasoma for his sacrifice. Promising to return, the latter goes home, hands over his kingdom, satisfies the brāhmaṇa, and returns to the *porisāda*, saying "this is my *saccapāramī*."

In the Jātakastava we first have a description of *kalmāṣaṣādā* (!) *sīhā Saudāysā rre* 'Kalmāṣapāda the lion, the son of Svetasa, the king.

He became strong through eating plenty of *tcāra* prepared with human blood. In various countries all sorts of atrocities were committed, and he was terribly dirty, like a *vetāla*, with a mace in his hand. 99 kings he carried off from their countries and placed them in holes on a hill (?), and tortured them for a long time. He made up his mind to perform a *bali* to the bhūtas, in a sacrifice: "But thou (the Buddha) warded it off, being *śrūttasūṃ* (i.e. Śrutasoma), the only saviour of all the beings in Jambudvīpa. Even Śakra's throne shook through this good deed, the troubles were overcome and everybody prospered. Because you were such a good and skilful protector, therefore I proceed to worship you hundred ten thousand times."

It will be seen that there are several common traits, but also much difference. The *Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā* has, as in many other cases, to a great extent recast the narrative and also introduced details and features which did not belong to the original tale. The Benares king who took to eating human flesh is here called Brahmadatta, the most common name of Benares kings in the *Aṭṭhakathā*. The occurrence of a misunderstood Kammāsapāda in two gāthās shows that this is a secondary innovation. The *Cariyāpiṭaka* only speaks of a *porisāda*, without giving any name, but the other sources give Kalmāṣapāda Saudāsa, and this name is known to belong to ancient Indian folklore, whence it was taken over by the Buddhists.

In the *Mahābhārata*, ed. Sukthankar, I. 166 f., we read about Kalmāṣapāda Saudāsa of the Ikṣvākuvaṃśa. When out hunting he met Vaśiṣṭha's eldest son Śakti, and as neither of them would stand aside, the king struck Śakti with his whip, and the latter cursed him: since you, like a rākṣasa, beat an ascetic, you will from to-day become a *puruṣāda*, addicted to human flesh. When later on the king wanted to conciliate Śakti, Viśvāmitra caused the rākṣasa Kiṃkara to enter him. Later on a dvija asked the king for food, and as the cook could not provide other meat, he told him to

satisfy the dvija even if he had to take human flesh. This led to a new curse, and later on the king ate first Śakti and subsequently the remaining ones of Vaśiṣṭha's hundred sons, as a lion would eat small deer, *siṃhaḥ kṣudramṛgān iva*. Vaśiṣṭha in vain tried to take his own life, but desisted when he learnt from Śakti's widow Adṛśyantī that she had given birth to a son. Kalmāṣapāda now came to kill Vaśiṣṭha, who was told by Adṛśyantī that none but he could restrain the *poriṣāda*. Subsequently he released him from his curses, and Saudāsa promised never more to molest dvijas.

This is evidently the same story, and even some minor features such as the number of victims and the statement that there is only one who can restrain the *puruṣāda* are easily recognizable in the Buddhist story.

The account of how Saudāsa became a *puruṣāda* is quite in accordance with current Indian notions in the *Mahābhārata* story. The *Jātakamālā* version, according to which he owed his predilection to human flesh to his descent from a lioness, may find some support in the use of the word *siṃha* 'lion' about Kalmāṣapāda in the Jātakastava, but it can also be due to expressions such as that in the *Mahābhārata* tale that he devoured Vaśiṣṭha's sons as a lion devours deer. The remark in the *Aṭṭhakathā* that Sudāsa had, in his previous birth, been a man-eating Yakṣa, sounds like a *pis aller*, the author feeling the necessity of giving an explanation of a feature he knew belonged to the tale and which looked strange. The story about how he first came to test human meat, because his cook could not provide other meat, has as we have seen a parallel in the *Mahābhārata*.

The story about the intended sacrifice of hundred princes is found only in the Buddhist sources, but there is evidently a certain connection with the eating of Vaśiṣṭha's hundred sons. The *Cariyāpiṭaka* gives the number of intended victims as *ekasata*, which elsewhere means '101', and also the *Aṭṭhakathā* states that

Brahmadatta had promised to perform a *balikamma* with *ekasata* kṣatriyas. The *Jātakamālā*, on the other hand, says 'with hundred princes', *kumāraśatena*, and in the *Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā*, p. 22, ll. 9-10, Sutasoma is said to have saved 100 kings that were to be sacrificed (*vadhyagataṃ rājaśataṃ parimocitam*). Hundred, and not hundred one, was evidently the number, and *ekasata* in the *Cariyāpiṭaka* may have been used in this sense. The author of the *Aṭṭhakathā* seems to have been in some confusion, and he had to explain why Brahmadatta wanted to fetch Sutasoma when he had already brought together *ekasata*, through the introduction of the tree god, whom he took to be one of the captured princes who had escaped. It seems possible that this incident is due to the existence of some such remark as that about Sutasoma being the only one who could help in the sources on which the *Aṭṭhakathā* drew. Cf. the *Mahābhārata* tale. The Jātakastava here seems to be in better accord with what we are led to believe was the original story, that the number of victims was to be hundred, and that Sutasoma was carried off in order to fill this number, because it says that Kalmāṣapāda had carried off 99 kings from their kingdoms.

In one detail the Jātakastava differs from all other sources, viz., in giving the name of the Bodhisattva as Śrutasoma and not Sutasoma. In its oldest form the jātaka was probably written in Ardhamāgadhī, and the two names would not have been distinguishable. Āryaśūra has misunderstood the name he found, which must have been *Sutasoma*, as meaning 'Soma' instead of 'Soma-offerer.' *Śrutasoma* would seem to be just as likely a name, because the prince's predilection for *subhāṣitas* plays a considerable rôle in the tale, the *Jātakamālā* verse 32 speaking of *śruta* as a lamp (*dīpa*) removing the darkness of infatuation in this connection. But just for that reason *śruta* may be a wrong Sanskritisation. Sutasoma is, as is well known, a well authenticated name, and Śrutasoma only occurs as a variant.

The whole story about the prince's fondness of *subhāṣitas* might even be a later accretion, though it is implied in the *Cariyā-piṭaka*, the *Aṭṭhakathā* and the *Jātakamālā*. There is no reference to it in the Jātakastava, but this fact can only serve as a warning, and we cannot as yet arrive at certain results. The *Mahābhārata* story has nothing of the kind, but it is possible, and perhaps likely, that the Indian tale about Kalmāṣapāda was combined with another tale about a *Subhāṣitagaveṣin* when it was adopted by the Buddhists.

The preceding remarks will have shown that even a comparatively late text such as the Jātakastava may prove to be of interest for our understanding of the history of the Buddhist jātakas. A thorough discussion of the various problems connected with this text can hardly be attempted before Bailey has published his edition. I have, however, thought that it might be useful to give an idea of the general character of the work, and I shall therefore add an account of a few of the Jātakas it contains.

The *Ṣaḍdantajātaka* (Jāt. 514, etc.): Six tusks, white like a conch, or nich, or a pearl-liana (Skt. *muktālatā* i.e. string of pearls), or snow, producing the splendour of the autumnal moon were yours, when you were the king of elephants, beautiful to behold. When a hunter came and asked for the tusks, you did not for a moment act niggardly. You pulled them out from the cavity of your mouth, as one would pluck sprouts from a branchy tree or as a man would tear lotus roots from Mount Himavat. Happy and content, with a stroke out of mercy, you quickly gave away your tooth jewels, as you feared much lest he might die from hunger. At all times you will be my foremost teacher, you are my refuge; save me, O gracious one; in the whole world, in all the realm of living beings there is no salvation without you, O powerful great One.

The Bodhisattva and the *vyāghrī* (Suvarṇabhāsa 18 etc): When a female tiger, weakened by hunger and thirst......wanted to devour her cubs, you took great compassion on them. For the sake of that

tigress you let yourself then fall from a hill, so that she would not eat her own small cubs. You made your mind suffer for the sake of the world. Homage to You, the bestower of security, O gracious One.

Temīyajātaka (Jāt. 538): You were born afraid of the high royal seat and feared much to receive kingship. For many a long year you remained without speaking......You lost the good name you had, viz., Sunetra, and were called deaf-mute, tongue-tied. Your longing was for pravrajyā, your striving towards renunciation, for the good state of emancipation. When they put you into power, you were a *ṛṣi*. Unmeasured crores of beings you saved from evils. O Lord, you performed deeds of vigour there in that country. Many beings reached dhyāna, settled in vratas. The deep torpor in the mind's abodes, the dense and hard darkness of wrong views you dispelled with ease through the rays of the Law, as the sun in the autumnal sky, as the thunderbolt breaks the *urvārīna* (?) mountain. So for a long time you dispelled the evil darkness of torpor. Homage to you, O glorious One.

The meeting with *Dīpaṅkara* (*Nidānakathā*, pp. 11 ff.): You were acknowledged by the Buddha Dīpaṅkara, lovely as the moon would shine in pure air without clouds in the midst of the nakṣatras. When you saw, wandering on the road, that teacher, you extended your matted hair in the dust before him and threw blue lotuses towards him. You received a prediction of Buddhahood. You are meritorious with immeasurable merits, O Lord, you are the Knower of the best path to Nirvāṇa. Therefore homage to you.

It will be seen from these extracts that the collection of eulogies of the Buddha is the cheif aim of the compiler. The various tales are more or less considered as well known and only indicated as giving occasion to this praise. Nevertheless they are not without some interest of their own.

STEN KONOW

The Pattern of the Nissaggiyas

The Pali Vinaya-piṭaka, Basket, Casket of Discipline is, as its name implies, a compilation whose main emphasis is on control, on restraint, on training. That of the Vinaya known as the Sutta-vibhaṅga has, as its chief object, the regulation of the life of the individual as a member of a community by means of a body of rules or restrictions external to him. These rules numbering 227 in the Pali Vinaya, together constitute the Pātimokkha. They decree for the monks and nuns of Gotama's Orders such behaviour as was considered correct and suitable according to the standards of the time with its concomitant circumstances. Any expression of the ideals of monastic life has to be sought in the *Suttapiṭaka;* the Vinaya is concerned with conduct, with life as outwardly lived, with facts, with expediency. Yet although discourses on the need for ideals and their value, and for man's inner spiritual and mental training and the means of realising these may be practically absent from the Vinaya, there is no doubt that its legal and somewhat austere character is based on a high and mature standard of morality, justice and common sense.

The spheres which the Vinaya touches in operating these foundations of ethics, common to civilised societies, are those of monks and nuns as individuals; as members of a one-sided Order, male or female, and in relation to other members of that same side of the Order; as members of a two-sided Order, male and female, and in relation to members of the opposite side of the Order; as members of a community whose conduct may affect the life of the laity, of those still living in the world; or as members of a community whose life and actions are comparable to those of votaries of other existing communities also following a life of religion.

Each of the 227 rules of the Pātimokkha is, as the Suttavibhaṅga has come down to us, embedded in a greater or lesser amount of auxiliary material. Generally speaking, this comprises a story leading up to the formulation of the rule, *sikkhāpada*, and the penalty for breaking this, while in some cases there follows another story showing that it was necessary to remodel the rule, and at whose conclusion the amended draft is given; next comes the Old Commentary or Padabhājanīya, explaining the words of the rule; then cases where the penalty of the rule or some other heavier or lighter penalty is incurred; and finally a list of cases which entail no offence against the rule.

In this paper, of the eight groups of rules for monks[1] into which the Bhikkhu-vibhaṅga of the Suttavibhaṅga is divided, I have chosen for examination the class known as Nissaggiya. The Vinaya is said to contain many inconsistencies. Here I hope to show that, while usually following the general pattern outlined above, the Nissaggiyas also disclose some exceptions and irregularities, although even underlying the differences there may be, at all events on occasion, some recognisable, and perhaps purposive, unity of design.

I have confined myself to the Nissaggiyas for this investigation of the formal structure of rules and their attendant parts, principally because their number is suitable. Thirty rules with their auxiliary material is neither too large to handle comfortably, as would be the ninety-two Pācittiyas, nor too small to yield sufficient results, as might be the four Pārājikas and, although to a lesser decree, the thirteen Saṅghâdisesas.

This survey, therefore, because it does not take into account a wider range of comparisons, because it does not marshal the Nissaggiyas beside the Pārājikas, Saṅghâdisesas or Pācittiyas, but only one Nissaggiya beside another, is not a study in the com-

1 There is also a separate Vinaya or discipline for nuns. The Nissaggiyas for nuns are not under consideration here.

parative structure of various classes of offence and rule. It is no more than a preliminary investigation into the likenesses and contrasts, apparent in the scheme or pattern on which the Nissaggiyas are arranged, and in which necessarily some account has been given of their subject matter. How closely or how distantly other calsses of offence resemble this scheme is a question whose answer will emerge when more widely comparative work on these lines has been accomplished.

Each of the thirty Nissaggiya rules for monks, if broken, gives rise to a *nissaggiya pācittiya* offence, that is to an offence of expiation, *pācittiya,* involving forfeiture, *nissaggiya.* In reality, the form of expiation enjoined by the Old Commentary, the Padabhājanīya, on these rules is confession of the offence. A *pācittiya* is (a minor offence) to be confessed, *āpatti desetabbā.* But the more literal translation of the term *pācittiya* would be "offence of expiation". For etymologically this term has no connection with confession although, as is seen from the Old Commentary, the offence is to be expiated by confessing it. Literally *pācittiya* as *prāyaścittaka,* a derivation to which various authorities incline,[2] would mean "in repentance, in compensation, in expiation". *Nissaggiya* means something to be forfeited or given up, and such a thing was that in respect of which the offence had been committed, for example a robe, a bowl or a rug. It would therefore seem best to translate *nissaggiya pācittiya* by "offence of expiation involving forfeiture."

The whole Nissaggiya group is introduced by the sentence, "These thirty rules, your reverences, of expiation involving forfeiture come up for recitation." Each rule is named in the Sinhalese edition, numbered in the Siamese edition, but neither named nor numbered in Oldenberg's edition.

The thirty rules fall into three sections of ten rules each. At the end of every tenth Nissaggiya the fact that the end of a section

2 *Vin. Texts,* I, 32; Geiger, *Pali Lit. und Sprache* § 27; B. C. Law, *Hist. Pali Lit.,* I, 46 ff., 54; E. J. Thomas, *Hist. Bud. Thought,* 18 f.

has been reached is marked by saying, "The first section, the second section, the third section", accompanied by its name. The first is called, in Oldenberg's edition, the section on *kaṭhina* (privileges), in the Sinhalese and Siamese editions the section on robes, *cīvara;* the second is called the section on silk; and the third the section on bowls. Then there follows a kind of mnemonic verse, abbreviation or key, called *uddāna*. A leading word from each rule is given here, for the *uddāna* was to help the memory of the monk who was to recite the rules, all the teaching being given orally.

In the second and third sections, the first word of the key is the same as the name of the section, that is "silk" and "bowls", and refers to the first rule, or in the case of the third section, to the first two rules of that section. But in the first section there is no mention of either *kaṭhina* or *cīvara,* robes. The reason for this discrepancy is, I think, that in the middle section only the first rule deals with silk, and in the third section only the first two rules deal with bowls. Therefore the words "silk" and "bowls" could appear in the key without unduly puzzling the reciter. But in the first section, not only is every rule concerned with robes or robe-material, but as many as the first three rules are concerned with *kaṭhina* (privileges). Hence other and more distinctive points had to be chosen from this set of rules in order to prompt the reciter's memory.

After the key at the end of the third section, it is said that these thirty rules have been recited. The reciter then says thrice to the monks present that he hopes they are pure in respect of these thirty rules, and concludes that they are, since they keep silence.

Twenty-two of the rules are said to have been formulated when Gotama was staying at Sāvatthī, three while at Rājagaha, two each while he was at Vesālī and Kapilavatthu, and one while at Āḷavī.

Of these thirty Nissaggiya rules for monks, as many as sixteen are concerned with robes, and fall into two groups, Nos. I-X, XXIV-XXIX; five are concerned with rugs (*santhata*), Nos. XI-XV; two

with sheep's wool, Nos. XVI-XVII; three with gold and silver and bartering, Nos. XVIII, XIX, XX; two with bowls, Nos. XXI, XXII; one with medicine, No. XXIII; and the last one, No. XXX, is against a monk appropriating for his own use benefits intended for the Order. There are moreover a few cross-sections. For example, in the matter of exchange of robes (No. V), in the matter of washing, dyeing and beating robes (No. IV), and in the matter of washing, dyeing and beating sheep's wool, the correct behaviour of a monk towards a nun also comes under legislation; and in two of the rules concerned with making rugs (Nos. XII, XIII), sheep's wool also receives legal attention.

About half the rules were formulated because monks acquired something by means considered unbecoming or tiresome: they asked for too much, they pressed potential donors, they put forward suggestions, for example as to the quality of the robe-material that they particularly desired. The remaining half were formulated because monks used various things or did various things in ways thought unsuitable: they had an unnecessary amount of robes or bowls, they laid their robes aside for too long, they made nuns wash their robes and their sheep's wool, they carried their sheep's wool so far that lay-people made fun of them. And so on.

Oddly there is no Nissaggiya concerned with lodgings, *senâsana*, or with almsfood, *piṇḍapāta*, which with robes and medicine, are regarded as a monk's four indispensable requisites. There are offences regarding these which had to be confessed, and which occur in the Pācittiya section, but evidently there are no types of offences where lodgings and almsfood had to be forfeited in addition to their wrongful acquisition or usage being confessed.

The most usual plan in each Nissaggiya is first to give an introductory story showing that a monk or monks behaved in a way that was thought unsuitable by someone who had seen it or who had been affected by it. The complaints of these critics even-

tually reached Gotama who, it is stated, having confirmed the reports, rebuked, the offending monks, and said that such behaviour was "not for pleasing those who are not yet pleased nor for increasing the number of those who are pleased". that is, with the Sākyan teaching and way of life. After this there comes the rule, always ascribed to Gotama, and designed to control such behaviour. The rule states the offence incurred for transgressing it, here, of course a *nissaggiya pācittiya*. Thirdly there follows the Old Commentary or Padabhājanīya, explaining words appearing in the rule, and including the method of forfeiting the article to be forfeited. Fifthly there is a set of clauses giving offences incurred, *nissaggiya pācittiya* and *dukkaṭa*, wrong-doing, if a monk thinks, whether rightly or wrongly, or is in doubt about some point raised in the rule, but acts wrongly. Lastly there comes a list of cases where there is no offence, *anāpatti*. These naturally bear some relation to the rule, while all end by saying that there is no offence if a monk is mad or is the first wrong-doer. Nissaggiya XIX is alone in containing no more than these last two invariable exemptions from incurring offence.

As is to be expected the Nissaggiyas exhibit a certain amount of variation from this general plan. I will discuss some of these discrepancies shortly. But first let us consider the forfeiture which is the distinguishing feature of this section of the Pātimokkha.

The article to be forfeited had, as a general rule, to be forfeited by the offending monk either to the *saṁgha*, a part of the Order, five or more monks residing within one boundary or one *āvāsa*, residence; or to a *gaṇa*, a group of from two to four monks; or to an individual monk. The offending monk had to state the reason, due to transgression of an important point in the rule, for forfeiting the article. Having forfeited it, he should confess the offence, and then, if the article was forfeited to an Order or to a group, the offence should be acknowledged by an experienced, competent monk; if it was forfeited to an individual monk, the offence should

be acknowledged by him. The forfeited article should be given back to the monk who had acquired it wrongfully by the body to whom he had forfeited it. Nissaggiyas XVIII, XIX, and XXII, but no others, decree that forfeiture should be made to the Order only, and not to a group or individual; they also preclude the customary return of the forfeited article to the monk who had obtained it unlawfully and who had confessed his offence.

The formulation of sixteen Nissaggiya rules resulted, as is recorded, from criticisms made of a monk or monks by the laity, eight rules resulted from criticisms made by modest monks, three from those by nuns, two from those by Ānanda, and one from those made by a wanderer. With the exception of Ānanda, who complained for the sake of the Order and not because he himself had been specially inconvenienced, these various classes of critics put forward their complaints because they personally had been in some way affected by the monk's behaviour. Thus there is a parallelism between the sources of the criticisms and the sections of society annoyed. Once Gotama is recorded to hear of unsuitable behaviour from Mahāpajāpatī while he was talking to her (No. XVII), and once he came upon signs of it himself (No. XV). Four times a new rule is formulated in place of one already existing, for occasions arose where its too scrupulous observance resulted in unfair situations. Hence the rule was altered to allow for such occasions.

It will be seen that the number of Nissaggiya rules formulated, according to this reckoning, is thirty-six. This means that six times the rule, as originally framed, had to be altered, but that both versions, and there are never more than two, together with their introductory stories, are set forth in six Nissaggiyas.

Indeed on these grounds the Nissaggiyas, in the interests of textual criticisms, may be divided into two sections. Section I, the smaller, may be taken to contain six Nissaggiyas: four in which the rule had to be altered in accordance with circumstances which

had not been foreseen when it was first set forth (Nos. I, II, XIV, XXI); and two others (Nos. V and VI) in which close adherence to the rule, as originally drafted, is shown to result in occurrences so unsuitable as to provoke complaints and criticism.

Section II, the larger, may be taken to contain the remaining twenty-four Nissaggiyas. In these the rule in its original form was able to stand and was in need of no remodelling. This section, because it is the larger, is naturally the more typical, but even here there are some exceptions to the general plan which merit attention.

In Section I the first formulation of a rule is always followed by the phrase, "And thus this rule of training for monks came to be laid down by the lord." There is no instance of this phrase occurring either after the second formulation of the rule in this Section, or anywhere in Section II, that Section where each rule is formulated once only. Yet in every case are rule and revised rule ascribed to Gotama in the text of the Vinaya. I do not know whether the occurrence of this phrase points to some older stratum in the *Sutta-vibhaṅga,* where only the rules so pointedly said to have been laid down by the lord genuinely were prescribed by him; or whether it in any way supports the theory that the stories were invented after the drafting of the rules and in order to account for them. The point of leaving in the original version, together with its attendant material, is doubtless to show why it would not work. Yet it seems queer so deliberately to ascribe to Gotama only those rules which had to be amended, a queerness not peculiar to the Nissaggiyas. It may be said that these rules worked well enough for some time, but that then there came a case, perhaps before the Founder's death, perhaps after, which made it clear that a revision and a more exact delimitation of the rule was necessary in the interests of justice and reason. This however does not explain the mystery why, in those more numerous Nissaggiyas where the rule is only once formulated, there is no addition of any phrase attributing the rule to Gotama.

In all of those Nissaggiyas where two versions of a rule are laid down, there is also and without exception the insertion of an *anujānāmi,* "I allow", an allowance which Gotama is reputed to have made to monks, and in some way mitigating the rigidity of the rule as first drawn up. For in Nissaggiyas I, II, V, VI, XIV, XXI an *anujānāmi* occurs in the talk, always ascribed to Gotama, which leads up to the second framing of the rule.

It is something more than coincidence that in the six Nissaggiyas where a rule is twice drafted, there should occur, after its first formulation, the phrase, "And thus this rule of training for monks came to be laid down by the lord", and before its second formulation, an *anujānāmi.* But whereas this phrase never occurs outside these six Nissaggiyas, an *anujānāmi* also occurs in five of the remaining twenty-four Nissaggiyas (Nos. III, XV, XXII, XXVIII, XXIX). In all these cases, except in Nissaggiya XXII, the pattern of which is in any case unique, the *anujānāmi* is inserted not immediately before but some way before the rule, here of course formulated only once.

Thus in Section I, as I have called it, which comprises the six Nissaggiyas under consideration, there is first a story leading up to a rule, and then another story showing that for some unforeseen reason the rule is not sufficiently elastic. An *anujānāmi* is then made counteracting this rigidity, followed by the revised version of the rule. Then there come the Old Commentary's explanations, and lastly the cases which incur no offence.

There are certain similarities between Rules I and XXI, and between Rules II and XIV. Each pair may be considered in turn.

In Nissaggiya I it is recorded that Gotama was staying at Vesālī while in Nissaggiya XXI he was at Sāvatthī. In Nissaggiya I the the group of six monks are recorded to have used three different sets of the three robes for different occasions, while in Nissaggiya XXI they made a hoard of bowls. The first drafting the rule results,

in the case of Nissaggiya I, from the criticisms of the modest monks, and in the case of Nissaggiya XXI, from the criticisms of the laity. Such complaints are here, as always, taken up by the modest monks, but in both of these Nissaggiyas the modest monks shift the emphasis. The consequence is that the first draft of the rule is more severe in character than it might otherwise have been. For these modest monks neither complained that the group of six monks wore various sets of the three robes, nor that they made a hoard of bowls. They complained that they wore an extra robe and used an extra bowl. The first draft of these rules therefore runs, "Whatever monk should wear an extra robe...should use an extra bowl, there is an offence of expiation involving forfeiture." In each case the word translated as "should wear" and "should use" is *dhāreyya*.

It is interesting to find that the story given after the first draft of the rule is precisely the same in Nissaggiyas I and XXI, merely reading "robe" in Rule I where "bowl" is read in Rule XXI.

In the light of the events which these stories recount, the rules came to be relaxed, and in one and the same respect. For an extra robe, and an extra bowl, accrued to Ānanda, and he, knowing that he must not keep them, wanted to give them to Sāriputta. But Sāriputta was in Sāketa, and would not arrive for nine or ten days. When Ānanda told this to the lord, it is recorded that Gotama gave an allowance, one suspects because Ānanda and Sāriputta were among his most favourite disciples, enabling monks to wear an extra robe and use an extra bowl for at most ten days.

Before this allowance had been given it was an offence to wear the one or use the other in any circumstances. In each case this allowance forms the substance of the second which is the final version of the rule, and under it less uncompromising in tone than the first version. Here, in addition to the articles with which these two Nissaggiyas deal, Nissaggiya I differs from No. XXI, since it brings in a new time-element, absent from No. XXI. This is probably

because bowls lasted longer than robes, and there was no ceremonial giving and making of bowls, as there was in the case of robe-material. For it is apparently only "when the robes are settled, when a monk's *kaṭhina* (privileges) have been removed" that "an extra robe may be worn for ten days at most. For him who exceeds that (period), there is an offence of expiation involving forfeiture." Nissaggiya XXI merely reads "An extra bowl may be used for ten days at most. For him who exceeds that (period), there is an offence of expiation involving forfeiture." Here the ten days are not themselves conditioned by any other considerations of time.

When the Old Commentary on Nissaggiya I has defined the two opening phrases of the rule, it proceeds on the pattern found also in this portion of Nissaggiya XXI. That is to say both not only define "for ten days at most" in precisely the same terms, but also "extra robe" and "extra bowl", as something 'not allotted, not assigned". But here Nissaggiya XXI gives a description of bowls according to their size, while Nissaggiya I has no corresponding description of robes. Both go on to an identical explanation of the method to be used in forfeiting the robe and the bowl that has been used for more than ten days, and to an identical list of offences incurred if the monk thinks that the ten days have elapsed when they have elapsed and acts against the terms of the rule, with permutations on this theme, due to doubt and modes of thinking wrongly. Or he may think that various events; being allotted, assigned, bestowed, lost, destroyed or stolen, have overtaken his robe or bowl when in fact they have not done so. Amongst these events there is only one which differs in these two Nissaggiyas, and naturally. Between "destroyed" and "stolen" we get, in Nissaggiya I "burnt" of a robe, and in Nissaggiya XXI "broken" of a bowl,[3] a difference which also obtains in the list of cases where there is no

3 Cf. Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga, Nissag. I, than on "a hoard of bowls,"

offence. This same list, with "burnt" of a robe, also occurs again in the *anāpatti*, no offence, clauses of Rules II, III, XXVIII, XXIX.

It is perhaps worth while to draw attention to a curious convention prevailing here. As we have seen, in the enumeration of the ways in which a monk may incur an offence by wrong thinking or by doubt, he may think that his robe or bowl is stolen when it is not stolen, *avilutte viluttasaññī*. But in the *anāpatti*, no offence, clauses, the phrase "if it is stolen" invariably gives way to the phrase "if they tear it from them (or him)", *acchinditvā gaṇhanti*.

There is one other point peculiar to Nissaggiyas I and XXI. For they are alone in giving a short additional story after the "no offence" clauses with which otherwise the Nissaggiyas always end. Moreover these additional stories are identical, the one merely reading "robe" where the other reads "bowl"; and both end in ascribing to the lord the formulation of a *dukkaṭa* offence: "Monks, a robe ...a bowl that is forfeited is not to be given back. Whoever should not give it back, there is an offence of wrong-doing."[4]

Some points in common may also be found between Nissaggiyas II and XIV. Nissaggiya II, whose first rule emanated from criticisms made by Ānanda, is concerned with the offence which a monk incurs if he should be away, separated from his three robes even for one night. Nissaggiya XIV, the first rule of which emanated from criticisms made by the laity, is concerned with the offence which a monk incurs if he should have a new rug made within six years. In both the lord is recorded to have been staying at Sāvatthī.

In both of these Nissaggiyas, after the first version of the rule has been laid down, a monk is recorded to have become ill in Kosambī. His realtions offered to nurse him if he would go to them. Monks urged him to go, but he refused on the grounds that, in Nissaggiya II, a monk must not be away, separated from his three robes, and he was not well enough to set out taking them;

4 Cf. Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga, Nissag. I, "a bowl........wrong-doing."

and in Nissaggiya XIV, on the grounds that a rug should last for six years, but he was not well enough to set out taking a rug and "without a rug there comes to be no comfort for me." To meet these difficulties the lord made an allowance, which in both cases took the form of an agreement (*sammuti*) to be given by the Order to the ill monk at his request. In Nissaggiya II the agreement that was allowed means that the Order was to agree to regard the monk who was ill as *not* away; separated from his three robes (*ticīvarena avippavāsasammuti*)—although in fact he was separated from them. In Nissaggiya XIV the agreement allowed means that the Order should give the monk who was ill the agreement as to a rug (*santhatasammuti*). This is not explained either in the *anujānāmi* or in the Old Commentary. But in Buddhaghosa's VA. (691) it is said that an ill monk without waiting for the six years to elapse, may have a new rug made at the place to which he goes.

The way in which an ill monk should ask the Order for the agreement and the way in which it should be given to him because they form part of the *anujānāmi* of each of these Nissaggiyas, are thus couched in terms ascribed to Gotama. In each case the asking and giving is to be carried out in the same manner. When all this has been explained there follows immediately the second draft of the rule. In both Nissaggiyas this merely repeats the first draft, but after adding the phrase, "except on the agreement of the monks".

From now on however Nissaggiyas II and XIV diverge. The Old Commentary necessarily differs in each case, only agreeing in the method of forfeiting the article to be forfeited. And this, it may be noted is, with three exceptions,[5] the same in all the Nissaggiyas.

Nissaggiya II then proceeds to a list, which may be compared with the list at Pārājika II. 4, of such sites as villages, various types of houses, boats, caravans, fields and so forth, and then states the place at which a monk should remain—at the main-entrance, the

5 Nissag. XVIII, XIX, XXII.

gate, the inner room, for example, if he has laid his robe aside in one of those sites. Nothing of this kind occurs in any of the other Nissaggiyas. After this, Nissaggiya II has the usual clauses concerned with a monk's thinking, rightly or wrongly, and doubting, but acting wrongly. In Nissaggiya XIV these clauses are replaced by others concerned with the offences, all *nissaggiya pācittiya*, into which a monk falls if he finishes by himself or gets others to finish for him what was incompletely executed by himself or by others. This theme on four variations also occurs in Rules XI, XII, XIII, XV, which, with Rule XIV, form the group connected with rugs.

To have made the pattern of Section I perfectly homogeneous, it would have been necessary to pair Nissaggiyas V and VI. But except that they each contain the two drafts of the rule, the first followed by the sentence, "And thus this rule of training for monks came to be laid down by the lord", and an *anujānāmi* preceding the second draft of the rule, they share little of note. For the nice parallelism found in the clauses connected with the offences incurred if a monk thinks, whether rightly or wrongly, or doubts, but acts wrongly, is not sufficient to set these two Nissaggiyas apart from all the rest. For others follow precisely the same course, namely, "If a monk thinks that a woman is not a relation when she is not a relation" (Nissag. V; cf. IV, VII); "If he thinks that a man (or woman) householder is not a relation when he is not a relation" (Nissag. VI, and cf. VII, VIII, XXVII, "if he thinks that a man is not a relation......"). These clauses then run through the usual variations, depending for whether it is "woman" or "man" on the wording of the rule. Thus in Nissaggiya V it is an offence for a monk to accept a robe from the hand of a nun who is not a relation, "except in exchange." In Nissaggiya VI it is an offence for a monk to ask a man or woman householder who is not a relation for a robe, "except at the right time."

In both of these Nissaggiyas the second version of the rule

differs from the first by the insertion of the phrases, "except in exchange" and "except at the right time." But in Nissaggiya V "except in exchange" is explained in the *anujānāmi,* and is not explained again in the rule. It means, according to the *anujānāmi,* exchange with five classes of people: monks, nuns, probationers, male novices, female novices. In Nissaggiya VI however "except at the right time" is explained not only in the *anujānāmi,* but also in the text of the rule itself. Here the explanation comes after the rule and the penalty for breaking it have been set forth. The rule defines "except at the right time" to mean "if a monk becomes one whose robe is stolen or one whose robe is destroyed." Yet this is only stating in much the same way the opening words of the rather long *anujānāmi* of this Nissaggiya. For this begins by saying, "I allow monks, one whose robe is stolen or one whose robe is destroyed to ask a man or woman householder who is not a relation for a robe."

The *anujānāmi* then goes on to say what a monk should do if at the first residence he visits there is for the Order a robe or some other covering that he could put on. But if there is nothing, he must not come back to the monastery naked, but must come covered up by leaves or grass. This is in order that he shall not be taken for a naked ascetic. But here, this Nissaggiya strikes a new note. For by saying, "Whoever should so come back (naked), falls into an offence of wrong-doing," it exhibits itself as the only Nissaggiya in which the *anujānāmi* concludes with, or even contains the formulation of, a *dukkaṭa* offence.

There are however three other occasions when an offence of wrong-doing is formulated in the Nissaggiyas, and is in each case attributed to Gotama. The occurrence of other *dukkaṭa* offences in the more stereotyped clauses belonging to the Old Commentary and setting forth the offences entailed by a monk's thinking, doubting and acting, are not ascribed to the lord. I have drawn attention to the *dukkaṭa* offences formulated at the end of Nissaggiyas I and

XXI. Another occurs in Nissaggiya XXII. With this Nissaggiya we come to a discussion of what I have called Section II. I shall now point out some of the more important exceptions to the general scheme of this larger group of the Nissaggiyas.

The whole of this is arranged upon rather a different plan from all the other Nissaggiyas. It begins with the introductory story, the criticism made by the laity and taken up by the modest monks, followed by their report on Gotama. He does not rebuke the offending monks themselves, but says to those who tell him of their conduct. "How can these foolish men, not knowing moderation, ask for many bowls?" This form of indirect reproof is not however peculiar to this Nissaggiya. Then comes, as would be expected, a formulated rule with the offence for transgressing it. But in this case, the offence is not a *nissaggiya pācittiya,* but an offence of wrong-doing, "Monks, a bowl is not to be asked for. Whoever should ask (for one), there is an offence of wrong-doing." Here the "many bowls" of the story appear in the rule as "a bowl," as in Nissaggiya XXI the "hoard of bowls"

Next comes another event which again aroused lay-people's displeasure and then that of modest monks. The criticism was not however levelled because a monk had been at fault in regard to the rule. He had indeed observed it too scrupulously for the lay-people's taste, for he had received almsfood into his hands because his bowl was broken. This made him, in their eyes, "like members of other sects," and it was of this that they complained. The *dukkaṭa* rule had, in fact, been tried and found wanting, for clearly it was not elastic enough to cover those times when it might be reasonable for a monk to ask for a bowl, and when close adherence to the rule only produced undesirable results. Gotama therefore made an allowance, "I allow you, monks, when a bowl is broken or when a bowl is destroyed, to ask for a bowl."

But then there came a time when the group of six monks

abused this privilege, by asking for many bowls when theirs were only a little broken, only a little chipped, only a little scratched. Again the laity and modest monks were critical. Gotama rebuked the six monks, and set forth a rule, with the offence, a *nissaggiya pācittiya*, for infringing it: "Whatever monk should get another new bowl in exchange for a bowl mended in less than five places, there is an offence of expiation involving forfeiture."

Thus in this Nissaggiya we get a *dukkaṭa* rule framed, an *anujānāmi* and a *nissaggiya pācittiya* rule framed, and a story to account for each. The inclusion of three stories in one is unique.

As in Nissaggiya VI there is some extra material in the text of the *nissaggiya pācittiya* rule itself occurring after the rule and the penalty for breaking it have been set forth, so in Nissaggyia XXII, there is also some extra material inserted in the same way. Strangely, it deals with forfeiture, giving a definite instruction that the article wrongfully acquired is to be forfeited, saying to whom it is to be forfeited, and shortly describing the way in which another bowl is to be given to the offending monk: "That bowl is to be forfeited by that monk to the company of monks, and whatever is the last bowl belonging to that company of monks, that should be given to this monk with the words: 'Monk, this is a bowl for you; it should be kept until it breaks.' This is the proper course in this case."

In the other Nissaggiyas the person or persons to whom the article should be forfeited, together with the method of forfeiting it, are given in the Old Commentary only, and never in the rule itself. The inclusion of a rubric as to forfeiture in this place, and as an elaboration of the term *nissaggiyaṃ*, suggests that the rubric derives from days when the implications of *nissaggiyaṃ* were not so clearly understood as to be in no need of concomitant explanation.

Moreover in these directions as to forfeiture, an expression unusual in the Nissaggiyas is used. For the rule says that the article is to be forfeited not, as in either of the expressions used in the Old

Commentary on Nissaggiya XXII, in the midst of the Order, *saṁghamajjhe*, or to the Order, *saṁgha*, but to a *bhikkhuparisā*, an assembly, congregation, company of monks. The word *saṁgha-majjhe* occurs again in the Old Commentary's exegesis on Nissa-ggiyas XVIII and XIX, but *bhikkhuparisā* never.

Thus another interesting point arises in this connection. For in this Nissaggiya the new bowl got in exchange for the mended bowl, can, apparently, only be forfeited to the Order. But this is not because bowls are more particularly communal property than anything else. For robes too and all other utensils used by monks, should be regarded as communal property. Moreover in Nissaggiya XXI an extra bowl, to be forfeited if it has been used for more than ten days, may be forfeited either to the order or to a group or to an individual. I think that in the whole injunction which follows the *nissaggiya pācittiya* rule, but which as it were forms part of the rule in Nissaggiya XXII, more stress is laid on communal ownership and custom than in the other Nissaggyias, although apparent in these too. Yet in these others, although the Order or sections of it receive and return the forfeited article, the community as a whole assumes no further responsibility for it.

But here, in Nissaggiya XXII, the forfeited article is not itself given back to the monk who acquired it and forfeited it. Now, although at the end of Nissaggiya XXI failure to give back a bowl that has been forfeited is said to entail an offence of wrong-doing, in Nissaggiya XXII a bowl, on being forfeited, becomes an extra bowl for the Order, and is absorbed by the community into their stock of bowls. Otherwise only in Nissaggiyas XVIII and XIX is the forfeited article not to be given back to the monk who forfeited it. The result of the Order's obtaining an extra bowl thus is that all its members profit. For their bowls, on the accretion of this additional one, may be shuffled round. But this is not to be done haphazard.

The Old Commentary explains the right procedure. A monk

who would not follow any of the four *agatis,* wrong courses, and who would know what is taken and what is not taken, is to be agreed upon by the *saṁgha* as assigner of bowls. He should make the bowl pass (presumably the new one obtained unlawfully by the offending monk), by first asking an elder to take it. Then the elder's bowl should be offered to a second elder, doubtless according to age. "In this way the bowl should be made to pass down to the youngest member of the Order." It therefore looks as if the youngest member's bowl became free. This is "the last bowl (*pattapariyanta*) belonging to that company of monks," mentioned in the rule. And this was the bowl to be given to the offending monk.

As I have said, in all the other Nissaggiyas, except XVIII and XIX, the thing that the offender had acquired, although wrongfully, was returned to him after forfeiture and confessed his offence.

Again, in Nissaggiya XXII, in place of the clauses dealing with offences incurred by a monk's thinking and doubting with his subsequent action, are substituted clauses dealing with offences incurred if a monk gets an unmended bowl or a bowl mended in from one to five places in exchange for an unmended bowl or for one mended in from one to five places. Similarly in Nissaggiyas XI-XV, which are all concerned with rugs and the making of them, the clauses on thinking and doubting are absent, but replaced by others on finishing by himself or by others what was incompletely executed by himself or by others. It is worth noticing that Nissaggiya XXII, which in other respects is exceptional, is also alone, apart from the group of Nissaggiyas on rugs, and whose substituted clauses are all identical the one with the others, in not containing clauses on thinking and doubting.

I think it possible that this Nissaggiya may date back to some time before the pattern of the Nissaggiyas had become stereotyped and moulded into the two standardised types. It might be argued, in the first place, that this Nissaggiya points to a time when en-

trants were drawn more from those who had a true religious vocation than from those who entered from a greater variety of motives. For the earlier entrants would not have been so liable to fall into serious offences, and a *dukkaṭa* was perhaps sufficient penalty for their delinquencies. This would mean that some *dukkaṭa* offences and rules were older than some Nissaggiya offences and rules.[6] Again it might be argued that this Nissaggiya, in common with those others which contain an *anujānāmi*, an allowance, and a rule, and with these which contain two versions of a *nissaggiya pācittiya* rule, shows, as it were historically, the trial and error involved in attempts that were being made, but before they had been satisfactorily concluded, for regularising behaviour, and also for mitigating the rigidity of the rules where circumstances showed that the enforcement of the penalties they entailed led to unsuitable results.

In the third place, this Nissaggiya also suggests that there was a tendency, operative within the Order, to set up a working mechanism. The appointment of an experienced, competent monk as assigner of bowls, together with the appointment, in Nissaggiya XVIII of a silver-remover, *rūpiyachaḍḍaka*, are pieces of not unimportant historical evidence that offices in the Order were in process of creation at the time to which these Nissaggiyas purport to refer.

In the fourth place, it might be said that because the *nissaggiya pācittiya* rule itself, in Nissaggiya XXII, includes the statement that the article wrongfully acquired must be forfeited, this rule antedates the other Nissaggiyas. In these, although forfeiture is intended, or their rules, when framed, would not contain the word *nissaggiya*, it is left to the Old Commentary to supply the

6 The occurrence of four *dukkaṭa* offences in those parts of the Nissaggiyas which are not Old Commentary, should correct the impression given at *Vinaya Texts*, I. xxv that the term *dukkaṭa* occurs only "in the latest portion of the Piṭaka", i.e. in the Old Commentary.

information as to the procedure which, in Nissaggiya XXII, is made explicit in the text of the rule itself.

In the fifth place, it is possible that the word *bhikkhuparisā*, because it merely indicates an assembly, a Company of monks,[7] belongs to those earlier days before Gotama's followers had been fully organised into a *saṁgha,* bound by the same observances and obligations, the same rule, and living in the same communion.

In the sixth place, it is possible that, since the forfeited article was taken possession of by the "company of monks," a time is thereby indicated when communal ownership and usage were more actual than nominal.

Lastly, an argument might be based on the fact, although I am not prepared to press this, that in this Nissaggiya a monk incurs offences by merely *doing* something, namely getting an unmended bowl in exchange for another unmended one, and so forth, and not by thinking and doubting and then acting. This, it might be said, is because Nissaggiya XXII derives from a time prior to the growth of interest in psychology, to a time prior to much analysis of mind-processes, to a time when a monk's actions were the criterion of the penalties deserved, and not these coupled with the thoughts and doubts preceding his actions. But the same conclusions would then have to be drawn from the action, namely the finishing of the rugs, which occurs without the more usual references to thinking and doubting, in Nissaggiyas XI-XV. And in any case these clauses belong to the Old Commentary.

As there are grounds for thinking that the twelfth Saṅghādisesa represents some specially ancient fragment of the Pātimokkha,[8] so I believe there may also be grounds for thinking that Nissaggiya XXII represents some other ancient fragment.

7 It is possible too that in such a context *bhikkhu* did not mean all that it at some time came to mean.

8 See *Book of the Discipline,* I. xxix.

Besides Nissaggiya XXII there are two others, Nos. XVIII and XIX, which, as has been mentioned, do not prescribe the return of the forfeited article to the monk who obtained it unlawfully. These two Nissaggiyas, although not saying so in their rule, also require the monk to forfeit the article to the Order only, and not to a group or individual. For both are concerned with gold and silver, called *jātarūparajata* in the one case and *rūpiya* in the other. These commodities may not be forfeited to a monk, for the rule itself precludes him from having either gold or silver in his possession. The *saṁgha* is more impersonal. As Buddhaghosa points out in his Commentary (VA. 691), *rūpiya* is not allowable, therefore it is not said that it must be forfeited "to the Order or to a group or to an individual," for however little is taken it cannot be exchanged for allowable goods, therefore it is to be forfeited in the midst of the Order. This expression, "it must be forfeited in the midst of the Order" *Saṁghamajjhe*, is peculiar to Nissaggiyas XVIII, XIX and XXII. The Order should dispose of the gold and silver by getting some lay-follower, according to the text of the Old Commentary, either to obtain medicine with them, or to throw them away. Failing both these eventualities, a monk should be agreed upon by the Order as silver-remover, whose business it would be to throw the gold and silver away, making no sign that he is doing so. The method of appointing the silver-remover is the same as the method of appointing the assigner of bowls in Nissaggiya XXII.

Having now considered Nissaggiya XXII which, even although it contains an *anujānāmi*, is unique in form, it will be found that the four Nissaggiyas III, XV, XXIII and XXIX, in what I call Section II, also contain an *anujānāmi*. They are therefore, on account of this point, exceptions to the general pattern of Section II.

Three of these Nissaggiyas Nos. III, XXVIII, XXIX are concerned with the laying aside of robes. All of them begin with an introductory story, at the conclusion of which comes the *anujānāmi*,

attributed as is invariable, to Gotama. This, in Nissaggiya III, reads, "I allow you, monks, having accepted a robe not at the specified time to lay it aside in the expectation of a robe;" in Nissaggiya XXVIII, "I allow you, monks, having accepted a special robe (*acceka-cīvara,* i.e. a robe given by somebody in a hurry or emergency, who wants to give with no delay) to lay it aside;" and in Nissaggiya XXIX, "I allow you, monks, when staying in lodgings in the jungle, to lay aside one of the three robes inside a house." The *anujānāmi* is in each case followed by a story showing that, probably thoughtlessly and not deliberately, the monks caused some abuse of the allowance. In Nissaggiya III and XXVIII exactly the same story is told and in exactly the same words, the only difference being that each naturally employs the words of its own *anujānāmi*. After this story comes the rule, improved to meet the kinds of events that intervened after the allowance had been given and then the Old Commentary arranged on the normal pattern with explanations of terms used in the rule and the occasions when no offence in connection with the rule is incurred.

Nissaggiya XV also contains an *anujānāmi*, ascribed as is usual to Gotama, but it is of rather a different pattern from the others. It is, "I allow those monks who are jungle-dwellers, who are almsmen, who wear robes to come up to see me if they wish." A long story is related before the rule is framed. Unique in the Nissaggiyas is the statement found in Nissaggiya XV which precedes the laying down of the rule. In all the other Nissaggiyas without exception, it is said that the unsuitable behaviour of the offending monks is "not for pleasing those who are not yet pleased, nor for increasing the number of those who are pleased. And thus this rule of training for monks should be set forth." But here Gotama is recorded as saying, "I will lay down a rule of training for monks based on ten grounds," which are stated.[9] There is very

9 Cf. also *Vin.* iii. 21, A. i. 98, 100, v. 70.

good reason for this. For in Nissaggiya XV, Gotama is not portrayed as receiving criticisms of unbecoming behaviour, but as himself detecting tokens of behaviour which struck him as undesirable, in the sense that it savoured of deception, less probably because it was wasteful or injurious to health. He saw here and there discarded rugs lying about, and was told that monks, longing for a sight of him, had discarded their rugs, thereby apparently assuming the sign (*aṅga*) of jungle-dwellers, of almsmen, of wearers of rag-robes. The rule itself appears at first sight, to bear little relation to the events recorded as leading up to its formulation, but it is in reality a nice example of Gotama's methods of gentle coercion. It is concerned with the way in which to make a new *nisīdanasanthata*, which is a difficult word to translate. Here it is enough to say that *nisīdana* is a piece of cloth to sit upon, and is so called if it has a border, while *santhata* is most likely a rug. It is very possible that Gotama realised that the monks would need new rugs in the place of those that they had discarded, since really they were nothing but ordinary monks, and not the more austere jungle-dwellers, almsmen and wearers of rag-robes who could dispense with things like rugs.

The legacy which they, in their deception, have bequeathed to posterity is that when a new *nisīdanasanthata* is being made for a monk, he must take a piece from all round an old *santhata*, rug, in order to disfigure the new *nisīdanasanthata*.

I. B. Horner

Tun-Huang Tibetan Documents on a Dharmadāna

In vol. II of the *Inventaire des manuscripts tibétains de Touen-Houang conservés à la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris,* will appear a great number of documents dealing with the civil and reilgious life of the country around Tun-Huang during the ninth to eleventh centuries. Some of them refer among other topics to jurisprudence, commerce, administration, family life, and throws light upon the social organization. References to pious donations, lists of texts copied by groups of monks and nuns, inventories of ecclesiastical properties, and so forth show the activity of Buddhist life.

The present document[1] is concerned with "a great gift of the Law" made by king Khri-gcug-lde-brcan (ཁྲི་གཙུག་ ལྡེ་བཙན་). The gift consists of hundreds of copies of the *Amitāyus sūtra* in Tibetan and in Chinese, and in the offering of a stūpa. Although the text does not mention expressly, we may assume that this stūpa was meant to shelter the copies of the sacred texts. The gift of the stūpa was proposed by the queen, was announced to the laymen through the medium of the saṅgha of bhikṣu and bhikṣuṇī from Ça-Cu (ཤ་ཙུ) (Tun-huang), and two thousand and seven hundred laymen answered to the saṅgha's appeal.

The manuscript does not only relate those facts, it is also an account which gives a receipt in full of the expenditure made for the copying. It is provided with five seals, three of which are still perfectly legible notwithstanding the friability of the material upon which they were stamped. Two of the seals repeat Hoṅ-ben's (ཧོང་ བེན) name, the third is that of Dbaṅ-mchog (དབང་མཆོག). The presence of the name, and above all of the seal, of Sthavira

1 Pelliot Tibetan Fond, temporary n° 260.

Hoṅ-ben in this act is of very great consequence, because Hoṅ-ben is unquestionably the same person as the monk Hong-pien mentioned in an imperial edict dated A.D. 851 which is engraved on a stone discovered at Tun-Huang, in the cave where the manuscripts were found.[2] The present deed, stamped with Hoṅ-ben's seal, may then be ascribed to the middle of the ninth century, and looked on with certainty as one of the most ancient pieces among the finds of Tibetan manuscripts brought to Paris by M. Pelliot.[3]

The text offers some of the peculiarities often found in the Tun-huang language: liquid labial nasal sound before *i* or *e*: *myed* (མྱེད) for class. *med* (མེད); contraction of the final of the word and of the initial of the particle which follows it: *phyogsu* (ཕྱོགསུ) class. *phyogs-su* (ཕྱོགས་སུ); adjunction of the semi-vowel འ་ after some finals in *a* (it is found here three times out of four in the word *brgya* (བརྒྱའ) and after *e* for instance: *dpe'* (དཔེའ) for class.

2 Cf. P. Pelliot, *une bibliothéque médiévale retrouvée au kau-sou, BEFEO.*, 1908, p. 503, and the translation of this inscription by E. Chavannes, in *Serindia.*

3 Other Tibetan manuscripts of Tun-huang refer to Hoṅben as follows:

The *ban-de* Hoṅ-ben is mentioned in a list of monks who settled a dispute over the ownership of slave women's children (temp. n° 268).

The *mkhan-po* Hoṅ-ben, receives Dbyig-gi rgyan's (དབྱིག་གི་རྒྱན) request (temp. n° 05001).

The *mkhan-po* Hoṅ-ben receives a missive referring to a donation by a prince (*lha-sras*); this document, very much damaged, is possibly connected with the text studied here (temp. n° 02062).

The *mkhan-po* Hoṅ-ben receives a message from Kim-kaṅ (temp. n° 02004).

Hoṅ-ben as well as Mtha-yas (མཐ་ཡས), Lha-'co (ལྷ་འཚོ), and Lha-dpal (ལྷ་དཔལ) send a request to the *naṅ-rje-po blon* (ནང་རྗེ་པོ་བློན) Ldoṅ-bzaṅ (ལྡོང་བཟང) (temp. n° 02060).

Document heavily damaged, but which is a request to the *mkhan-po* Hoṅ-ben (temp. n° 02061).

dpe (དཔེ); use of an aspirate in the words which do not possess one in class. : *gthad* (གཐད) for *gtad* (གཏད), *ched* (ཆེད) for class. *chen* (ཆེན).

Some obscure points still remain, which future research in documents of the same origin will make it possible to explain, but the interest of the present deed, which is fortunately undamaged, stands undiminished by this.

TEXT

༄༅ || sun lha-sras khri-gcug-lde-brcan-gyi sku-yon-du|| ça-cur rgya bod-gyi dar-ma che-dpag-tu-myed pa bris-te|| 'baṅs phyogsu chos-gyi-sbyin-ba ched-po khyab-par mjad-par sbyar-te|| luṅ huṅ si'i gcug-lag-khaṅ-gi dar-ma'i bjod-du brubs-pa-las|| rgya'i che-dpag-tu-myed-pa bam-po brgya'-sum-cu-rca-lṅa daṅ bod-gyi bam-po bźi-brgya'-brgyad-cu ste| spyi-sdom-bam-po drug-brgya-rca-bco-lṅa|| byi-ba lo'i dpyid-sla tha-cuṅs ches brgyad-la|| jo-mo bcan-mo 'phan-gyi yum sras-gyi pho-braṅ 'od-sruṅ-gi sku-yon-du|| ça-cu'i dge-'dun sde-gñis-gyis|| ça-cu yul phyogs-gyi khyim-pa| sku-yon-du bsṅos-te mchod-rten gcig scald-par|| pho-braṅ-gi mjad-byaṅ daṅ 'phrin-byaṅ|| chos-gyi-gñi-'jin daṅ bde-blon-gyi 'phrin-byaṅ-las 'byuṅ-nas|| khyim-pa ñi-stoṅ-bdun-brgya' mchod-rten- scal-pa'i du-su|| chos-gyi-sbyin-ba chen-po bgyis-pa'i rgyar-spyad-par|| gnas-brtan ban-de hoṅ-ben daṅ dbaṅ-mchog-gis gthad-de god-nas|| dar-ma'i rub-ma-pa ban-de yun hyve'i-he daṅ| li dam-'guṅ dar-ma'i god daṅ gtan-chigsu 'chaṅ-du scald-te|| slad-gyis dar-ma'i spyi-rcis nam̤ mjad-pa'i che| god rgya 'di daṅ| god-yig bla-dpe' mchis-pa daṅ gtugs-nas|| mthun-na god scal-bar bgyis-te| gtan-chigs sug-rgya-can 'chaṅ-du scald-pa||

༄༅ །། སྲུན་ ལྷ་སྲས་ ཁྲི་ གཙུག་ ལྡེ་བརྩན་ཀྱི་ སྐུ་ ཡོན་དུ །།
ཤ་ཅུར་ཀྱུ་ བོད་ཀྱི་ དར་མ་ཆེ་ དཔག་ད་ མྱེད་པ་ བྱིས་དེ །། འབངས་
ཕྱོགསུ་ ཆོས་ཀྱི་ སྦྱིན་ བ་ཆེད་པོ་ ཁྱབ་པར་ མཛད་པར་ སྦྱར་དེ །། ལྷུང་
ཧུང་ སིའི་ གཙུག་ ལག་ ཁང་གི་ དར་མའི་ བཟོད་དུ་ བྲབས་ པ་ལས །།
ཀྱིའི་ ཆེ་ དཔག་དུ་ མྱེད་པ་ བམ་པོ་ བརྒྱའ་སུམ་ ཅུ་ཙ་ལྔ་ དང་བོད་ཀྱི་
བམ་པོ་ བཞི་ བརྒྱའ་ བརྒྱད་ ཅུ་སྟེ ། སྦྱི་ སྤོམ་ བམ་པོ་ དྲུག་ བརྒྱ་ ཙ་
བཅོ་ལྔ །། ཁྲི་ བ་ལོའི་ དཔྱིད་སླ་ཐ་ ཙུངས་ ཆེས་ བརྒྱད་ ལ ། རྗེ་མོ་
བཙན་མོ་ འཕན་ཀྱི་ ཡུམ་སྲས་ཀྱི་ ཕོ་ བྲང་ འོད་ སྲུང་གི་ སྐུ་ ཡོན་དུ །།
ཤ་ ཅུའི་ དགེ་ འདུན་ སྡེ་ གཉིས་ ཀྱིས །། ཤ་ཅུ་ ཡུལ་ ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་
ཁྱིམ་པ ། སྐུ་ ཡོན་དུ་ བསྔོས་དེ་ མཆོད་ རྟེན་ གཅིག་ སྩལད་པར །།
ཕོ་ བྲང་གི་ མཛད་ བྱང་ དང་ འཕྲིན་ བྱང །། ཆོས་ཀྱི་ གཉི་ འཛིན་
དང་ བདེ་བློན་གྱི་ འཕྲིན་ བྱང་ ལས་ འབྱུང་ནས །། ཁྱིམ་པ་ཉི་ སྟོང་
ཀྲུན་ བརྒྱའ་ མཆོད་ རྟེན་ སྩལ་པའི་ དུ་སུ །། ཆོས་ཀྱི་ སྦྱིན་ བ་ཆེན་པོ་
བགྱིས་པའི་ རྒྱུར་ སྦྱད་པར །། གནས་ བརྟན་ བན་དེ་ཧོང་ བེན་ དང་
དབང་ མཆོག་གིས་ གཐད་དེ་ གོད་ནས །། དར་མའི་ཅུབ་མ་པ་ བན་དེ་
ཡུན་ ཀྭའི་ ཀེ་ དང ། ལི་དམ་ འགུང་ དར་མའི་ གོད་དང་ གདན་ ཚིགསུ
འཆང་ དུ་སྩལད་དེ །། སླད་ཀྱིས་ དར་མའི་ སྤྱི་རྩིས་ ནཾ་ མཛད་ པའི་ཆེ །
གོད་ཀྱུ་ འདི་དང ། གོད་ ཡིག་ ཐྲ་ དཔེའ་ མཆིས་པ་དང་ གདུགས་
ནས །། མཐུན་ ན་ གོད་སྩལ་བར་བགྱིས་དེ ། གདན་ ཚིགས་སུག་ཀྱུ་ཅན་
འཆང་དུ་སྩལད་པ །།

TRANSLATION

As a gift from God's son (*lha-sras* ལྷ་སྲས)[4] Khri-gcug-lde-brcan[5] (ཁྲི་གཙུག་ལྡེ་བརྩན) the Chinese and Tibetan texts of the Amitāyus[6] sūtra have been written down and prepared at Ça-cu (ཤ་ཅུ) in order to manifest a great gift of the Law, for the benefit of the subjects; when they were deposited in the library[7] of the Luṅ-huṅ-si[8] *vihāra,* there were a hundred and thirty-six *bam-po* (བམ་པོ) of the Amitāyus sūtra in Chinese and four hundred and eighty *bam-po* in Tibetan, upon the whole six hundred and fifteen *bam-po.*

4 Meaning king instead of "prince", which is the usual meaning. About the title devaputra, translated exactly by *lha-sras,* cf. the article by Sylvain Lèvi, *JA.*, Jan.-March, 1934, in particular pp. 3, 10 and 11, note 1. In the record edited by F. W. Thomas, *JRAS.*, 1928, pp. 98 and 90, Khri-gcug-lde-brcan is also called *lha-sras;* likewise in ms. n° 130 of the *Inventaire des manuscripts tibétains de Touen-houang,* vol. I, which reads *lha-sris* (ལྷ་སྲིས). But here the first syllable of the document, *sun* (སུན) is obscure.

5 The graphy *brcan* (བརྩན) for *bcan* (བཙན) of this syllable of the king's name should be compared to the graphy *nram* (ནྲམ) for class. *nam* (ནམ) *sprur* (སྤྲུར) for class. *spur* (སྤུར) already observed in manuscript temp. n° 202 (cf. *Document tibétain de Touen-houang sur l'expansion bouddhique, Le Dhyāna chinois, JA.* Av.-Juin 1939 (in the press). But the insertion of *r,* constant in the final syllable of the king's name (cf. Hackin, *Formulaire sanscrit-tibétain*) can never be found in *bcan-po* (བཙན་པོ) or *bcan-mo.*

6 Hundreds of copies in Tibetan of the Amitāyus Sūtra, quite in a new state, have been found in the Ts'ien-fo-tong and are kept in the National Library of Paris.

7 *bjod* (བཇོད) for class. *mjod* (མཇོད) "treasure".

8 Luṅ-Huṅ-si (ལུང་ཧུང་སི) most probably the Long-hing-sseu, cf. *BEFEO.*, 1908, p. 518.

On the eighth day of the last month in the spring of the year of the Rat, the queen, as a gift from the 'Od-sruṅ[9] Palace of the 'Phan-yum-sras ordered the saṅgha of both sexes of the Ça-cu country to announce "Laymen of the country of Ça-cu! Having resolved to make a donation, a stūpa has been offered. Motion and message[10] from the Palace". After the publication of the *chos-gyi gźi-'jin's*[11] (ཆོས་གྱི་ གཞི་འཛིན) and the *bde-blon's*[12] message, one thousand and seven hundred laymen shared in the offering of the stūpa.

The "expenditure license" for the execution of the great gift of the Law having been delivered by the Sthavira *ban-de* Hoṅ-ben and by Dbaṅ-mchog,[13] after the expenses[14] were made, the *rub-ma-pa*[15] of the Scriptures (*dar-ma*) the *ban-de* Yun Hyve'i-he

9 Cf. *Inventaire des manuscripts tibétains de Touen-houang*, n° 131. 'Phan-yul (འཕན་ ཡུལ) is a place often mentioned in the colophons of the Tanjur, cf. *Répertoire du Tanjur*, s.v., about *'Phan-gyi-yum-sras*, cf. the name of the palace *Yum-bu-kla-sgan* the first element of which is parallel with *yum-sras*.

10 The use of *byaṅ* (བྱང) class. *byaṅ-bu* (བྱང་བུ) is very frequent in the Tun-huang texts, with the meaning of "tables" then of "message"; cf. F. W. Thomas, *JRAS.*, 1934, p. 109.

11 *chos-gźi* (ཆོས་གཞི) describes, according to Desgodins, the estates belonging to the communities; the *chos-gyi-gźi-'jin* (ཆོས་གྱི་གཞི་འཛིན) (*dharma-vastudhara*) would be the manager or *vihārasvāmin*,, cf. S. Lèvi, *Quelques titres énigmatiques du Bouddhisme indien*, *JA.* 1915, p. 201.

12 The duties of the *bde-blon* (བདེ་བློན) important ones, are not clearly defined.

13 Dbaṅ-mchog (དབང་མཆོག) might be the translation of an Indian name *Indrottama.

14 *god* (གོད) =class. *goṅ* (གོང) cf. F. W. Thomas, *JRAS.*, 1927, p. 837.

15 *rub-ma-pa* (རུབ་མ་པ་) cf. *rub-pa* (རུབ་པ) which means "to gather, to collate, to close"; this official is perhaps the librarian, or "curator"?

(ཕུན་ ཧྦེའི་ཧེ) and Li Dam-'guṅ (ལི་དམ་འགུང་) have been given the bills of expenditure for the scriptures; on the day where the total account for the scriptures is made, this extent of expenditure has been added up *gtugs* (གཏུགས) and entered on the Great Book of the expenses; in agreement, the expenses have been paid back and the bill signed[16] *sug-rgya can* (སུག་རྒྱ་ཅན) has been put in possession.

[Five seals follow. One of them, repeated, bears Hoṅ-ben's name; the design is not clear (perhaps a bird with spread wings). On another, Dbaṅ-mchog reads easily, the name being topped with an element which perhaps is *bde-bloṅ;* the drawing represents a sort of salamander. The two other seals are illegible].

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16 In the official or private deeds of Tun-huang, some terms describing the signature, the stamp or the seal should be defined precisely *Sug-rgya* (སུག་རྒྱ) that we find here is the equivalent of *phyag-rgya* (ཕྱག་རྒྱ) (*mudrā*) that I translate by "Seal" print in relievo. *Dpaṅ-rgya* (དཔང་རྒྱ) formed with *dpaṅ/dpaṅ-po* (དཔང་དཔང་པོ) "witness, warrant" would be the attestation. In these texts where a dpaṅ-rgya (དཔང་རྒྱ་) is mentioned, it is always in the sense of the seal of a warrant and moreover it is always a print in relievo instead of being just a stamp. There is no material difference then between dpaṅ-rgya (དཔང་རྒྱ) and sug-rgya (སུག་རྒྱ) but a difference in the character of the person who signs with the seal *Sug-yig* (སུག་ ཡིག) in the manual signature.

More about Dhyāna

Had Louis de la Vallée Poussin consented to become our guest, as we suggested, when in the last war, brutal and treacherous smothering of his country sent him an exile to Britain, what was mere acquaintance might have developed into interchange of thought, by which I should have greatly profited. As things befell, mere acquaintance got no further,[1] and what I have here to say is only an impersonal tribute to the memory of a veteran of Buddhist research. And if I quote him in one word only, it is to differ from him. Namely, he called the Pali *jhāna 'les quatre extases,'*[2] and I emphatically do not.

In writing 'More about Dhyāna', I have to recall to short memories, that it is now nearly 12 years since, in this Journal (1927), I first put forward a *new theory* as to the nature and aim of *jhāna* in quite early Buddhism. I had anticipated this position in *Gotama the Man*, but that had to wait two years for a publisher. But in 1931, I devoted a chapter to establishing my theory by canonical evidence in my *Sakya, or Origins of Buddhism*. My theory was this, that, discarding such terms for *dhyāna* as ecstasy, rapture, trance, meditation, the historically correct definition of *jhāna* in the Pali Canon was a training to be in readiness, by attention by a mental *tabula rasa* or 'clean slate' (*parisuddhi*), and poise, for developing certain psychic gifts. The object of this development was chiefly that more in life (*bhiyyobhāva*) which comes to him or her, who can be aware of the sympathetic presence of the *deva* or *devatā,* worthy men of other worlds, and enter into converse with them, and profit by their wider knowledge of life.

1 I enjoyed his hospitality in 1923 at Brussels, for a few days' Congress but not in his house.

2 In his *Nirvāṇa*.

I am not here repeating the evidence I gave, but once given, it should become crucial. It should indeed be enough to note the use, rare elsewhere, of the prefix *dibba, divya*: 'belonging to devas', in *jhāna* contexts: *dibbacakkhu, -sota, -sayana*. But no! I have failed all these years to see any attention favourable or hostile paid to my evidence, either in India or Europe, at least in printed form. Save only in one publication by a few converts to Buddhism, and there, whereas no heed whatever is paid to my theory, my term for *jhāyati, jhāna*: 'musing', is turned down as feeble, negative and inadequate.

It is mainly to buttress this my term, that I here add a More. It seemed reasonable enough, though admitted by a make-shift term, for me to find it unnecessary to apologise for substituting it in *Sakya*, or in later books. Even in presenting Mr. F. L. Woodward's *Book of the Gradual Sayings*, I, (Pali Text Soc. 1932), I left it to stand on its own feet. But since I have come to know of the one scrubby little depreciation, I have come to see, that my 'musing' is better than a mere make-shift term, having the masterpieces of our Elizabethan literature at its back. Moreover, the partial transition in meaning in the early Sakyan tradition, of the word *sati* (*smṛti*) needed to be brought out. Lastly, it is not sufficiently realized by those who would see in all Buddhism, old and later, a cult largely given to meditation, contemplation with concentration, how much, by their rendering of certain words, they are importing meanings that were oiginally not there. Let me take these points in brief detail.

Since my one critical notice gives no reason for its dissatisfaction with my choice of 'musing', I can only assume, that for it, musing means a compound of mere reverie[3] or mental meandering, and those nine pensive woman-symbols of Greek culture, the Muses;

3 Lord Chalmers persistently used 'revive' for Jhāna as his after-thought in his *Sutta-Nipāta*. In such matters he was the man of letters, not the scholar.

absentmindedness, 'brown study'. It has been forgotten that in the Shakespeare plays the usual meaning is alert attention and surmise. Thus Edward IV to his brothers overhearing: "you muse what chat we two have had?" And Bertram to Helena: "to entreat you, that...you rather muse than ask, why I entreat you"... And Alonso, at Prospero's "strange shapes":

"I cannot too much muse:
Such shapes, such gesture and such sound"...

And the Dauphin in King John:

"I muse your majesty doth seem so cold?"

How different is the usage here from just desultory work of mind. So closely, for English literature, is musing allied to attentive surmise, that as our lexicographer Skeat reminds us, the word is derived from old French and Italian words for muzzle or snout: "to hould one's muzle or snout in the aire", as a dog[4] with paw uplifted sniffs. And it is precisely this alert attention which, I hold, was originally aimed at in *jhāna,* as betrayed by the fourfold formula and the contexts I cited.

And to express this there was no better word than *jhāyati,* a derivative of *dhī,* to think. Whitney, in *Sanskrit Roots,* may translate just by 'think'; Geiger in *Pali,* may translate just by 'meditieren' (why this foreign term for the land of Kultur?). But neither is really concerned with the history of thought; their aim is word-inflections. Max-Müller and Dr. Hume in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* have the literary aim, it is true, and the one puts 'reflection', the other 'meditation'. But how much better in that aim is not Deussen's 'sinnen', and the preference given to 'sinnen' for 'dhyāna' in Boethlingk and Roth. Readers will recollect the passage: "Earth as it were muses; atmosphere, heaven, water, mountain, as it were muses..." How, for the nature-lover, does not 'sinnen',

4 Florio, 16th cent. lexicographer.

'musing', here make appeal! How does it not call up, say, a hilly landscape, volcanic or stratified in outline, brooding as it were either over a long past or over things to come? Even if we see, in musing, association with the Greek *mousa*, we are still referred by the philologian, not to static absorption, but to a root (*maō*) signifying eager desire, yearning, excitement, effort. Let it then by candid critics be reconsidered, whether my choice of the word 'musing' be indeed so very inadequate.

It is very possible, though it must be now a guess, that the great prominence given, in earliest Buddhism, to the practice of *jhāna*, helped to induce a new force in the word *sati*. For 'memory', there was already the word *saraṇa*. Yet here, the Pali breakdown from *smṛ* to *sar* may have been complicated by that other breakdown from *śri* into *sar*, growing in proportion as the term *saraṇa*: 'something gone to, a refuge', became over more the orthodox outlook on 'Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha.' For indeed *saraṇa* 'as remembering' is a very rare word in the Pali Canon. On the other hand *sati* is far oftener used to mean what my husband sagaciously termed 'mindfulness', the mental, alert heedfulness, rather as to things present and possible, than to things past, which is so marked a feature in the Sutta teaching. Thus, to be *sato* or *satimā* is not to be so much 'remembering' as to be either analyzing (as in the four *satipaṭṭhānas*) or on one's guard. It is true that, in the *abhiññā* of *pubbe-nivās'ânussati*, memory of former 'lives', *sati* is certainly recollection, but the enforcement of a prefix seemed necessary, as it seemed in the six, and then ten *anussatis*, which again are not so much, exercises in memory about devas, death and the rest as a summing up mentally what each concept amounts to—and one cannot well recollect one own dying.

Any way the apex of *jhāna* preparation was held to be attaining to a purified *sati*, with poise. And when we consider that this meant, less a remembering, more a mindful alertness, we see

jhāna as the men of the jhāna-formula saw it: the being ready and attentive. Remember too there was no good word for 'attention'. Later on, *manasikāra* became specialized as this, but, in the Suttas, it is a very general term for work of mind.

Attention as to what? In the *Majjhima-Nikāya,* wherein great frequency to jhāna-reference is found, the fourfold formula is shown ten times as followed abruptly, (without explanation for the sequence but as a thing habitual, prescribed) by the formulas of the *abhiññās,* all but the later sixth and last of which describe psychic gifts. Two of these, sight and hearing, are referred to as deva-conditions (*dibba-, divya*), wrongly translated as celestial. And it requires no great intelligence to see, that the preparation described as of jhāna was to favour the development, the practice of one or other of those five gifts.

But in other ten Suttas of the *Majjhima,* the fourfold formula is followed no less abruptly by a fourfold formula khown as *arūpa-jhāna* or *vimokkha.* These are very different, are great fetches in abstract thought. Further, they are so far from being prepared for by the fourfold formula, that this would be a positive deterrent, a disability, for their practice. Abstract thought cannot be indulged in or realized in word description if analytic and reflective thinking be first eliminated. But the Jhāna-formula *begins with this elimination.* Clearly therefore, in the abstract *arūpajhāna*, we have a later practice won to orthodox approval, and the formula for it substituted by editors, so as to effect the minimum change with maximum recognition. We may exclaim it is true, that the worthy editors would not do anything so self-contradictory! Well, our psychology is now more advanced in analysis, than was theirs, and for all we know, the abstractions may have been viewed as so many flashes of what we are pleased to call *intuition*, and only made absurd as not of thought, (eliminated), when so worded as to resemble fetches of *thinking*.

I would only, here, add this: Pali is singularly poor in words for what we call meditation, contemplation, once we disentangle such terms as *jhāna* and *bhāvanā*. These have been assumed by translators to mean great and pervasive work in meditation, a word that surely means toil of intellect. If *jhāna* mean alert attention, *bhāvanā* means 'making-become', or that spiritual growing, which is by no means solely or even mainly recondite intellection. Of this I have written elsewhere. The usual word, in the Suttas, for attitude and preoccupation in thought is *paṭi-sallāna* (for *-lāyana*), with or without *rahogato* 'gone into solitude.' Now this idiom is *never associated* with *jhāna*. Gotama is shown sitting in, lit., 'solitary cleaving'; he thereupon gets up and follows a course of action. Even when, as is rare, a disciple asks him, or another, for "a theme in brief, the which having heard he may abide self-contained, solitary, ardent, zealous," there is no syllable indicating he was going to sit brooding on it. May be he was, but the words *we* should put in are not there.

I am not maintaining, that the absence of the fit word implies he was not. Have I not repeatedly affirmed, that Buddhism was a gospel of will, with no such fit word for it? But this poverty in word should make us more guarded in fitting a life of much meditative brooding on to the shoulders of men like the first Buddhists. There is no safe guarantee that, in their teaching we see a tendency to spend hours immersed in pure, and especially in abstract work of mind. That preoccupation tends ever to lose the one chief thing, the Man and his growth, in 'ideas about' him and this and that. From its very first utterance, as recorded, the New Word was *the quest of the very man*, potentially divine, if not actually so......as yet. And it is a striking fact that, in the commentary on *jhāna*, as dealt with in Abhidhamma, the question is raised: "But who is it who here is seeking access to a better world (*rūpaloka*, the Brahmā-deva world)? for with a going there must be a goer?"

What a contrast to the later-compiled essay,[5] where, so engrossing has been the pondering over 'ideas about', that a concluding injunction enjoins: "Way is there but no goer"!

Jhāna was emphatically a concern of the Man, seeking, not some blank void, as 'all is space', 'all is mind', 'there is nothing', 'there is neither this nor that', but *the Man elsewhere, elsewise*, the men namely, he had come to call *devas, devatās*, the worthy men of the next world, of the better world than that next. Developing deva-hearing, deva-sight, deva-thought, he could come to find, *as we too may find*, that with them he was in no need of dying first, to be in converse with nobler, lovelier conditions of living. Here and now he could be in a More than earth-life afforded, meeting with unfailing sympathy and will to help. Verily, Gotama is shown saying, this is, for me here and now, extreme happiness: the staying among, and conversing with devas, *when in fourth jhāna*.[6] Little wonder is there that we find him alluded to as "Gotama muser seated in the wood'.[7]

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5 *Visuddhi-magga*.
6 *Majjhima*, II, 37.
7 *Sutta-Nipāta*, ver. 165.

Date of the Haṭhayogapradīpikā of Svātmārāma Muni

Dr. J. N. Farquhar has dealt with "Muslim Influence" on Hindu religion in his *Outlines of the Religious Literature of India*[1] and assigned it to a period between A.D. 1350 and 1800 (Chap. VII). This chapter on "Muslim Influence" includes a note on the *Gorakhnāthis*[2] and their literature. The *Haṭhayogapradīpikā*[3] a standard manual dealing with the theory and practice of the Haṭhayoga forms part of this literature as the Gorakhnāthis are great adepts in the practice of Haṭhayoga. Evidently, therefore, the date of the *Haṭhayogapradīpikā* (=*HP*) according to Farquhar must lie between 1350 and 1800 A.D. though he regards the *HP* as the earliest of the three modern Haṭhayoga texts viz. the *HP*,[4] the *Gheraṇḍa Saṁhitā*[5] and the *Śiva Saṁhitā*.[6]

Dr. Farquhar's view about the modern character of the *HP*, is further supported by the remarks of Dr. P. C. Bagchi[7] on the list of the Mahāsiddhas[8] mentioned in the *HP*. These remarks read as follows:—

1 Published by Oxford University Press, London, 1920. 2 *Ibid.*, pp. 348-349.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 348—Dr. Farquhar observes:—"On the *Haṭhayoga* and the *Gorakṣa-śataka* which are mentioned above as works attributed to Gorakhnāth, three more modern works depend, the *Haṭhayogapradīpikā* by Svātmārāma Yogīndra, the disciple of Śrināth, the *Gheraṇḍa Saṁhitā* and the *Śivasaṁhitā*. The first is the earliest of the three. The *Pradīpikā* and the *Gheraṇḍa Saṁhitā* deal with the same subjects but only part of the *Śivasaṁketa* is devoted to *Haṭhayoga*; the rest of it is more like a treatise on Śāktayoga."

4 Text and Eng. Tr. in the *Sacred Books of the Hindus* (=*SBH.*), Panini Office, Allahabad. Text and Eng. Tran. in TPH. series, Adyar.

5 Text and Eng. Tran. in SBH. German Tran. in *Fakir and Fakirtum* by Richard Schmidt, Berlin, 1908.—Text and Eng. Tran. in TPH. series, Adyar.

6 Text and Eng. Tran. in *SBH.* by S. C. Vasu.

7 *Kaulajñānanirṇaya* (Calcutta Sanskrit series) 1934, Intro., p. 19.

8 I record for ready reference the list of Mahāsiddhas from the TPH. (Adyar) edition of the *HP*:—

आदिनाथ (p. 2, 8, 96, 202); आदिनाथेन शंभुना (p. 155); श्रीगुरुनाथं (p. 4); मत्स्येन्द्रगोरक्षाद्याः (p. 7); मत्स्येन्द्र (p. 2); शाबर (p. 3); आनंदभैरव (p. 4); चौरङ्गी

"Svātmārāma Yogīndra in his *Haṭhayogapradīpikā* (I, 4 ff.) extols him, (i.e. Matsyendranātha) along with Gorakṣanātha as the first connoisseur of the science of Haṭha. In the same book is also given a list of the Mahāsiddhas who are believed to have controlled the influence of time by their spiritual attainments. The name of Matsyendra stands in that list, second only to Śrī Ādinātha i.e. Śiva. *This list does not seem to be very old as like all the late traditions it considers Mīnanātha as different from Matsyendra.* It contains the names of some Siddhas whom we know from the Buddhist tradition of the 84 Siddhas. Some of these names occur in this list in very currupt forms: e.g. Nāradeva for Nāḍapaṇḍita, Ṭiṇṭiṇi for Ḍheṇḍhaṇa, Virūpākṣa for Virūpā etc. This shows that the list of the *Haṭhayogapradīpikā belongs to a period when the memories of the great Siddhas had already become old.*"[9]

Though both Dr. Farquhar and Dr. Bagchi regard the *HP*, as comparatively a modern work, no attempt has been made by them

(p. 5); मीनः (p.6); गोरक्षः (p. 7); विरूपाक्ष (p. 8); बिलेशय (p. 9) ; मन्थान (p. 10); भैरव (p. 11); सिद्धिः (p. 12); बुद्धः (p. 13); कन्थडिः (p. 14); कोरण्टकः (p. 15); सुरानन्दः (p. 16); सिद्धपादः (p. 17); चर्पटिः (p. 18); कानेरी (p. 19); पूज्यपादः (p. 20); नित्यनाथः (p. 21); निरञ्जन (p. 22); कपाली (p. 22); बिन्दुनाथः (p. 24); काकचण्डीश्वर (p. 28); अल्लमप्रभुदेवः (p. 29); घोंडाचोली (p. 30); टिण्टिणिः (p. 31); भानुकी (p.32); नारदेवः (p. 33); खण्डः (p. 34); कापालिकः (p. 35); योगशास्त्रविशारदैः (p. 18); योगिपुंगवैः (p. 36, 58); वसिष्ठाद्यैः मुनिभिः (p. 19); मत्स्येन्द्राद्यैः योगिभिः (p. 19); मत्स्यनाथोदितं आसनं (p. 22); शिवेन कथितानिः (८४ आसनानि) (p. 26); आचार्यैः (p. 64); आचार्याणां केषांचित् (p. 67); केषां चिन्मतं (p. 103); महासिद्धैः (p. 99); कापालिके खण्डमते (p. 140); हठतन्त्वाणाम् (p. 130); मतांतरे (p. 184); पूर्वाचार्यैः महात्मभिः (p. 200); गोरक्षनाथेन (p. 201); केवलं हठकर्मिणः (p. 208); राजयोगमजानन्तः ।

9 *Kaulajñānanirṇaya,* Intro., p. 19. According to Dr. Bagchi (p. 32) Matsyendranātha (referred to in the *HP*) probably flourished towards the *beginning of the 10th century A.D.* in *Candradvipa* which is tentatively identified by him with *Sandvip* island in the deltaic region of Bengal. Matsyendranātha may have passed a part of his career in Kāmarūpa which then had risen to be a great centre of mysticism.

to fix the chronological limits for the *HP*. I shall, therefore, try to indicate these limits on the strength of data available to me.

The *HP*, is represented by numerous Mss.[10] in the different Mss. libraries in the world and has been printed with Bengali and Hindi translations together with Sanskrit commentaries from Calcutta and Ahmedabad[11] besides the English translations from Adyar and Allahabad already referred to in this paper. These facts are sufficient to establish the popularity enjoyed by the work. The *HP*, propounds a combination of the Haṭhayoga and the Rājayoga.[12] Its author calls himself as *Svātmārāma*[13] and *Svātmārāma Yogīndra* styled as "*Śrī-Sahajānanda-Santāna-Cintāmaṇi*."[14] No further information about the author or his *guru* is furnished by the *HP*.[15] We must, therefore, search for references to Svātmārāma and his *HP*, elsewhere.

10 Aufrecht in his *Catalogus Catalogorum* records the following Mss.—*Part I*, 753—Jones 411. Cop. 9. IO 1725. L. p. 195. Oxf. 233b. Hall p. 15. L. 250. 766. 1513. K. 138. B. 4, 6. Ben, 66. Bik. 567. Haug. 44. Katm. 5. NW, 416, Oudh XIV, 88. XVII, 54. NP. V, 198. Burnell 112a. P. 12. Bha. 221. H. 224. Oppert 1067. II, 2806, 5091. 6524. Rice 192. Peters 3. 391. BP. 304. Quoted by Rāmānanda, Oxf. 72b, by Sundaradeva, Hall p. 17.—*Commentaries*:—(1) by Umāpati NW. 434 (2) Jyotsnā by Brahmānanda L. 1513. Khn. 86 Oudh XIV, 88. (3) by Mahādeva NW. 434 (4) by Rāmānandatīrtha NW. 436 (5) by Vrajabhūṣaṇa NW. 434,—*Part II, 181*—BL. 167. Fl. 85 (inc). GB. 119 Gov. Or. Libra. Madras 112. 10355, 1725, 3101. Oudh XXI, 126. Peters. 4.23. Stein 133.—*Part III, 155*—AK. 733. AS. p. 238. Bd. 615. CS. z. 164, Lz. 905, 906, 907 (Upadeśa 4). Peters. 6, 316. Tb. 75. *Commentary* by Brahmānanda Bd. 615. Tb. 75.

Des. Cata. of Madras Mss., IX (1910), Nos. 4391, 4392, 4393, 4394, 4395, 4396; *Des. Cata.* of *Tanjore Mss.*, XI (1931), Nos. 6710, 6711, 6712, 6713, 6714; *List of Ujjain Mss., 1936*, p. 69, No. 1572 dated Śaka 1745 (=A.D. *1823*), No. 1573 (commentry by Brahmānanda).

11 Vide p. 4914 (Remarks) of *Des. Cata. of Tanjore Mss.*, XI (1931).

12 *HP.* (TPH., ed.), p. 208. 13 *Ibid.*, p. 7. 14 *Ibid.*, p. 45.

15 In my article on the 'Uḍḍiyāna Bandha of Haṭhayoga' (*Journal of the Orissa Academy*, vol. II, 1938, No. 1, p. 56) I have reproduced the following entry from the unpublished work of the late Vora Jatashankar Harajīvan called the कविकाव्य-कालकल्पना (p. 648):—

"स्वात्माराम योगि—सन्यासी, सहजानंदशिष्य, गृहस्थाश्रममा नाम मीननाथ,

In a work called the *Haṭharatnāvalī*[16] the author appears to refer to Svātmārāma, the author of the *HP*, in the following verse:—

हठविद्यां हि मत्स्येन्द्रगोरक्षाद्या विजानते ।
आत्मारामोऽपि जानीते श्रीनिवासस्तथा स्वयम् ॥३॥

Ātmārāma mentioned in this verse appears to be identical with Svātmārāma, the author of the *HP*. As the date of the *Haṭharatnāvalī* of Śrīnivāsa[17] has not been fixed, so far as I am aware, the above reference to Svātmārāma does not help us to fix any limit to the date of the *HP*.

A work called the *Śivatattvaratnākara* composed in A.D. 1709 (=Śaka 1631) appears to have made use of the *Haṭhayogapradī-*

उमाशंकरपुत्रः (१) हठप्रदीपिका (हठयोगप्रदीपिका), श्लोक ५००, अध्याय ४, वि० सं० १६८७ मां करोछे, (२) वर्णदीपिका ॥" .

I have no means of knowing the evidence on which the above entry is based. It appears, however, that according to the above unverified statement the *HP* was composed in *Vikrama Saṁvat 1687*=A.D. 1631. We shall have to see if this unverified date of the *HP*, is contradicted by any known references to the *HP* in works of prior dates.

16 Aufrecht *Cata. Catalo.* I, 753— "हठरत्नावली— NP V, 118. Quoted by Sundaradeva, Hall, p. 17.—By Śrīnivāsa, Burnell 112b. SB., 349. The remarks on Ms. No. 6715 of हठरत्नावली (*Tanjore Cata.*, XI, 1931, p. 4923) in the Tanjore Mss. Library read as follows:—"In the Introduction to the work he (the author) mentions himself as one of the four great advocates of Yoga along with Matsyendra, Gorakṣa, and *Ātmārāma*, as well-versed in all branches of knowledge, as an author of commentaries on *Śaśadharīya*, *Maṇikaṇṭhīya*, and one Vedānta *Paribhāṣā* (other than the work of Dharmarājādhvarin) and as the son of a great astrologer Timmajyautiṣika and Somāmbā. He styles himself as the conqueror of great logicians like Mahādeva Miśra. It may be inferred that he was an Āndhra Brahmin."

17 Śrīnivāsa describes himself as follows in verse 2 at the beginning of his *Haṭharatnāvalī*:—

वेदे वेदान्तशास्त्रे फणिपतिरचिते शब्दशास्त्रे स्वशास्त्रे
तन्त्रे प्राभाकरीये शशधररचिते न्यायरत्नार्णवेन्दुः ।
सांख्ये सारस्वतीये कणभुगभिहिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणिज्ञो
श्रीमज्ज्योतिर्विदग्रेसरनरतनुजो राजते श्रीनिवासः ॥२॥

The logician Śaśadhara flourished about 1125 A.D. according to S. Vidyābhūṣaṇa (*History of Indian Logic*, Calcutta, 1921, p. 396).

pikā.[18] We may, therefore, fix A.D. 1709[19] as one terminus to the date of the *HP*. Let us now see if we can push back this limit of A.D. 1709 on the strength of reliable documentary evidence, especially the evidence of the dated Mss. of the *HP*. The Bhandarkar Institute, Poona (Govt. Mss. Library) contains about 10 Mss. of the *HP*. One of these Mss. viz. No. 399 of 1895-1902 is dated *Saṁvat 1751* =A.D. 1695. This date, therefore, may enable us to push back the date of the *HP* say before A.D. 1650 or so. This chronological limit does not so far conflict with the unverified statement of Vora Jatashankar that the *HP* was composed in A.D. 1631.

The other terminus for the date of the *HP* according to Farquhar would be about A.D. 1350[20] as he includes the *HP* in the literature produced during the period of Muslim influence on Hindu religion (1350 and 1800 A.D.). If Farquhar's view is correct the date of the *HP* must be between A.D. 1350 and A.D. 1650, a period of 300 years. The *Yogacintāmaṇi* of Śivānanda

18 *Des. Cata. of Madras Mss.*, vol X, p. 3908. "शिवयोगं शिवालोकं हठयोगप्रदीपिकाम्." *The Śivatattvaratnākara,* an encyclopædic Sanskrit poem was composed by the Keladi chief of Basava Rāja, whose ancestors were subordinates of the emperors of Vijayanagara. The work was completed in A.D. 1709. S. K. Aiyangar, *Sources of Vijayanagar History*, Madras, 1919.

19 The India Office Ms. No. 1836 of the *HP.*, was copied at Ahmedabad in Saṃvat 1759 (=*A.D. 1703*)—Vide *I.O. Cata.*, Part IV, 1894, p. 600.

20 This terminus of A.D. 1350 for the date of the *HP* is not quite improbable. The *HP* mentions मत्स्येन्द्र, चौरङ्गी, मीन and गोरक्ष who appear to be identical with Nāthapanthi Yogis of the same name. According to Mr. T. C. Das Gupta (*Aspects of Bengali Society*, Cal. Uni. 1935, p. 155) Nāthism was borrowed from Mahāyāna Buddhists and was current in Bengal about the 11th century A.D. In the songs of Raja Govindacandra composed in the 1st half of the 11th century (say between A.D. 1000 and 1050 Mayanāmati the mother of Raja Govindacandra is stated to have been "*initiated into mahājñāna by Gorakṣanātha*" and that she visited the *pāṭhaśālā* of Gorakṣanātha containing 1600 disciples (*Ibid.*, p. 188). If these references have any historical value they appear to make Gorakṣanātha a contemporary of Raja Govindacandra about 1050 A.D. and hence the date of the *HP*. must be sought for after A.D. 1100 or so.

Sarasvati contains numerous quotations from the *HP*.[21] According to my data Śivānanda's work stands midway between about 1500 and 1850 A.D.[22] The *HP* is also quoted by Sundaradeva in his *Haṭha-Saṅketa-Candrikā*[23] but the date of this work being unsettled this reference has no immediate chronological value for our present inquiry. The dates of the commentators of the *HP* viz. Umāpati, Mahādeva, Ramānandatīrtha being also unsettled we are unable to make use of their commentaries for fixing the limits for the date of the *HP*. Brahmānanda, author of the commentary *Jyotsnā* on the *HP*, is a late commentator as he was the disciple of one Meruśāstrin who was alive in A.D. 1859.[24]

There is a treatise on Haṭhayoga in Hindi called *Jogapradīpyakā*[25] by one Jaiyatarāma or Jayatarāma. It appears to have been

21 Vide the *Yoga Cintāmaṇi*, Ed. by Haridās Vidyāvāgiśa, Calcutta Oriental Series. The quotations from the *HP*., are introduced by the name "हठप्रदीपिकायाम्" on the following pp. of the *Yoga Cintāmaṇi*:—10, 14, 16, 31, 34, 37, 39, 40, 44, 47, 87, 88, 98, 106, 129, 131, 134, 136, 140, 142, 143, 147, 155, 157, 158, 211, 272. (Vide my article on this work in *Yoga*, vol. IV, No. 26-28, p. 11).

22 *Yoga*, vol. IV (Nos. 26-28). p. 14.

23 Hall: *Bibliography*, Calcutta, 1859, p. 17-18 Sundaradeva was the son of Viśvanātha Deva. They were of Kāsyapa gotra and were Marhaṭṭas of Benares. Sundaradeva's spiritual guide was Pūrṇānanda. The *Haṭha-Saṅketa-Candrikā* quotes from the following works:—हठप्रदीपिका or हठदीपिका, योगचंद्रिका, योगचिंतामणि, सनातनसिद्धान्त, योगसारसमुच्चय. संकेतशिक्षा, योगसंग्रह, योगरहस्य, विरक्तासर्वस्व, नाडीशुद्धि, शक्तिबोध, शक्तिजागर, हठयोग by गोरक्षनाथ, पवनयोगसंग्रह, तन्त्रराज, सूतसंहिता, हठरत्नावली, शिवसंहिता, त्रिपुरासमुच्चय, कुंभकपद्धति, Sureśvarācārya's मानसोल्लास, स्वरोदयं, जीवन्मुक्तिविवेक, सिद्धांतशेखर, योगतत्वप्रकाश or ०प्रकाशक, योगतत्वावली, योगशिखोपनिषद्, ईश्वरगीता, नंदिपुराण, आत्मपुराण, ब्रह्मविद्योपनिषद्, योगदीपिका, वायुसंहिता, योगयाज्ञवाल्क्य, कालिकापुराण, जैगीषव्ययोगशास्त्र, अमृतबिंदूपनिषद्, योगसार, योगबीज, हेमाद्रि, केरलतंत्र, नकुलीशयोगपारायण, ईश्वरीतंत्र, योगभास्कर, स्पर्शयोगशास्त्र, सिद्धसोपान, रसप्रदीप, अमनस्क, सदाशिवगीता, ईश्वरमीननाथसंवाद, योगहृदय, तंत्रचूडामणि, and विद्यारण्य .

24 Aufrecht, *Cata. Catalo*. I, 388b. Vide also my article in *Yoga*, vol. III (17-20), pp. 4-5 where I have recorded a list of works and authors quoted by Brahmānanda.

25 See Ms. No. 117 of A 1883-84 in the Govt. Mss. Library at the B.O.R.

composed in Saṁvat 1784 (=A.D. 1729). To what extent Jaiyatarāma's *Jogapradīpyakā* is indebted to Svātmārāma's *Haṭhayogapradīpikā* I am unable to say at present as I have not studied this Hindi treatise. Even if it is modelled on the *HP*, its date of composition viz. A.D. 1727 does not conflict with the date of the *HP*, as recorded by Vora Jatashankar viz. A.D. 1631.[26]

In the list of teachers recorded in the *HP*, one Nityanātha is mentioned as *Mahāsiddha*. If he is identical with Nityanātha Siddha the author of *tāntrika* and *vaidyaka* works[27] and in particular of the work *Rasaratnasamuccaya* which "agrees with the work attributed to Vāgbhaṭa"[28] we can support the earlier terminus of A.D. 1350 for the *HP* presumed by Dr. Farquhar in his *Outlines* etc. The *Rasaratnasamuccaya*, be it of Vāgbhaṭa or Nityanātha Siddha, belongs to about A.D. 1300 according to Dr. P. C. Ray[29] and it

Institute, Poona—folios 101. This Ms. ends as folows:—"संवत सतरासैअसी अधिक चतुरदसज्ञान। आस्वन सित दशमी विजैपूर्ण ग्रंथप्रमान ॥७८०॥ इति श्रीजोगप्रदीप्यकायां जैयतरामेण विरचितायां समाधिवर्णन नाम अष्टमोखण्डसपूर्ण ॥ सुभमस्तु ॥" Saṁvat 1784, *aśvina Sita Daśamī* is equal to *Wednesday, 13th September, 1727* (*Indian Ephemeris*, vol. VI, p. 257).

26 The dates of the Mss. of works relating to Matsyendranātha and his school as noted by Dr. Bagchi (pp. 60 ff. of his Intro. to *Kaulajñānanirṇaya*) do not conflict with our limits for the date of the *HP* viz., *A.D.* 1350 and 1650. The works relating to Matsyendranātha and his school are:—

(1) श्रीकामाख्यगुह्यसिद्धि (2) अकुलागमतन्त्र Nepal Ms. dated A.D. 1671, (3) गोरक्षशतकम् a Nepal Ms. belonging to a late age, (4) गोरक्षभूजंगम् Nepal Ms. dated 1730 A.D., (5) गोरक्षसंहिता Nepal Ms.—Bengali writing of the 16th and 17th centuries, (6) नित्याह्निकतिलकम् Ms. dated *A.D.* 1395—(Vide H. P. Shastri's *Nepal Catalogue*, I, pp. 111-112 and II, pp. 70, 82). This Ms. contains a list of teachers of the Kaula school as also their birth places. मत्स्येन्द्रनाथ is mentioned in this list as Dr. Bagchi points out. The 14th teacher in this list is from महाराष्ट्रदेशः. His original caste was क्षत्रिय.

27 *Cata. Catalogorum*, I, 295.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 496—रसरत्नसमुच्चय.

29 *History of Hindu Chemistry*, vol. I, (1902), Intro. p. lvi—According to Dr. P. C. Ray the author of the *Rasaratna-Samuccaya* was contemporary of Roger Bacon who died in A.D. 1294.

mentions the names of कपालि, सुरानंद, खराड, कापालिक, भैरव, मन्थानभैरव, (or मन्थान and भैरव) काकचराडीश्वर, which are also found in the *HP*. All these teachers were probably experts in the रसविद्या or alchemy and हठयोग. According to Dr. Mukherji[30] Nityanātha Siddha is posterior to Dallaṇācārya who is assigned by scholars to the 12th century.[31] If this Nityanātha Siddha the writer on alchemy to whom is attributed the authorship of the work *Rasaratnasamuccaya* is identical with his name-sake mentioned as a teacher of हठयोग in the *HP*, the date of the *HP*, must be assigned to a period after the 13th century i.e. after A.D. 1300 or so and hence in the present state of our data we may fix A.D. 1350 as the tentative earlier terminus to the date of the *HP*, the later terminus[32] being about A.D. 1650 as stated above on the strength of the dated Mss. of the *HP*.

P. K. GODE

30 *Journal of Āyurveda,* (Calcutta) July 1935, p. 17.

31 Vide 16 of Hoernle's *Osteology,* Oxford, 1907.

32 Vijñānabhikṣu (*c. 1650*) in his *Yogasārasaṁgraha* (Adyar Edn. 1933) refers to works on the Haṭhayoga on p. 39 as follows:—"आसननाडीशुद्धयादयस्तु हठयोगादि ग्रन्थेष्वशेषतो द्रष्टव्याः" I wonder if this reference has anything to do with the *HP*.

Nārāyaṇatīrtha the commentator of the *Upaniṣads* (between *1500 and 1700* A.D.) quotes from the *HP*. at least four times (Vide p. 3 of my article in the *Bombay University Journal,* vol. VII, part 2, Sept., 1938).

In the *Bodleian Library Cata.* by Winternitz & Keith, vol. II (1905) p. 1306 there is a Ms. (No. 1306) of the *HP,* the date of which is stated as "about the *middle of the 18th century*. We are here informed of the following translations and editions of the *HP*.:—(1) Text with *Jyotsnā* Comm. Burdwan, 1890 (2) German trans. by H. Walter, Munich, 1893. (3) English trans. by Srīnivāsa Aiyangar, Bombay 1893. *Rudrayāmalatantra* (Oxford Mss., 1869, p. 89) refers to हठयोग as follows:—हठयोगं प्रकथितमिदानीं शृणु तत्क्रमम्. The anthology *Śārṅgadhara-paddhati* (A.D. 1363) contains 2 chapters on हठयोग (Nos. 157 and 158)—See *Peterson's* Edn. I, 1888, p. 662. A work called "राज्ञां प्रतिबोधकं प्रकरणम्" (Ms. *No. 67 of 1871-72*—B.O.R. Institute) quotes from the *HP*:—folio 20—"गोप्रश्नमाह हट्टप्रदीपिकायां etc." This work mentions तभारवोश्वर्वणां on folio 14 and is therefore *later than A.D. 1600. HP*. is again mentioned on fol. 26.

The Story in Stone of the Great Renunciation of Neminātha

We are familiar with scenes from the life of Buddha, particularly the Great Renunciation represented in numerous sculptures of the Græco-Buddhist school from Gandhāra, Sāñcī, Amarāvatī and elsewhere in India. But little is known of similar scenes in the lives of Jaina teachers because hardly any Jaina sculpture of the king has reached the museums in India, Europe or America. The majority of them are still preserved in the temples on Mount Ābu, at Kumbharia (at the foot of Mount Ābu), in Pātan and at some recently discovered sites in Central India. The story of the Great Renunciation of Neminātha, the 22nd Jaina Tīrthaṅkara, which is carved in a ceiling panel in the Tejaḥpāla temple on Mount Ābu is perhaps more poignant in the swiftness and contrasts of its scenes than the gradual world-weariness of Buddha.

The story had become a classic as early as the 4th century B.C. for it is related in the *Uttarādhyayanasūtra*,[1] a canonical work of the Jainas. Since then it was so popular and sacred that as late as the 12th century A.D., Hemacandra, the great poet-philosopher of Gujarāt, included it in his work, on the lives of 63 great men.[2]

Neminātha, or Ariṣṭanemi as he was called before he became a Jina, was a prince who, some 5000 years ago, is supposed to have lived in the town of Sauryapura (perhaps modern Mathurā). Keśava (Kṛṣṇa of Hindu mythology) was his friend and relative, and he by his influence arranged the engagement of Ariṣṭanemi with Rājimatī, a daughter of king Ugrasena of Mathurā (and later of Dwarka). For the marriage-rite the bridegroom, according to the

1 Jacobi, *Sacred Books of the East* and Charpentier, *Archives D'Etudes Orientales*, vol. 18, *adhyayana* 22, p. 164 ff.

2 *Triṣaṣṭhi-śalākā-puruṣa-caritra*, *Parva* 5, *Sargas* 5, 9, 10, 11, 12.

A ceiling in the marble temple at Mt. Ābu, built by the minister Tejaḥpāla in A.D. 1232, depicting in 7 sections Neminātha's marriage procession, his arrival at the bride's palace, his sudden decision to renounce the world on seeing the animals for slaughter, and scenes prior to the renunciation. (*N.B.* Section I is not reproduced here).



Section II

Section III

Section IV

Section V

Section VI

Section VII

The Great Renunciation of Neminātha

Courtesy: Nathalal C. Shah, Bombay.

Hindu custom, was invited to go to the bride's house. Decked in rich clothes and ornaments, riding on the best of elephants under a raised umbrella, fanned by attendants, and surrounded by his clansmen, and preceded by musicians and an army drawn up in rank and file, he started from his palace.

On his way he saw animals, kept in enclosures. Overcome by fear and looking miserable, beholding them thus Ariṣṭanemi spoke to his charioteer, "Why are all these animals, which desire to be happy, kept in an enclosure?"

The charioteer answered, "Lucky are these animals because at thy wedding they will furnish food for many people."

Having heard these words, which meant the slaughter of so many innocent animals, he, full of compassion and kindness to living beings, decided to renounce the world and then he presented the charioteer with his ornaments and clothes.

Everyone including the gods coming to know of Ariṣṭanemi's resolution gathered together to celebrate and witness the Great Renunciation. Thus surrounded, sitting in a palanquin Ariṣṭanemi left Dwarka for Mount Raivataka, (modern Girnār in Kāthiāwār), and there in the presence of the whole assembly he plucked out his hair in five handfuls, called technically *Pañca-muṣṭi-loca*. Ariṣṭanemi renounced the world. An erstwhile prince, about to be married to a beautiful princess, was now a homeless, naked ascetic in search of truth and happiness for the suffering humanity.

With but one exception, the story in the canonical work is faithfully represented on a ceiling carved in the marble temple called "Lūṇavasahi," built by Tejaḥpāla, a minister of king Vīradhavala of Gujarāt in 1232 A.D., at Delwara on Mount Ābu.

The ceiling is divided into 7 horizontal sections. Each section depicts a part of the story. Beginning from the bottom:

SECTION I. :—shows the dancers and musicians which led the marriage procession of Ariṣṭanemi.

Section II. :—the battle between Kṛṣṇa and king Jarāsandha with Ariṣṭanemi in a chariot.[3]

Section III. :—the musicians, army and clansmen.

Section IV. :—(from right,: first, the arrival of Ariṣṭanemi in a chariot; second, animals tied for slaughter in an enclosure; third, the marriage pandal, called *'Cori'*, a square tent-like bower constructed with seven brass or earthen pots, supported by stems of plantain trees, and decorated with festoons of garlands; fourth and fifth, the elephants guarding the entrance of the palace and horse-stable; sixth, gateway to the palace of Rājimatī; seventh, two-storied palace, with chamberlain announcing to Rājimatī and her friends the arrival of Ariṣṭanemi.

Sections V, VI, VII, face upwards. Chronologically first comes Section VI, then VII and lastly V.

Section VI. :—(from right) Ariṣṭanemi seated on a throne in the midst of the assembly of gods and men, giving money and food in charity for a year before he became a Jina.

Section VII. :—(from left to right) first, a scene which cannot be exactly identified; it shows Ariṣṭanemi seated on a throne attended by fly-whisk bearers and others; second, Neminātha seated in meditation-pose and plucking out the hair in five handfuls.

Section V. :—(from right to left) first, procession of gods and men carrying Ariṣṭanemi to Mount Raivataka; second, Ariṣṭanemi, now Neminātha, standing erect and motionless practising penance (*kāyotsarga*).

We may marvel at the strange happenings of the story, but not less admirable is the art of the sculptor who has told it in stone. His chisel has carved minute details with fullness, vividness and a rare clarity. Every scene stands out in bold relief, endowed with life

3 An episode not mentioned in the canonical work but which is referred to in later works. This battle took place because Jarāsandha perhaps resented Ariṣṭanemi's marriage with Rājimatī.

and individuality. Behold the meek animals in the enclosure, and the spirited elephant guarding the entrance to the palace of Rājimatī. Contrast similarly the movements of the crowd with the stillness of Neminātha.[4]

H. D. SANKALIA

4 Besides the art it would be worthwhile not only to compare this story but similar stories in Jaina literature with those related in Hindu (or Brahmanic) literature. For one thing the story in the *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* enables us to push back the traditional historicity of Kṛṣṇa and others mentioned in the Purāṇas.

The Vaiṣṇava Philosopher Priyādāsa and his Works

In my article "Some Vāghela Rulers and the Sanskrit Poets patronised by them," published in the *Krishnaswami Aiyangar Commemoration Volume*, pp. 48-54, I have mentioned on p. 53: "Another imitation of the *Gītagovinda* was done in the *Saṅgīta-Raghunandana* (H. P. Śāstri's *Cat.* VII, No. 5259). This work is composed by one Priyādāsa, under the patronage of Viśvanāthasiṁha. Although the last colophon would make Viśvanāthasiṁha himself the author of the work............yet the 5th verse from the beginning...........indicates that the real author was perhaps one Priyādāsa."*

H. P. Śāstri's *Catalogue* gives us two colophons of the work, one of the 16th and another of the 1st chapter. They are—

इति श्रीमन्महाराजकुमार-श्रीविश्वनाथसिंहदेवविरचिते संगीतरघुनन्दने ग्रन्थमाहात्म्यवर्णन-पूर्व्वक-प्रणामविधानं नाम षोडशः सर्गः समाप्तः ॥

इति श्रीमन्महाराजकुमार-श्रीबाबूसाहेबविश्वनाथसिंहदेवकृते संगीतरघुनन्दने मङ्गलवर्णनं नाम प्रथमः सर्गः ॥

From both these colophons it is clear that the work was composed when Viśvanāthasiṁha was a prince and had not ascended the throne. This is further strengthened by the term बाबूसाहेब which was perhaps his pet name. After becoming king, he could not

* My curiosity about Priyādāsa was roused when I came to know from Pandit Brajendra Nath, the Finance Minister of the Rewa State, that the State Library contained the Mss. of several works of Priyādāsa. He was kind enough to send me a list of these Mss. From this list I selected some names and requested the Finance Minister to lend me the Mss. I am grateful to him for the kind help which he rendered to me and through me to the scholarly world by getting the permission of loan from His Highness the Mahārājā Saheb of Rewa and then by sending over the Mss. to Delhi. The example set by His Highness is well worthy of emulation by the other Ruling Princes of India. This will help the scholarly world to explore the vast field of learning which is lying hidden in Ms. form in the palace libraries of different Rājās and Mahārājas in our country.

have been called बाबूसाहेब . Again, in the last colophon of रामचन्द्राह्निकटीका (H. P. Śāstri's *Cat*. VII. Nos. 5255-5256), the title of Viśvanāthasiṁha is श्रीमहाराजाधिराजश्रीमहाराजाबाहादुर, which clearly indicates that at this time he was a full-fledged king. Comparing the titles of both these works, it appears that Viśvanāthasiṁha was a devotee of Rāmacandra, and from a few verses of रामचन्द्राह्निक and संगीतरघुनन्दन, quoted in H. P. Śāstri's *Catalogue*, it appears that he was a poet and a scholar of no mean order. Hence, on the basis of

जयति सच्चिदानन्दघनवरदवरसर्व्वगुणशालिश्ङ्गारमूर्त्तिः ।
सर्व्वजनवत्सलः प्रविगलितमत्सरः प्रेमपाथोधिपुरुषार्थपूर्त्तिः ॥
सर्व्वगतसर्व्वमतसर्व्ववन्दितचरणसर्व्वशरणागतोद्धृतिविहारी ।
गुरुरूपरघुवरः श्रीप्रियादास इह विश्वनाथान्तरगीतकारी ॥

the fifth verse of संगीतरघुनन्दन, it is not necessary or logical to ascribe the authorship of this work to Priyādāsa (as stated in H. P. Śāstri's *Cat*. VII., p. 219 and re-affirmed by me in my article referred to above) and deny it to Viśvanāthasiṁha.

Up to this time nothing is known about Priyādāsa or his works, except one, viz., सुसिद्धान्तोत्तम which is printed. On p. 515 of that work we read the following verse—

एतस्मादुत्तमाच्छास्त्राज्जातं ग्रन्थचतुष्टयम् ।
तत्त्वनिश्चयवेदान्तसारभक्तिप्रभादिकम् ॥

In this verse, the author names only three works—तत्त्वनिश्चय, वेदान्तसार and भक्तिप्रभा. The fourth work is not mentioned but is indicated by the word आदि . The editor of the सुसिद्धान्तोत्तम here gives the following footnote—

स्वरचितवेदान्तसारटीकायामयमेव प्रियादासाचार्य्यः "समाकारि समाप्राप्ते समासेन सतां प्रियम् । इदं वेदान्तसारं वै स्वब्ध्यरीमेन्दुवासरे ॥१७६४॥" स्वकृतश्रुतितात्पर्यामृतटीकायां च "हरिदेवस्य देवस्य समीपे मङ्गलप्रदे । व्योमाश्वेमेन्दु १८७० संख्याढ्ये वत्सरे मासि कार्तिके ॥ सुकृष्णैकादशीयुक्ते संमतं संसतां मुदे । आचार्यः श्रीप्रियादासो निर्ममे ग्रन्थमुत्तमम् ॥" इति लिखति । रेवाराजश्रीविश्वनाथसिंहदेवानां सभासदासीदिति च श्रूयते ॥

From this it appears that the editor knew the Mss. of वेदान्तसार and श्रुतितात्पर्यामृत only. Again, he seems to think that श्रुतितात्पर्यामृत

is the fourth work alluded to by the word आदि. In the Ms. of श्रुतिसूत्रतात्पर्यामृत (identical with श्रुतितात्पर्यामृत) which I have consulted, there are two chapters (प्रकरण s), and the verses quoted by the editor of सुसिद्धान्तोत्तम in the footnote referred to above, are not found in the Ms. That the Ms. is complete and the work extends up to the 2nd chapter only, is proved by the following verses found on fol. 33a of the Ms.

श्रुतिसूत्रामृतं यद्वै प्रियादासप्रदर्शितम् ।
वितनोतु सतांशं तच्छाश्वतं सात्वतां सदा ॥
ये प्रयोगाः कृता ह्यस्मिंच्छास्त्रे चासाधवो मया ।
कर्तव्याः साधवस्ते तु सज्जनैः शुद्धया धिया ॥

Perhaps the editor had another Ms. of this work. As regards the existence of भक्तिप्रभा, the editor seems to be ignorant. I have not been able to find any Ms. of वेदान्तसार. I have consulted a Ms. of the वेदान्ततत्त्व which is a short tract of 19 verses and is most probably different from तत्त्वनिश्चय. But प्रियादास has written several other works out of which I was able to examine the following in Ms.: दीक्षासारनिर्णय, सुमार्ग, वेदान्ततत्त्व, सुसिद्धान्तोत्तम, भक्तिप्रभा, वैष्णवसिद्धान्त and श्रुतिसूत्रतात्पर्यामृत ।

Not only from the verse in praise of प्रियादास given by विश्वनाथसिंहदेव in his work संगीतरघुनन्दन (quoted above), but also from his works, it is clear that प्रियादास was a very learned man and lived the life of a saint. No other information about प्रियादास is known to us, except that his preceptors were चन्द्रलाल (praised in every work) and हरिवंश whom he calls महाचार्य mentioned only in the first stanza of दीक्षासारनिर्णय). Unfortunately we possess neither any work of these preceptors nor any details about them. Out of modesty Priyādāsa calls himself as शब्दज्ञानविहीन and attributes his works to the blessings of his गुरु—

चन्द्रलालं गुरुं वन्दे मनसो दैवतं परम् ।
शब्दज्ञानविहीनैर्यः कारयेद् ग्रन्थमुत्तमम् ॥

(the 1st verse of सुसिद्धान्तोत्तम and वैष्णवसिद्धान्त).

शब्दज्ञानविहीनेन मयापि सुखदा कृता ।
टीका सुलोचना सद्भिः शोधनीया तु सात्वतैः ॥

(Comm. on भक्तिप्रभा)

In श्रुतिसूत्रामृत we read

ये प्रयोगाः कृता ह्यस्मिंच्छास्त्रे चासाधवो मया ।
कर्तव्याः साधवस्ते तु सज्जनैः शुद्धया धिया ॥

As all his works show, he was a Vaiṣṇava and a follower of Vallabhācārya. He must have exercised a great influence on विश्वनाथसिंहदेव even while he was a prince. We know that भक्तिप्रभा and वेदान्तसार were composed in V.S. 1864 (= 1809 A.D.) and श्रुतितात्पर्यामृतटीका in V.S. 1870 (= 1815 A.D.). The Ms. of दीक्षासार bears V.S. 1879 (= 1824 A.D.) as the date of copying. In other Mss., no date is given. Hence, we can conclude that the literary activity of प्रियादास belongs to the first quarter of the 19th century A.D.

Among the available works of Priyādāsa, (i) सुसिद्धान्तोत्तम (already printed), (ii) भक्तिप्रभा and (iii) श्रुतिसूत्रतात्पर्यामृत are major, and (iv) दीक्षासारनिर्णय, (v) सुमार्ग, (vi) वेदान्ततत्त्व and (vii) वैष्णवसिद्धान्त are minor.

Major Works

(i) सुसिद्धान्तोत्तम

This work along with its commentary by the author himself is the *magnum opus* of Priyādāsa. It is divided into 5 विश्रामs or chapters. The first chapter विश्वकारणनिर्णय discusses the various theories about the first cause of the universe. His conclusion is stated in the verse—

यः सेश्वरस्यास्य च कारणं सतो ब्रह्मादिशब्दैरनुशब्दितः परः ।
स भक्त्यधीनो गतमत्सरादिभिः कृष्णोऽनुरत्या परिसेव्य आत्मदः ॥ I. 4.

In the second chapter द्विविधभक्तिवर्णनम्, the doctrine of the twofold भक्ति (सगुणा and निर्गुणा) is expounded. In the third chapter जीवदासतत्त्ववर्णनम्, it is expounded that the supreme goal of mankind should be the service of God—

अतो वै स्वात्मनात्मानं तद्दासं क्लेशवर्जितम् ।
मत्वान्यत्तु हरिं सर्वं ज्ञात्वा तं विभजेद् बुधः ॥ III. 19.

In the fourth chapter सुमतनिर्णय he discusses the various theories of Advaita and comes to the conclusion—

अतो जीवेश्वरौ कर्म स्वभावः काल एव च ।
माया चानाद्यनन्तास्ते षट् पदार्थाः सनातनाः ।।
ज्ञात्वैवं दासभावेन भगवान् स्त्रीनरादिभिः ।
सेव्यस्तद्भक्तसङ्गेन भक्त्यासंगैर्मुमुक्षुभिः ।। IV. 26-27.
यतोऽस्य ब्रह्मणः शक्तिपरिणाम इदं जगत् ।
अतोऽचिद्विग्रहं तस्य ज्ञात्वा ध्यायेत तं बुधः ।। IV. 35

The fifth chapter deals with परमानन्दप्राप्तिकारण and ends thus:

यतः साधनश्रेष्ठानां फलानां च प्रियोत्तमम् ।
फलं श्रीभगवद्भक्तिर्नान्यदुक्तं महर्षिभिः ।।
अतो दारसुतापुत्राद्यासक्तिं सर्वदुःखदाम् ।
त्यक्त्वा श्रीवल्लभे भक्तिः कर्तव्या स्त्रीनरादिभिः ।।
नानारूपैर्यतो वेदा भजन्त्यव्ययमीश्वरम् ।
श्रीकृष्णं सर्वहेतुत्वात्सोऽतः सेव्यः सुरासुरैः ।।
एतत्सर्वं त्रिभिर्मानैर्ज्ञातव्यं सुमुमुक्षुभिः ।
प्रत्यक्षादिसुशब्दान्तैः प्रमाणज्ञैर्महात्मभिः ।। V. 25-28.

The commentary of the author is very learned, but at the same time simple in style and replete with quotations from the Vedas, Upaniṣads, Smṛtis, Purāṇas, etc. As pointed out above, this work forms the basis of four other works, of which भक्तिप्रभा is one.

(ii) भक्तिप्रभा

No. 136/20. Size 13 inches by 6½ inches. Extent: 119 leaves; 12 lines to a page; 40 letters to a line. Devanāgarī characters; hand-writing very good, but the text is corrupt. Two lines in black ink on either border; text given in the centre of the page with commentary above and below it. Old and mostly country paper. Fol. 23 repeated. In this work the author takes the different verses of श्रीमद्भागवत and interprets them according to the tenets of वल्लभाचार्य. It is divided into 4 chapters called मयूख s dealing with भक्तिपरत्वनित्यत्व, पराऽपराभक्ति, भागवतधर्म and परमानन्दवर्णन. The topics and the subject-matter are very much similar to those of सुसिद्धान्तोत्तम. It

bears the date Saṃvat 1700 although the author gives the date of its composition as अब्ध्व(ब्ध्य)रीभेन्दुवत्सरे (१८६४). There are no marks of punctuation. It begins—

Fol. 1a (Commentary).

श्रीगणेशाय नमः। श्रीराधावल्लभो जयतितराम्।
किशोरौ राधिकाकृष्णौ प्रधानपुरुषेश्वरौ।
वंदे परस्परात्मानौ सच्चेतोभ्रूषजीवने (?) ॥१॥
शताद्रिर्ब्रह्मणा येन कमनीयकरे धृतः।
तस्य सत्कारणस्यांघ्रिं हृदि कुर्वे परात्मनः ॥२॥
ब्रह्मादीनां मतं ज्ञात्वा गुरुं नत्वा सनातनम्।
दिव्यां भक्तिप्रभाटीकामहं कुर्वे सुलोचनाम् ॥३॥
प्राकृतानां विबोधाय ग्रन्थेऽस्मिन् सरलाः कृता।
प्रयोगाः सर्वशब्दानां शं नृणामिच्छता मया ॥४॥
नानावादगदांधा ये संसारभयमाश्रिताः।
तेषामभयदेयं तैस्सेवनीया सुलोचना ॥५॥
भक्त्यंगरूपगुणसाधनधर्मनाम्नां तच्छास्त्रसूत्रनिगमागमसात्त्विकानाम्।
ज्ञानं विशुद्धममलामृतमिच्छतापि सेव्यानुरागकमलेन सुलोचनेयम् ॥६॥

यः खलु सर्वेश्वरः सर्वनियंता सर्वान्तर्याम्यनन्तब्रह्माण्डाधिपतिर्जगज्जनको जगत्पालको जगद्गुरुर्भगवान् ब्रह्मणे स्वपुत्राय परमभक्ताय सकलनिगमागमसारं महापुराणं श्रीमद्भागवताख्यं कृपया व्याचचक्षे, स एव त्रिलोकसुन्दरः सच्चिदानन्दविग्रहः महाकारुणिको विश्वमंगलमंगलसमुद्रः समस्तकल्याणगुणगणार्णवो मधुसूदनः सर्वेन्द्रियप्रेरको महाविभूतिपतिः श्रीराधिकावल्लभो मां निमित्तं विधाय भक्तिप्रभां प्रदर्श्य च तस्या व्याख्यामपि चकार। अतो ग्रंथकारं स्वयं भगवन्तं रमानाथं ज्ञात्वा भगवद्भक्तिमद्भिः करुणामयैः सद्भिरालोचनीयोऽयं ग्रन्थः। etc.

Fol. 3b. (Text).

कारिका। येन मे नोदिता कृष्णगीतमाधुर्यमूर्तिना।
भारती वदनाज्जाता तं हिताख्यमहं भजे ॥१॥

Fol. 4a. कारिका। प्रणम्यात्माहमाधीशं चन्द्रलालं गुरूत्तमम्।
वक्ष्ये भक्तप्रमोदाय शास्त्रसिद्धान्तमुत्तमम् ॥२॥

It ends:—Fol. 117b. (Text).

कारिका। इदं भागवतार्कस्य महः सर्वार्थसाधकम्।
प्रपठेद्धारयेत्प्रीत्या स सतां पदवीमियात् ॥१४॥
वेदशब्दादि शास्त्राणां पुराणां (णानां) तथैव च।
सारं भागवतं तस्य चेदमष्टादशात्मकम् ॥१५॥

Fol. 118a.

कल्पवृक्षो हरेदि (दि)व्यो ग्रंथोऽयं सर्वकामदः ।
अकामैः सर्वकामैर्वा सेव्यः सर्वत्र सर्वदा ॥१६॥
सेयं भागवतार्कस्य भक्तिभा वितनोतु शम् ।
जीवानां कृष्णभक्ताना (नां) प्रियादासेन दर्शिता ॥१७॥

इति श्रीसिद्धान्तोत्तमे भक्तिप्रिया (corrected to ०प्रभा) यां परमानन्दवर्णनो नाम चतुर्था मयूष(ख)समूहः ॥४॥

(Commentary).

Fol. 118a.

भक्तिप्रभां पठति यः शृणुयाच्च नित्यं मुक्तो भवत्यलमतो विषमादसारात् ।
संसारतः समधिगम्य पदं मनुष्यः संमोदते भगवतो भवनाशकस्य ॥३॥
आचार्याः (र्यः) श्रीप्रियादासश्चकार भक्तिभां शुभाम् ।
आनन्दाय सतां पुंसामब्ध्व(ब्ध्य) रीभेन्दुवत्सरे ॥४॥

इति श्रीसिद्धान्तोत्तमे श्रीभक्तिप्रभायां टीकायां सुलोचनायां प्रियादासाचार्यविरचितायां परमानन्दफलवर्णनो नाम चतुर्थो मयूष(ख)समूहः ४ ॥ समाप्तम् ॥

In a different hand Saṃvat 1800.

(iii) श्रुतिसूत्रतात्पर्यामृत*

No. 15/86. Size 13 inches by 6¼ inches. Extent: 33 leaves; 10 to 15 lines to a page; 54 letters to a line. Country paper; Devanāgarī characters; hand-writing legible. Text is in the centre of the page with commentary above and below it. No marks of punctuation but numbers of sūtras or the Vedic texts are tinged with red pigment. Paper old and slightly worn out. Fol. 9b blank. The work is divided into two chapters भक्तिप्रकरण and सफलज्ञानप्रकरण in which the authors takes the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa primarily and the Sūtras of Śāṇḍilya, Patañjali along with the Upaniṣadic texts secondarily and interprets them, according to the tenets of Vallabhācarya as having पराभक्ति for their तात्पर्य. The author comments on the Brahmasūtras in the order given below:—

संपद्याविर्भावः स्वेनशब्दात् । IV. 4.1. ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः । IV. 4.5. चितितन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वादित्यौडुलोमिः । IV. 4.6. एवमप्युपन्यासात्पूर्वभावादविरोधं

* Its commentary is called महत्प्रिया.

वादरायणः । IV. 4.7. अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा । I. 1.1. जन्माद्यस्य यतः । I. 1.2. शास्त्रयोनित्वात् । I. 1.3. तत्तु समन्वयात् । I. 1.4. ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् । I. 1.5. गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् । I. 1.6. रचनानुपपत्तेश्चानुमानम् । II. 2.1. अन्यत्राभावाच्च न तृणादिभ्यः । II. 2.5. दृश्यते तु । II. 1.6. देवादिवदपि लोके । II. 1.25. आत्मकृतेः परिणामात् । I. 4.26. नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः । I. 1.16. अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात् । II. 3.43. उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनाम् । II. 3.19. नाणुरतच्छ्रुतेरिति चेन्नेतराधिकारात् । II. 3.21. स्वशब्दोन्मानाभ्यां च । II. 3.22. तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छ्रुतेरात्मनि च । III. 2.7. गुणाद्वा लोकवत् । II. 3.25. व्यतिरेको गन्धवत् । II. 3.26. पृथगुपदेशात् । II. 3.28. अविरोधश्चन्दनवत् । II. 3.23. तद्गुणसारत्वात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत् । II. 3.29. मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात् । I. 3.2. नात्माऽश्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः । II. 3.17. शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत् । I. 1.30. फलमत उपपत्तेः । III. 2.38. वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्तथा हि दर्शयति । II. 1.34. न कर्मविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वात् । II. 1.35. उपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च । II. 1.36. अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात् । I. 1.20. अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसंगादसमञ्जसम् । II. 1.8. न तु दृष्टान्ताभावात् । II. 1.9. अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः । I. 2.21. आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् । I. 1.12. हेयत्वावचनाच्च । I. 1.8. अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् । III. 2.14. आह च तन्मात्रम् । III. 2.16. तदव्यक्तमाह हि । III. 2. 23. उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत् । III. 2.27. भेदव्यपदेशात् । I. 3.5. जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च । IV. 4.17. भोगमात्रसाम्यलिंगाच्च । IV. 4.21.

It begins—Fol. 1b.

श्रीराधावल्लभो जयतितराम् ।

भक्तिं भागवतांश्चैव नत्वा श्रीराधिकापतिम् ।
वक्ष्येऽहं श्रुतिसूत्राणां तात्पर्यामृतमुत्तमम् ॥१॥

श्रीराधावल्लभो जयतितराम् । कमनीयतमं शांतं प्रणम्याच्युतमद्भुतम् । श्रुतिसूत्रामृतस्येमां वक्ष्ये टीकां महत्प्रियाम् ॥१॥

सद्भिः श्रीभगवत्यार्ये कर्तव्या भक्तिरुत्तमा ।
यतः साधनवृन्दानि तदर्थं कथितानि वै ॥२॥

तदेवाह सद्भिरिति । सद्भिः सर्वावस्थायां भगवत्युत्तमा निर्गुणा परा भक्तिरेव कर्तव्येदमेव (तात्पर्यामृतं on the margin) तदाहुर्वेदवेदान्तज्ञाः । यतो ज्ञानादीनि साधनवृंदानि तदर्थं भक्त्यर्थमेव निगमागमैः कथितानि ॥२॥

ब्रह्मकांडं तु भक्तौ तदनुज्ञानाय सामान्यात् ॥३॥

तदेवाह शांडिल्यो मुनिवरः शांडिल्यविद्यायां ब्रह्मकांडमिति (द्वाभ्याम् on the margin)। तत् तस्य भगवतो (नु on the margin) ज्ञानाय यदुपवर्णितं ब्रह्मकांडं वेदैस्तदुपनिषद्रूपं ज्ञानकांडं भक्तौ भक्त्यर्थमेव। चतुर्थ्यर्थे सप्तमी (अर्थवशाद्विभक्तिविंपरिणाम्यते)। यतस्तज्ज्ञानेन तस्मिन् भक्तिर्भवति। तत्कुतः। (ननु भगवतोऽनुज्ञानाय यद्ब्रह्मकांडं तद्भगवत्प्राप्त्यर्थं भवतु कुतः भक्त्यर्थम् on the margin) सामान्यात्। यथा मणिज्ञानेन मणौ प्रीतिर्भवति तस्मात्तज्ज्ञानस्य तत्प्रीतेरंगत्वं तथा ॥३॥

दृष्टत्वाच्च ॥४॥

लोकेऽपि सौंदर्यादिज्ञानस्य तरुण्यादौ प्रीतिहेतुत्वं दृष्टं तस्मादपि ज्ञानस्य भक्त्यंगत्वमेवावसीयते ॥४॥

It ends:—Fol. 33a.

मर्त्यानां चाप्यमर्त्यानां दिव्यं साध्वमृतं परम्।
सेवनीयमतः सर्वैर्बद्धमुक्तमुमुक्षुभिः ॥२११॥

इति श्रीश्रुतिसूक्ततात्पर्यामृते प्रियादासाचार्यप्रदर्शिते द्वितीयं सफलज्ञानप्रकरणं संपूर्णम्।

इति श्रीश्रुतिसूक्ततात्पर्यामृतटीकायां महत्प्रियायां प्रियादासाचार्यविरचितायाम् सफलज्ञानप्रकरणं द्विति(ती)यं संपूर्णं। श्रीराधावल्लभो जयति।

Minor Works

(iv) दीक्षासारनिर्णय

No. 128/86. Size 9 inches by 4¼ inches. Extent:—13 leaves. 7 lines to a page, 20 letters to a line. Country paper; Devanāgarī characters; hand-writing legible. Two lines on each border. Marks of punctuation in red ink. The work is finished on fol. 13a of the codex and is followed by a few verses dealing with एकादशीनिर्णय and अष्टमीनिर्णय. At the end we find the date of copying the Ms. as संवद् १८७६ (= 1823 A.D.). Here we learn of the other preceptor of our author whose name is हरिवंश महाचार्य and who is not named by Priyādāsa anywhere else.

It begins:—Fol. 1a.

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥
हरिवंशं महाचार्यं चन्द्रलालं च सद्गुरुम्।
प्रणम्य सन्मतं ज्ञात्वा वक्ष्ये दीक्षामनुत्तमाम् ॥१॥
गुरुशिष्यसुवादेन विशुद्धशास्त्रचक्षुषा।
नाग्रहेण च द्वेषेण स्वनुत्प्रेरणया(?)न वा ॥२॥

शिष्य उवाच ॥
का दीक्षा शुभदा लोके सेवनीया मुमुक्षुभिः ।
भजनीयोऽपि को देवो ब्रूहू (हि) शास्त्रविदां वर ॥३॥
श्रीगुरुरुवाच ॥
वैष्णवी परमा दीक्षा पंचसंस्कारलक्षणा ।
धारणीया सदा सद्भिः प्रीत्या सवाघनुत्तमे (?) ॥४॥

It ends:—Fol. 13a.

दिव्येयं वैष्णवी दीक्षा प्रियादासप्रमोददा ।
वितनोतु वैष्णवानां मंगलान्यव्ययानि च ॥

इति श्रीदीक्षासारनिर्णयस्समाप्तः । After a few verses संवद १८७६, चैत्रवदि ८ सुके लिषी माधौरामलेषकनै ।

The work deals with the rules of initiation of the Vaiṣṇavas. It is written in the form of a dialogue between the teacher and his student. In answer to his student's question, the teacher replies that the Vaiṣṇava initiation consisting of five संस्कार s viz., ताप, पुंड्र, नाम, माला and मन्त्र, is the best of initiations. The other दीक्षा s are impure. Cf.—एवं मुद्रादयः पंच संस्काराः । तल्लक्षणा वैष्णवी दीक्षा सर्वश्रेष्ठा सर्वपापहरा शुद्धा । अन्यास्त्वशुद्धा एव । तासु शाक्ता तु नरकप्रदैव, दुराचारात् कुमतस्वीकाराच्च । कुमतं तु—मातृयोनिं परित्यज्य सर्वयोनिषु क्रीडयेत् । अभावे कन्यकायोनौ ॥ तथैव चेति—सुराभक्षणमात्रेण साक्षान्नारायणो भवेदित्यादिकम् । अतस्सा दीक्षा तु नरकप्रदा । तदुक्तं श्रीशिवेन तद्ग्रंथकारेण—ये ये मतमवष्टभ्य चरंति पृथिवीतले । सर्वैर्धर्मैश्च रहिता यास्यन्ति निरयं सदेति ॥ शैवी दीक्षा तु श्रेष्ठा श्रुतिस्मृतिप्रतिपाद्यापि भृगुशापाग्र एव सुखदा । तत्पश्चात्तु शापदग्धा जाता । अतो वर्जनीया । शापस्तु श्रीभागवते—भवव्रतधरा ये च ये च तान्समनुव्रताः । पाखण्डिनस्ते भवन्तु सच्छास्त्रपरिपन्थिनः ॥ नष्टशौचा मूढधियो जटाभस्मास्थिधारिणः । विशन्तु शिवदीक्षायां यत्र दैवं सुरासवम् ॥ इत्यादि । तस्माद्वैष्णवी दीक्षा धारणीया । ननु तस्या अपि तप्तमुद्रातुलसीमालांगाया वैष्णवीदीक्षाया निन्दा श्रूयत इति चेत्सत्यम्, सा तु राजसतामसागमपुराणेष्वसुरमोहनाय तेषां तस्यामरुचये मुनिभिः कृता । etc.

(v) सुमार्ग (vi) वेदान्ततत्त्व

सुमार्ग consists of 23 verses. We find a Ms. codex containing it along with another small treatise वेदान्ततत्त्व containing 19 verses. Following is a short description:—

No. 14/57. Size 9½ inches by 5½ inches. Extent:

3 leaves; 11 lines to a page; 35 letters to a line. Country paper; Devanāgarī characters; hand-writing good; four lines in black ink on each border. पद s are separated by means of vertical marks on the top. Verse-numbers are given. सुमार्ग contains the rules of conduct which a Vaiṣṇava ought to follow while वेदान्ततत्त्व, in the words of the author himself, is an outcome of the author's doubts in regard to Vedānta.

सुमार्ग begins:—

श्रीराधावल्लभो जयति ।

श्रीराधावल्लभं देवं नत्वा सर्वाधिपाधिपम् ।
सुमार्गः कथ्यते मित्र मोदायाच्युतभक्तये ॥१॥
भक्तिः श्रीमाधवे शश्वन्निर्गुणा वा गुणात्मिका ।
स्वाधिकारानुरूपेण कर्तव्या स्त्रीनरादिभिः ॥२॥
तामसी तु सदा त्याज्या निंदाहिंसात्मिका सता ।
क्लेशदा ते मुदा कार्या सात्त्विकी राजसी तु वा ॥३॥
स्वधर्माचरणं चैव तस्याः प्रौढत्वसिद्धये ।
पंचैवाधर्मशाखायाः कर्तव्यं तन्निवर्तनम् ॥४॥

It ends—

सर्वेषामिच्छतां भव्यं मार्गोऽयं सर्वसिद्धिदः ।
माननीयो ह्यतः पुंभिः स्त्रीभिश्च पापनुत्तये ॥२२॥
जीवानां मङ्गलं दिव्यं सुमार्गो वितनोतु तत् ।
प्रीत्याख्यं शृण्वतां चापि प्रियादासप्रदर्शितः ॥२३॥
इति सुमार्गोऽयं संपूर्णः ॥

वेदान्ततत्त्व begins:—

श्रीराधावल्लभो जयतितराम् ॥

कृष्णं नत्वा तत्त्वं वक्ष्ये वेदान्तस्य ध्यात्वा राधाम् ।
नित्यं नितांजस्वाचार्यं (?) भक्तोऽहं तद्भानालोकः ॥१॥
श्रुतिमूलानि सांख्यादीन्यपि शास्त्राणि सात्वतैः ।
पूर्वपक्षाय सर्वाणि वर्णितानि महर्षिभिः ॥२॥
वेदबाह्यं त्वमूलत्वात्तार्कं श्रुत्यसंमतम् (?) ।
इति ज्ञात्वा चला धीर्मे जाता वेदान्तसंज्ञके ॥३॥
तस्मात्तत्तदहं वक्ष्ये वेदवेदान्तचक्षुषा ।
राधाकृष्णकृपाशक्त्या प्रीतये सात्त्वतां सता ॥४॥

यतो जन्माद्यस्य त्वमरमुनिनाथाखिलपतिः
सतोऽग्रे ह्यासीद्यः जभववय आद्यानतपदः (?)।
स कृष्णो ज्ञातव्यो हृदि तदनुरागाय परमो
न चान्योऽन्यान्यद्वा इति वदति वेदो हितविदा ॥५॥

It ends—

इदं वेदान्ततत्त्वं वै मंगलं परमं सताम्।
वितनोतु ह्यदासानां प्रियादासप्रदर्शितम् ॥१६॥ etc.

In the Rewa library there is another Ms. of सुमार्ग which contains a Hindi commentary written in the Rewa dialect. See No. 131/185.

(vii) वैष्णवसिद्धान्त

No. 138/38. Size 6¼ inches by 4¼ inches. Extent: 6 leaves; 9 lines to a page; 18 letters to a line. Country paper; Devanāgarī characters; hand-writing good, but incorrect. It is a small treatise dealing with पुष्टिमार्ग containing 54 leaves. It is in the form of a dialogue between a शिष्य and गुरु. The trend of the work can be easily guessed from a few questions of the disciple given below—

अद्वैतं वा सदाद्वैतं किं वा युग्मविलक्षणम्।
द्वैताद्वैतं परं ब्रह्म पृच्छेऽहं त्वां मुनेऽव्ययम् ॥४॥
नन्वद्वैते कथं तस्मिन्नानात्वं दृश्यते पृथक् ॥६a॥
नन्वभेदेऽद्वितीयेऽद्धा द्वैताभावात्कुतो जगत्।
तत्कल्पको जनोऽज्ञानं येभ्यस्ते सुमतं भवेत् ॥८॥
किं वाभासं स्वयं स्वस्मिन् प्रतिबिंबं च पश्यति।
विश्वं वा तद्भवे जात्या भवे दुःखादिसंयुतः ॥६॥

But most of the verses given in it are identical with the text of सुसिद्धान्तोत्तम.

It begins—

श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तिभ्यो नमः।
चन्द्रलालं गुरुं वन्दे मनसो दैवतं परम्।
शब्दज्ञानविहीनैर्यः कारयेद् ग्रन्थमुत्तमम् ॥१॥
प्रणम्य राधिकाकान्तं वेदवेदान्तचक्षुषा।
प्रश्नोत्तरेण सिद्धान्तं वक्ष्ये वैष्णवप्रीतये ॥२॥ etc.

It ends—

सोऽयं वैष्णवसिद्धान्तः प्रियादासमतानुगाः (गः) ।
शुभानीश्वरभक्तानां वितनोतु सदा सताम् ॥५४॥
इति श्रीवैष्णवसिद्धान्त (:) समाप्त (:) ॥

It is unfortunate that a scholar of such worth should have remained unknown to us so long. His contribution to the Vallabhite Vedānta is not mean and his works deserve publication and a close study, at least at the hands of the followers of Vallabhācārya.

HAR DUTT SHARMA

Advaita, Causality and Human Freedom

It will be the aim of this paper to treat in some detail the notion of causality as set out in and criticised by the *advaita vedānta*, consider its affinities if any with the conception of cause in modern science and discuss the bearing of these views on the problem of human freedom. In the course of the discussion I shall specifically refer to two books—Prof. Stebbing's *Philosophy and the Physicists*[1] and Dr. Brahma's *Causality and Modern Science*.[2] I have neither the time nor the ability to discuss the former in full; I shall content myself with a consideration of the tenth chapter on 'Human Freedom and Responsibility'. The second book presents more a point of view than a detailed exposition; and with this, though in agreement to a large extent, I have to express dissatisfaction in some measure.

I

The advaitin's ontological position has been often stated and requires little repetition. Reality is non-dual; it is consciousness or experience, self-luminous by nature; it is eternal and free. On this are super-imposed as appearances duality, inertness, cognisability in dependence on another, dependence, impermanence, and so on. The super-imposition is the work of nescience. This is not real as then there could not even be the realisation of it as nescience, leading to its sublation; it is not unreal, since duality and dependence are facts of immediate experience in no wise comparable to the impossible barren woman's son or even to the barely possible, but not actual, hare's horn; it is therefore considered indeterminable, not characterisable as real or as unreal,

1 Methuen, 1937. 2 Allen and Unwin, 1939.

anirvācya. All limitations, and all relations among the limited fall within the realm of this nescience, which is neither co-eval with reality nor falls outside of it. Finitude and plurality being phenomenal, the relations among the diverse, such as time, space and cause are also phenomenal. They cannot claim to hold good absolutely, whether for all or everywhere.

Though such a position is not attractive or convincing on the face of it, a little consideration would seem to make it acceptable in the case of space and time. Analysis of these reveals two sets of difficulties. We seem unable to set limits to space and time though, obviously, spatial and temporal characteristics belong only to the finite. What is bounded in space, and what has a beginning or end, these are certainly finite. Space itself, however, cannot be bounded; what lies outside space? If it is more space, it means we have not so far come to the limits of space; if it is non-space, we have to admit that the spatial finitude of our experience derives from something determined, if at all, in the last resort by something which is not space; and this, in effect, will not differ from conceding the phenomenality of space. One may contend that space is infinite though spaces are finite. This again will be the admission of advaita in another way—the admission of the possibility of finitude being an appearance of the infinite, limitation an appearance of the limitless, the many an appearance of the one. It may still be argued that while the advaitin considers the many and the finite to be appearances, the opponent treats them as real just as much as the one and the infinite. To maintain in the same breath the reality of opposed qualities like infinitude and finitude is to fly in the face of the law of contradiction and refuse to think. Justification based on the category of identity-in-difference will prove but a broken reed, as will be seen presently. It may be said that an infinite cause may have finite effects; with this contention we shall have to deal in the consideration of causality. This pos-

sibility excepted, there seems no way of avoiding the phenomenality of space. So also of time.

The other set of considerations mentioned relates to experiences like dreams. The contents of these experiences are actual enough and enjoy spatial and temporal properties very much at variance with the setting of the dreamer in what we call actual, i.e. waking, life. While the dreamer's body lies in Madras, the dream relates to Benares or to the battle-front. While the dream occupies what corresponds to a few minutes of our waking time, the dreamer often grows up, gets married, achieves success and even dies within that period. There would thus seem to be different and conflicting spatial and temporal systems within our experience. Even within waking experience, consider the phenomenon of reverie. In the course of a few minutes we run through a course of events which occupied a considerably longer interval of time. Is the latter contained in the former? If so, how can this be unless the interval which seems so variable is also negligible as ultimate reality, unless time is phenomenal?

Similar considerations may be raised in regard to causality too. It has been argued that causal efficiency is no proof of reality; the dream food satisfies dream hunger though not waking hunger. But these arguments are not quite conclusive in regard to causality being phenomenal. The causal efficiency of the dream content has indeed been used in the reverse way by realists like the Mādhvas to establish the reality of that content. Further, though he who dreams of Māhiṣmatī does not wake up there, he who dreams of a snake wakes up often with actual trembling; the victim of a nightmare actually cries out; and the physiological consequences of an erotic dream belong to the waking order of experience. It was also noticed that an appeal may be made to causality in order to exhibit the reconcilability of one and many, finite and infinite. The notion of cause, therefore, seems to stand on a slightly better footing than

space and time, from the point of view of the anti-phenomenalist; and it deserves a fuller consideration.

The advaitin, like the follower of the sāṅkhya holds to *sat-kārya-vāda*, the doctrine that the effect is not a creation *de novo*, but is prefigured in the cause. The sāṅkhya arguments for the position are well known. Either there is or there is not a time interval between cause and effect. If there is, does the cause wholly cease to exist, before the effect comes into being? In that case, the immediate antecedent of the product would be a non-existence; and though we may in speech distinguish non-existence of X from non-existence of Y, there is in reality no way of distinguishing one non-existence from another. Thus, so far as the immediate antecedent goes, we have no explanation why X is the effect, not Y; theoretically any effect may follow from any cause; sand may produce oil, and water curds; for between the alleged cause and sought effect, there is interposed a non-existence, whose character can be but homogeneous. Yet in practice we do not get curds out of water; we treat the effect as derivable only from a potent cause. What can this potency be except the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, in a latent form? If, however, no time-interval be admitted between cause and effect, we have to take them as either identical or as wholly different; in neither case is the cause-effect relation possible; cow is not the cause of itself; nor is it the cause of a horse; co-existent differents are no more cause and effect than the two horns of a bull.

With this line of sāṅkhya criticism of the vaiśeṣika creationist position, the advaitin has great sympathy. He will not, however, subscribe to the ultimacy of the causal concept; for if the sāṅkhya criticism is pressed to its limits, the concept has to be abandoned. The critic of the creationist view can admit the pre-existence of the effect only in a latent form; the causal operation serves to make it patent or manifest. The questions raised about the effect may be

raised about its manifestation too. Is that pre-existent or not? If pre-existent, it could be only as manifest, since it is absurd to say there is manifestation, but as non-manifest; and if manifestation is pre-existent, it amounts to the admission of the effect as fully pre-existent, not merely as a potentiality; and such an effect needs no explanation in terms of causal operation. On the other alternative of manifestation being produced *de novo* by the operation, what is the special virtue of this effect, that it alone is susceptible of creation, not the effects which become manifest? It seems legitimate to conclude that the sāṅkhya while envisaging a difficulty has, instead of solving it, only pushed it back one stage. And the difficulty seems insoluble so long as we stick to the distinctness of cause and effect. We seem nearer a solution, if we deny the distinctness treating cause and effect as appearances of the same reality. This is in effect what the advaitin does. The non-distinctness is asserted not as between finite causes and effects in the world, but as between the world and its cause, Brahman. The causal relationship is to be understood as between the substrate and the super-imposed, the rope and the snake; but for the rope there would be no snake-delusion there; it is present only so long as the rope is there and disappears into the rope, when the latter is truly known as such. The effect, the delusion, is nothing other than the cause, though it appears to be different. The causal relation is based on this delusive difference. It is, so to speak, subjective; and this subjectivity will, one may expect, infect all derivative finite causal relations too. The advaitin, however, maintains the relative objectivity of finite causal relationships. Causality is no doubt a product of nescience; but so long as we live in a world of nescience, without rising above it to that which is neither cause nor effect, we have no right to impugn causality; it is as objective as the world is; even for the transcendence of nescience we depend on this concept, since we have to depend on means like instruction, reflection, contemplation, etc.

If these were not well-settled causes, they could not be depended on by us in our laudable endeavour to realise ourselves; and yet when we do realise, the very means which furthered our endeavours appear delusive. The needs of science and metaphysics seem to be equally satisfied by the invocation of two worlds. Whether causal rigidity in the empirical world is consistent with denial of causality in the transcendental world is a problem which we shall have to pose in the course of this paper. The orthodox advaita position would seem to admit of some improvement.

We have to note in the meantime that the cause would seem to find no logical resting place short of Brahman; and in Brahman it seems to annul itself along with the effect. This is how. The concept in question is an attempt to understand change. It attempts to explain what is fleeting and limited in time, what was not, but is and may cease to be, what in other words is occasional and impermanent. The presumption in any such explanation is that the permanent and the unchanging is self-explanatory; by being related thereto the transient may be made intelligible. A mere relation of one thing to another does not satisfy *per se*. It will no doubt be said that explanation consists in relating the unknown to the known, not the fleeting to the permanent; even in this way of conceiving explanation it must be remembered that the known implies a relatively unified and relatively permanent system; and the permanence of the knowing self at least is in most cases assumed. Without the relation to something more permanent or fundamental, no phenomenon finds explanation. The goal of explanation would seem to be therefore the exhibition of the relation of the changing to that which is above change. Hence it is that *pradhāna* and primal atoms alike are conceived as unborn and eternal. Where the world is declared to arise out of a First Cause, such cause is itself not a product and is conceived as above space and time. This indeed is the merit of the causal concept, that, how-

ever inconsistently, it rises above the very limitations and diversities which lead to its invocation and seeks to reach infinitude and unity. The relating of one phenomenon to another may give some temporary or practical satisfaction; but we cannot logically stop short of the noumenon above the phenomena.

And when we do get to the noumenon, whether by reasoning or testimony or both, we still seem to be no better off logically. The noumenon, Brahman, the supreme and sole reality, is the cause. The effect cannot be spoken of as such unless there is some difference from the cause. Hence the world though differing from Brahman in respect of finitude, inertness etc., may well because of this very difference be the effect of Brahman. The world is not eternal and constant; else it would not be an effect; nor would it require explanation, as the eternal is self-explanatory. It is not real in the way that Brahman is real. Nor is it unreal, as in that case it would have nothing at all in common with Brahman and could not be its product. The effect shares with the cause the negation of unreality; it differs from the cause in falling short of reality by which we understand what is always and for ever. The phenomenon in other words is indeterminable as real or as unreal; hence its relation to the noumenon can have no better status; that too, must be but indeterminable or phenomenal. The advaitin does assert the non-otherness of effect from cause; he does not however assert their identity in such wise as to deduce for the effect the reality of the cause; the negation of otherness amounts only to this —that the effect has no reality other than that of the cause.[3] Hence, it is that the promissory statements of *śruti* can be justified as to the knowledge of all (effects) through knowledge of the one (cause).

3 Cf.: "na khalv ananyatvam ity abhedam brūmaḥ, kiṃ tu bhedaṃ vyāsedhāmaḥ"—*Bhāmatī*, II, i, 14.

It is worth while sparing some attention here to the notion of identity-in-difference as connected with the causal concept. Identity and difference may appear *prima facie* irreconcilable contraries; but their co-existence, one may contend, is both possible and actual, as will be seen if we look at the many transformations of a single cause. Hail and snow are different; so are bracelet and ear-ring; yet these differences co-exist with the fundamental identity of each pair, in the causal aspect, i.e., as water and as gold. As cause there is identity; as effect there is difference. One has to ask what the relationship is between the cause and the effects. Is it identity or difference? If identity, then, what holds good in the causal aspect should equally hold good in the effect-aspect too, so that there is no propriety in restricting the identity of hail and snow only to their causal aspect; they must be identical even as products, a conclusion commendable neither to common-sense nor to the opponent. Suppose, however, there is difference between cause and effects; then between hail which is different from water and snow also different from water, how can there be identity in the causal, i.e., water-aspect? We shall have to resort here again to identity-in-difference, a procedure tainted with the charge of self-dependence or infinite regress. Further, when because of identity-in-difference there is intermixture between the causal and effect-aspects, how can there be the restriction of identity to one of these aspects? We are again faced with the violation of common-sense.

The real is the cause; the effect may not be identical therewith nor different therefrom; nor is difference *cum* non-difference intelligible; the effect is neither real nor unreal; one term of the causal relation being thus indeterminable, the relation itself is indeterminable.

This conclusion may be due to our illegitimate attempt to extend the causal concept beyond the phenomenal realm, where alone it can be legitimately invoked. Phenomenal causality knows

nothing of these transcendental difficulties. The relation between one phenomenon and another can be so refined as to be invariable and unconditional; and with this all reasonable ambitions of causal explanation will have been satisfied. In answer to such an objection let us undertake a still closer investigation of the causal concept.

The *advaitin's* examination of cause as conceived by the realists of the time is very instructive and can perhaps be hardly improved upon. The cause is usually conceived as an antecedent in time. Of course, not any antecedent will do, e.g. a donkey standing by the potter's shed is not a cause in respect of the production of a pot. We refine the notion by the qualification of invariability; we know that the donkey is not an invariable antecedent. But our difficulties seem to be just beginning. Those who enumerate causes admit causal efficacy not merely for distinct events in time, but also for certain common conditions like time, space, *Īśvara*, etc. *Īśvara* is above time, hence not an antecedent in time. Time itself is not in time and hence cannot be treated as such an antecedent. An ingenious attempt will claim that though there are no temporal distinctions for time, they may be understood through adjuncts, just as the *advaitin* claims that, because of adjuncts, distinctions are introduced in the distinctionless. Priority and posteriority for time would be due to the priority and posteriority of the adjuncts. But how are the adjuncts distinguished as prior or posterior? Because of time; and because of the adjuncts so determined time itself is to be characterised as prior or posterior; a clear case of self-dependence. If time were not the determinant of sequence among adjuncts, all of them would be simultaneous, making all empirical usage impossible. This very impossibility would be a ground for treating time and cause as phenomenal, not for admitting sequence among adjuncts and claiming at the same time that it is not temporally determined. This is only to recognise under another name, time as a distinct adjunct determinative of

sequence; and one of the two postulates, either this adjunct or time, is clearly superfluous. Even were differentiation by adjuncts possible, it could not be said that time qualified by one of these exists in another time differently qualified, since in any case time cannot exist *in* itself. We do not indeed say that Devadatta who wears glasses exists *in* Devadatta who wears a suit.

This kind of difficulty may not appeal to those who refuse to recognise general causes. Even these will realise that invariable antecedence in time is over-pervasive of symptoms and co-effects, which are not causes. Day is not the cause of night. A persistent low temperature symptomatic of tuberculosis is not the cause of the patient's subsequent decline. We have to introduce further refinements in our understanding of invariable antecedence; and we seem nowhere near success in doing this. We may thus seek to dismiss symptoms and co-effects on the ground of their being *anyathāsiddha*, like the donkey or like the all-pervasive ether. The donkey's presence where the pot is made is due to other causes. Neither its presence nor the cognition of its presence is linked up *as a cause* with the cognition of the pot. Given its own causes the presence of the donkey would be fully accounted for, without any reference to the production of pot. So too in the case of ether, its presence is inevitable because of its pervasiveness, not because it accounts for the pot-production. Similarly the day is the effect of the rotation of the earth round the sun; it may be invariably associated in our minds with night, but its presence and cognition are adequately accounted for by its own cause without reference to night; so also the low persistent fever is accounted for by the tubercle bacillus without a necessary reference to the subsequent decline. Thus co-effects and symptoms may be ruled out.

But, we ask, do you mean to rule out all conditions that are accounted for by their own causes or are inevitable? In that case you would be ruling out most if not all accepted causes. The pervasive

ether is admitted to be the cause of sound, and the pervasive self of happiness, etc. It may be you are not prepared to admit their pervasiveness and *anyathāsiddhatva.* The difficulty, however, persists in the case of admitted causes. The clay and the wheel and the staff are undoubted causes of the pot. Are not these causal conditions sufficiently accounted for in their turn by their own antecedents? Perhaps, you think, they are not fully accounted for without reference to their purpose, the production of the pot, their final cause. There are at least two difficulties in such a view. You as a conscious being may consider the lack of final purpose to be a defect and may be inclined to read it in whatever you cognise; but that of itself will be no justification for reading this purpose into inert objects and determining their causality or non-causality thereby. Further this purpose is not an antecedent in time, but what is to be fulfilled in time, while what we seek to do here is to clear up the notion of an invariable antecedent. Again, what is it that we try to understand? Is it not the causality of clay, wheel etc., in relation to pot? The notion of pot as the final cause of the wheel, etc., how does that help us in this? In any case, it is difficult to maintain that clay is not understandable except with reference to a pot to be produced. It may be where it is by accident or design; and the design may relate to pots or dolls or a nature-cure plaster. The antecedents of its presence can be definite, not the purposes which it may serve; and because of the definiteness of the former, it does not cease to be a cause of pot etc. Of course, clay present in a potter's house is different from clay in Mahatma Gandhi's. In the former case, its causality of pot or basin is exceedingly likely; but it is only likely; the probability approximates to certainty when you see it in the potter's hands; even then there is an element of uncertainty; he may change his mind and throw it away or fashion something else; the certainty is greater when a rough shape has been given and you watch it on the wheel; it is

greatest when the pot has been finished; you can then say the clay of the pot is the cause of the pot, a proposition perilously near tautology. Again, in the case of earth, water, light, and seed, each of which is accounted for by its own causes and is known without a necessary reference to the growth of crops, can the causality in respect of crops be denied? The notion of *ananyathāsiddhatva* turns out to be a frail reed incapable of sustaining the causal concept.

You may now demand of the alleged cause that it should be helpful in producing the effect. But wherein lies helpfulness? And what degree of it is required? In any particular case of pot the donkey may be helpful; from contemplating its utility the potter may have derived extra cheerfulness and succeeded in finishing off a better pot than usual. This extra psychical stimulus may be provided by different causes for different pots; the potter may dream of his wife or his gains; though because of variability no one of these can be the cause of pot in general, causality in respect of each particular pot seems difficult, if not impossible, to deny.

Assuming for a moment all such objections to be fanciful, let us see whether there is any definite way of understanding the helpfulness of the cause. It is not that the effect is invariably present where the cause is; for the presence of seed is not invariably attended by the shoot. Of course, it will be said, seed alone is not the cause, but seed together with accessories. But it is in determining these accessories that we have all the trouble just noted; the donkey and the potter's wife are clamant in their demand for inclusion though with a show of logic we insist on excluding them. The only legitimate ground for their exclusion is that though present they are not present as causal. Our difficulty however is just what constitutes causal presence and it is no help to refer to accessories with a need for excluding what are not causal.

In any case, it is clear that the semi-popular usage of 'cause' has to be abandoned; for this can produce the effect only in depen-

dence on auxiliaries; and those auxiliaries do, properly speaking, enter into the very cause of the effect in question. We cannot legitimately separate the alleged cause from the auxiliaries; and any attempt to include them seems to end only when we come right down to the effect itself.

It may be said that nothing can be simpler than to determine the true auxiliaries, on the ground of co-presence and co-absence, *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Whatever has this generic quality is a cause, not any other. There are some merely technical objections to such a view; e.g. a genus, since it cannot possess another genus, can never be a cause. Since clay which is co-present and co-absent with pot has the genus substance-ness and this is shared by donkey etc., these too would be causes. If this genus be considered too wide and remote and a narrower more proximate genus insisted on, e.g. clayiness or earthiness, then such non-distinctive causes as ether, time, space etc., would be wholly excluded from the causal category, whereas time and space are always conceded to be causes. This is also the reason for our failure to understand *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Is the co-presence in time, or space, or both? In the first case, time cannot be a cause since it is not present in time; in the second case, space cannot be a cause; and the since neither is present in *both* space and time, neither can be a cause in the third case. Nor is the difficulty merely fanciful or terminological. For no cause is such in the abstract, but only as occurring in certain spatial and temporal conditions; and these cannot be ignored in reckoning causal efficiency; rains at harvest-time cannot be the cause of plenty.

We have still to face the ancient bugbear known as plurality of causes. Fire may be caused by a match-stick, or a burning-glass or by a steel and tinder. No one of these is the invariable antecedent of fire, yet each is said to cause fire. Our logicians in their wisdom say such usage is due to ignorance and lack of analysis.

Where the alleged cause and effect are sufficiently refined by analysis it will be found the same cause has only the same effect and the same effect has the same cause. Where the fire in the oven has been lit by one of these alternative modes, what, one wonders, will the analysis of the effect lead us to? Our perception does not acquaint us with any difference in the fires. It may be said that if we look at the fires armed with the knowledge of their causes, we are enabled to distinguish the products too. In a class of young boys not old enough to be invested with the sacred thread and all looking more or less alike we distinguish a brahmin boy by his parentage from the rest; so too in the case of the fires and other similar effects alleged to result from a plurality of causes. The illustration is not suitable. For reasons, sound and unsound, we admit the brahmin parentage of the particular boy and then deduce or admit his brahminhood. Here, however, which is the cause is the very point at issue; and the matter we say is unsettled, because of the inconstancy of the antecedents of fire at different times. To the reply that the fires too are different we oppose their practical indistinguishability. It is no answer to this to offer their distinguishability in the light of their distinct causes. Granted their causality the effects would be distinguishable; granted the distinguishability the alleged causes would be really such: thus we have flagrant reciprocal dependence.

Nor is this due to the apparent puerility of the instance chosen. Though death, in popular speech, may be due to many causes, any particular instance of death will on analysis prove traceable only to one of such causes. Interference with the respiratory system is not the same as interference with the circulatory system. Drowning interferes with respiration; certain varieties of snake poison clot the blood and arrest circulation. Both are vital functions. The arrest of one leads to the suspension of the other also, resulting in what we call death. In respect of the final cessation of all functions, is there

any difference? None we can discover. In the preliminaries thereto there are differences: one may get black in the face, or have the wind-pipe or spinal column broken, or the respiratory passage filled with water, or one's blood-vessels choked up with clotted blood; but this is just what we too affirm; in the face of such divergent antecedents how can we deny plurality of causes or affirm a distinction in the effects, except at the risk of such tautologies, as "Drowning is the cause of death by drowning"? Analysis is a good servant, but a bad master. The man in the street does not analyse and has perhaps little faith in the infallibility of causal relations; the logically trained person analyses, but that does not justify his pathetic faith in the perfect causal relation; if the process of analysis is pressed forward rigorously instead of being allowed to stop short to contemplate its triumphs, it will find itself under the necessity to transcend the causal concept.

Again, since, where we do not arrive at a non-difference of cause from effect, we have to distinguish between the cause and its auxiliaries, may we not, even on the assumption of effects being distinguishable, attribute the distinctness to the auxiliary rather than to the cause? Drowning and shooting are both causes of death, we may say; there is no doubt of this difference in the effects, that there is water in the respiratory passages in one case and a hole through the heart in the other; but this is due to the mode in which the different causes function to their accessories; it cannot detract from the possibility of different causes to produce the same effect. Not a very sound argument, perhaps, but a plausible one.

Our difficulties, it may be thought, are due to the persistence of the popular notion that the cause is a single condition, whereas it is in truth a complex of conditions. We should not confuse ourselves with the notion of a cause and its auxiliaries, but should always envisage a causal complex, any member of which may figuratively, and for strictly limited purposes, be called a cause. A cause

is that which is a member of a causal complex. This does not, however, take us very far, since, as we have already seen, our difficulty is to determine how much to include in this complex and what to exclude. The only answer we get is that we should include all causes and only causes; but this is to go round in a circle. Further, being a member of the complex, is it the very nature (*svarūpa*) of each of the components? Then each should produce the effect. Even if aggregation be not the *svarūpa* it may be eternal; in such a case the effect should be constant, instead of appearing and disappearing. If, however, the aggregation is adventitious and occasional, how does *that* come about? If it is due to another cause, that will involve another complex and we shall have an infinite regress; or our notion of the first complex would itself turn out to be defective because of the non-inclusion of this factor which accounts for its own being. And when this cause of the complex can itself explain the effect, why postulate an intermediate complex? The complex should be accounted for by its own constituents. Is each then distributively the cause? Then, since some one element of it, e.g. space, will be constant, the complex should be constant, and also the effect. If to avoid this we say that the factors collectively account for the aggregation, we are in the old round of explaining collectiveness by itself. To postulate another complex or aggregate of course leads to infinite regress.

Why all this difficulty about aggregation? All conditions that are proximate constitute the complex; what is remote does not enter into it. The matter is not so simple, as we have difficulties parallel to those in understanding co-presence and co-absence. If the proximity be in time alone or space alone, time would be excluded in the former case and space in the latter; proximity in both would exclude both from causal conditions. If you mean not such contiguity, but either conjunction or inherence of one condition or set of conditions in the other or others, then conjunction and inherence would

not be causes, since for them there is not another conjunction or inherence. That there is a single complex may be determined from the production of a single effect; but this is to beg the question as to what it is that produces the effect.

Our troubles have been due to conceiving cause statically. The factors not merely exist but also function in producing the effect. This functioning (*vyāpāra*) we call aggregation or complication; and the effect results therefrom. We are still in the woods; for is this functioning extrinsic or intrinsic to the factors? If intrinsic, we have to determine whether it belongs to each factor distributively or to all collectively. In the former case we have the old difficulty that some factors being constant, the operation and the effect would also be constant. To conceive function as intrinsic to the aggregate does not help, since our present efforts are directed only to the understanding of aggregation. If the functioning be extrinsic to the factors, another functioning would have to be interposed between that and the factors, and there would be infinite regress. If, however, the function of complication can be arrived at without an intermediate function, why may not the factors produce the effect itself without the interposition even of complication?

When the conception of functioning fares thus, it is no help to define cause as that which has function. Other difficulties apart, this would exclude the final function from the cause, since that function has not another function. And since function cannot be defined except in terms of generating i.e. causing,[4] we are again involved in a vicious circle. Further, the possession of function cannot be interpreted as inherence or as generation. The latter involves self-dependence while the former is contrary to what is known. Sacrifice is said to be instrumental to heavenly enjoyment through the function of an unseen potency (*apūrva*); but this

4 The function is what is generated by the cause and generates the effect produced by the cause.

apūrva is not inherent in the sacrifice; for the sacrifice perishes while the *apūrva* survives and results in the enjoyment hereafter.

Enough of this juggling, you may say; it may be that I cannot define cause; but you cannot disprove it. For, living as we do in a world of finite particulars that come and go, the recognition of cause is inevitable; else there would be but constancy, neither appearance nor disappearance; what is uncaused is eternal, like ether or the self. The average realist who urges this is not quite aware of his own presuppositions. The Indian logician, for instance, holds that the non-existence of an effect prior to its production is uncaused; but it is not eternal, terminable as it is by the coming into being of the effect. Again, a barren woman's son is not caused; nor is he eternal. Even if you protest against this reference to non-entities, what are the positive instances on which you base your pervasion? Neither the existence nor the eternality of ether and the self is universally admitted. The rejection alike of eternality and of the absence of causation cannot avail as the ground of pervasion; for the materialist who admits all things to be transient yet denies the validity of inference or causation. One who delights in the bare bones of logic may attempt the following inference: What is in dispute is caused, since it has prior non-existence; what is uncaused has no prior non-existence, like the self; since the uncaused self is admitted by the vedāntins, and the present argument is addressed to them alone, the example is unquestionable. But there is a more fundamental defect; the *probandum* must be something known; it must not be a wholly unknown predicate or one whose nature is in doubt; it must not be *aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇa*. Since the causal concept is just that which is in dispute, it serves no purpose to set up an inference like the above to prove that something is caused.

Does the advaitin then deny causality altogether? No; he does deny its intelligibility and ultimate reality. Viewing ourselves and our environment as finite and changing, there is only one way

of rising above our limitations; that is to grasp the identity in the differences, the permanent in the changing. The causal concept is an eminently successful attempt at such apprehension. In the nature of things, however, it cannot claim to be more real than what it seeks to comprehend. The phenomenal world is illusory; the causal concept applicable thereto is also illusory. The causal relation is not ultimately real, because nothing we call cause is ultimately real. What causal explanation seeks is such identity of character between cause and effect as will secure rigid and predictable sequence; the reality of either is for it an irrelevant question. And logically there is no reason for us to insist that any cause or all causes alike should be real. In the first place, all causal factors are not alike; the potter's staff is little like the clay and less like the potter; why should such divergent conditions agree in a claim to reality? True, we call them all causes, just as we apply the notion of similarity to a variety of cases; but the similarity of cow to ox is not the same as that of a cow to she-buffalo; much less has it in common with the similarity of brother and sister. Why insist on reality being common to such widely divergent factors? Further, by him who says the cause is real, reality is presumably conceived as qualifying the cause. If the cause in every case is that which *has* reality for its qualification, then the substrate (*viśeṣya*), the cause, itself is not real; if, on the contrary, the cause does not have reality for its qualification, then too it is not real. Nor can this dialectical skill be turned against the advaitin. It may not be said for instance that if Brahman be qualified by reality, the substrate of the world would be unreal, and that the same consequence follows, only more so, if Brahman be not qualified by reality. For the advaitin holds Brahman to be reality itself, above all distinctions of substrate and attribute. Brahman is co-eval with *sattva*, not *antarbhāvitasattva*; and such a claim may intelligibly be made only for what is one, infinite, above space and time, not for the multiple and the limited.

It would follow from this that explanations of the finite as finite would achieve but limited success where they do not wholly fail. For the finite is grounded in the infinite and the latter alone can explain itself or another. Scientific explanations could take us beyond the particular phenomena sought to be known, but not very far; since our particular interests are limited they may and do offer help to satisfy those interests; but if we pressed forward, either because of irrepressible theoretical or satiated and novelty-seeking practical quests, we would find our explanations melting into thin air or doubling back to the starting point. Such an expectation on the part of the advaitin is justified in a measure by what some modern scientists have to say. The name of Eddington is notorious in this connection. And in spite of the disagreement even of some professors of philosophy, it is worth while taking note of his conclusions.

"The determination of the physical laws," says Eddington, "reflects the determinism of the method of inference."[5] And the mode of inference he exhibits as strictly cyclic, maintaining its rigidity by cutting away what inconveniently refuses to fit into the scheme. Thus Einstein in his statement of the law of gravitation makes use of the concept of *potentials* which are said to "obey certain lengthy differential equations." *Potentials* are quantities derivable from fundamental quantities called *intervals*. *Intervals* are relations between events measurable by a *scale* or *clock*. A *scale* is a graduated strip of *matter*. Keeping to the world of mechanics, matter may be defined in terms of *mass*, *momentum* and *stress*. To the question what these three are, Einstein's theory is claimed to have given an exact answer. "They are formidable looking expressions containing the *potentials* and their first and second derivatives

5 *The Nature of Physical World* (Everyman), p. 262.

with respect to the coordinates."[6] And thus we have gone round full circle, or as Eddington diagrammatically represents it, round the pentagon.



The only way to avoid this going round is to stop short somewhere with what you know or what you seem to know. Most people would imagine they know what matter is and would not question further. For them, scientific explanation would appear very sound, simplifying and inter-connecting concepts, making the whole world more intelligible. But the knower, who is he? What is Mr. X? Surely till that is answered the explanation is not complete. It is because of ignoring this question that systems are maintained and certainty achieved. But neither the metaphysician nor even the scientist has the right to ignore this question.

The cyclic nature of physical inference is illustrated by the children's rhyme of the house that Jack built; only at a certain stage we retrace our steps instead of going on, so that we repeat ourselves indefinitely.[7] And the fact of empirical validity of what we infer

6 *Op. cit.*, p. 254.

7 Or, as another interprets it "We are doing what the dictionary compiler did when he defined a violin as a small violoncello and a violoncello as a large violin" (*Limitations of Science*, p. 193, Pelican).

cannot guarantee the objective reality of the starting point of the inference. "When from an observation of pink rats we infer the presence of alcohol, the validity of the inference lies in the fact that what we infer originates a process which ends in the mental construction of pink rats.........But it is not presupposed that the pink rats are objectively real."[8]

Eddington holds that with the advent of quantum physics, the decline of determinism has also set in. The strict reign of *causality* (the belief in rigid reversible causal relations, as distinguished from the belief in *causation* that any consequent is due to its antecedent or complex of antecedents) is no longer found valid in the domain of physics where it had been supposed to hold undisputed sway. Not all modern physicists are willing to sacrifice determinism. But causality is a positive idea, the burden of proof of which lies on those who advance it; and physicists like Einstein and Max Planck, though they would like to re-establish determinism, see no present means of doing it. Their present failure does not involve failure for all time. Strict causality has not been disproved. But this can give no satisfaction to the physicist whose task it is to prove it, if he can. And despite Planck's emphatic assertion that "natural phenomena invariably occur according to the rigid sequence of cause and effect. This is the indispensable postulate of all scientific research,"[9] we have Eddington's assurance that "Present day physics is simply indifferent to it. We might believe in it today and disbelieve in it to-morrow; not a symbol in the modern text-books of physics would be altered."[10]

If the reaction to determinism among modern physicists is not uniform, the welcome among philosophers has not been all that one might expect. Prof. Stebbing re-acting violently against the idealism as well as the loose language of Eddington will concede only

8 *New Pathways in Science*, p. 294.
9 *Where is Science Going?* p. 107.
10 *New Pathways*, p. 302.

that "the discovery of uncertainty relations does involve a considerable change in our attitude to determinism. But I doubt whether it is quite the change that either Jeans or Eddington supposes."[11] "The dominance of universal causation is felt to be a nightmare. Heisenberg's principle has some part to play in revealing to us what it is we thought we were accepting."[12] A very limited concession! Radhakrishnan holds that "Even freedom of man is not helped in any way by the freaks within the atom. To suggest that electrons possess free will is to degrade freedom itself."[13] "If in order to be satisfied of the truth of freedom" says Dr. Brahma, "we want it to be proved at the level of mechanism, if instead of rising up to the level of freedom we desire that it may exist at the lower level of mechanism, we are demanding what is nothing short of the impossible. Freedom is not determinism and it can never hold good of determinism."[14] The meaning of this last statement is far from clear, especially in view of what he says later. "The freedom that cannot find any place for necessity and causation but always opposes itself to the latter cannot be the ultimate category."[15] Should we not conclude from this that "real" freedom does not oppose itself to determinism and, to that extent, does hold good of determinism? Dr. Brahma is quite content with the indeterminism or non-determination of Brahman; at the level of the phenomenal or empirical, causation may have full sway. But this is just what we as humble logicians in quest of the truth fail to understand. Quite irrespective of what may be true of a transcendent or noumenal background, we found it difficult to grasp the notion of cause or effect in any intelligible or consistent fashion even at the empirical level. We found that try as we might we were landed in self-dependence or infinite regress, defects which strangely enough seemed to find a parallel in

11 *Philosophy and the Physicists*, p. 184.
12 *Ibid.*, p. 240.
13 *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 246.
14 *Causality and Science*, p. 20.
15 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

physical laws as expounded by Eddington. The cyclic nature of physical law exhibits the self-dependence we have detected in the causal notion. And the scientist today recognises, instead of rejecting, the plurality of causes. "We may think" says Eddington "we have an intuition that the same cause cannot have two alternative effects; but we do not claim any intuition that the same effect may not spring from two alternative causes."[16] And the following quotation from Prof. Davidson will serve as a commentary on this: "The scientific world is full of examples of the same effect proceeding from different causes. An instance from chemistry may be taken. It is well known that formic acid can be obtained from nettles, ants, and other living organisms. It can also be obtained from its elements by simple methods; for instance, potassium formate can be produced from carbon monoxide and caustic potash, and formic acid can be produced from the compound by distilling with dilute sulphuric acid."[17] This measure of agreement makes us suspect that there may be more to the matter than is conceded by Prof. Stebbing or other philosophers, realist or idealist.

Let us consider for a moment the measure of indeterminism now claimed to the credit of the sciences. Each atom is supposed to comprise a nucleus of positive electricity with one or more electrons revolving round it. The nucleus may consist of a single proton or a number of protons and electrons closely packed together, with a preponderance of protons over electrons so that there is a balance of positive electricity. The electron revolving in its orbit should naturally tend to draw ever closer to the nucleus and the process would be normally presumed to be continuous. It has been found, however, that what occurs is a change by jumps, not a continuous change. We have to assume a succession of orbits; from each of these the electron may jump to a higher or a lower, either absorbing

16 *Nature of the Physical World*, p. 286.

17 M. Davidson, *Free-Will or Determinism*, p. 44.

energy or radiating it; it may jump to the next lower or to the next but two; when the electron will jump and how much it will jump we do not know and have no means of knowing; all that we do know for certain is that between the energy levels of the various orbits the relation is constant, being expressible in terms of *h* (Max Planck's constant, equivalent to $6{\cdot}55 \times 10^{-27}$ erg. seconds) or some integral multiple of *h*, such as 2 *h*, 3 *h*, etc. There is thus an uncertainty within the atom, what Radhakrishnan calls a freak, as to when and how its mobile components, the electrons will change; the time, the quantity and direction of change are all uncertain.

This much can afford little basis for the scientific determinist or indeterminist philosopher. The measurements required may appear present impossibilities but may be future achievements, even like the bombing and disintegration of atoms. To this extent one may sympathise with Dr. Brahma when he says "If future experiments reveal to us that the indeterminism supposed to exist in the movements of the electron is really non-existent, Philosophy would find itself helpless to prove its position if it now accepts the argument of Professor Eddington."[18] But the arguments of Eddington and Schrödinger go a little further than this. They maintain not merely that the movement of the electron is uncertain in the present state of our knowledge, but *can never be certain*, so that scientific prediction, such as we used to believe in, is impossible. In order to foretell the motion of the electron you must know both its position and its velocity; but in the nature of things, you can never approach accuracy in regard to the one without receding from accuracy in regard to the other. In order to know the position of the electron you have to look at it or illuminate it with light rays of a smaller wave-length; not even the shortest of ordinary light rays, the violet rays, is short enough for the purpose. We have to use what are called gamma-rays from radio-active substances. When such rays

18 *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

are used, at least one quantum of energy will be involved and this is sufficient to disturb the electron, in an unpredictable manner. We would have very nearly fixed the position but would have disturbed the velocity. If we used lights of long wave-length but little energy, the velocity would be undisturbed, but the position would be uncertain. Accurate prediction requires knowledge of both position and velocity. "But these two factors are so connected that the more accurately we know the one the less accurately we know the other."[19] To put it in terms of Schrödinger's wave-theory, an electron may be taken to be associated with a wave-packet so as to correspond to it in some way. Wave-packets may comprise waves of great or small length. In the former case their velocity will be less than in the latter. The velocity of the electron in the larger wave will be not quite determinate, as it may be either in the forward moving or back-ward moving part of the wave; but since the velocity of the wave itself is low, the indeterminacy will be low compared with the indeterminacy of position due to the length of the wave; the latter indeterminacy is reduced in the case of waves of shorter wave-length; but because of their greater frequency the difference in velocity between the forward and backward parts will be much greater; hence the indeterminacy of velocity is much higher in this case. "We pay for precision in position by uncertainty in velocity and *vice versa*."[20] The difficulty, to repeat, is not one of present inability, but the impossibility of prediction, given present conceptions.

It may be urged that these conceptions may give place to others, in the light of which prediction may appear possible. The wave theory gave way to the particle theory; now there is a tendency to combine the two and speak of a wavicle; we may in time arrive at some more intelligible synthesis which will do justice to the phenomena and preserve determinism. As against this we have to re-

19 *Limitations of Science*, p. 92.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 93.

member that Eddington and those of his persuasion do not claim to have established indeterminism scientifically. They do claim to have dis-established scientific determinism. Strict causality as understood in the past is neither possible nor necessary for science. We have so far only probability based on statistical laws. These statistical laws are not and need not be grounded on a rigid reversible causal relation.

We may assume for the moment that the principle of indeterminacy (strictly speaking it is uncertainty, and is expressive of the inability of the observer, not of the nature of things) has been established. Even thus, it holds of microscopic bodies, not of macroscopic entities like ourselves or our bodies. Granted the electron is free, what follows for us, endowed with organisms composed of large masses of electrons? The governing law may be statistical in its nature, not a relation of rigid necessity. This, however, means little in practice. By extensive observation we may compute the average longevity of the members of a country, community, profession or the like. It will not be possible on the basis of this average to judge the longevity of any particular member of that group; any particular member's length of life may hover about the mean or be far in excess or defect. Despite such uncertainties and aberrations, the average will continue to hold good for the whole as such. Similarly whatever may be the indeterminacy of the individual electron, the general law of causality will continue to hold good of us who are wholes of electrons. Microscopic uncertainties cannot detract from macroscopic certainty. The supposed freakishness within the atom is no guarantee of my freedom.

The argument thus advanced seems irrefutable. And the advaitin, who is interested not in the empirical, but in the transcendental, ideality of the concept, may well be disposed to accept the argument at its face value. He cannot, however, afford to forget that his own dialectic has convicted the causal concept of self-

dependence, reciprocal dependence and so on. The cloven hoof (ideality) would seem to be manifest, however dimly, even at the empirical stage. The philosophic advocate of non-difference cannot afford to recognise water-tight planes or compartments, such that causality is wholly real in one plane and wholly unreal in another. It is in truth neither real nor unreal; this indeterminability (*anir-vācyatva*) is manifest in varying degrees in various planes. The advaitin cannot, therefore, countenance scientific determinism as either actual or possible.

It seems likely that the insurance company analogy is responsible for a confusion. The promoter of such a company, if he accepts reliable statistical figures about longevity, gets the advice of a good actuary, and permits no swindling by himself or by others, is exceedingly likely to prosper in his business despite the uncertainty of any individual's death or survival. In such a case, however, the group or class has no individuality of its own. It is loosely knit; if some die early, others die late and there is a balancing which preserves the average age intact. Suppose we consider instead something like the behaviour of a crowd and the behaviour of a company of soldiers. In the latter case, we can predict for the whole, not in spite of uncertainty about the parts, but because there is no uncertainty about them. In the former case, we may be certain about the parts but uncertain about the whole; while each member of a crowd may be inoffensive, whether because of timidity or a genuine law-abiding nature, the crowd as a whole will often over-ride both tendencies and behave in a thoroughly disgraceful manner. The difference between the insurance statistician and the collective psychologist is that the former studies happenings, while the latter studies behaviour. "Collective security" is possible in the former case in a manner and to an extent impossible in the latter. This is because in *behaviour* as contrasted with *event*, we have to deal not merely with particulars, but with

units or individuals; and each unit or individual seems to exhibit distressing symptoms of uncertainty.[21] This is of course most so in the case of the units called individual selves, as is evident from our deliberation as to what we shall do, our regrets for what we did or failed to do and so on. This, however, is to anticipate the question of human freedom.

To return to scientific determinism, it may be argued that with the possible exception of psychology, science is interested in happenings as such, not behaviour, and that if statistical laws can make predictions in those fields, the needs of determinism will be satisfied therewith. This sounds reasonable enough. But let us examine the nature of statistical law. It is based on a number of observations presumably accurate and formulated in such a way as to hold good of the whole constituted of the individuals observed. The proposition "Early marriages produce weaklings" based on observation of A, B, C............Z, who are all progeny of early marriage, is an instance of such a law; again, the proposition "South Indians generally die at 50," based on numerous observations as to the incidence of mortality in a large number of South Indians in all walks of life, is a statistical law. In neither case has a necessary connection been established between cause and effect or antecedent and consequent. But the observations so far as they went, were accurate. There was no doubt of A-Z having been children of parents married early or their being weaklings; the individual South Indians observed did die at the various ages noted by the observer. There is some basis of accuracy to go upon. If similar accuracy were attainable in the case of at least some of these microscopic electrons, we might formulate a statistical law holding good of the

21 After I had completed the paper I came across the following lines in Eddington's latest book: "A study of mob-psychology would be a very unsatisfactory foundation for a theory of the human mind. The molar law, or mob-law, of physics is an equally unsatisfactory introduction to the theory of individual or atomic behaviour." *The Philosophy of Physical Science*, p. 30.

macroscopic body though not of any individual microscopic component. This possibility, however, is just what is denied by the Principle of Indeterminacy which says that position and velocity cannot both be accurately determined. And though from a large number of non-accurate observations one may make a guess to a future event, the prediction can never on this basis achieve any better status than that of a guess, more or less lucky.

We may be faced now with the proposition that what is statistically aimed at is a law that applies to microscopic bodies, not to macroscopic ones; with regard to these, there is neither doubt nor failure of the application of the causal law as ordinarily understood. Even on this position there are certain difficulties. What we know as statistical law is such not because its basis is inaccurate, but because though accurate as far as it goes it does not make room for analysis and the establishment of a rigid connection; with the microscopic bodies, however, we find, if Heisenberg is not mistaken, that our observations are and necessarily must remain inaccurate. Statistics deal with inadequate data while here we are faced with inaccurate data. The difference, we grant, is one of degree; this, however, is as little ground for ignoring it, as the tiny size of the baby for ignoring its illegitimacy (in Marryat's story). Secondly, we have to ask whether these microscopic entities occupy a region of their own or are constitutive of the macroscopic bodies supposed to be governed by rigid causality. If they are constitutive, what is the guarantee that the uncertainty of microscopic behaviour will not affect the macroscopic too?[22] It would be ridiculous of course to argue that the larger the whole the greater is the indeterminacy; for the uncertainties may cancel out one another. But is the cancelling out more than a probability? Strictly speaking, should we not say that we cannot be certain as to whether the microscopic uncertainties

22 *Cp.* "If, however, the components acted quite capriciously why should there be aggregate constancy?" Laird, *Recent Philosophy*, p. 165.

accumulate or are annulled? And whatever we may judge of *events* as such, should not this uncertainty be our most legitimate conclusion with regard to *behaviour*?

All this seems much at variance with common sense. In looking back on what we know of occurrences or behaviour, we fail to see how any event could have occurred or failed to occur otherwise than as it did. In retrospect at least there seems to be no uncertainty. But this is no problem for the advocate of indeterminacy. In stating the principle, this is how Eddington envisages and answers the difficulty: "There is no limit to the accuracy with which we may know the position, provided that we do not want to know the velocity also. Very well; let us make a highly accurate determination of position now, and after waiting a moment make another highly accurate determination of position. Comparing the two accurate positions we compute the accurate velocity—and snap our fingers against at the principle of indeterminacy. This velocity however, is of no use for prediction, because in making the second accurate determination of position we have roughhandled the particle so much that it no longer has the velocity we calculated. *It is a purely retrospective* velocity."[23] "Nature thus provides that knowledge of one half of the world will ensure ignorance of the other half, ignorance, which, as we have seen, may be remedied later when the same part of the world is contemplated retrospectively."[24] "It is easy to prophesy after the event."[25]

Between the Eddington picture of the indeterminacy in the atom and our average picture of human indeterminacy there is a close

23 *Nature of the Physical World*, p. 295. 24 *Ibid.*, p. 296.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 296. It will be interesting to consider here what we know of astrology. It is a matter of common experience among those who consult astrologers that any astrologer worth the name shows uncanny ability in predicting the past while his success as to the future is much more restricted. He may succeed in forecasting certain outstanding events; but the minuteness and accuracy characteristic of the prediction of the past are generally lacking in the prediction

parallel. Most of us feel that, after we have acted, the speculation if we could have done otherwise is idle; but before acting we do feel that there is a choice to be made and that much hangs on this choice. Retrospectively we do admit determinism, but not prospectively. And if a serious-minded scientist finds a parallel for this in intra-atomic behaviour, there is little need for us to look with scorn at "freaks within the atom." Any such parallel is bound to be interesting and illuminating, though, of course, never conclusive. And it is not the claim of the Eddington group to have proved human freedom; rather do they maintain that the supposed obstacle of the exact sciences is no longer there.

It may be thought that the claim to exactitude of certain sciences was never a bar to human freedom. The determinism of external events cannot affect the fact of human responsibility. Prof. Stebbing makes a distinction between responsibility *for* and responsibility *to*. I am responsible *for* my acts *to* some authority, God or the king or my neighbours. When a question of accountability or responsibility *to* some one arises, it may be legitimate to plead determinism as an excuse. But so long as I do not ignore the fact that whatever is done it is *I* that do it, my responsibility *for* the act persists and cannot be got rid of. The notion of responsibility *to*

of the future. This may be due in many cases to the astrologer's lack of competence; in some cases it is due to inaccuracy of data, the required precision being almost unattainable in the nature of things; to some extent again the lack of accuracy is due to the possible modification of the future by the individual himself; he may offer propitiations and avert malign influences; the planets seem to be responsible only for some tendencies, the effectuation or frustration of such tendencies being, to some extent at least, in the hands of the victim. It is indeed urged that the function of astrology is not to satisfy idle curiosity about the future, but to help the individual to forward good tendencies and avert evil ones, by suitable measures. It is also common belief that astrological predictions of the future fail in the case of yogins, because of their intensive self-culture. However this may be, we find that astrology combines precision as regards the past with a haziness more or less negligible as regards the future; and this combination instead of disentitling it to be a science, seems to bring it into line with other exact science, in its modern developments.

is irrelevant; what matters is responsibility *for* and this does not stand in need of scientific indeterminism. What matters is that *I* act; and our interest should lie in making precise the *I*, not in making the act indeterminate.

One may sympathise with this clever line of reasoning without, however, being convinced by it. The question of responsibility to God may be irrelevant, but that of responsibility to society and the state is very important. If a person's acts are the result not of choice, but of prior states and those of still prior states and so on, are we justified in intervening at some stage awarding praise or blame, reward or punishment? On such an extremely determinist view even our approbation and reprobation would appear determined; so the question of justification may not arise. But even in regard to responsibility *for*, surely there is a difference between a primary and a secondary sense thereof. I am responsible for my fall, physical or moral, in a way in which the stone is not responsible for falling. If my responsibility consists in this, that it is *I* who act, the stone should be responsible in precisely a similar manner in that it is the *stone* which falls. This however is not what we mean. With regard to this very falling of the stone, both I and the stone may be responsible, I by the fact of displacing it and the stone by the act of falling, but in very different senses. The stone acts as it is acted on. I act because of the forces which act on me and as I choose among these forces. An abstract external calculation of forces, such as is possible or as is assumed to be possible in the case of the stone, is not possible in my case. That is why I am responsible in a sense in which the stone is not. To square this fact of responsibility with scientific determinism we have either to deny that fact or abrogate determinism. The former is what earlier scientists and the materialists did; the latter is what the Eddington group of scientists do.

A third course is perhaps not impossible. One such way would admit determinism in a limited sphere. Determinism is all right in

the world of matter, but will not apply to spirit. We are concerned, however, not with the freedom of spirit in the abstract, but with the freedom of human beings, apparently bound in and reacting to a material environment, and embodied in psycho-physical frames. If those frames and the environment are strictly determined, there is no sense in claiming freedom for me; my responsibility is no better than that of the falling stone. Am I different from the frame and the mechanism? If not, the determinism of the latter applies to me also. If I am different, in what realtion am I to the mechanism, and how is it determined? If there is a relation and that is undetermined we leave the door wide open for the influx of the demons of primitive faith; calculation and determinism, even within a limited sphere, become impossible since this sphere is liable to be disrupted at any time from without. If the relation is determined, it cannot obviously be so unless the other relatum, the *I* is also determined, and no determinate relation is conceivable where one relatum is undetermined and undeterminable. The only relation, if it can be called that is one of super-position of the mechanical on the non-mechanical, of matter on spirit. This is the advaita notion which we shall examine presently. But short of this there seems no way of avoiding the extremes of denying human responsibility or scientific determinism. To claim a mysterious sphere for the *I* is only to do violence to science without any corresponding advantage in metaphysics.

Why not then adopt the advaita doctrine of super-position? The mechanical, the material, the determined is a superimposition on the conscious, the spiritual, the ever-free. So long as we are in the sphere of the super-imposed we gladly concede determinism. We recognise however that it is only a phenomenal plane, the plane of the analytical intellect. When, by a deeper intuition, we rise to the higher plane of spirit, there is no determinism. The Real, the Absolute is neither free nor not-free; the appearance is never free.

The fetterless spirit appears as fettered in its own laws; the non-relational appears as the harmoniously related; the uncaused and un-causing appears as a system of rigidly interlinked causes and effects. "The Absolute" says Dr. Brahma "expresses itself differently at different stages and this infinite variety of expressions also in a way proves the infinitude of the Absolute. It is our limitation which is responsible for the belief that what is causally connected cannot be freely conceived. But if we attempt to reach the deepest levels of our experience and to be directly cognisant of the inexhaustible, autonomous spring that underlies and supports the ever-changing playful states of consciousness, we can realise that what is freely conceived is expressed through harmony, law and system, and that there is no opposition between perfect freedom and spontaniety on the one hand and law and system, causality and determinism on the other."[26]

This passage, I confess, has puzzled me greatly. In some ways its contention seems as patent as it is acceptable. How can the infinite appear finite, the self-luminous as other-illumined, the un-determined as determined? To this our answer must frankly be that as finite consciousnesses we do not know, and to deny the reconciliation is really to presume an omniscience we do not possess. The reconciliation *may be* for aught we know; it *must be* if we are to conserve the intelligibility of the finite in some measure; therefore it *is*. The adoption of this Bradleian reasoning, however, presupposes a *must be*: a stage which we cannot postulate if the finite causal system were a closed system, if determinism, causality, law, system were intelligible instead of being riddled with contradictions as shown in the Bradleian and advaita dialectic. We may admit that the ever-free can and does express itself as if bound; but if the freedom is real, the bondage can be nowhere near perfect.

26 *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

Another idea under-lying Dr. Brahma's words may perhaps be expressed thus. Brahman is undetermined; it is not a term in a cause-effect series; all the same it is not characterless; the undetermined nature of Brahman does not lead to the possibility of anything being anything else; the absolute freedom of Brahman is consistent with its being determinate, its being character (though not endowed with characteristics), so that what is abstracted therefrom or superposed thereon is such and such, not something else; and between the various super-positions certain definite laws hold good. This is as it should be. A thoughtful advaitin would repudiate the characterisation of Brahman, refuse to predicate characteristics thereof, but not say that it is characterless. It is that which is at the mercy of all outside influences that has no character; not, however, that which has no inside or outside and is homogeneous. If, therefore, it is this reconciliation that is meant by Dr. Brahma between law and its transcendence, there is no need to disagree.

But here again it must be remembered that the finite is not a plane or sphere apart from the infinite; it is the infinite itself which expresses itself in finitude; hence even on the empirical view the boundaries of the finite cannot afford to be hard and fast; they must have a certain haziness, though the haziness may be negligible when dealing with large numbers. What I wish to stress is this: what you call finite has or has not a hard crust; if *ex hypothesi* you endow it with such a crust you will never make it jump out of its skin into the infinite either now or ever; if on the contrary it has no such crust, but we treat it as if it had, then law, system, determinism are not absolute even in the empirical sphere. Surely this is the only legitimate conclusion, if the deeper intuition is not a *deus ex machina* but the fruition and fulfilment of the disciplined intellect itself. From such a point of view the postulation of indeterminism in science is a conclusion very much to be welcomed. Absolute certainty for the true advaitin, belongs to Brahman alone for

that alone is both determinate and undetermined. Anywhere short of that, what is claimed to be absolutely certain is only an exercise in tautology more or less successfully camouflaged.

Again, what can be meant by the statement that the "Absolute expresses itself differently at different stages"? Is it that distinctions of space and time have real significance for the Absolute? Does the Absolute really have to pass through various stages? Or is it that in the Absolute, which is one, *we* distinguish stages? Surely this last is the position acceptable to the advaitin. And on such a view, the non-reality of the stages and distinctions has to be admitted, despite their presentation and empirical reality. The admission of this much of reality may be a necessary stage even in the realisation of illusoriness. As the ancient advaitin asks:

"गौणमिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्रदेहादिबाधनात्
सद्ब्रह्मात्मा-हमिति एवं बोधि कार्यं कथं भवेत् ?"

But what we insist on is only the non-reality, not the unreality (*asattva*) of the empirically real. Even at a level far short of absolute realisation, we find that error has been the gateway to truth; this does not prevent the recognition of the error nor shift the realisation of the more inclusive truth to a higher plane or to a different sphere. The passage from error to truth may follow the laws of wave mechanics or of quantum mechanics. We may insensibly move towards the truth or jump to it in well-marked stages; and our jumps may not all be in a forward direction; however this may be, it can never be maintained that in one sphere or plane the error was true, but not in another. We thought it true at one stage, but now we do not think so; the germ of our present realisation was in it from the outset; it may be a fresh discovery, not a fresh importation; and consistently with this we have to declare not its reality, but its non-reality even in the empirical sphere. The deficiencies of empirical reality are to be made known not elsewhere or at another time in a

different order of experience; our finite practical life itself exhibits its self-diremptive character. What is required is not an ecstatic flight to mystic heights but some patient and persistent analysis. The Vedānta says "That thou art" not "That thou wilt become"; oneness with the Absolute is a present experience, not a mere hope of the future; and the imperfections of the phenomenal must be evident to us now, since we are the noumenon even now and do not have to become it hereafter. We cannot admit indeterminism in one plane and system, causality and law in another plane. Indeterminism is not indeterminateness; hence the *possibility of law* to a limited extent; system is relational, and relation being an unintelligible concept in the last resort, can never be complete; hence the possibility of law *only to a limited extent*. Freedom can hold good of determinism, despite Dr. Brahma's assurance to the contrary; it is because determinism can never be complete; in its attempt at fullness and precision it reaches out indefinitely or turns round in a tautologous circle. The self is free energising, as it is self-luminous consciousness. This freedom, however, being another name for the fullness of character independent of external conditions, and not equivalent to the indeterminable subjection to influences other than one-self, it is determinate. This determinateness is appreciable by us in our efforts at prediction, which are so successful in regard to the past and achieve a limited measure of success in regard to the future, though our certainty about the future is not and can never be anything more than a high measure of probability. For the ever-free in its appearance can never appear as the merely determined or the merely indeterminable; it must combine both features while rising above both; hence the predictability in retrospect and the probability in prospect. This is one approach to an understanding of reality and for help in this approach, we may be duly thankful to modern scientists, though beyond this we may not go in reliance on their conclusions.

The dismissal of causality does not involve the abolition of all certainty. It is dreary philosophy which can hold out no certainty at least of release. This certainty cannot be taken away by advaita or by modern science. There is no philosophy possible without the certainty of the philosophising self. This is self-luminous, self-evident, self-guaranteed. And release, according to the advaitin, is the self's own nature. It is that it is; it can never be gained nor lost, though it may appear to be lost and appear to be regained. For us who appear to be searching, the regaining of our own nature is a certainty; it is indeed the only certainty, and the only measure among the probabilities which are all we have left to us in prospect.

S. S. Surya Narayana Sastri

The Life and Works of Madhva

I. *Predecessors of Madhva*

Nothing definite or authentic about the forerunners of Madhva's theism is known to us beyond what has been recorded by Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya, in his *Maṇimañjarī*, a short poem furnishing the necessary mytho-historical back-ground to his more elaborate "Life of Madhva" (*Madhvavijaya*). From this and from the evidence of Madhva's own works, it is clear that the system of the Ācārya claims its descent mainly from the ancient monotheism of the Ekānti-Vaiṣṇavas or the Bhāgavatas.[1] But for all practical purposes, Madhva is himself the first historical founder and exponent of the system of philosophy associated with his name. Pre-Madhva hagiology is a blank save for the bare names of a few "forerunners" preserved to us in the *Maṇimañjarī*. An account in the *Padma Purāṇa*[2] derives Madhva's 'Viṣṇu-Glaubens' from Brahmā (Brahmasampradāya). The following is the traditional 'Guruparamparā' of the sect up to Madhva :—

Śrī Haṃsa (Nārāyaṇa)
|
Brahmā
|
The four Sanas
|
Durvāsas
|
Jñānanidhi Tīrtha
|
Garuḍavāhana Tīrtha
|
Kaivalya Tīrtha

Kaivalya Tīrtha
|
Jñanīśa Tīrtha
|
Para Tīrtha
|
Satyaprajña Tīrtha
|
Prājña Tīrtha
* * * *
[Gap of 300 years]
Acyutaprekṣa
|
Ānanda Tīrtha *alias* Madhvācārya

It will be seen from the above that tradition has preserved the names of at least half a dozen of the historical predecessors of Madhva. There is a gap of about 300 years between Prājña Tīrtha

1 केवलवंश as it is called in *Maṇimañjarī*, VIII, 33 cd.

2 सम्प्रदाये ब्रह्मनाम्नि मध्वाचार्यः प्रतिष्ठितः (Pādma.) vide *Catussūtribhāṣya*, introd. XXIV.

and Acyutapreksa. And nothing is known of the persons who flourished during this period. It is alleged that the saints of the creed were suffering severe persecution at the hands of the Advaitins in ascendancy, during this period.[3] A vivid and somewhat inflammatory account of this is given in chapter 7 of the *Maṇimañjarī*. Stripped of all exaggeration, the facts of the case were:

Driven to desperation by the ascendancy of Advaita, the Dvaita teachers had outwardly accepted monism. All that they could do was to ensure the bare continuation of their preceptorial line and leave the rest to the future.[4] In the course of two or three generations, when the stormy past had been forgotten, the once quasi-monists became full-fledged monists and remained in that blissful state of ignorance of their original antecedents, till the days of Acyutapreksa. No genuinely historical work on Dvaita could therefore have been written or preserved at such times. That is why we do not find Madhva referring to any historical work of his predecessors. The last in this line was Puruṣottama Tīrtha (*M. Vij.* vi, 33)[5] alias Acyutapreksa who was the Sannyāsa-Guru of Madhva. It is clear from the *M. Vij.* that he was a warm Advaitin (v, 25; iv, 8; ix, 33-37)[6] though different impression is sought to be created by a passage in the *Maṇimañjarī*.[7] The very first Vedāntic classic in which his teacher instructed Madhva, was the *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman. (*M. Vij.* iv, 44). It is obvious therefore, that Madhva was himself the actual historical founder and exponent of his system.

3 Such persecutions have parallels in Indian and classical history. Witness for instance the persecution of the Christians in Rome, in the early centuries of the Christian era, and of Rāmānuja in the 10th century.

4 Such existence *incognito* is held to account for the non-preservation of the names of the teachers subsequent to Prājña Tīrtha (a contemporary of Śaṅkara).

5 It is by this name that he is referred to in the Śrikūrmam Inscription of Narahari Tīrtha (1281 A.D.).

6 It is said that there were frequent disagreements between Madhva and his Guru, and it was with great difficulty that the Ācārya ultimately converted him. (ix, 33-37) to his way of thinking.

7 VIII, 33 and 36.

No doubt, as we have seen in Part I, the theistic philosophy preached by the Ācārya has a long history behind it and goes back to the original basic literature of Hinduism viz., the Veda-Śāstra. But there is no evidence of immediate literary activity of any kind which would connect the works of Madhva himself with these original sources of his system, as is available for instance in the case of the works of Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja. We have seen the peculiar circumstances which are said to have rendered such links impossible in the case of the early forerunners of the Dvaita school.[8] Such absence however need in no way belittle the importance, reliability or innate metaphysical satisfyingness of the system itself as obviously in the last resort such links in the chain must stop somewhere and the only appeal thereafter would be to the basic scriptures themselves on which a given system may claim to be based. That is why Madhva himself has passed by all his historical predecessors including Acyutaprekṣa himself in complete silence; and persistently claims to have received his message directly from the lips of Bādarāyaṇa-Vyāsa.[9] Throughout his works Madhva acknowledges no other teacher save Vyāsa and has not even once mentioned the name of Acyutaprekṣa anywhere in his works.[10] Of course, no offence was meant to nor any taken by Acyutaprekṣa himself. The history of Dvaita literature proper, thus begins with Madhva.

II. *Date of Madhva*

There has been a controversy within the limits of a century or

8 Even the four names of the (historical) predecessors of Para Tīrtha are purely traditional. They are not recorded either in the *Maṇimañjarī* or in the *M. Vij.* the earliest extant biographical sketches of *Madhva*. They are however to be found in the genealogical tables of the Bhaṇḍārkere Mutt (the original mutt of Acyutaprekṣa, still in existence).

9 Cf. तस्यैव शिष्यो जगदेकभर्तुः (*Mbh.-t.-n.* xxxii, 170) and many other similar references in the other works of Madhva.

10 Even his very first work, the *Gītābhāṣya*, a copy of which he is said to have left with his Guru before starting on his first trip to Badari (*M. Vij.* vi, 32), opens with a salutation to Vyāsa and Acyutaprekṣa is entirely ignored.

so over the date of Madhva. Both the 'traditional' date of birth 1199 A.D., claimed for him on the authority of a passage (xxxii, 131) in his *Mahābhārata-tātparyanirṇaya*, and the date Śaka 1040-1120 proposed in some of the geneo-chronological tables of the Uttarādi and other Mutts, have now been set at rest by the discovery and publication of the inscriptions especially the one dated Śaka 1203 of Narahari Tīrtha—a direct disciple and second 'successor' of Madhva on the Pīṭha. The evidence of these inscriptions shows that Narahari was in Kaliṅga between 1264 and 1293 A.D. It appears also that he was the regent of the state 1281-93. If the statement of the *Mbh. -t.-n.* then, is to be accepted in its literal sense, Madhva would have lived up to 1278 A.D. According to the uniform testimony of the Mutt lists, he was succeeded by Padmanābha Tīrtha who remained on the Pīṭha for seven years and after him Narahari occupied the Pīṭha for nine years. On this view, Narahari would have come to the Pīṭha in 1285. But the evidence of inscriptions shows that he was still in Kaliṅga in the years 1289, 1291 and 1293. The obvious inference is that he could not have come to the Pīṭha till after 1293.[11] The Mutt lists agree in placing Narahari's demise in the cyclic year of Śrīmukha. These two facts should go to show that the event cannot be placed earlier than 1333 A.D. Calculating backwards from the year of Narahari's demise, we arrive at 1317 (Piṅgaḷa) as that of Madhva. Assuming that tradition is correct in assigning to him a life of seventy-nine years, and in placing his birth in a Viḷambi, we get 1238 A.D. as the year of his birth. This agrees very well indeed with the inscriptions of Narahari Tīrtha—the terms of one of which (Śrīkūrmam, 1281 A.D.) imply that Madhva was in flesh and blood at or about the time.

1238-1317 A.D. thus appears to be the most satisfactory date

11 It cannot be that Narahari was allowed to be the regent at the court of Kaliṅga and occupy the pīṭha of Madhva at the same time between 1285-93.

for Madhva.[12] The relevant material bearing upon this question has been brought together and discussed by me in two papers on the subject contributed to the *Annamalai University Journal* (iii, 2, and v, 1.), and to them further attention is invited. The various other theories on the date of Madhva have also been examined and refuted there.[12a]

III. *Life of Madhva*

The *Madhvavijaya* of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya is the earliest biography of Madhva that has come down to us. If we eliminate the many miracles and supernatural incidents which the piety and zeal of the biographer have attributed to him, we may get a fairly complete picture of the Ācārya's life and mission. There are also well-written accounts in English of the life and teaching of Madhva.[13]

i

Madhva was born of Tuḷu[14] Brahmin parents of humble status at the village of Pājakakṣetra,[15] some eight miles to the south-east of the town of Uḍupi in the South Kanara district of the Madras Presidency. His father's family-name was Naḍḍantillāya of which

12 This date has recently been upheld by Dr. Saletore in his *Ancient Karṇāṭaka (History of Tuḷuva)*, Poona, 1936. In the light of this date, the statement in the *Mbh. -t.-n.* would have to be explained as a rough estimate in terms of centuries, the actual difference between the two being thirty-nine years.

12a. Prof. P. P. S. Sastri has recently championed the date of the Mutt lists, in his paper on 'Mādhva chronology' in the *Kuppusvami Sastri Com. Vol.* (Madras). With more zeal than regard for facts he has adopted 1181 A.D. as the year of the Śrikūrmam Inscr. But he forgets that there are *five more* inscriptions of Narahari, all dated between 1264 and 1293, wherein the chronograms given admit of no emendation whatever. For a refutation of the Professor's plea see my rejoinder in the *Annals of B.O.R.I.*, vol. xix, 3.

13 By such authors as C. M. Padmanābhācār, C. N. K. Iyer, S. Subba Rau, and C. R. Krishna Rau.

14 Madhva was thus a Tuḷu (Śivaḷḷi) Brahmin and not a Kanarese as supposed by some.

15 Not Kalyāṇpūr as wrongly stated by Carpenter (p. 406) and Barth (p. 195). The old family-house of Madhva still stands at the village of Beḷḷe in Kakra-Maṭha (Tuḷu for Pājakakṣetra).

the well-known "Madhyagehabhaṭṭa or "Madhyamandira"[16] is the Sanskrit equivalent. Madhva's original name was Vāsudeva. At the age of seven or so, he had his 'Upa-nayana' and went through a course of Vedic and Śāstric studies under a teacher who belonged to the family of the 'Totantillāyas' ('Pūgavana' *M. Vij.* iii, 49).

ii

The next event in the life of Vāsudeva was his renunciation. It is difficult to fix his age at the time, but it was probably soon after his sixteenth year (iii, 54-56). His studies of the Śāstras had, in the meanwhile, created in him a profound repulsion towards the prevailing philosophy of his day and he was filled with a desire to resuscitate the old realistic theism of the Vedaśāstra, in its pristine purity. The call of the spirit took him to Acyutapreskṣa from whom he sought and obtained initiation as a monk under the name of Pūrṇa-prājña.

Some time after initiation was spent in the study of Vedāntic classics beginning with the *Iṣṭasiddhi*. Frequent disagreements between master and disciple terminated the studies before long. Pūrṇaprājña was made the head of the Mutt of Acyutaprekṣa. It was on this occasion that Acyutaprekṣa conferred upon him the name of Ānandatīrtha. The name "Madhva" by which he is more widely known, was not given to the Ācārya by anyone. It was assumed by him (for a reason that will be clear later on) as being synonymous with the other.

Madhva spent some time in and about Uḍipi, teaching the disciples of Acyutaprekṣa and entering into disputations with a

16 Not "Madhyamanḍāra" as given out by Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar (*Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism* etc. Strassburg, 1913, p. 58.) The equivalent "Madhyamandira" is applied to Madhva too by Mādhava in the *Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha*. It was the family name (cf. *M. Vij.* ii, 9.) "The name Naḍḍantillāya" cannot "be traced to the fact that it (the village of Naḍḍantāḍi or Madhyatāla,) was the midday halting place of Madhva" (Saletore, *Ancient Karṇāṭaka*, vol. i, p. 416, f.n. 11, Poona 1936) for the very simple reason that according to the evidence of *M. Vij.* ii, 9, Madhva's father also went by that name (Naḍḍantillāya).

number of Pandits, Monistic, Jain and Buddhist. The *M. Vij.* (v, 8-16), mentions his encounters with Vāsudeva Paṇḍita, Vādisiṃha and Buddhisāgara. This teaching and constant disputations considerably sharpened his powers and made him an adept in reasoning and polemics. Encouraged by the initial successes, the Ācārya made up his mind to go on a South Indian tour and find a wider field for the propagation of his new faith. Trivandrum, Cape Camorin and Rāmeśvaram were among the places visited. At Cape Camorin, he fell into a violent conflict with an Advaitic monk *wrongly identified*[17] with Vidyāśaṅkara Tīrtha—the then (?) Svāmi of the Śṛṅgerī Mutt. After the conclusion of "Cāturmāsya" at Rāmeśvaram, he moved on to Śrīraṅgam where the Ācārya must have come into personal contact with the followers of Rāmānuja there. From Śrīraṅgam he seems to have returned to Uḍipi through a northern route.

Altogether the southern tour must have taken two or three years to be finished. It must have shown Madhva that breaches had already been effected in the citadel of Māyāvāda and this knowledge must have strengthened his original resolve. No wonder then, that soon after his return to Uḍipi, Madhva began his career as an author with a commentary on the *Gītā*, which was not however published till after his return from the first north Indian tour, which came off shortly.

This time, the Ācārya had a larger retinue than on the earlier occasion. We have no information as to the route taken, the places visited or the incidents on the journey. It is stated that while at the hermitages of the Himalayas, Madhva left by himself for Badarī the abode of Vyāsa. He returned after a few days and composed his Bhāṣya on the *B.S.* which was transcribed by Satyatīrtha. Resuming their homeward march, the party journeying probably through

17 By C. N. K. Iyer and C. M. Padmanābhācār. For a refutation of this most untenable identification see my paper: "The Madhva-Vidyāśaṅkara Meeting,—A Fiction," *Journal of the Annamalai University*, vol. iii, no. 1.

Behar and Bengal, came ultimately to Rajamundry. Here there was a protracted debate at the conclusion of which the famous Śobhana Bhaṭṭa (the future Padmanābha Tīrtha) was worsted and converted. The conversion of Narahari Tīrtha also must have taken place at the same time.[18]

The north Indian tour had made a considerable impression on the people. Till now Madhva's criticism of the Advaita had been mostly destructive. But after the publication of his own commentaries on the *Gītā* and on the Sūtras, no one could say that he had no alternative to give in place of the system which he so severely criticised. The first achievement after the return to Uḍipi was the conversion to his own views of Acyutaprekṣa who fell *not without* a fierce struggle (*M.Vij.* ix, 33-37).

The merits of the new system, the living earnestness of its founder, his irresistible personality and incisive logic soon brought many converts and adherents.[19] To bring and hold them all together, the Ācārya had the beautiful image of Śrī Kṛṣṇa installed in a newly erected temple at his Maṭha at Uḍipi and made it the rallying centre of his followers (ix, 43). He also inaugurated a few reforms and introduced some changes in the ceremonial code of his adherents. These were the substitution of flour-made ewes for live ones in sacrifices and the rigorous observance of fasts on Ekādaśī days.

18 Dr. Saletore (*History of Tuḷuva,* p. 439) is definitely wrong in dating Narahari Tīrtha's meeting with Madhva as late as 1270. The ascetic title of "Śrīpāda" is found applied to the former (as pointed out by me in *A. U. Journal,* iii, 2, p. 247) even in the very first inscription of 1264 which would mean that Narahari Tīrtha's conversion must have taken place in or about 1264 but certainly before 1270.

19 Dr. Saletore (*op. cit.,* 444-49) is wrong again in connecting the legends touching the conversion of certain members of the Koṭiśvara and allied groups by a *Mādhva ascetic* narrated in the *Puttige* version of the *Grāma Paddhati* with Madhva. It is enough to show that the passages cited speak uniformly of a Mādhva Muni,—an ascetic of the Mādhva order कलौ युगे मध्वमतप्रचरडम् । which would be inapplicable to Madhva himself. The incident as will be shown later on, has reference in reality to Vādirāja Tīrtha.

The *M. Vij.* (ix, 44-50) seems to refer to one such Piṣṭapaśu-yajña actually performed at the instance of Madhva at which the Ācārya's younger brother officiated as Hotṛ-priest. We are told that a member of the Maraḍitāya family (Jarā-ghaṭita-gotra) organised a protest and created a good deal of opposition to this new type of sacrifice. But Madhva stood firm and carried the day.

After this he again started on a (second) north Indian tour to Badarī and returned after visiting Delhi, Kurukṣetra, Benares and Gayā (x, 52). The subsequent tours were confined mostly to the South Kanara district. Viṣṇumaṅgala, (near Kāsargoḍ) Kaḍatala etc. were his favourite resorts. The years that followed brought further acquisitions to his fold. The prestige of the new faith had been very well established. Many works had in the meantime been written by Madhva such as the Bhāṣyas on the ten Upaniṣads, the ten Prakaraṇas and running expositions of the *Bhāgavata* and *Mahābhārata*. Naturally, the increasing popularity of the new faith caused no small anxiety and heart-burning to the custodians of the established faith (Advaita). Desperate remedies were tried to combat the danger. We are told of an actual raid on the library[20] of Madhva (xiv, 2) which contained a very valuable collection of books. The books were afterwards recovered and restored to the Ācārya at the intervention of Jayasiṁha the ruler of Kumbla.[21] The incident naturally brought Madhva into touch with the ruler at whose request he visited his capital. Close on the heels of this visit came the momentous conversion of the great Trivikrama Paṇḍita (probably a court-Pandit of Jayasiṁha) who was the foremost scholar and autho-

20 Dr. Saletore (*Ancient Tuḷuva*, p. 424) is mistaken in giving "*Madhva-siddhānta*" as the name of one of the works stolen on the occasion. There does not appear to have been any such work in existence and none is mentioned either in the *M. Vij.* or other sources known to us. The raid itself is said to have been carried out at the instigation of the Advaitic monk Padma Tīrtha who is reported to have hailed from the Coḷa country (xii, 2) and his ally Puṇḍarīka Purī.

21 C. M. Padmanābhācār has wrongly identified him with the then ruler of Travancore, which is unsupportable.

rity on the Advaita Vedānta, in those parts. This Trivikrama was the father of Madhva's biographer Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya. After his conversion Trivikrama was commissioned to write a commentary on Madhva's *Sūtrabhāṣya* which he did under the name of *Tattva-pradīpa.*[22] The Ācārya himself had by this time composed his master-piece the *Anuvyākhyāna* on the Sūtras.

Trivikrama's conversion was another turning point in the history of the faith. Many more joined the fold and Madhva's fame spread far. His parents died about this time (xv, 91) and the next year his younger brother and seven others were ordained monks (xv, 128-30). These became the founders of what later on came to be known as the eight Mutts of Uḍipi.

The last years of the Ācārya seem to have been spent in teaching and worship. His three works, the *Nyāyavivaraṇa*, the *Karmanirṇaya* and the *Kṛṣṇāmṛtamahārṇava*, were all probably composed about this time.

His mission was now nearly completed. His message to the world had been delivered and he had the satisfaction of seeing it well-received. His works had been placed on an enduring basis. He had gathered round him a band of devoted disciples who could be relied upon to carry the light of Theism to the nook and corner of the land. It was time for him to retire from the scene of his labours and leave *them* in charge of future work. Charging his disciples with his last message in the closing words of his favourite Upaniṣad—the *Aitareya*, not to sit still, but to go forth and preach,[23] Śrī Madhva disappeared from view, on the ninth day of the bright half of the month of Māgha, of Piṅgaḷa 1318 A.D.

B. N. Krishnamurti Śarma

22. A fragment of which was published by me in 1934 (Madras, Law Journal Press).

23 नाप्रवक्त्र इत्याचार्या आचार्याः (A. Ā.)

Bhaṭṭavṛtti

Bhaṭṭavṛtti is usually a piece of land given to a learned Brahman to provide for his living, with a view to ensuring the pursuit of his calling, namely, the propagation of learning. A Bhaṭṭa more often coupled with the term Ācārya to show respect, making it Bhaṭṭācārya, is of recognised use for a man of learning. The term figures frequently in proper names in Bengal now-a-days in the original sense. The name however occurs as the name of a class, generally of Vaiṣṇava Brāhmaṇas, in South India. The class thus represented is that of priests employed in temple for conducting worship, which necessarily implies a knowledge of the forms of worship, involving some acquaintance with various specialised branches of learning. The class is now generally perhaps more ignorant than learned except for the formal technicalities of worship they go through, more or less mechanically, although it must be said that one does come across a learned man among them here and there. The most recondite matter of their learning now-a-days is the knowledge of the Āgamas which are the regular manuals of worship. A Bhaṭṭavṛtti however has reference, not to this class of temple-priests, but to a man of more than ordinary learning who engages himself in propagating that learning by teaching, which, among the Brahmans at any rate, was free, and sometimes even involved the feeding and maintenance of the students. Bhaṭṭavṛtti therefore is a peculiar tenure of land as the more general class of Brahmadēya and Dēvadāya. These are usually lands under the ordinary arrangement of tenancy by cultivators paying revenues to the bodies constituting the government of rural areas. The normal tenure of land would involve the payment of various dues in various classes, some of them ear-marked for particular purposes. A number of these payments would take on the character, not of payments but of return for services rendered,

either by the village community as a whole, or by the government as a whole, or it may be even by an individual landlord. Payments therefore which could be regarded as return for services will be excluded from the payments, usually due to the village authorities, in the case of lands given to Brahmans, or to temples. The revenue incidences will be there, but what constitutes return for services, etc., among the items of revenue, would be separated. That kind of a tenure where lands are given over to men of learning who engage themselves in teaching, is what is called Bhaṭṭavṛtti generally. It would be interesting to know definitely what the Bhaṭṭas were expected to be, and what they were expected to do in return for the receipt of this *vṛtti*, which would simply be provision for their maintenance.

An interesting document, datable precisely and referable to the year A.D. 999, has recently been brought to light from a village in the Chingleput District, where the record is found in a dilapidated temple, more or less completely destroyed, but has perhaps recently been restored in a poor way. The record is now found on stones rebuilt, and on stones not in their original position, so that the record has to be pieced together and cannot be read as one continuous document where it is. I am indebted to the Superintendent for Epigraphy through whose courtesy I was able to read and make out a copy for my use. The temple apparently went by the name Vēdanārāyaṇa, rather an unusual name for a deity installed in a temple. It is dated in the 14th year of a Rājakēsarivarman, distinguished by a preceding epithet imperfectly preserved, but an epithet peculiar to the great Rājarāja, the first of the name, A.D. 985-1016. The document declares itself to be promulgated by the *Sabhā* of Ānūr, which was a rural unit by itself in the subdivision of Kaḷattūr. It refers to the gift of 12 *paṭṭis* of land. This piece of land was originally gifted to the Subhramaṇya temple at Tiruttaṇi, and the village assembly was making an annual payment of 12 *kaḷañju* of

gold. The document under reference states that the assembly took it upon themselves to pay this amount to the Tiruttaṇi temple themselves, and then transformed these 12 *paṭṭis* of land into a Bhaṭṭavṛtti. It was otherwise released from all kinds of payment incidental to the holding of land, and these the Bhaṭṭa was allowed to utilise for his maintenance.

The qualifications demanded of the Bhaṭṭa are laid down in the following section and are of particular interest. (1) It is laid down that he should be a man born of a Sāmavedin. He should nevertheless be learned in another Veda than his own. (2) He should not be a native of the village, and must come and settle down from another village. (3) He ought to be able to teach naturally the two Vedas, the knowledge of which is expected of him as a preliminary necessity. (4) He ought further to be able to teach *Vyākaraṇa Aṣṭādhyāyi* (Pāṇini's grammar). This is perhaps meant for an elementary grammar, or grammar taught in general. (5) He ought to be able to teach the Pāṇinīya Vyākaraṇa, that is, the science of grammar on the system of Pāṇini. (6) He must next be able to teach *Alaṅkāra Śāstra*. He must be able to teach these with regular commentary. (7) He should further be able to comment properly upon *Viṁśad Adhyāyam Mīmāṁsā Śāstra*, that is, to expound elaborately the Mīmāṁsā Śāstra in all its 20 chapters. (8) It is further laid down that he ought to take in four students to whom he should give one meal daily, probably the midday meal, so that they could stay all the day with him for the purpose of his teaching. He ought to teach the subjects above described to these, and turn them out fully qualified in due course. This is the document so far as its substance goes.

It will be noticed that the qualifications laid down in the document are comparatively high. This is No. 1. (2) That the teaching of the Veda or the two Vedas involved here is teaching the Veda with commentary or *Vyākhyāna*. It is not merely the

teaching of the Vedic recital. That Vedas were taught with commentary had already been laid down as a condition for the franchise almost a century earlier than this date, and seems to have been more or less the general practice. (3) The teacher was not merely a teacher of the Veda which, as it is understood in modern times, would mean nothing more than the teaching of the Veda for purposes of recital and no more. But the teaching laid down here is very much more than that. It should also be noted that in addition to teaching the Veda with commentary, the teacher is expected to teach grammar, the grammar needed for general requirements. (4) He should further be able to teach the subject on the Pāṇinīyan system as a science. (5) Similarly *Alaṅkāra Śāstra,* poetics and rhetoric. (6) Lastly he should be able to expound, to an equal degree of proficiency, the *Mīmāṁsā Śāstra,* and, what is more in it, the *Mīmāṁsā Śāstra* in its 20 chapters. The last detail is of the utmost importance to the history of the *Mīmāṁsā Śāstra.* It is clearly stated here that this *Mīmāṁsā Śāstra* was of 20 chapters as it is clearly stated. The 20 chapters of this *Mīmāṁsā Śāstra* would include the first 12 chapters which are together called *Karma Mīmāṁsā,* and the last 4 chapters which are generally known by the term *Bhrama Mīmāṁsā;* but it also includes the four chapters in the middle. These four probably were called by another name, but is known to Hindu scholars now-a-days in the Daivi Kāṇḍa, two chapters and Saṅkarṣaṇa Kāṇḍa the other two chapters, making the four of the middle. That these twenty chapters constituted the Mīmāṁsā as a whole single science, and were so regarded regularly at the time of the inscription, is important addition to our knowledge of the Śāstra, as recently an opinion has been expressed in a publication of the Allahabad Pāṇini Office, where the Saṅkarṣaṇa Kāṇḍa is plainly stated to be a fabrication of Rāmānuja. This document is of date perhaps one generation anterior to the date of birth of Rāmānuja, and a *Mīmāṁsā Śāstra* of 20 chapters was then regularly known as such. The history

of the *Mīmāṁsā Śāstra* has recently been receiving attention, and a recent work[1] bearing on the subject shows an inclination to put it in its proper perspective. This statement in an inscription of date A.D. 998-9, of the 14th year of Rājarāja Coḷa puts it altogether beyond a doubt that the *Mīmāṁsā Śāstra* was taught as a single science composed of 20 chapters, whatever divisions it might have had as a matter of teaching convenience. This record thus confirms a work called *Prapañcahṛdayam*[2] published recently in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Ganapati Śāstrī.

From what is said above, it would be clear that what is called Bhaṭṭavṛtti was far from being a provision for feeding or maintaining an idle Brahmin, but a provision for learning, where the qualifications demanded and the work expected to be done by the beneficiary, were both high. The work to be actually done by the Bhaṭṭa was also precisely laid down, and obviously had been done actually by the teacher.

S. KRISHNASVAMI AIYANGAR

1 By Mr. Ramaswami Sastri of the Annamalai University.

2 For a fuller discussion on this see *Maṇimēkhalai in its historical setting,* and note on 'Mīmāṁsā' pending publication in the *Woolner Commemoration Volume.*

Kālidāsa

Of Kālidāsa's immediate predecessors we know little; and with the doubtful exception of the plays ascribed to Bhāsa, we know still less of their works. Yet, it is marvellous that the Kāvya attains its climax in him and a state of perfection which is never paralleled in its later history. If Aśvaghoṣa prepared the way and created the new poetry and drama, he did not finish the creation; and the succession failed. In the interval of three or four centuries, we know of other kinds of literary effort, but we have little evidence of the type which would explain the finished excellence of Kālidāsa's poetry. It must have been a time of movement and productiveness, and the employment of ornate prose and verse in the Gupta inscriptions undoubtedly indicates the flourishing of the Kāvya; but nothing striking or decisive in poetry or drama emerges or at least survives. What impresses us in Kālidāsa's works is their freedom from immaturity, but this freedom must have been the result of prolonged and diverse efforts extending over a stretch of time. In Kālidāsa we are introduced at once to something new which no one hit upon before, something perfect which no one achieved, something incomparably great and enduring for all time. His outstanding individual genius certainly accounts for a great deal of this, but it appears in a sudden and towering glory without being buttressed in its origin by the intelligible gradation of lower eminences. It is, however, the effect also of the tyrannical dominance of a great genius that it not only obscures but often wipes out by its vast and strong effulgence the lesser lights which surround it or herald its approach.

Of the predecessors of whom Kālidāsa himself speaks, or of the contemporaries mentioned by legends, we have very little information. There are also a few poets who have been confused, identified or associated with Kālidāsa; some of them may have been contem-

poraries or immediate successors. Most of these, however, are mere names; and very scanty and insignificant works have been ascribed to them by older tradition or more modern guess-work. Of these the only sustained work is that of Pravarasena whose date is unknown but who may have reigned in Kashmir in the 5th century A.D.[1] He wrote the *Setubandha*[2] or *Rāvaṇavadha* in fifteen cantos; if it is in Prakrit, it is obviously modelled on the highly artificial Sanskrit Kāvya. The anthologies,[3] however, assign to him three Sanskrit stanzas, but they are hardly remarkable. Of Mātṛgupta, who is said to have been Pravarasena's predecessor on the throne of Kashmir, and who may or may not be identical with dramaturgist Mātṛguptācārya,[4] nothing remains except two stanzas contextually attributed by the Kashmirian Kalhaṇa in his *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (iii, 181, 252),[5] and one by another Kashmirian Kṣemendra, in his *Aucitya-vicāra-carcā* (*ad* 22). Mātṛgupta, himself a poet, is said to have patronised Meṇṭha or Bhartṛmeṇṭha,[6] whose *Hayagrīva-vadha* elicited royal praise and reward. The first stanza of this

1 See Peterson in *Subhāṣitāvalī*, introd, pp. 60-61. But Stein in his translation of the *Rāja-taraṅgiṇī*, i, pp. 66, 84 f. would place Pravarasena II as late as the second half of the 6th century.—The ascription of a *Kauntaleśvara-dautya* to Kālidāsa by Kṣemendra and Bhoja is used to show that Pravarasena, as the Vākaṭaka ruler of Kuntala, was a contemporary of Kālidāsa; but this is only an unproved hypothesis.

2 Ed. S. Goldschmidt, with German trs., Strassburg and London 1880; ed. Sivadatta and Parab, with Skt. comm. of Rāmadāsa, NSP, Bombay 1895.

3 F. W. Thomas, *Kavīndra-vacana*°, introd., pp. 54-55.

4 S. K. De, *Sanskrit Poetics*, i, p. 32; fragments of this writer have been collected from citations in later works and published by T. R. Chintamani in the *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, ii (1928), pp. 118-28.

5 These are also given as Mātṛgupta's in *Sbhv* nos. 3181 and 2550. It is curious that the first stanza is assigned to Karpaṭika by Kṣemendra (*Aucityavicāra*° *ad* 15).

6 Kalhaṇa iii. 125 f., 260-62.—The word *meṇṭha* means an elephant-driver, and this meaning is referred to in a complimentary verse in Jahlana's *Sūkti-muktāvalī* (4. 61). The poet is sometimes called Hastipaka. Maṅkhaka (*Śrīkaṇṭha-carita* ii. 53) places Bhartṛmeṇṭha in a rank equal to that of Bhāravi, Subandhu and Bāṇa; Śivasvāmin (*Kapphiṇābhyudaya* xx. 47) equals him with Kālidāsa and Daṇḍin; and Rājaśekhara thinks that Vālmiki reincarnated as Meṇṭha!

work, in Śloka, is quoted by Kṣemendra,[7] as well as by some commentators and anthologists,[8] but it is obviously too inadequate to give an idea of the much lauded lost poem. Tradition associates Kālidāsa also with Ghaṭakarpara and Vetālabhaṭṭa. It has been suggested[9] that Ghaṭakarpara may be placed even earlier than Kālidāsa; but the laboured composition of twenty-four stanzas,[10] which passes under his name, hardly deserves much notice. It reverses the motif of the *Megha-dūta* by making a lovelorn woman, in the rainy season, send a message to her lover, and aims chiefly at displaying skill in the verbal trick of repeated syllables, known as Yamaka, exclusively using, however, only one variety of it, namely, the terminal. It employs a variety of metres,[11] but shows little poetic talent. Nor is there much gain if we accept the attribution to this poet of the *Nīti-sāra*,[12] which is simpler in diction, but which is merely a random collection of twenty-one moralising stanzas, also composed in a variety of metres.[13] Of the latter type is also the

7 *Suvṛtta-tilaka ad* iii. 16: The poem is also mentioned in Kuntaka's *Vakrokti-jīvita* (ed. S. K. De, Calcutta 1928, p. 243) and in the *Nāṭya-darpaṇa* of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra (ed. GOS, Baroda 1929, p. 174).

8 Peterson, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-94.

9 H. Jacobi, *Das Rāmāyaṇa*, Bonn. 1831, p. 125 note. Jacobi relies mainly on the wager offered by the poet at the close that he would carry water in a broken pitcher for any one who would surpass him in the weaving of Yamakas, but the poem may have been anonymous, and the author's name itself may have had a fictitious origin from the wager itself. The figure, Yamaka, though deprecated by Ānandavardhana, is old, being comprehended by Bharata, and need not of itself prove a late date for the poem.

10 Ed. Haeberlin in *Kāvya-saṃgraha*, Calcutta 1847, p. 120. f., which is reprinted by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara in his *Kāvya-saṃgraha*, i, Calcutta 1886, p. 357-66; ed. with a Skt. comm. by G. M. Dursch, Berlin 1828 (with German verse trs.).

11 Sundarī, Vasantatilaka, Aupacchandasika, Rathoddhatā, Puṣpitāgrā, Upajāti and Drutavilambita, among which Rathoddhatā predominates.

12 Ed. Haeberlin, *op. cit.*, p. 504 f; Jīvānanda, *op. cit.*, pp. 374-80.

13 Upajāti, Śārdūlavikrīḍita, Bhujaṅgaprayāta, Śloka, Vaṃśathavila, Vasanta-tilaka, Mandākrāntā, the Śloka predominating. Some of the stanzas are fine, but they occur in other works and collections.

Nīti-pradīpa[14] of sixteen stanzas, which is ascribed to Vetālabhaṭṭa; but some of the verses of this shorter collection are indeed fine specimens of gnomic poetry, which has been much assiduously cultivated in Sanskrit.[15]

The doubtful poems of Kālidāsa, which comprise some twenty works, form an interesting subject, but no serious or complete study has yet been made of them. Some of them, such as the elaborate Yamaka-Kāvya, called *Nalodaya*[16] in four cantos, and the slight *Rākṣasa-kāvya*[17] in some twenty stanzas are now definitely known to be wrongly ascribed; but it is possible that some of the Kālidāsa

14 Ed. Haeberlin, *op. cit.*, p. 526 f.; Jīvānanda *op. cit.*, p. 366-72. The metres used are Upajāti, Vasantatilaka, Śārdūlavikrīḍita, Drutavilambita, Vaṃśathavila, Mandākrāntā and Śloka.

15 Śaṅku is also regarded as a contemporary of Kālidāsa. He cannot be identical with Śaṅkuka, whom Kalhaṇa mentions as the author of the *Bhuvanābhyudaya*, a poem now lost; for this poet belongs to the time of Ajitāpīḍa of Kashmir (about 813-16 A.D.); see S. K. De, *Sanskrit Poetics*, i, p. 38. Śaṅkuka is also cited in the Anthologies in one of which he is called son of Mayūra; Peterson in *Sbhv.* p. 127 and G. P. Quackenbos, *Poems of Mayūra*, New York 1917, pp. 50-52.

16 Ed. with the Subodhinī comm. of the Maithila Prajñākara-miśra, and with introd., notes, and trs. in Latin by F. Benary, Berlin 1830; also by W. Yates, with metrical Engl. trs., Calcutta 1844. Pischel (*ZDMG*, lvi, p. 626) adduces reasons for ascribing its authorship to Ravideva, son of Nārāyaṇa and author probably also of the *Rākṣasa-kāvya*. With this view R. G. Bhandarkar (*Report, 1883-84*, p. 16) agrees. Ravideva's date is unknown, but Peterson (*JBRAS*, xvii, 1887, p. 69, note, corrected in *Three Reports*, 1887, p. 20 f.) states that a commentary on the *Nalodaya* is dated in Saṃvat 1664=1608 A.D. But A. R. Ramanatha Ayyar (*JRAS*, 1925, p. 263) holds that the author of the *Nalodaya* was a Kerala poet, named Vāsudeva, son of Ravi, who lived in the court of Kulaśekhara and his successor Rāma in the first half of the 9th century (?), and wrote also another Yamaka-kāvya, *Yudhiṣṭhira-vijaya* (ed. Sivadatta and K. P. Parab, NSP, Bombay 1897) and unpublished alliterative poem called *Tripura-dahana*.

17 Ed. Hoefer in *Sanskrit Lesebuch*, Berlin 1849; ed. K. P. Parab, NSP, Bombay 1900; also in Jīvānanda, *op. cit.*, iii, pp. 343-53; Latin trs. by F. Belloni-Filippi in *GSAI*, xix, 1906, pp. 83 f. It is sometimes called Buddhivinoda or Vidvadvinoda Kāvya, a text of which is published by D. R. Mankad in *IHQ*, xii, 1936, p. 692 f.; S. K. De *IHQ*, xiii, p. 172-76. There is a poet named Rākṣasa or Rākṣasa-paṇḍita, cited respectively in *Sadukti-karṇāmṛta* (i. 90. 5) and *Śārṅgadhara-paddhati* (nos. 3810-11), although the stanzas in the anthologies are not from the poem.

Apocrypha belongs to his contemporaries and followers. A more serious claim for Kālidāsa's authorship is made for the *Ṛtu-saṃhāra*[18] as a youthful production of the poet. It has been contested, however, that the poem may be young, but not with the youth of Kālidāsa. The Indian tradition on the question is uncertain; for while it is popularly ascribed, Mallinātha, who comments on the other three poems of Kālidāsa, ignores it;[19] and the artistic conscience of Sanskrit rhetoricians did not accept it, as they did the other three poems, for purposes of illustration of their rules; nor is any citation from it found in the early anthologies.[20] The argument that the poem is an instance of Kālidāsa's juvenilia,[21] and is therefore not taken into account by commentators, anthologists and rhetoricians, ignores niceties of style, and forgets that the poem does not bear the obvious stigmata of the novice.[22] The Indian literary sense never thought it fit to preserve immaturities. The work is hardly immature in the sense that it lacks craftmanship, for its descriptions are properly mannered and conventional, even if they show some freshness of observation and feeling for nature; its peculiarities and weaknesses are such as show inferior literary talent, and not a mere primitive or undeveloped sense of style.[23] It has been urged that

18 Ed. W. Jones, Calcutta 1792 (reproduced in facsimile by H. Kreyenborg, Hannover 1924); ed. with a Latin and German metrical trs. by P. von Bohlen, Leipzig 1840; ed. W. L. Pansikar, with the comm. of Maṇirāma, NSP, 6th ed. Bombay 1906 (1st ed. 1906).

19 Mallinātha at the outset of his commentary on *Raghu*,° speaks of only three Kāvyas of Kālidāsa on which he himself commented.

20 Excepting four stanzas in *Subhāṣitāvali*, of which nos. 1674, 1678 (=*Ṛts.* vi. 16, 19) are assigned expressly to Kālidāsa, and nos. 1703, 1704 (=*Ṛts.* i. 13, 20) are cited with *Kayor api;* but on the composite text of this anthology, which renders its testimony doubtful, S. K. De, *JRAS*, 1927, pp. 109-10.

21 Hillebrandt, *Kālidāsa*, Breslau 1921, p. 66 f; Keith's *JRAS*., 1921, pp. 1066-70, *JRAS*, 1913, pp. 410-412, *HSL*, pp. 82-84; Nobel in *ZDMG*, lxvi, 1912, pp. 275 and *JRAS*, 1913, pp. 401-410; Harichand Shastri, *L'Art poétique de l'Inde*, Paris 1917, pp. 240-42.

22 E. H. Johnston, introd. to *Buddha-carita*, Calcutta 1936, p. lxxxi.

23 This would rather rule out the suggestion that inasmuch as it shares

Vatsabhaṭṭi in his Mandasor inscription borrows expressions and exploits two stanzas of the *Ṛtu-saṃhāra*. The indebtedness is much exaggerated;[24] but even if it is accepted, it only shows the antiquity of the poem, and not Kālidāsa's authorship. If echoes of Kālidāsa's phrases and ideas are traceable (e.g. ii. 10), they are sporadic and indicative of imitation, for there is nowhere any suggestion of Kālidāsa as a whole.[25] The poem is, of course, not altogether devoid of merit; otherwise there would not have been so much controversy. It is not a bare description, in six cantos, of the details of the six Indian seasons, nor even a *Shepherd's Calender*, but a highly cultured picture of the seasons viewed through the eyes of a lover. In a sense it has the same motif as is seen in the first part of the *Meghadūta;* but the treatment is different, and there is no community of character between the two poems. It strings together rather conventional pictures of kissing clouds, embracing creepers, the wildly rushing streams and other tokens of metaphorical amorousness in nature, as well as the effect and significance of the different seasons for the lover. It shows flashes of effective phrasing, an easy flow of verse and sense of rhythm, and a diction free from elaborate complications; but the rather stereotyped descriptions lack richness of content and they are not blended sufficiently with human feeling.

Unlike later Sanskrit poets, who are often confident self-puffers, Kālidāsa expresses modesty and speaks little of himself. The current Indian anecdotes about him are extremely stupid, and show that no clear memory remained of him. He is one of the great poets

some of Aśvaghoṣa's weaknesses it is a half-way house between Aśvaghoṣa and Kālidāsa.

24 Cf. G. R. Nandargikar, *Kumāradāsa*, Poona 1908, p. xxvi, note.

25 Very pertinently Keith calls attention to Kālidāsa's picture of spring in *Kumāra*° iii and *Raghu*° ix, and of summer in *Raghu*° xvi (to which scattered passages from the dramas can also be added); but the conclusion he draws that they respectively show the developed and undeveloped style of the same poet is a matter of personal preference rather than of literary judgment.

who live and reveal themselves only in their works. His date, and even approximate time, is at worst uncertain, at best conjectural. His works have been ransacked for clues, but not very successfully; but since they bear general testimony to a period of culture, ease and prosperity, they have been associated with the various great moments of the Gupta power and glory. The hypotheses and controversies on the subject need not occupy us here,[26] for none of the theories is final, and without further and more definite material, no convincing conclusion is attainable. Let it suffice to say that since Kālidāsa is mentioned as a poet of great reputation in the Aihole inscription of 634 A.D., and since he probably knows Aśvaghoṣa's works and shows a much more developed form and sense of style (a position which, however, has not gone unchallenged),[27] the limits of his time are broadly fixed between the 2nd and the 6th century A.D. Since his works reveal the author as a man of culture and urbanity, a leisured artist probably enjoying, as the legends say, royal patronage under a Vikramāditya,[28] it is not unnatural to associate him with Candragupta II (*cir.* 380-413 A.D.), who had the style of

26 The literature on the subject, which is discussed threadbare without yielding any definite result, is bulky and still growing. The various views, however, will be found in the following: G. Huth, *Die Zeit des Kālidāsa* (Diss.), Berlin 1890; B. Liebich, *Das Datum des Candragomins und Kālidāsas* Breslau 1903, p. 28, and in *Indogerm: Forschungen* xxxi, 1912-13, p. 198 f.; A. Gawronski, *The Digvijaya of Raghu*, Krakau 1914-15; Hillebrandt, *Kālidāsa*, Breslau 1921; Pathak in *JBRAS*, xix, 1895, pp. 35-43 and introd. to *Meghadūta;* Keith, *JRAS*, 1901, p. 578, 1905, p. 575, 1909, p. 433, *Ind. Office Cat.* vol. 2, pt. ii, p. 1201; *Sanskrit Drama*, pp. 141-47; also references cited in Winternitz, *HIL*, iii, p. 40 f.

27 See Nandargikar, introd. to *Raghu°*; Ksetresh Chattopadhyay in Allahabad Univ. Studies, ii, p. 80 f.; K. G. Sankar in *IHQ*, i, p. 312 f. To argue Aśvaghoṣa is later than Kālidāsa is to presume, without sufficient reason, a retrogressive phase in literary evolution.

28 S. P. Pandit (preface to *Raghu°*) admits this, but believes that there is nothing in Kālidāsa's works that renders untenable the tradition which assigns him to the age of the Vikramāditya of the Saṃvat era, i.e., to the first century B.C. The view has been developed in some recent writings, but the arguments are hardly conclusive.

Vikramāditya, and whose times were those of prosperity and power. The various arguments, literary and historical, by which the position is reached, are not invulnerable when they are taken in detail, but their cumulative effect cannot be ignored. We neither know, nor shall perhaps ever know, if any of the brilliant conjectures is correct, but in the present state of our knowledge, it would not be altogether unjustifiable to place Kālidāsa roughly at 400 A.D. It is not unimportant to know that Kālidāsa shared the glorious and varied living and learning of a great time; but he might not have done this, and yet be the foremost poet of Sanskrit literature. That he had a wide acquaintance with the life and scenes of many parts of India, but had a partiality for Ujjayinī, may be granted; but it would perhaps be hazardous, and even unnecessary, to connect him with any particular geographical setting or historical environment.

Kālidāsa's works are not only singularly devoid of all direct personal reference, but they hardly show his poetic genius growing and settling itself in a gradual grasp of power. Very few poets have shown greater lack of ordered development. Each of his works, including his dramas, has its distinctive characteristics in matter and manner; it is hardly a question of younger or older, better or worse, but of difference of character and quality of conception and execution. All efforts,[29] therefore, to arrive at a relative chronology of his writings have not proved very successful; and it is not necessary to indulge in pure guess-work and express a dogmatic opinion.

29 Huth attempts to ascertain a relative chronology on the basis of metres, but Kālidāsa is too finished a metrist to render any conclusion probable on metrical evidence alone; see Keith's effective criticism in *SD.*, p. 167. That *Kumara*° and *Megha*° are both redolent of love and youth and *Raghu*° is mature and meditative is not a criterion of sufficiently decisive character. The dramas also differ in quality and character of workmanship, but it is pure conjecture to infer from this fact their earliness or lateness. Similar remarks apply to the elaborate attempt of R. D. Karmarkar in *Proc. Second Orient. Conference,* Calcutta 1923, pp. 239-47. It must be said that the theories are plausible; but their very divergence from one another shows that the question is incapable of exact determination.

The *Kumāra-saṃbhava*[30] is regarded as one of Kālidāsa's early works, but it is in its own way as admirably conceived and expressed as his other poems. But, to the extent to which it has survived, it does not complete its theme,—a defect which it shares with the *Raghu-vaṃśa*, also apparently left incomplete. The genuineness of the first seven cantos of the *Kumāra-saṃbhava* is beyond doubt; but it brings the narrative down to the marriage of Śiva and Pārvatī, and the promise of the title, regarding the birth of the Kumāra, is not fulfilled. Probably canto viii is also genuine; along with the first seven cantos, it is commented upon by Mallinātha and Aruṇagiri, and is known to writers on Poetics, who somewhat squeamishly censure its taste in depicting the love-sports of adored deities,[31] it also possesses Kālidāsa's characteristic style and diction. The same remarks, however, do not apply to the rest of the poem (ix-xvii) as we have it now. The remaining cantos probably form a supplement[32]

30 Ed. A. F. Stenzler, with Latin trs. (i-vii), London 1838; ed. T. Ganapati Shastri, with comm. of Aruṇagiri and Nārāyaṇa (i-viii), Trivandrum Skt. Ser. 1913-14. Cantos viii-xviii first published in *Pandit* i-ii, by Vitthala Shastri, 1866. Also ed. with comm. of Mallinātha (i-vii) and Sītārāma (viii-xvii), NSP, 5th ed. Bombay 1908 (10th ed. 1927); ed. with Mallinātha, Cāritravardhana and Sītārāma, Gujarati Printing Press, Bombay 1898. Eng. trs. by R. T. H. Griffith, 2nd ed., London 1879. It has been translated into many other languages, and edited many times in India. The NSP ed. (2nd ed. Bombay 1886, also 1908) contains in an appendix Mallinātha's comm. on canto viii, which is accepted as genuine in some South Indian editions and manuscripts (see Eggeling in *Ind. Office Cat.*, vii, p. 1419, no. 3764).

31 For a summary of the opinions, see Harichand Shastri, *Kālidāsa et l'Art poétique de l'Inde*, Paris 1917, p. 235 f.

32 Jacobi in *Verhandl. d. V Orient Kongress*, Berlin 1881, ii, 2, pp. 133-56; Weber in *ZDMG*, xxvii, p. 174 f. and in *Ind. Streifen*, iii, p. 217 f, 241 f. The arguments turn chiefly on the silence of the commentators and rhetoricians, and on grammatical and stylistic evidence, which need not be summarised here. Although the intrinsic evidence of taste, style and treatment is at best an unsafe guide, no student of Sanskrit literature, alive to literary niceties, will deny the obvious inferiority of the supplement. The extreme rarity of MSS for these additional cantos is also significant; and we know nothing about their source, nor about the source of the commentary of Sītārāma on them (the only notice of a MS occurring only in Mitra, *Notices*, 8, no. 3289, p. 38). It must, however, be admitted that, though an

composed by some later zealous admirer, who not only insists upon the birth of Kumāra but also brings out the motive of his birth by describing his victory over the demon Tāraka. It is unbelieveable that Kālidāsa abruptly left off his work; possibly he brought it to a proper conclusion; but it is idle to speculate as to why the first seven or eight cantos only survived. The fact remains that the authenticity of the present sequel has not been proved.

Nevertheless, apart from the promise of the title, these genuine cantos present a finished and unified picture in itself. The theme is truly a daring one in aspiring to encompass the love of the highest deities; but, unlike the later Greek poets to whom the Homeric inspiration was lost, the Sanskrit poets never regard their deities as playthings of fancy. Apart from any devotional significance which may be found but which Kālidāsa, as a poet, never emphasises, the theme was a living reality to him as well as to his audience; and its poetic possibilities must have appealed to his imagination. We do not know exactly from what source[33] Kālidāsa derived his material, but we can infer from his treatment of the Śakuntalā legend, that he must have entirely rehandled and reshaped what he derived. The new mythology had life, warmth and colour, and brought the gods

inferior production, the sequel is not devoid of merit; and there are echoes in it, not only from Kālidāsa's works, but also lines and phrases which remind one of later great Kāvya-poets. The only citation from it in later writings is the one found in Ujjvaladatta's commentary on the *Uṇādi-sūtra* (ed. T. Aufrecht, Bonn 1859, *ad* iv. 66, p. 106), where the passage *ravaḥ pragalbhāhata-bheri-saṃbhavaḥ* is given as a quotation with *iti Kumāraḥ* (and not *Kumāre*). It occurs as a variant of *Kumāra*° xiv. 32[a] in the NSP edition; but it is said to occur also in Kumāradāsa's *Jānakī-haraṇa*, which work, however, is cited by Ujjvaladatta (iii. 73) by its own name and not by the name of its author. If this is a genuine quotation from the sequel, then it must have been added at a fairly early time, at least before the 14th century A.D., unless it is shown that it is a quotation from Kumāradāsa and an appropriation by the author of the sequel. The question is reopened by S. P. Bhattacharya in *Proceedings of the Fifth Orient. Conf.*, vol. i, pp. 43-44.

33 The story is told in *Mahābhārata*, iii. 225 (Bombay ed.) and *Rāmāyaṇa*, i. 37. It is known to Aśvaghoṣa in some form, *Buddha-carita*, i. 88; xiii. 16.

nearer to human life and emotion. The magnificient figure of the divine ascetic, scorning love but ultimately yielding to its humanising influence, the myth of his temptation leading to the destruction of Kāma as the emblem of human desire, the story of Umā's resolve to win by renunciation what her beauty and love could not achieve by their seduction, and the pretty fancy of the coming back of her lover, not in his ascetic pride but in playful benignity,—this poetic, but neither moralistic nor euhemeristic, working up of a scanty Purāṇic myth in a finished form is perhaps all his own. If there is a serious purpose behind the poem, it is merged in its total effect. It is, on the other hand, not bare story-telling or recounting of a myth; it is the careful work of a poet, whose feeling, art and imagination invest his pictures with a charm and vividness, which is at once finely spiritual and intensely human. His poetic powers are best revealed in his delineation of Śiva's temptation in canto iii, where the mighty effect of the few swift words, describing the tragic annihilation of the pretty love-god by the terrible god of destruction, is not marred by a single word of elaboration, but produce infinite suggestiveness by its extreme brevity and almost perfect fusion of sound and sense. A fine example also of Kālidāsa's charming fancy and gentle humour is to be found in the picture of the young hermit appearing in Umā's hermitage and his depreciation of Śiva, which evokes an angry but firm rebuke from Umā, leading on to the hermit's revealing himself as the god of her desire.

The theme of the *Raghu-vaṃśa*[34] is much more diversified and extensive, and gives fuller scope to Kālidāsa's artistic imagination.

34 Ed. A. F. Stenzler, with a Latin trs., London 1882; ed. with the comm. of Mallinātha by S. P. Pandit, Bombay Skt. Ser., 3 vols. 1869-72, and by G. R. Nandargikar, with English trs., 3rd revised ed., Bombay 1897; ed. with comm. of Aruṇagiri and Nārāyaṇa (i-vi), Mangalodaya Press, Trichur, no date. Often edited and translated in parts or as a whole.

The work has a greater height of aim and range of delivery, but has no known predecessor. It is rather a gallery of pictures than a unified poem; and yet out of these pictures, which put the uncertain mass of old narratives and traditions into a vivid poetical form, Kālidāsa succeeds in evolving one of the finest specimens of the Indian Mahākāvya, which exhibits both the diversity and plenitude of his powers.[35] Out of its nineteen cantos there is none that does not possess an interest of its own; and there is throughout this long poem a fairly uniform excellence of style and expression. There is hardly anything rugged or unpolished anywhere in Kālidāsa; and his works must have been responsible for setting the high standard of formal finish which grew out of all proportion in later poetry. But he never sacrifices, as later poets often do, the intrinsic interest of the narrative to a mere elaboration of the outward form. There is invariably a fine sense of equipoise and an astonishing certainty of touch and taste. In the *Raghu-vaṃśa*, Kālidāsa goes back to early legends for a theme, but it is doubtful if he seriously wishes to reproduce its spirit or write a Heldengedicht. The quality of the poem, however, is more important than its fidelity to the roughness of heroic times in which the scene is laid. Assuming that what he has given us is only a glorified picture of his own times, the vital question is whether he has painted excellent individuals or mere abstractions. Perhaps Kālidāsa is prone to depicting blameless regal characters, in whom a little blameworthiness had better been blended; but if they are meant to be ideal, they are yet clearly distinguished as individuals; and, granting the environment, they are far from ethereal or unnatural. Kālidāsa introduces us to an old-world legend and to an atmosphere strange to us with all its romantic charm; but beneath

35 The Indian opinion considers the *Raghu-vaṃśa* to be Kālidāsa's greatest poem, so that he is often cited as the Raghukāra *par excellence*. Its popularity is attested by the fact that about forty commentaries on this poem are known.

all that is brilliant and marvellous, he is always real without being a realist.

The earlier part of the *Raghu-vaṃśa* accords well with its title, and the figure of Raghu dominates, being supported by the episodes of his father Dilīpa and his son Aja; but in the latter part Rāma is the central figure, similarly heralded by the story of Daśaratha and followed by that of Kuśa. There is thus a unity of design, but the entire poem is marked by a singularly varied handling of a series of themes. We are introduced in first canto to the vows and austerities of the childless Dilīpa and his queen Sudakṣinā in tending Vasiṣṭha's sacred cow and submitting to her test, followed by the birth of Raghu as a heavenly boon. Then we have the spirited narrative of young Raghu's fight with Indra in defence of his father's sacrificial horse, his accession, his triumphant progress as a conqueror, and his generosity which threatened to impoverish him—all of which, especially his Digvijaya, is described with picturesque brevity, force and skill. The next three cantos (vi-viii) are devoted to the more tender story of Aja and his winning of the princess Indumatī at the stately ceremonial of Svayaṁvara, followed, after a brief interval of triumph and happiness, by her accidental death, which leaves Aja disconsolate and broken-hearted. The story of his son Daśaratha's unfortunate hunt, which follows, becomes the prelude to the much greater narrative of the joys and sorrows of Rāma. In the gallery of brilliant kings which Kālidāsa has painted, his picture of Rāma is undoubtedly the best; for here we have realities of character which evoke his powers to the utmost. He did not obviously wish to rival Vālmīki on his own ground, but wisely chooses to treat the story in his own way. While Kālidāsa devotes one canto (ix) of nearly a hundred stanzas to the romantic possibilities of Rāma's youthful career, he next accomplishes the very difficult task of giving, in a single canto of not much greater length, a marvellously rapid but picturesque condensation, in Vālmīki's Śloka

metre, of the almost entire *Rāmāyaṇa* up to the end of Rāma's victory over Rāvaṇa and winning back of Sītā. But the real pathos of the story of Rāma's exile, strife and suffering is reserved for treatment in the next canto, in which, returning from Laṅkā, Rāma is made to describe to Sītā, with the recollective tenderness of a loving heart, the various scenes of their past joys and sorrows, over which they pass in their aerial journey. The episode is a poetical study of reminiscent love, in which sorrow remembered becomes bliss, but it serves to bring out Rāma's great love for Sītā better than mere narration or description,—a theme which is varied by the pictures of the memory of love in the presence of suffering in the *Megha-dūta*, and in the two lamentations, in different situations, of Aja and Rati. Rāma's passionate clinging to the melancholy, but sweet, memories of the past prepares us for the next canto on Sītā's exile, and heightens by contrast the grief of the separation, which comes with a still more cruel blow at the climax of their happiness. Kālidāsa's picture of this later history of Rāma, more heroic in its silent suffering than the earlier, has been rightly praised for revealing the poet's power of pathos at its best, which never exaggerates but compresses the infinite pity of the situation in just a few words. The story of Rāma's son, Kuśa, which follows, sinks in interest; but it has a remarkably poetic description of Kuśa's dream, in which his forsaken capital city, Ayodhyā, appears in the guise of a forlorn woman and reproaches him for her fallen state. After this, two more cantos (xviii-xix) are added, but the motive of the addition is not clear. They contain some interesting pictures, especially that of Agnivarṇa at the end, and their authenticity is not questioned; but they present a somewhat colourless account of a series of unknown and shadowy kings. We shall never know whether Kālidāsa intended to bring the narrative down to his own times and connect his own royal patron with the dynasty of Raghu; but the poem comes to an end rather abruptly in the form in which we

have it.[36] It will be seen from this brief sketch that the theme is not one, but many; but even if the work has no real unity, its large variety of subjects is knit together by the powers of colour, form and music of a marvellous poetic imagination. Objects, scenes, characters, emotions, incidents, thoughts—all are transmuted and placed in an eternising frame and setting of poetry.

The *Megha-dūta*,[37] loosely called a lyric or an elegy, is a much smaller monody of a little over a hundred stanzas[38] in the

36 The last voluptuous king Agnivarṇa meets with a premature death; but he is not childless; one of the queens with a posthumous child is said to have succeeded. The Purāṇas speak at least of twenty-seven kings who came after Agnivarṇa, and there is no reason why the poem should end here suddenly, but not naturally. (See S. P. Pandit, Preface, p. 15 f.; Hillebrandt, *Kālidāsa*, p. 42 f.). It has been urged that the poet's object is to suggest a moral on the inglorious end of a glorious line by depicting the depth to which the descendants of the mighty Raghu sink in a debauched king like Agnivarṇa who cannot tear himself from the caresses of his women, and who, when his loyal subjects below want to have a sight of him puts out his bare feet through the window for them to worship! Even admitting this as a not unnatural conclusion of the poem, the abrupt ending is still inexplicable.

37 The editions as well as translations in various languages are numerous. The earliest editions are those of H. H. Wilson, with metrical Eng. trs., (116 stanzas) Calcutta 1813 (2nd ed. 1843); of J. Gildemeister, Bonn 1841; of A. F. Stenzler, Breslau 1874. The chief editions with different commentaries are: With Vallabhadeva's comm., ed. E. Hultzsch, London 1911; with Mallinātha's comm., ed. K. P. Parab, NSP, 4th ed. Bombay 1881, G. R. Nandargikar, Bombay, 1894, and K. B. Pathak, Poona 1894 (2nd ed. 1906, both with Eng. trs.); with Dakṣiṇāvartanātha's comm., ed. T. Ganapati Shastri, Trivandrum 1919; with Pūrṇasarasvatī's comm., ed. Śrīvāṇī-vilāsa Press, Srirangam 1909; with comm. of Mallinātha and Cāritravardhana, ed. Narayan Shastri Khiste, Chowkhamba Skt. Ser., Benares 1931. English trs. by Col. Jacob, Poona 1870. There are some fifty commentaries mentioned by Aufrecht.

38 The great popularity of the poem paid the penalty of interpolations, and the total number of stanzas vary in different versions, thus: as preserved in Jinasena's *Pārśvābhyudaya* (latter part of the 8th century) 120, Vallabhadeva (10th century) 111, Dakṣiṇāvartanātha (*c.* 1200) 110, Mallinātha (14th century) 121, Pūrṇasarasvatī 110, Tibetan version 117, Pánabokke (Ceylonese version) 118. A concordance is given in Hultzsch, as well as a list of spurious stanzas.—On text-criticism, see introd. to eds. of Stenzler, Pathak and Hultzsch; J. Hertel's review of Hultzsch's ed. in *Götting. Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1912; Macdonell in *JRAS*, 1913, p. 176 f; Harichand,

stately and melodious Mandākrāntā metre; but it is no less characteristic of the vitality and versatility of Kālidāsa's poetic powers. The theme is simple enough in describing the severance and yearnings of an imaginary Yakṣa from his beloved through a curse; but the selection of the friendly cloud as the bearer of the Yakṣa's message from Rāmagiri to Alakā is a novel, and somewhat unreal, device,[39] for which the almost demented condition of the sorrowful Yakṣa is offered as an apology by the poet himself. It is perhaps a highly poetical, but not an unnatural, personification, when one bears in mind the noble mass of Indian monsoon clouds, which seem almost instinct with life as they travel from the Southern tropical sky to the snows of the Himalayas; but the unreality of the poem does not end there. It has been urged that the temporary character of a very brief separation and the absolute certainty of reunion make the display of grief unmanly and its pathos unreal. Perhaps the sense of irrevocable loss would have made the motif more effective; the trivial setting gives an appearance of sentimentality to the real sentiment of the poem. The device of a curse, again, in bringing about the separation—a motif which is repeated in another form in the *Abhijñāna-śakuntala*—is also criticised; for the breach here is caused not by psychological complications, so dear to modern times. But the predominantly fanciful character of Sanskrit poetry recognises not only this as a legitimate means, but even departure on a journey,—on business as we should say to-day; and even homesickness brings a flood of tears to the eyes of grown up men and women! It is, however, not necessary to exaggerate the artistic insufficiency of the

op. cit., p. 238 f; Hermann Beckh, *Ein Beitrag zur Textkritik von Kālidāsas Meghadūta* (Diss.), Berlin 1907 (chiefly on the Tibetan version). A Sinhalese paraphrase with Eng. trs. published by T. B. Pánabokke, Colombo 1883.

39 Bhāmaha (i. 42) actually considers this to be a defect. The idea of sending message may have been suggested by the embassy of Hanūmat in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (cf. st. 104, Pathak's ed.), or of the Swan in the story of Nala in the *Mahābhārata*. Cf. also Kāmavilāpa Jātaka (no. 297), where a crow is sent as a messenger by a man in danger to his wife. But the treatment is Kālidāsa's own.

device; for, the attitude is different, but not the sense of sorrow. If we leave aside the setting, the poem gives a true and poignant picture of the sorrow of parted lovers, and in this lies its real pathos. It is true that the poem is invested with a highly imaginative atmosphere; it speaks of a dreamland of fancy, its characters are semi-divine beings, and its imagery is accordingly adapted; but all this does not negate its very human and genuine expression of the erotic sentiment. Its vividness of touch has even led people to imagine that it gives a poetic form to the poet's own personal experience; but of this one can never be sure. There is little of subjectivity in its finished artistic execution, and the lyric mood does not predominate; but the unmistakable warmth of its rich and earnest feeling, expressed through the melody and dignity of its happily fitting metre, redeems the banality of the theme and makes the poem almost lyrical in its effect. The feeling, however, is not isolated, but blended picturesquely with a great deal of descriptive matter. Its intensity of recollective tenderness is set in the midst of the Indian rainy season, than which, as Rabindranath rightly remarks, nothing is more appropriate for an atmosphere of loneliness and longing; it is placed also in the midst of splendid natural scenery which enhances its poignant appeal. The description of external nature in the first half of the poem is heightened throughout by an intimate association with human feeling, while the picture of the lover's sorrowing heart in the second half is skilfully framed in the surrounding beauty of nature. A large number of attempts[40] were made in later times to imitate the poem, but the *Megha-dūta* still remains unsurpassed as a masterpiece of its kind; and its chief value lies in its pure poetry, not in its description, matter or setting.

Kālidāsa's deep-rooted fame as a poet somewhat obscures his merit as a dramatist; but prodigal of gifts nature had been to him,

40 See Chintaharan Chakravarti, on the Dūta-kāvyas, *IHQ.*, iii, pp. 273-97.

and his achievement in the drama is no less striking. In the judgment of many, his *Abhijñāna-śakuntala* remains his greatest work; at the very least, it is considered to be the full blown flower of his genius. Whatever value the judgment may possess, it implies that in this work we have a unique alliance of his poetic and dramatic gifts, which are indeed not contradictory but complementary; and this fact should be recognised in passing from his poems to his plays. His poems give some evidence of skilful handling of dramatic moments and situations; but his poetic gifts invest his dramas with an imaginative quality which prevents them from being mere practical productions of stage-craft. It is not implied that his dramas do not possess the requisite qualities of a stage-play, for his *Śakuntalā* has been often successfully staged; but this is not the only, much less the chief, point of view from which his dramatic works are to be judged. Plays often fail, not for want of dramatic power or stage-qualities, but for want of poetry; they are often too prosaic. It is very seldom that both the dramatic and poetic qualities are united in the same author. As a dramatist Kālidāsa succeeds, mainly by his poetic power, in two respects: he is a master of poetic emotion which he can skilfully harmonise with character and action, and he has the poetic sense of balance and restraint which a dramatist must show if he would win success.

It is significant that in the choice of theme, character and situation, Kālidāsa follows the essentially poetic bent of his genius. Love in its different aspects and situations is the dominant theme of all his three plays,—carefree love in the setting of a courtly intrigue, impetuous love as a romantic and undisciplined passion leading to madness, and youthful love at first heedless but gradually purified by suffering. In the lyrical and narrative poem the passionate feeling is often an end in itself, elegant but isolated; in the drama, there is a progressive deepening of the emotional experience as a factor of larger life. It therefore affords the poet, as a dramatist,

an opportunity of depicting its subtle moods and fancies in varied circumstances, its infinite range and intensity in closeness to common realities. His mastery of humour and pathos, his wisdom and humanity, come into play; and his great love of life and sense of tears in moral things inform his pictures with all the warmth and colour of a vivid poetic imagination.

The *Mālavikāgnimitra*[41] is often taken to be one of Kālidāsa's youthful productions, but there is no adequate reason for thinking that it is his first dramatic work. The modesty shown in the Prologue[42] repeats itself in those of his other two dramas, and the immaturity which critics have seen in it is more a question of personal opinion than a real fact; for it resolves itself into a difference of form and theme, rather than any real deficiency of power.[43] The *Mālavikā*° is not a love-drama of the type of the *Svapna-vāsavadatta,* to which it has a superficial resemblance, but which possesses a far more serious interest. It is a light-hearted comedy of court-life in five acts, in which love is a pretty game, and in which the hero need not be of heroic proportion, nor the heroine anything but

41 Ed. F. Bollensen, Leipzig 1879; ed. with comm. of Kāṭayavema (*c.* 1400 A.D.) by S. P. Pandit, Bombay Sansk. Ser., 2nd ed. 1889, and by K. P. Parab, NSP, Bombay 1915. Trs. into English by C. H. Tawney, Calcutta 1875 and London 1891; into German by Weber, Berlin 1856; into French by V. Henry, Paris 1889. On Text-criticism see C. Cappeller, *Observationes ad Kālidāsae Mālavikāgnimitra* (Diss.), Regimonti 1868; F. Haag, *Zur Textkritik und Erklärung von Kālidāsas Mālavikāgnimitra,* Frauenfeld 1872; Bollensen in *ZDMG,* xiii, 1859, p. 480 f; Weber in *ibid.,* xiv, 1860, p. 261 f; Jackson in *JAOS,* xx, p. 343 f (Time-analysis). For fuller bibliography see Sten Konow, *Indische Drama,* Berlin and Leipzig 1920, p. 63.

42 If the work is called *nava,* with a reference to far-famed predecessors, the same word is used to designate his *Abhijñānaśakuntala,* which also modestly seeks the satisfaction of the learned as a final test; and his *Vikramorvaśiya* is spoken of in the same way in the Prologue as *apūrva,* with reference to former poets (*pūrva kavi*). In a sense all plays are *nava* and *apūrva,* and no valid inference is possible from such descriptions.

43 Wilson's unfounded doubt about the authorship of the play led to its comparative neglect, but Weber and S. P. Pandit effectively set the doubts at rest. For a warm eulogy, see V. Henry, *Les Littératures de l'Inde,* p. 305 f.

a charming and attractive maiden. The pity of the situation, no doubt, arises from the fact that the game of sentimental philandering is often played at the expense of others who are not in it, but that is only an inevitable incident of the game. The motif of the progress of a courtly love-intrigue through hindrances to royal desire for a lowly maiden and its denouement in the ultimate discovery of her status as a princess was perhaps not as banal in Kālidāsa's time[44] as we are wont to think; but the real question is how the theme is handled. Neither Agnimitra nor Mālavikā may appear impressive; but they are appropriate to the atmosphere. The former is a carefree and courteous gentleman, on whom the burden of kingly responsibility sits but lightly, who is no longer young but no less ardent, who is an ideal Dakṣiṇa Nāyaka possessing a great capacity for falling in and out of love; while the latter is a faintly drawn ingénue with nothing but good looks and willingness to be loved by the incorrigible king-lover. The Vidūṣaka is a more lively character, who takes a greater part in the development of the plot in this play than in the other dramas of Kālidāsa. The interest of the theme is enhanced by the complications of the passionate impetuosity and jealousy of the young discarded queen Irāvatī, which is finely shown off against the pathetic dignity and magnanimity of the elderly chief queen Dhāriṇī. Perhaps the tone and tenor of the play did not permit a more serious development of this aspect of the plot, but it should not be regarded as a deficiency. The characterisation is sharp and clear, and the expression polished, elegant and even dainty. The wit and elaborate compliments, the toying and trifling with the tender passion, the sentimentalities and absence of deep feeling are in perfect keeping with the outlook of the gay circle,

44 The source of the story is not known, but it is clear that Kālidāsa owes nothing to the Purāṇic stories. As st. 2 shows, accounts of Agnimitra were probably current and available to the poet.

which is not used to any profounder view of life.[45] One need not wonder, therefore, that while war is in progress in the kingdom, the royal household is astir with the amorous escapades of the somewhat elderly but youthfully inclined king. Gallantry is undoubtedly the keynote of the play, and its joys and sorrows should not be reckoned at a higher level. Judged by its own standard, there is nothing immature, clumsy or turgid in the drama. If Kālidāsa did not actually originate the type, he must have so stamped it with the impress of his genius that it was, as the dramas of Harṣa and Rājaśekhara show, adopted as one of the appealing modes of dramatic expression and became banalised in course of time.

In the *Vikramorvaśīya,*[46] on the other hand, there is a decided weakness in general treatment. The romantic story of the love of the mortal king Purūravas and the divine nymph Urvaśī, is old, the earliest version occurring in the *Ṛgveda* (x. 95); but the passion and pathos, as well as the logically tragic ending, of the ancient legend[47]

45 K. R. Pisharoti in *Journal of the Annamalai Univ.*, ii, no. 2, p. 193 f, is inclined to take the play as a veiled satire on some royal family of the time, if not on the historical Agnimitra himself, and would think that the weakness of the opening scene is deliberate.

46 Ed. R. Lenz, with Latin notes etc., Berlin 1833; ed. F. Bollensen, St. Petersberg 1846; ed. Monier Williams, Hertford 1849; ed. S. P. Pandit and B. R. Arte, with extracts from comm. of Kāṭayavema and Raṅganātha, Bom. Skt. Ser., 3rd ed. 1901, 1st ed. 1879; ed. K. P. Parab and M. R. Telang, NSP, with comm. of Raṅganātha, Bombay 1914 (4th ed.); ed. Carudev Shastri, with comm. of Kāṭayavema, Lahore 1929. Trs. into English by E. B. Cowell, Hertford 1851; into German by L. Fritze, Leipzig 1880; into French by P. É. Foucaux, Paris 1861 and 1879. The recension according to Dravidian manuscripts is edited by Pischel in *Monatsber. d. Kgl. preuss. Akad. zu Berlin,* 1875, p. 409 f. For fuller Bibliograpy see Sten Konow, *op. cit.*, p. 65-66.

47 Kālidāsa's source, again, is uncertain. The story is retold with the missing details in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,* but the Purāṇic accounts entirely modify it, not to its advantage. The *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* preserves some of its old rough features, but in the *Kathā-sarit-sāgara* and in the *Matsya-purāṇa* we find it in a much altered form of a folk-tale. The latter version closely resembles the one which Kālidāsa follows, but it is not clear if the *Matsya-purāṇa* version itself, like the *Padma-purāṇa* version of the Śakuntalā-legend, is modelled on Kālidāsa's treatment of the story.

is changed into an unconvincing story in five acts of semi-courtly life, with a weak denouement of domestic union and felicity, brought about by the intervention of a magic stone and the grace of Indra. The fierce-souled spouse, *la belle dame sans merci* of the *Ṛgveda*, is transformed into a passionate but selfish woman, an elevated type of the heavenly courtesan, and later on, into a happy and obedient wife. The modifying hand of folk-tale and comedy of courtly life is obvious; and some strange incidents and situations, like the first scene located in the air, are introduced; but accepting Kālidāsa's story as it is, there is no deficiency in characterisation and expression. If the figures are strange and romantic, they are still transcripts from universal nature. Even when the type does not appeal, the character lives. The brave and chivalrous Purūravas is sentimental, but, as his madness shows, he is not the mere trifler of a princely amourist like Agnimitra; while jealous queen Auśinarī is not a repetition of Irāvatī or Dhāriṇī. Although in the fifth act, the opportunity is missed of a tragic conflict of emotion between the joy of Purūravas in finding his son and his sorrow at the loss of Urvaśī resulting from the very sight of the child, there is yet a skilful delineation of Kālidāsa's favourite motif of the recognition of the unknown son and the psychological climax of presenting the offspring as the crown of wedded love. There are features also in the drama which are exceptional in the whole range of Sanskrit literature, and make it rise above the decorum of courtly environment. The fourth act on the madness of Purūravas is unique in this sense. The scene is hardly dramatic and has no action, but it reaches an almost lyric height in depicting the tumultuous ardour of undisciplined passion. It is a fantasy in soliloquy, in which the demented royal lover, as he wanders through the woods in search of his beloved, demands tidings of his fugitive love from the peacock, the cuckoo, the flamingo, the bee, the elephant, the boar and the antelope; he deems the cloud with its rainbow to be a demon who has borne his beauteous bride

away; he searches the yielding soil, softened by showers, which may perchance, if she had passed that way, have retained the delicate impression of her gait, and may show some vestige of the red tincture of her dyed feet. The whole scene is melodramatically conceived; and if the Prakrit verses are genuine,[48] they are apparently meant to be sung behind the scenes. The stanzas are charged with exuberance of emotion and play of fancy, but we have nothing else, which appeals in the drama, but this isolation of individual passion. The inevitable tragedy of such a love is obvious; and it is a pity that the play is continued even after the natural tragic climax is reached, even at the cost of lowering the heroine from her divine estate and making Indra break his word!

That the *Abhijñāna-śakuntala*[49] is, in every respect, the most finished of Kālidāsa's dramatic compositions is indicated by the almost universal feeling of genuine admiration which it has always evoked.

48 The authenticity of the Prakrit verses has been doubted, chiefly on the ground that the Apabhraṃśa of the type found in them is suspicious in a drama of such early date, and that they are not found in the South Indian recension of the text. The Northern recension calls the drama a Troṭaka, apparently for the song-element in these verses, but according to the South Indian recension, it conforms generally to the essentials of a Nāṭaka.

49 The earliest edition (Bengal Recension) is that by A. L. Chézy, Paris 1830. The drama exists in four recensions: (i) Devanāgarī, ed. O. Böhtlingk, Bonn 1842, but with better materials, ed. Monier Williams, 2nd ed. Oxford 1876; with comm. of Rāghavabhaṭṭa, ed. N. B. Godbole and K. P. Parab, NSP, Bombay 1883, 1922, (ii) Bengali, ed. R. Pischel, Kiel 1877; 2nd ed. Harvard Orient. Ser., revised by C. Cappeller, Cambridge, Mss. 1922, (iii) Kāśmīrī, ed. K. Burkhard, Wien 1884, (iv) South Indian, no critical edition, but printed with comm. of Abhirāma, Śrī-vāṇī-vilāsa Press, Srirangam (no date), etc. Attempts to reconstruct the text, by C. Cappeller (Kürzere Textform), Leipzig 1909 and by P. N. Patankar (called Purer Devanāgarī Text), Poona 1902. But no critical edition utilising all the recensions has yet been undertaken. The earliest English trs. is by William Jones, London 1790; but trs. have been numerous in various languages. On Text-criticism, see Pischel, *De Kālidāsae Çakuntali recensionibus* (Diss.), Breslau 1872 and *Die Rezensionen der Çakuntala*, Breslau 1875; Harichand Shastri, *op. cit.*, p. 243 f.; A. Weber, *Die Rezensionen der Śakuntalā* in *Ind. Studien*, xiv, pp. 35-69, 161-311. For fuller Bibliography, see Sten Konow, *op. cit.*, 68-70, and M. Schuyler in *JAOS*, xxii, p. 237 f.

The old legend of Śakuntalā, incorporated in the Ādiparvan of the *Mahābhārata*, or perhaps some version of it,[50] must have suggested the plot of this drama; but the difference between the rough and simple epic narrative and Kālidāsa's refined and delicate treatment of it at once reveals his distinctive dramatic genius. The shrewd, straightforward and taunting girl of the epic is transformed into the shy, dignified and pathetic herione, while the selfish conduct of her practical lover in the Epic who refuses to recognize her out of policy, is replaced by an irreprehensible forgetfulness which obscures his love. A dramatic motive is thereby supplied, and the prosaic incidents and characters of the original legend are plastically remodelled into frames and shapes of beauty. Here we see, in its best effect, Kālidāsa's method of unfolding of a character, as a flower unfolds its petals in rain and sunshine; there is no melodrama, no lame denouement, to mar the smooth, measured and dignified progress of the play; there is temperance in the depth of passion, and perspicuity and inevitableness in action and expression; but, above all this, the drama surpasses by its essential poetic quality of style and treatment.

Some criticism, however, has been levelled against the artificial device of the curse and the ring,[51] which brings in an element of chance and incalculable happening in the development of the plot.

50 The *Padma-purāṇa* version is perhaps a recast of Kālidāsa's story, and there is no reason to think (Winternitz, *GIL*, iii, p. 215) that Kālidāsa derived his material from the Purāṇa, or from some earlier version of it. Haradatta Sarma, *Kālidāsa and Padma-purāṇa*, Calcutta 1925, follows Winternitz.

51 Criticised severely by H. Oldenberg in *Die Lit. d. alten Indien*, Stuttgart and Berlin 1903, p. 261.—The curse of Caṇḍabhārgava and the magic ring in the *Avimāraka*, which have a different purpose, have only a superficial similarity, and could not have been Kālidāsa's source of the idea. On the curse of a sage as a motif in story and drama, see L. H. Gray in *WZKM*, 1904, pp. 53-54. The ring-motif is absent in the Mahābhārata, but P. E. Pavolini (*GSAI*, xix, 1906, p. 376; xx, 1907, p. 297) finds a parallel in Jātaka no. 7. It is perhaps an old Indian story-motif.

It should be recognised, however, that the psychological evolution of action is, more or less, a creation of the modern drama. The idea of destiny or divinity shaping our ends, unknown to ourselves, is not a peculiarly Indian trait, but is found in ancient drama in general; and the trend has been from ancient objectivity to modern subjectivity.[52] Apart from judging a method by a standard to which it does not profess to conform, it cannot also be argued that there is an inherent inferiority in an external device, as compared with the complication created by the inner impetus, to which we are in the present day more accustomed, perhaps too superstitiously. It is not really a question of comparative excellence, but of the artistic use which is made of a particular device. It is true that in Kālidāsa's *Abhijñāna-śakuntala*, the dramatic motive comes from without, but it is effectively utilised, and the drama which is enacted within and leads to a crisis is not thereby overlooked. The lovers are betrayed also by what is within, by the very rashness of youthful love which reaps as it sows; and the entire responsibility in this drama is not laid on the external agency. Granting the belief of the time, there is nothing unreal or unnatural; it is fortuitous but not unmotived. We have here not merely a tragedy of blameless hero and heroine; for a folly, or a mere girlish fault, or even one's very virtues, may bring misfortune. The unriddled ways of life need not always be as logical or comprehensible as one may desire; but there is nothing illogical or incomprehensible if only Svādhikāra-pramāda, here as elsewhere, leads to distress, and the nexus between act and fate is

52 C. E. Vaughan, *Types of Tragic Drama*, London 1908, p. 8 f. On the idea of Destiny in ancient and modern drama, see W. Macneille Dixon, *Tragedy*, London 1924, pp. 35-46. The device of the Ghost as the spirit of revenge in Euripides' *Hecuba* and Seneca's *Thyestes* is also external, although it was refined in the Elizabethan drama, especially in Shakespeare. The supernatural machinery in both *Hamlet* and *Macbeth* may be conceived as hallucination projected by the active minds in question, but it has still an undoubted influence on the development of the plot of the respective plays, which can be regarded as dramas of a man at odds with fate.

not wholly disregarded. If the conflict, again, between the heart's desire and the world's impediment can be a sufficient dramatic motive, it is not of very great poetic consequence whether the impediment assumes the form of a tragic curse, unknown to the persons affected, and plays the rôle of invisible but benevolent destiny in shaping the course of action. It is true we cannot excuse ourselves by arraigning Fate, Chance or Destiny; the tragic interest must assuredly be built on the foundation of human responsibility; but at the same time a human plot need not always be robbed of its mystery, and simplified to a mere circumstantial unfolding of cause and effect, all *in nostra potestate*. Fate or Ourselves, in the abstract, is a difficult question; but, as in life so in the drama, we need not reject the one for the other as the moulder of human action.

Much less convincing, and perhaps more misconceived, is the criticism that Kālidāsa evinces no interest in the great problems of human life. As, on the one hand, it would be a misdirected effort to find nothing but art for art's sake in Kālidāsa's work, so, on the other, it would be a singularly unimaginative attempt to seek a problem in a work of art and turn the poet into a philosopher. It is, however, difficult to reconcile the view mentioned above with the well known eulogy of no less an artist than Goethe, who speaks of finding in Kālidāsa's masterpiece "the young year's blossom and the fruit of its decline," and "the earth and heaven combined in one name." In spite of its obvious poetical exaggeration, this metaphorical but eloquent praise is not empty, but sums up with unerring insight the deeper issues of the drama, which is bound to be lost sight of by one who looks to it merely for a message or philosophy of life.

The *Abhijñāna-śakuntala*, unlike most Sanskrit plays, is not based on the mere banality of a court-intrigue but has a much more serious interest in depicting the baptism of youthful love by silent suffering. Contrasted with Kālidāsa's own *Mālavikāgnimitra* and

Vikramorvaśīya, the sorrow of the hero and heroine in this drama is far more human, far more genuine; and love is no longer a light-hearted passion in an elegant surrounding, or an explosive emotion ending in madness, but a deep and steadfast enthusiasm, or rather a progressive emotional experience which results in an abiding spiritual feeling. The drama opens with a description of the vernal season, made for enjoyment (*upabhoga-kṣama*); and even in the hermitage where thoughts of love are out of place, the season extends its witchery and makes the minds of the young hero and heroine turn lightly to such forbidden thoughts. At the outset we find Śakuntalā, an adopted child of nature, in the daily occupation of tending the friendly trees and creepers and watching them grow and bloom, herself a youthful blossom, her mind delicately attuned to the sights and sounds in the midst of which she had grown up since she had been deserted by her *amānuṣī* mother. On this scene appears the more sophisticated royal hero, full of the pride of youth and power but with a noble presence which inspires love and confidence, possessed of scrupulous regard for rectitude but withal susceptible to rash youthful impulses, considerate of others and alive to the dignity and responsibility of his high station but accustomed to every fulfilment of his wishes and extremely self-confident in the promptings of his own heart. He is egoistic enough to believe that everything he wishes must be right because he wishes it, and everything does happen as he wishes it. In his impetuous desire to gain what he wants, he does not even think it necessary to wait for the return of Kaṇva. It is easy for him to carry the young girl off her feet; for though brought up in the peaceful seclusion and stern discipline of a hermitage, she is yet possessed of a natural inward longing for the love and happiness which are due to her youth and beauty. Though fostered by a sage and herself the daughter of an ascetic, she is yet the daughter of a nymph whose intoxicating beauty had once achieved a conquest over the austere and terrible Viśvāmitra.

This beauty and this power she had inherited from her mother, as well as an inborn amiableness and desire for love; is she not going to make her own conquest over this great king? For such youthful lovers' love can never think of the morrow, it can only think of the moment. All was easy at first; the secret union to which they committed themselves obtains the ratification of the foster-father. But soon she realises the pity of taking love as an end in itself, of making the moment stand for eternity. The suffering comes as swiftly and unexpectedly as the happiness was headlong and heedless.

To these thoughtless lovers the curse of Durvāsas comes to play the part of a stern but beneficent providence. With high hopes and unaware of the impending catastrophe, she leaves for the house of her king-lover, tenderly taking farewell from her sylvan friends, who seem to be filled with an unconscious anxiety for her; but very soon she finds hereself standing utterly humiliated in the eyes of the world. Her grief, remorse and self-pity are aggravated by the accusation of unseemly haste and secrecy from Gautamī, as well as by the sterner rebuke of Śārṅgarava; "Thus does one's heedlessness lead to disaster!" But the unkindest cut comes from her lover himself who insultingly refers to instincts of feminine shrewdness, and compares her, without knowing, to the turbid swelling flood which drags others also in its fall. Irony in drama or in life can go no further. But the daughter of a nymph as she was, she had also the spirit of her fierce and austere father, and ultimately emerges triumphant from the ordeal of sorrow. She soon realises that she has lost all in her gambling for happiness, and a wordy warfare is useless. She could not keep her lover by her youth and beauty alone. She bows to the inevitable; and chastened and transformed by patient suffering, she wins back in the end her husband and her happiness. But the king is as yet oblivious of what is in store for him. Still arrogant, ironical and self-confident, he wonders who the

veiled lady might be; her beauty draws him as irresistibly as it once did, and yet his sense of rectitude forbids any improper thought. But his punishment comes in due course; for he was the greater culprit who had dragged the unsophisticated girl from her sylvan surroundings and left her unwittingly in the mire. When the ring of recognition is recovered, he realises the gravity of his act. Her resigned and reproachful form now haunts him and gives him no peace in the midst of his royal duties; and his utter helplessness in rendering any reparation makes his grief more intense and poignant. The scene now changes from earth to heaven, from the hermitage of Kaṇva and the court of the king to the penance-grove of Mārīca; and the love that was of the earth changes to love that is spiritual and divine. The strangely estranged lovers are again brought together equally strangely, but not until they have passed through the trial of sorrow and become ready for a perfect reunion of hearts. There is no explanation, no apology, no recrimination, nor any demand for reparation. Śakuntalā has now learnt in silence the lessons of suffering; and with his former self-complacency and impetuous desires left behind, the king comes, chastened and subdued, a sadder and wiser man. The young year's blossom now ripens into the mellow fruit of autumnal maturity.

Judged absolutely, without reference to an historical standard, Kālidāsa's plays impress us by their admirable combination of dramatic and poetic qualities; but it is in pure poetry that he surpasses even in his dramatic works. It should be admitted that he has the powers of a great dramatist; he can merge his individuality in the character he represents; he can paint distinct individuals, and not personified abstractions, with consistent reality and profound insight into human nature; all his romantic situations may not be justified, but he is always at the height of a situation; within certain limits, he has constructive ability of a high order and the action is perspicuous, naturally developed and adequately motived; he makes a skilful use

of natural phenomenon in sympathy with the prevailing tone of a scene; he gives, by his easy and unaffected manner, the impression of grace, which comes from strength revealed without unnecessary display or expenditure of energy; he never tears a passion to tatters or oversteps the modesty of nature in producing a pathetic effect; he does not neglect the incident in favour of dialogue or dainty stanzas; all this and more may be freely acknowledged. But the real appeal of his dramas lies in the appeal of their poetry more than in their purely dramatic quality. His gentle pathos and humour, his romantic imagination and his fine poetic feeling are more marked characteristics of his dramas than mere ingenuity of plot, liveliness of incident and minute portraiture of men and manners. They save him from the prosaic crudeness of the realist, as well as from an oppressive and unnatural display of technical skill. The elegant compliment of the author of the *Prasanna-rāghava* that Kālidāsa is the 'grace of poetry' emphasises the point; but poetry is not too seductive for him. He is a master of sentiment, but not a sentimentalist, who sacrifices the realities of life and character; he is romantic, but his romance is not divorced from common nature and common sense. He writes real dramas and not a series of elegant poetical passages; the poetic fancy and love of style do not strangle the truth and vividness of his presentation; he is also not in any sense the exponent of the opera, or the lyrical drama, or the dramatic poem. He is rather the creator of the poetical drama in Sanskrit. But the difficult standard which he set could not be developed except in an extreme form by his less gifted successors.

In making a general estimate of Kālidāsa's achievement as a poet, one feels the difficulty of avoiding superlatives; but the superlatives in this case are amply justified. Kālidāsa's reputation has always been great; and this is perhaps the only case where both Eastern and Western critics, applying not exactly analogous standards are in general agreement. That he is the greatest of Sanskrit poets is

a commonplace of literary criticism, but if Sanskrit literature can claim to rank as one of the great literatures of the world, Kālidāsa's high place in the galaxy of world-poets must be acknowledged. It is not necessary to prove it by quoting the concurring eulogiums of Goethe and Ānandavardhana; but the agreement shows that Kālidāsa has the gift of a great poet, and like all great poetic gift, it is of universal appeal.

This high praise does not mean that Kālidāsa's poetic art and style have never been questioned or are beyond criticism. Leaving aside Western critics, whose appreciation of an alien art and expression must necessarily be limited, we find the Sanskrit rhetoricians, in spite of their great admiration, are not sparing in their criticism; and, like Ben Jonson who wanted to blot out a thousand lines in Shakespeare, they would give us a fairly long list of "faults" which mar the excellence of Kālidāsa's otherwise perfect work. We are not concerned here with the details of the alleged defects, but they happily demonstrate that Kālidāsa, like Shakespeare, is not faultily faultless. That his rhetoric is of the best kind is shown by the hundreds of passages approved by the rhetoricians themselves; but that they sometimes disapprove his not conforming rigidly to their laws is also significant. If his obedience is successful, his disobedience is often no less successful in giving him freedom of idea and expression and saving him from much that is wooden and merely conventional.

Even in the imposing gallery of Sanskrit poets, who are always remarkable for technical skill, Kālidāsa has an astonishing display of the poetic art; but he never lends himself to an over-development of the technical to the detriment of the artistic. The legend which makes Kālidāsa an inspired idiot and implies a minimum of artistic consciousness and design is perhaps as misleading as the counter-error of too great insistence upon the consciousness and elaboration of his art. There is little doubt that he shared the learning of his

time, but he wears his learning lightly like a flower; while the deceptive clarity and simplicity of his work conceal the amount of cultivation and polish which goes into its making. It is not spontaneous creation; but while lesser poets lack the art to conceal art, he has the gift of passion, imagination, music and colouring to give an effective appearance of spontaneity and inevitability. He belongs to a tradition which insists upon literature being a learned pursuit, but he is one of the great and limpid writers who can be approached with the minimum of critical apparatus and commentatorial lucubrations.

This marvellous result is possible because Kālidāsa's works reveal a rare balance of mind, which harmonises the artistic sense with the poetic, and results in the practice of singular moderation. No other Sanskrit poet can approach him in the command of that mysterious instrument, the measured word. Kālidāsa has a rich and sustained elevation of diction, but it is never overwrought and very rarely rhetorical in the bad sense. Conceits and play upon words are to be found in him, as in Shakespeare, but there are no irritating and interminable puns; no search after strained expressions, harsh inversions or involved constructions; no love for jewels five words long; no torturing of words or making them too laboured for the ideas. Even Kālidāsa's love of similitude,[53] for which he has been so highly praised, never makes him employ it as a mere verbal trick, but it is made a natural concomitant of the emotional content for suggesting more than what is expressed. On the other hand, his ideas, emotions and fancies never run riot or ride rough-shod over the limits of words, within which they are compressed with tasteful economy and pointedness of phrasing. The result is a fine adjustment of sound and sense, a judicious harmony of word and idea, to a point not often reached by other Sanskrit poets. This is seen

53 A study of Kālidāsa's Upamā has been made by P .K. Gode in *Proc. of the First Oriental Conf.*, Poona 1922, pp. 205-26. On Kālidāsa's relation to Alaṃkāraśāstra in general, see Hillebrandt, *Kālidāsa*, p. 107 f.

not only in the extraordinary vividness and precision of his presentment of images and ideas, but also in the modulation of letter, syllable, word, line and stanza to produce a running accompaniment at once to the images and ideas. The felicity of expression, its clarity and ease, which have been recognised in Kālidāsa as the best instance of the Prasāda Guṇa, come from this careful choice of a rich store of words, both simple and compound, which are not only delicately attuned but also made alive with the haunting suggestion of poetry. If it is simplicity, it is simplicity made more elegant than ornateness itself by sheer genius for proportion and vividity. There are hundreds of words, phrases and lines in Kālidāsa, echoing passages and veritable gems of expressions, giving us an infinity of fresh and felt observations, which fasten themselves on the memory; such is the distinctness of his vision and the elaborate, but not laboured, accuracy of his touch. If the gift of phrasing is one of the tests of a great writer, Kālidāsa possesses this happy gift; but it is also combined with the still more rare gift, seen in perfection in great poets, of putting *multum in parvo* and of opening up unending vistas of thought by the magic power of a single line or phrase.

Kālidāsa is indeed careful of form, but he is not careless of matter. Like later Sanskrit poets he does not make his narrative a mere peg on which he can luxuriously hang his learning and skill. Whatever may be said about his choice of themes, he is seldom unequal to them. The wide exploration of subjects, legendary, mythical, emotional and even fanatastic, and his grasp over their realities are seen in the way in which he handles his huge and diverse material in the *Raghu-vaṃśa*, creates a human story out of a divine myth in his *Kumāra-saṃbhava*, and depicts the passionate love of hapless lovers in an environment of poetical fancy in his *Meghadūta* and his dramas. He may not always be at the height of his power through the entire length of a work, but he is always at the height of a particular situation. His sources are not exactly known, but it

is clear that his subjects serve him for the stuff out of which he *creates;* and Kālidāsa has perhaps borrowed nothing from his supposed originals that makes him Kālidāsa. He is not so much the teller of a story as the maker of it, and his unerring taste and restraint accomplish this making by not allowing either the form or the content to overwhelm or exceed each other.

The same sense of balance is also shown by the skilful adjustment of a mobile and sensitive prosody to the diction and theme of the poems. The total number of different metres which Kālidāsa employs is only about twenty. With the exception of Mandākrāntā of his short poem, they are either Śloka,[54] or a few moric metres like Vaitālīya, Aupacchandasika or Puṣpitāgrā, but the general bulk consists normally of the relatively short lyrical measures of the Triṣṭubh-Jagatī family, or metres akin to it. In the drama there is greater metrical variety suited to the different situations and emotions. In the bigger poems the short lyrical measures are perhaps meant for facility of continued narration; the simplicity and swing of the stanzas make his narrative flow in a clear and attractive stream; but even in the leisurely descriptive and reflectively serious passages, they never cramp the thought, feeling or imagination of the poet. The stately and long-drawn-out music of the Mandākrāntā, on the other hand, very well suits the picturesque and melancholy recollections of love in his *Meghadūta*. It is, however, clear that Kālidāsa is equally at home in both short and long measures; and though a part of canto ix of the *Raghu-vaṃśa* is meant deliberately to display the poet's skill in varied metres, the variation is not unpleasing. But, normally, it is not a question of mere metrical

54 It is remarkable that the Śloka is used not only for the condensation of the Rāmāyaṇa story in *Raghu*° xii, but also for the Stotra of deities both in *Raghu*° x and *Kumāra*° ii, as well as for the narration of Raghu's Digvijaya. For repetition of the same metre for similar theme, cf. Upajāti in describing marriage in *Raghu*° x and *Kumāra*° vii; Rathoddhatā in depicting amorous pastimes in *Raghu*° xix and *Kumāra*° viii; Viyoginī in Aja-vilāpa and Rati-vilāpa, etc.

skill, but of the developed and delicate sense of rhythmic forms and the fine subtelty of musical accompaniment to the power of vivid and elegant presentation.

With the same sense of equipoise Kālidāsa's imagination holds in perfect fusion the two elements of natural beauty and human feeling. His nature-pictures grow out of the situations, and his situations merge into the nature-pictures. This is palpable not only in his *Megha-dūta*, but practically throughout his other two poems and his dramas. The pathos of the destruction of Kāma is staged in the life and loveliness of spring; Rāma's tender recollection of past joys and sorrows is intimately associated with the hills, rivers and trees of Daṇḍaka; the pretty amourette of Agnimitra, the madness of Purūravas, or the woodland wooing of Duṣyanta is set in the midst of the sights and sounds of nature. A countless number of Kālidāsa's beautiful similes and metaphors are drawn from his loving observation of natural phenomena. The depth and range of his experience and insight into human life is indeed great, but the human emotion is seldom isolated from the beauty of nature surrounding it. Kālidāsa's warm humanism and fine poetic sensibility romanticise the natural, as well as the mythological, world, and they supply to his poetry the grace and picturesqueness of background and scenic variety.

It will be seen that the sense of universality in Kālidāsa's work springs not merely from its humanity and range of interests, but also from the fact that it reveals him as a great master of poetic thought, who is at the same time a master of poetic style. Diction, imagery, verbal music, suggestion,—all the elements of poetry are present in an intense degree and in many forms and combinations novel and charming; but all exhibit a marvellous fusion of the artistic consciousness with poetic imagination and feeling. Kālidāsa's poetic power, which scorns anything below the highest, is indeed not narrow in its possibilities of application but its amplitude and

exuberance are always held in restraint by his sense of art, which however, does not act as an incubus, but as a chastener. His work, therefore, is never hampered or hurried; there is no perpetual series of ups and downs in it, no great interval between his best and his worst; it maintains a level of excellence and a stamp of distinction throughout. All ruggedness and angularity are delicately smoothed away; and the even roundness of his full-orbed poetry appeals by a haunting suggestion of serene beauty, resulting from a subtle merging of thought and feeling in sound and visual effect.

But from this springs as much the strength as the weakness of Kālidāsa's poetic achievement. If tranquil contemplation of recollected emotions, in both eastern and western theory, denotes the aesthetic attitude and forms the essence of true poetry, Kālidāsa's work is certainly marked by it in an eminent degree. His tranquility, considered as an attitude towards life, is not easy-going indifference or placid acquiescence in the order of things; there is enough of earnestness and sense of sorrow to indicate that it must have been hard-won, although we are denied the sight of the strife and struggle which led to its attainment, or of the scars or wrinkles which it might have been left behind. In his poetry, it bore fruit in the unruffled dignity and serenity of artistic accomplishment. At the same time, it encouraged a tendency towards reserve more than towards abandon. Kālidāsa's poetry seldom surprises us by its fine excess; it is always smooth, measured and even. The polished and the ornate is as much natural to Kālidāsa as, for instance, the rugged and the grotesque to Bhavabhūti. While Kālidāsa broiders the exquisite tissue of poetry, Bhavabhūti would have it rough and homespun. This is perhaps not so much a studied effect as a temperamental attitude in both cases. The integrity and sincerity of primal sensations and their fervid expression, which Bhavabhūti often attains, are rare in Kālidāsa's highly refined and cultured utterances. It is not that Kālidāsa is averse to what is intense and

poignant, as well as grand and awe-inspiring in life and nature, but the emotions are chastened and subdued in the severity, strength and dignity of finished poetic presentation. There is nothing crude, rugose or tempestuous in Kālidāsa, not a jarring note of violence or discord, but everything is dissolved in the harmony and beauty of reposeful realisation. The limitation of this attitude is as obvious as its poetic possibility. While it gives the perfect artistic aloofness conducive to real poetry, it deprives the poet of robust and keen perceptions, of the concrete and even gross realism of undomesticated passion, of the freshness of the drossy but unalloyed ore direct from the mine. Kālidāsa would never regard his emotions as their own excuse for being, but would present them in the embalmed glamour of poetic realisation, or in the brocaded garb of quintessenced rhetoric. Kālidāsa has perhaps as much optimism for civilisation as Bhavabhūti has for savagery; but he does not often attain the depths and heights which Bhavabhūti does by his untamed roughness. It is for this reason that some of Kālidāsa's pictures, both of life and nature, finely poetic as they are, are still to refined and remote. The Himalayas do not appear to Kālidāsa in their natural grandeur and sublimity, nor the Daṇḍaka forest in its wild beauty and ruggedness; all these pictures are to be properly finished and framed, but thereby they lose much of their trenchant setting and appeal.

But all this is not mere suavity or finicality. Kālidāsa's poetry does not swim in langour, cloyed with its own sweetness; the chastity and restraint of his imagination, the precision and energy of his phrasing, and the austerity of his artistic vigilance save him from mere sensuous ideality. The ornate in Kālidāsa, therefore, means very rarely prettiness or aesthetic make-believe; it is the achievement of the refined effect of a thought or feeling chiselled in its proper form of beauty and becoming thereby a poetic thought or feeling. It thus involves the process through which the poet

lifts his tyrannical passion or idea to the blissful contemplation of an aesthetic sentiment. Kālidāsa can keep himself above his subject in the sense of command, as Bhavabhūti too often merges himself in it in the sense of surrender; and the difference is best seen in their respective treatment of pathos, in which Kālidāsa's poetic sense of restraint and balance certainly achieves a more profound effect. This is nowhere more clear than in the picture of Rāma's suffering on the occasion of Sītā's exile drawn respectively by the two poets. Bhavabhūti's tendency is to elaborate pathetic scenes almost to the verge of crudity, omitting no circumstance, no object animate or inanimate, which he thinks can add to their effectiveness; and, like most Sanskrit poets, he is unable to stop even when enough has been said. But Kālidāsa, like Shakespeare, suggests more than he expresses. Not one of those who gather round the body of Cordelia makes a phrase; the emotion is tense, but there is no declamation to work it up. The terrible blow, given by the reported calumny regarding his beloved, makes Rāma's heart, tossed in a terrible conflict between love and duty, break in pieces, like the heated iron beaten with a hammer; but he does not, declaim, nor faint, nor shed a flood of tears. It is this silent suffering which makes Kālidāsa's Rāma a truly tragic figure. Not until Lakṣmaṇa returns and delivers the spirited but sad message of his banished wife that the king in him breaks down and yields to the man; but even here Kālidāsa has only one short stanza (xiv. 84) which sums up with infinite suggestion the entire pity of the situation.

S. K. De

Indo-Europeans in the Mediterranean Area

It is not inappropriate, in view of the deep interest of the late erudite scholar, Louis de La Vallée Poussin, in the Indo-European question, to honour his memory by examining an issue connected vitally therewith. At what date can we trace the presence of people of Indo-European speech in the lands bordering on the Mediterranean Sea? The problem is one of those to which no certain answer can be given, but results of greater or less probability are still worth striving for.

I

Asia Minor

The claim has been made by Dr. Forrer[1] that the Luvians, whose speech is of Indo-European character, came to Asia Minor before the fourth millennium B.C. This theory is set out in a modified form by Dr. A. Götze,[2] who finds Luvian as the speech dominant in south-west Asia Minor, including Arzava, whose eastern area extended to the Pisidian Alps, and Kizvatna, which embraced at least a part of Cilicia,[3] in the third millennium. In the north he finds Proto-Hattic speech, which is assuredly not Indo-European, using prefixes for noun and verb formation in a manner which distinguishes it from any other speech of Asia Minor known to us; it may be deemed to be the speech of the earlier people. In the south-east he finds Ḫurrite and Amorite speeches with the use of Akkadian speech for treaty purposes. Archæological evidence is adduced to

1 *SBA.*, 1919, pp. 1034 ff.; *MDOG.*, lxi. (1921), 23 ff.; *ZDMG.*, N.F. i. 215 ff.

2 *Kleinasien*, pp. 53 ff.

3 These locations are much disputed. Forrer (*Klio*, xxx. 135 ff.) places Arzava in Cilicia, but cf. Sommer, *IF.* lv. 202 ff.

confirm the date assigned to Luvian. In west Asia Minor we find pottery of the red or black types known from the discoveries at Troy and Yortan, extending to Pisidia and even up to Konya, the date of which may be placed from the third millennium down to 1900 at least. In the east we have painted Cappadocian pottery in the Halys region, from say 2000 to 1200. The ornamentation and form of the vessels used show a close connection. We note that the Luvian is older in phonology and forms than Hittite, which was established about 1900 in the east, and we can thus properly connect the Troy-Yortan civilisation with the Luvian, and that found at Alishar Hüyük, third stage, with the Hittite speeches. The cultures known as Alishar I and II are different from that of Alishar III which we must treat as intrusive, showing the advent of the Hittites. The new art, however, does not prevail; Alishar III is merged ultimately in Alishar II.

The picture presented to us is not very clear. Apparently the Proto-Hattic are to be held to have occupied Asia Minor, and then the Luvians and Hittites to have entered from Europe in the third millennium, though Hittite activity becomes apparent only later. Dr. Forrer indeed holds that the Luvians entered before the fourth millennium, and the Hittites only in the second half of the third, but it is really difficult to separate the two speeches in this way. The claim that Luvian is the older is far from clear. It is true[4] that in the third person singular and plural of the verb in the present we have the forms *-ti* and *-nti* against the Hittite developments *-zi* and *-nzi*, but the third plural preterite *-nda* is not necessarily older than the Hittite *-ir*, nor the singular in *-tta* than the Hittite *-t*, *-ta*, or *-š*. In other respects Luvian seems to be more affected by non-Indo-European speeches than Hittite, and there is no sufficient reason to hold that it is anything more than a dialectical variation of that tongue.

4 Sommer, *Aḫḫijavā—Urkunden* (1932), p. 108.

Dr. Götze supports his views of the Luvians by ascribing to their speech the famous *-ss-* and *-nt-* (also *-nth-* and *-nd-*) suffixes, which have played a great part in discussions of Aegean language.[5] As the suffixes are found widely in Greece, in other parts of the Balkan peninsula, and in many areas of Asia Minor, it is clear that they must represent the speech of a very widely prevalent race, and it is highly improbable that that race was Indo-European for a most obvious linguistic reason. The words wherein they appear are regularly without Indo-European cognates, whence the obvious deduction is that the suffixes are not Indo-European. Characteristic is the Labyrinth,[6] bound up in Greek tradition with the bull of Minos of Knossos. The word denotes the place of the double ax (*labrys*), a word non-Indo-European, just as Minos himself and Knossos have non-Indo-European names.

Dr. Götze ascribes to Luvian the deities Šandaš, Tarhunt and Tarku; and instances Tarhuntašša and Dattašša as showing plainly the sense of 'belonging to' the god mentioned. But it is very far from proved that Tarhunt or Šandaš are in any sense Luvian deities. There is indeed much more ground for holding that these deities are non-I.E. We find Sandes and Sandon in Lydia, Trokondas in Lycia and Pamphylia, and neither name nor that of Datta seems to be I.E. Dr. Brandenstein[7] indeed insists that Tarhunt is a Luvian modification of a Proto-Hattic Tarhun or Tarhu, the affix being the Luvian equivalent of I.E. *-went-*. The same authority claims the *-nd-* affix for Proto-Hattic, on the score that it is presumed in the name Arinnanda given to a mountain rich in streams, *arin* being found

5 Kretschmer, *Einleitung in die Geschichte der griechischen Sprache* (1896); A. Fick, *'Ortsnamen als Quelle für die Vorgeschichte Griechenlands* (1905); *Hattiden und Danubier in Griechenland* (1909).

6 R. Burrows, *The Discoveries in Crete*, p. 117. W. Brandenstein, *Hirt-Festschrift* (1936), ii. 37 insists that Luvian derived the *-ss-* suffix from a development of Proto-Hattic *-s-*. See on the suffix, Sommer, *op. cit.*, pp. 123, 157, 363 f., 370 f

freely in names of streams or places therewith connected, as in the Greek Arne, Arna, and Arnaia. But this view is denied by Dr. Götze,[8] who insists that the Proto-Hattic Burushat and Kuburnat give the true forms, and the Hittite Baršuḫanda and Kaburnanda are nasalised by a process which has analogies in Hittite. Dr. Brandenstein,[9] however, claims that the names with *-at* recorded in the Cappadocian records show an Assyrian *-at* substituted through likeness of sound, not sense, for the original *-and(a)*. He admits, however, that the Greek words in *-ant(h)-* are not necessarily taken from Proto-Hattic, while most of those in *-inth-* and *-unth-* are not thence derived. The case for Proto-Hattic origin is certainly not made out, and the Luvian forms are best ascribed to the non-I.E. speech prevalent in the lands occupied by the Luvians.

There seems no real reason in the circumstances of the case to separate Luvians and Hittites on their first appearance in Asia Minor. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that differentiation was the result of division, the Luvian settling on the south coast, while the Hittites moved rather to the interior. When they entered Asia Minor, and by what route, remains to be considered. The view of Professor E. Meyer[10] is that the date of entry was about 2500 B.C., and no doubt in favour of an early date we may reckon the fact that in certain respects the language of the Hittites is antique. But on this point there must be caution. We are told that its antiquity is established by the incomplete character of the plural, the absence of moods, the small number of tenses, and the lack of the feminine—to which on one view may be added the fact of its possessing the much disputed sound *h*, a fact upon which has been

7 *Hirt-Festschrift* (1936), ii. 31. 8 *Kleinasien*, p. 50. 9 *Op. cit.*, ii. 30.
10 *Geschichte des Altertums*, II, i, 22. On the linguistic character of Hittite, see Keith, *IHQ.*, xiv. 1 ff. B. Rosenkranz (*IF.*, lvi. 265 ff.) holds that Luvian was the colloquial speech of the Hittite realm.

built up an imposing mass of hypotheses of very dubious value, despite their ingenuity.[11] But all this argument is of slight value; there remains the possibility or probability that the alleged marks of early date are rather signs of deterioration of an I.E. speech among non-I.E. people. Everything points to the people of I.E. speech being merely an élite, who physically were soon merged in the existing population which deeply affected their religion and culture.

Against an early date tells the absence of any clear recognition of their existence in the Kültepe records of the Assyrian colonies, whose activities seem to have been ultimately terminated by the advent of the I.E. speakers. Moreover, it must be regarded as surprising, if they really came in the third millennium, that their activities should be recorded only from about 1900 B.C. or, on one theory, about 1650.[12] There seems, therefore, every ground for placing their arrival not long before that date, though due allowance must be made for the fact that, so far as our record reveals, they were not conscious of themselves as immigrants.

The route of their entry is claimed by E. Meyer[13] to have been the Caucasus. Otherwise, he argues, they would assuredly have established themselves in the rich plains of the western areas. Moreover, the later Kimmerioi followed this route, showing that it was not unnatural. These arguments are of weight, even if his other contentions are not conclusive. The chariot in the Florentine Museum, found in Egypt has the nave fastened to the spokes by birchbark, and the birch is found in the Caucasus, but we cannot assert that it came with Hittites or that the Hittites introduced the horse, the chariot, and racing. These may be due to the I.E. ele-

11 New theories of ablaut and primitive roots have been based on it. Kurylowicz, *Études indoeuropéenes*, I, (1935); Benveniste, *Origines de la formation des mots en indoeuropéen*, I, (1935).

12 Sommer, *Ahhijavā-frage und Sprachwissenschaft* (1934), p. 49.

13 *Op. cit.*, II. i. 23 f.

ments of the Mitanni. On the other hand, it is argued[14] that the earliest records treat the Hittites as advancing from the west, but, granting this, it is clearly a mere conjecture that they entered Asia Minor from the west, and the absence of any trace of them in the western areas is significant. Taken on the whole, entry from the Caucasus seems more probable, once we dismiss the suggestion that the Luvians were the bringers of the civilisation of Troy from Europe. This leaves the Caspian route for the Mitanni and the Aryans generally.

From another point of view it has been proposed[15] to find evidence of a Proto-Indo-European stratum of population in Asia Minor. The evidence adduced for this hypothesis is linguistic. It is argued that certain I.E. elements in Lycian and Lydian, for instance, can best be explained by the hypothesis that there was an admixture of such a Proto-I.E. speech with differing non-I.E. speeches. But obviously the natural way to explain the apparent I.E. elements in these speeches is to set them down to admixture of the native speeches with I.E. elements in later times, and, if we are to establish a Proto-I.G. hypothesis, we need to be able to show the existence of a number of words with some peculiarity distinguishing them from normal I.E. But this is far from being the case. It is held that a Proto-I.E. *Tin-*, denoting Zeus, is reflected by Etruscan *Tin(i)a* and Laconian *Tindaridai*, the *Dioskouroi*, as opposed to I.E. *din-*, Slav. *dini*, 'day'. Similarly with a like change *titō* is explained by the glossaries to denote dawn or day, and can be compared with the Albanian *dite*. We have also the name *Tithōnos*, but the legend and the formation of the name from the feminine have decidedly a non-I.E. suggestion. There is nothing to be gained by the suggestion that the word group

14 F. Schachermeyr, *Hirt-Festschrift* (1936), i. 235, n. 1.

15 Kretschmer, *Glotta*, xiv. 300 ff.; xi. 277 f. Disapproved by Terracini, *Studi etruschi*, v. 341.

Greek *Anēr*, Sabine *Nero*, etc. is connected with Hittite *Inaraš*, for the word seems to denote a female deity,[16] and connection with the word for 'man' is too far fetched. There is an Inaras as a proper name of a man, but it is much more reasonable to find for it an origin of Asianic character. Other evidence is as unconvincing, and it is impossible to find any archaeological facts[17] which demand the acceptance of the Proto-I.E. hypothesis, which therefore ought to be negatived as unnecessary and certainly quite unprovable. If we examine the words adduced as I.E. in Lycian and Lydian, we shall not find any which cannot be explained from contact with historical I.E. peoples; thus Lycian *sñta*, 'hundred,'[18] is patently of Phrygian origin and so forth.

The Phrygians,[19] it may safely be assumed, were pressed forward from Thrace into Asia Minor largely by the Illyrian movements; they were followed by Mysians and Bithynians. It is probable that leaders of the Moschoi known to Tiglatpileser I (*c.* 1115-00) were of Phrygian race.[20] Penetration to the south-east was stayed by the Assyrians in due course, but the Hittite realm, with Arzava and Kizvatna, the minor states of Asia Minor, and the buffer state, Amurru, were ruined. Interest attaches to the records of Rameses III[21] who stayed the advance of wandering peoples in Egypt about 1900 B.C. The Philistines seem to have been the leaders, and Crete as well as Cyprus may have for a time fallen under their control. But, whether we recognise a shortlived Philistine empire[22] or not, they

16 J. Friedrich, *Hirt-Festschrift* (1936), ii. 223; cf. Brandenstein, *ibid.*, ii. 36.

17 Schachermeyr's view (*Hirt-Festschrift*, i. 236) lacks any clearness.

18 P. Meriggi, *IF.*, xliv. 3; cf. *Hirt-Festschrift*, ii. 257 ff.

19 Meyer, *op. cit.*, II. i. 567 ff. The Dardana known to Rameses II as Hittite auxiliaries cannot be treated as Phrygians, nor those of Homer or the tribe which annoyed the Macedonian kings; A. R. Burn, *op. cit.*, pp. 109 ff.

20 Götze, *Kleinasien*, p. 187.

21 Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, iv. 64; Meyer, *op. cit.*, II. i. 455 ff.

22 Meyer, *op. cit.*, II. i. 560 ff., 586 ff.; Schachermeyr, *Hirt-Festschrift* (1936), i. 245; Hall, *Cambridge Ancient History*, ii. 275 ff.; Burn, *op. cit.*, pp. 141 ff.

left their mark in the form of a group of states on the coast of Palestine. There is no doubt that the Philistines profited from the traditions of late Mycenaean pottery, architecture, and weapons, and it is argued that their appearance, as depicted in Egyptian art, and as described in the Old Testament, suggests nordic racial characteristics. There is no particular reason to object to classing them with the Phrygian movement; more than that cannot reasonably be claimed.

The Mitanni Indo-European elements may be taken not to have entered into their historic homes from Europe, and need not here be further considered.[23]

II
Greece and the Balkans

How far can we trace back I.E. elements in the Balkans and in Greece? There is a widespread belief that something can be inferred from archaeology. The Greek language must have developed its distinctive characters in some considerable area, and it is suggested[24] that we may trace an I.E. civilisation in the third culture of Thessaly, which would correspond with this development. It is marked by the going out of fashion of painted pottery, and the introduction of new types of pottery, high-handled cups and jugs with cut-away necks, while the first perforated stone axe-heads and mace-heads appear. The area of this culture extends from the Dardanelles to the Adriatic with ramifications in the Danube valley, Upper Italy,

23 See G. Schmökel, *Die ersten Arier im Alten Orient* (1938); Götze, *Hethiter, Churriter and Assyrer* (1936), pp. 32, 48, 55, 98 f., 117 f.; A. Ungnad, *Subartu* (1936). It should be noted that the I. E. Hittites are assigned only to 1650 B.C. by I. Gelb, *Inscriptions from Altshar and Vicinity* (1935).

24 V. S. Childe, *The Aryans*, pp. 58 ff.; A. R. Burn, *Minoans, Philistines and Greeks*, pp. 33 ff.

and even Apulia. The date of this culture may be conjectured to be about 2300 B.C. From it was derived the Minyan or Middle Helladic culture of central Greece, whose authors ousted the early Helladic settlers from Orchomenos about 1900 B.C. The same civilisation was carried to the Peloponnese and to Attica and Aegina. This dispersion may account for the differentiation of the common Greek into different dialects, the Aeolic in Thessaly and the north, the Attic and the Ionian as the speech of those who penetrated south. The Dorian and west Greek dialects will represent the speech of the Greek elements in Macedonia and the west, where we can trace the third Thessalian culture also. The development of Greek civilisation through contact with the pre-Greek population was deeply affected by the influence of the Minoan civilisation as developed in Crete. About 1600 it is suggested Minoans established a strong hold on Mycenae,[25] and the specific Mycenaean civilisation gradually evolved in reaction against this influence. A valuable date is suggested for the existence of Arcadian speech in the Peloponnese by the fact that the Greek dialect of Cyprus was closely akin to Arcadian, and about 1400 on, appears there a stream of imported Mycenaean pottery.

Another view of the position, however, is possible.[26] It is pointed out that the Minoan civilisation appears on the Greek mainland about the termination of the Middle Minoan age and the beginning of late Minoan, say 1600 B.C., the date depending on Egyptian synchronisations. But it is suggested that the appearance of Minoan influence is not due to conquest or colonisation from Crete, but to the appearance in Greece of a northern I.E. race which was able to bring pressure to bear on the Minoans of Crete and to exploit their artistic capabilities. This conclusion is supported[27] by

25 Wace, *Cambridge Ancient History*, i. 597 f.; Burn, *op. cit.*, pp. 74 ff.; G. Glotz, *The Aegean Civilization*, pp. 44 ff.

26 M. P. Nilsson, *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion*, pp. 23 ff.

27 Nilsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 12 ff.

stressing certain novel features in the culture of the Mycenaean period which are not Minoan. These include the megaron, the characteristic form of house, preserved in the later Greek temple, as compared with the buildings of Knossos. The distinction is very marked: the Minoans produce a court surrounded by a complex of many rooms, without architectonic plan, while the Mycenaeans produce a house consisting of one single room surrounded by a court. Again, while the Mycenaean ladies adopted the Minoan dress of flounced skirt and an open jacket, the men in the Mycenaean representations appear not in the Minoan loin cloth, but in a shirt or chiton with short sleeves. The amber of the north, probably the Baltic, is richly represented in the Mycenaean graves, but is very rare in Minoan Crete. The practice of ornamenting helmets with boar's tusks is specifically Mycenaean, whose tastes may be deemed more primitive than those of the highly cultivated Minoans. More striking still is the fact that the Mycenaeans made use of the writing of the Minoans merely for labels; we may imagine that they were far less literate[28] than their rivals. The horse too may have reached the mainland before it was carried to Crete[29] by Indo-Europeans. Even in art there are traces of non-Minoan influence as in the clumsiness of the sculptured stelae over the Mycenaean shaft graves, and the geometrical treament of decorative elements such as spirals, meanders, and rosettes. There is the like geometrical treatment of decorative motifs on many of the gold objects from the shaft graves. The evidence is satisfactory enough, and it tends to support the view of the position as one in which a dominant element is superimposed on a less war-like situation. We may, therefore, incline to the belief that we have here the presence of Indo-Europeans. We need not, however, rule out the possibility of some Minoan colonisation also.

28 Homer clearly had vague ideas as to writing, *Iliad*, vi. 168 ff. There is no proof that Greek on the mainland was written in Aegean characters.

29 The usual view takes it from Syria; Evans, *Palace of Minos*, i. 16 ff.; G. Glotz, *The Aegean Civilization*, p. 167.

How far can we trace back the new influence? Here we reach no assured result. If we are asked to accept the intruders as the people who developed the third Thessalian culture, the answer must be that there is no essential reason for accepting this view. It may be sound, but we cannot establish it. The new features enumerated are not characteristic of that culture in sufficient degree. Later on, it may prove practicable to strengthen the case for this opinion by further archaeological considerations, but the issue does not now permit of final determination.

A further question arises whether we can bring the catastrophes which archaeological evidence proves to have from time to time affected Minoan civilisation into connection with events on the mainland, and with the distribution of the Greek dialects. There appears to have been at the time of transition from the Middle to the Late Minoan age a disaster in Crete, marked by the destruction of the palaces of Knossos and Phaistos. The disaster was not wholesale, and the palaces were rebuilt. At the end of Late Minoan I, Knossos was subjected to a fresh catastrophe, which affected also other towns. The Mycenaean civilisation of the mainland starts from Late Minoan I. Its fresco painting was derived from the Cretan wall painting of Late Minoan I; its pottery follows the earlier style of Late Minoan I, and they develop independently. At Knossos, on the other hand, we find the reconstruction of the palace with the development of the special Palace style, and of a linear script class B, while the Mycenaean script so far as it is used derived from earlier forms employed in Late Minoan I.

At the end of Late Minoan II Knossos was sacked and destroyed, and the whole island suffered from severe poverty and decadence, while, on the other hand, the mainland civilisation flourished.[30] The second palace at Mycenae was erected at the beginning of Late

30 Glotz, *Aegean Civilization*, pp. 47 ff.; Burn, *Minoans, Philistines and Greeks*, pp. 103 ff.

Minoan III and the famous Lion Gate, the Grave Circle, the enceinte of the citadel, and the third group of the tholos tombs have been ascribed to this period, to which also may be assigned the later palaces of Tiryns and Thebes. The cause of the destructions cannot, of course, be determined with certainty, and may have varied; local disturbances may explain certain instances, but it is hardly possible to doubt that the fall of Knossos at the end of Late Minoan II was due to enemy action on a large scale, while the special development of Knossos in that epoch and its distinction from the civilisation of the mainland points to hostility between Knossos and Mycenae.

The distribution of the Greek dialects has been appealed to in order to carry things further. The essential distinctions of these dialects may be given as (1) the Attic and the Ionian or eastern group; (2) the central group, sometimes called Achaean, which includes the Aeolean of Asia Minor, Thessalian, Boeotian, Arcadian, and Cypriot; and (3) the western, including the Dorian of the Isthmos towns, Argolis, Laconia, Messenia, Crete and the Southern Sporades, and the north-western of Aetolia, Elis, etc. Efforts have indeed been made from time to time to claim Dorian affinities for Achaean and to regard the Achaeans as closely related to, and precursors of, the Dorians.[31] But, despite the energy with which this thesis has been expounded, it fails to convey conviction. The Greeks who took possession of Cyprus were Arcadian by speech but we know that they were styled Achaeans.

It has been suggested that linguistic evidence supports the view that the first Greeks in Greece were Ionian by speech. Their later distribution shows then in Attica, Euboea, the Cyclades, and the middle part of the western coast of Asia Minor, but there are traditions which assign to them also later district of Achaea, Megara, Epidauros and Troizen, while Herodotos assures us that they once

31 Cf. Nilsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-41. Contrast Burn, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-42; but see Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, II. i. 280 ff.

inhabited the strip of coast known as Kynouria south of Argolis, which later had been made Dorian. Linguistic evidence helps.[32] It shows that traces of Ionic influence can be seen in the Achaean group, but not *vice versa*, which is best explained by the assumption that Achaeans superimposed themselves on Ionic lands, whence in substantial measure the Ionians withdrew to the less attractive Attica, whence took place the migration to the Cyclades and Asia Minor. The Achaeans in their turn fell under Dorian domination in most of the Peloponnese; there is a striking proof of the superimposition of Dorian on Achaean speech in the Laconian dialect, where the god of Taenarum is styled Pohoidan, in place of the Dorian Poteidan, the orignal being patently the Arcadian Posoidan, the weakening of *s* to *h* being a normal feature of Laconian. In Thessaly and Boeotia we have the concurrence of tradition and of linguistic phenomena to show that the Acheans there were invaded by western tribes.

On the whole the distinction of dialects is best accounted for by the theory of distinct waves of population, resulting in geographical separation and the development of national characteristics, partly no doubt as the consequence of co-mingling with different groups of pre-Hellenic population. It is thus legitimate to conjecture that it was Ionians who first occupied Argolis and Attica, attracted by their proximity to the Cretan civilisation, just as the German tribes of the Great Migration were attracted to Italy and Rome. Like the Goths of the 3rd century A.D.,[33] they learned to build ships, to invade Crete and thence to bring back booty and slaves; moreover, they took over Minoan civilisation and created from it that of the Mycenaean epoch. Perhaps to them may be assigned

32 Kretschmer, *Glotta*, i. 9 ff.; Buck, *Classical Philology*, xxi. 1 ff.; Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik*, i. 75 ff.

33 So the Slavs reached the Adriatic in 610 A.D.; and in twenty years were very active on the sea.

the destruction of Knossos at the end of Middle Minoan, and at the end of Late Minoan I. The fall finally of Knossos at the end of Late Minoan II may mark the advent of a new Greek immigration, that of the Achaeans who partly subjected, partly expelled the Ionians. The idea is supported by the fact that there now appear the great buildings of the late Mycenaean period, but contemporaneously a decline of art sets in, while a change of taste[34] is shown by the representations of boar and lion hunts as well as the bull-leaping game famous in Minoan Crete. The fact that the towns are strongly walled reveals a period of contention and small principalities as opposed to the unwalled cities[35] of Crete, where the fleet was expected to assure safety and there was a unity of rule for probably a prolonged period.

If we assign dates to these supposed movements, then we arrive at some period before 1600 B.C. for Ionian inroads on Crete, and about 1400 for Achaean assaults and their dominance in much of Greece. These dates depend on Egyptian synchronisms in the main, and are fairly to be trusted. How much earlier the Ionians entered Greece we simply cannot say, for, as noted above, there is no archæological evidence which carries any conviction as to the period or character of their stay in the lands to the north or north-west.

The destruction of this civilisation was doubtless due to various causes. We may probably admit that the Achaeans declined in the quality of their artistic productions, once the destruction of Knossos prevented a continuous connection between Minoan and Mycenaean civilisation. But external influences were of great importance. Archæological evidence establishes that *c.* 1200 B.C.—the date is based on the records of Rameses III of Egypt who stemmed the flood of invasion—there was a widespread destruction of historic sites,

34 Burn, *op. cit.*, pp. 105 ff.

35 Burn, *op. cit.*, p. 92. On the Ionians, see Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, II. i. 282-7.

especially in the Peloponnese, and most of all in Argos and Korinth.[36] A considerable number of sites were left uninhabited, and we may assume much emigration, especially to Cyprus. Artistically the period of sub-Mycenaean culture which follows ranks low; it may be reckoned as extending from *c.* 1200 to 1050 B.C., and it is perhaps to this period that we should assign, not indeed the first beginnings of colonisation by Ionians and Aeolian Aegeans, but its wide extension. In this period possibly fell the epoch of Homeric poetry.

What brought about this collapse? The usual suggestion that it was due to the west Greeks and the Dorians is not wholly satisfactory, for it proves to be impossible to trace the continuity of the Dorian settlements into the sub-Mycenaean age. We find a change from sub-Mycenaean to protogeometric style in art rather abruptly, probably about 1050 B.C. It appears at Sparta, now first settled, not superimposed on the Mycenaean Menelaion, at Korinth which now attains importance, and in Rhodes, where there is a sharp break between the sub-Mycenaean and the protogeometric age, visible especially in the cemeteries both as regards the place of internment and the form of the tombs.[37] It is not unnatural to assume the Greeks of the north-west advanced into central Greece about the same period, so that for the invaders who wrought havoc about 1200 we have to look to Thraco-Phrygian elements, impelled perhaps by Illyrians whose activities may well have caused the north-west Greeks and Dorians to move on. Of the close relations of Dorians and Illyrians we have a striking proof in the existence of the three tribes of the Dorians. The Dumanes have been shown to represent the national Dorian element, the Pamphyloi, mingled tribes, and the Hyllees bear the style of an Illyrian tribe. We may thus take it that the Dorians were long in Epirus. It is quite a plausible theory that under Illyrian pressure they may have essayed

36 Schachermeyr, *Etrusk. Frühgeschichte*, pp. 32 ff.
37 Schachermeyr, *op. cit.*, pp. 47 ff.; *Hirt-Festschrift* (1936), i. 247.

a move to the east, which failed as a whole owing to the resistance of the north-west Greeks, leaving Doris as a trace of its existence, and that later on, compelled to abandon Epirus, they proceeded to take possession of Crete, whence they later attacked the Argolid, and thereafter from the north-east assailed the region wherein they established Sparta.[38]

In any case, whatever the causes, the decline of art is notorious, and it is a quite legitimate assumption that the later revival of Greek artistic achievement was largely due to the renaissance of Minoan talent modified by the immixture of Greek Indo-European blood. As is well known, so far as evidence is available, the Greek population has always contained a very large Mediterranean racial element,[39] and the society depicted to us by Homer is certainly suggestive of the rule of great feudal lords over much humbler people,[40] whence we may well believe that, even when strongest, the Achaeans were a governing aristocracy, whose blood was rapidly being intermingled with that of the earlier race.

III

Foreign Evidence of Greek Activities

It seems clear that the destruction of Knossos about 1400 B.C. meant the end of Cretan thalassocracy and opened the way to the spread of the Acheans, and that they were attracted, as formerly to Knossos, to Egypt as a great centre of wealth and civilisation. Linguistically the movement is attested by the Achaean elements in the curious dialect of Pamphylia, and by the Arcadian,

38 Cf. F. Miltner, *Klio*, xxvii. 54 ff.; for the tribes see Lagercrantz, *Streitberg-Festgabe*, pp. 218 ff. On one theory the Dorians were 'spear-fighters'; W. Schulze, *SBA.*, 1910, p. 805. For the history of Sparta, see T. Lenschau, *Klio*, xxx. 269 ff.

39 Burn, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-7; Glotz, *Aegean Civilization*, pp. 57 ff.

40 The common people are curiously ignored, or, in the case of Thersites, treated with contumely; Burn, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

i.e. Achaean, dialect of Cyprus. In that island we find Mycenaean art as well as language and its comparatively early date is shown by the fact that the Cypriots adopted, not the Phoenician alphabet which achieved success in Greece, but a clumsy syllabic script going back to Cretan originals.[41] It is natural that we should expect from this period of maritime activity to find records by people already familiar with such action of the inroads of the Greeks, and it is often alleged that from Egyptian and Hittite sources we can obtain confirmation of their presence. The question is one of equal interest and importance.

The most important source to be considered is the evidence of the Hittite records, which present us with a fair amount of information regarding the old and the new Hittite realm, the latter disappearing in the inroads which about 1200 B.C. swept over the eastern Mediterranean area. Part of the intruders were Phrygians from the Balkans, whose I.E. character is not in serious doubt; they may have lived for a time in contact with the proto-Greeks. What is clear is that they were closely related to the Thracians[42] of the same period. Illyrians also may have participated in the movement which brought destruction to the Achaean as well as the Hittite strongholds. It is quite possible as noted above that the Dorians only became active after the destruction wrought by the earlier invaders.

In its greatness the Hittite realm[43] was ruled by a Great King superior over vassal kings, who was reckoned to be on a footing of equality with the Great Kings of Egypt, Babylon, and Assyria when the rise of that power eclipsed the former glories of the Mitanni-Ḫurri state. The fact of recognition of equality in express terms is justly deemed significant of a new spirit in the east, superceding

41 Glotz, *Aegean Civilization*, pp. 377 ff.

42 E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik*, i. 67 ff.

43 Schachermeyr, *Hethiter und Achäer* (1935).

the older conception by which each power aimed at unbounded empire. North and middle Syria fell under Hittite control, but its extension is not clear. The capital, the modern Boghazköi, anciently Hattuša,[44] is clearly older than the I.E. Hittite occupation; and the kingdom was doubtless inhabited by people of whom only the dominant element was Indo-European.

Prima facie, its records could be read to reveal considerable knowledge of Greece. Dr. Forrer[45] led the way by asserting the recognition of two kings of Aḫḫiyavā, named Antaravaš, who was also king of Lazpaš, his son Tavagalavaš, described as an Aiavalaš, an Aeolian,[46] both in the 14th century B.C. Finding a record in Pausanias (ix. 34.6) of two mythical kings connected with Orchemenos, he felt justified in holding that we had mention of Achaia, of Andreus, and of Eteokles, and of Lesbos. A century later he found an Attariššiyaš, also a king of Aḫḫiyavā, plundering the coasts of Caria and Cyprus and becoming an ally of the Hittite king; here he found Atreus, father of Agamemnon. A little earlier was recorded Alakšanduš of Uiluša, who must be Alexandros of Ilios. Other equations were given. Tāravizan was made out to be the Greek Troizan, Taruiša, Troy, and Aššuva Asie. Much discussion followed, and it is now possible, more objectively to envisage the situation.[47]

Tāravizan must disappear; even if correctly read, which is more than doubtful, the place cannot have been in Greece, for the person mentioned in relation to it is not a person of Aḫḫiyavā but a Hittite. Tavagalavaš turns out not to be a king of Aḫḫiyavā; Antaravaš is an uncertain interpretation; his nationality is not known at all, and he is not mentioned as connected with Aḫḫiyavā

44 Sommer, *Aḫḫijavāfrage und Sprachwissenschaft*, p. 55
45 *MDOG.*, lxiii. 1 ff.; *OLZ.* 1924, pp. 113 ff.; *Kleinas. Forsch*, i. 252 ff.
46 This is clearly wrong and no longer pressed by the author.
47 Sommer (*Aḫḫijavā-Urkunden*) gives the essential texts.

or Lazpaš. The deities of these two places are desired to help the Hittite king Muršil, but there is nothing to show that they are in close proximity. Attariššiyaš was of Aḫḫiyā and was a condottiere or something of that sort, who attacked a protégé of the Hittite king, and later raided Alašia, no doubt Cyprus. There is nothing whatever in him of Atreus of history. All these identifications and the argument based on that of Alakšanduš[48] must be deemed wholly irrelevant and clearly wrong. We are left thus with Aḫḫiyavā, and its equation with Achaia.

The facts regarding it can be summarised as follows.[49] It is known first under Muršil of the Hittite kingdom as engaged in a certain measure of conflict over Millavanda, a country which seems to have fallen under its suzerainty; from it the Aḫḫiyavā king appears to have attempted to establish influence in Luqqā, which brought about a Hittite countermove against Millavanda. Under Hattušil III (*c.* 1295-60) the countries were on friendly terms. Under Tutḫalia IV (*c.* 1260-30) we find that Aḫḫiyavā was, on the one hand, perhaps recognised as a Great Kingdom, but was denied the formal title, whether because its greatness was recent or because it lay outside the region of the Great Kingdoms of Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria. Under him and his successor, Arnuvanda (*c.* 1230-15) there occurred the ravages of Attariššiyaš, while the latter's reign ended shortly before the great wanderings which destroyed the Hittite realm. It should be added that in addition to Attariššiyaš

48 Sommer (*Aḫḫijavā-frage*, pp. 24 ff.) shows clearly that it is impossible to take Alexandros in Greek as a genuine old compound, denoting 'one who wards men', and to suppose that Alakšanduš represents a Greek chief, and not an Asianic prince. This is fatal to ideas that Troy was really a semi-Greek state, or that Alakšanduš was a Greek prince of Ialysos in Rhodes (Burn, *Minoans, Philistines, and Greeks*, p. 121). The I.E. character of early Trojan population (Childe, *The Aryans*, pp. 130 ff.) seems clearly an error; cf. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, II. i. 298 ff.

49 As interpreted by Schachermeyr, *Hethiter und Achäer*, pp. 43 ff. cf. Götze, *Hethiter, Churriter und Assyrer*, pp. 43 ff.; *Kleinasien*, pp. 77 ff.

we hear of Atpāš and Avayanaš as well as Tavagalavaš, perhaps as subordinate rulers; none of these names is at all likely to be Greek, a fact of some importance.

The position of Aḫḫiyavā is vaguely described in the Hittite texts. It had ships, which it could send to Syria, and the Hittite king sent by ship an exile thither.[50] There is no mention of any direct contact between Aḫḫiyavā and the Hittite kingdom; there is evidence that the Hittites were at some distance, for no town-name occurs, and the ignorance of its ruler regarding Hittite social rules as to the status of the family of the queen is implied; moreover, both countries are deemed suitable as reception areas of persons banished. It follows from these facts that Aḫḫiyavā must either have been situated in Asia Minor at some distance from the Hittite realm, or it must have been overseas. Millavanda was in direct contact with the Hittites, and close to the Luqqā, who must be the Lycians; it therefore should be located in Caria or Pamphylia. The Luqqā have naturally been hailed as I.E., their name being interpreted as 'wolf men', perhaps from a totem, or 'worshippers of the wolf god'[51] but it is very much more likely that it is a word of Asia Minor, perhaps from a stem *luk-*, 'high', so that the land was named from its highlands.[52]

Dr. Kretschmer contends that in Luqqā we have to recognise a Proto-Indo-European *lukos*, which corresponds to I.E., *ṷlkos*, and this accords with his general view of Proto-I.E. influence in Asia Minor.[53] But this claim lacks any sound basis. We do not know that the Luqqā had any claim to be regarded as wolf-men in any

50 This by no means implies a great distance; even now geographical conditions often render sea transit easier; Sommer, *Aḫḫijavā-Urkunden*, pp. 311 f.; *IF.*, lv. 282 f.

51 Kretschmer, *Kleinasiat. Forsch.* i. 1 ff.

52 See Schachermeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 57, n. 3.

53 This view Kretschmer (*Glotta*, xxi. 238 ff.) seems to have abandoned in favour of a Greek immigration before 1400 B.C.

sense. When we find Apollo worshipped there, and Apollo connected in some way with wolves, there is nothing to show that he was not brought from Greece. The meaning of Apollo as Lukēgenēs[54] in Homer is wholly uncertain and unascertainable. More to the point still is the fact that the name Luqqā cannot soundly be severed from the name of the Lukaones. That name shows no necessity of rendering as 'wolf-worshippers'. None of the words of like formation adduced by Dr. Kretschmer is naturally interpreted in a like sense. He has to find the Sanskrit Bhaga in the Bagadaones; to invent a non-existent god Ḫatti for Kataones; and to ignore that the name Mēiones, supposed to be connected with the goddess Ma, has an *-i-* as an essential element. Nor can we accept as an argument for the immigration of Greeks the conclusions drawn from Herodotos' statement[55] that aforetime the land occupied by Lycians in his time was called Milyas and its people Solymoi. All we need assume at most is that Milyas was one of the territories of the Luqqā. The idea of Lycians as Greeks can plainly be traced to the fancy of the Greek world, which invented for the Persians Persees, son of Perseus of Argos.[56]

We hear,[57] indeed, of invaders from Crete or Lycia, but their name was Termilai as is confirmed by their own local records. We cannot say whether they were merely an offshoot of the Luqqā or a distinct people. Their name is without interpretation. But the 'wolf' complex has not spared them. We are told[58] that the word, Trm̃mili, denotes 'the wolfish people', *t* being a collective prefix. The singular is then discovered in Milyas, for *rmilyas,* though that word, as denoting the land of the wolfish ones, should surely maintain the plural.

54 Sommer, *Ahhijavāfrage*, p. 79; *IF.*, lv. 261.
55 i. 173; cf. vii. 92.
56 *Ibid.*, vii. 61.
57 Cf. Sommer, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
58 Ostir, cited in *Hirt-Festschrift*, ii. 32.

In the same spirit[59] we are assured that the Luvians might be no other than Lycians, as wolves. This follows from the fact that in ideographs the name is given as UR. BAR. RA which means 'jackle-people'. Unfortunately the Luvian speech does not permit us to accept the proposal, even if we could believe that UR. BAR meant 'wolf', for in it the labio velar assumed in I.E. *wḷkwos* gives not *v* but *ku* as in *kuinzi*, plural of the relative. A different etymology is suggested by a version of the name in Hieroglyth-Hittite which would make the people to be those of stone, perhaps as inhabiting rocky lands. All these guesses have minimal value. It is characteristic of the whole method of argumentation of which in these matters even Dr. Kretschmer makes use, that he finds evidence of Proto-I.E. in the most chance similarities, and in such as have no probative value at all. Thus Lydian *-k* and Etruscan *-c*, meaning 'and', are needlessly made Proto-I. E., despite the obvious possibility of direct I. E. origin from *kwe*, Sanskrit *ca*, Greek *te*, Latin *que* and so on. So Greek ethēke, 'he placed', is compared with Etruscan *lupuce*[60] on the assumption that it means 'he died', although the only thing clear is that the Etruscan word falls in the sphere of death, neither the verbal nor the past tense implication being proved. So again the adversative particles Etruscan *-m, -um;* Hittite *ma;* and Thessalian *ma* are classed together[61] without noting that these sounds are a primitive and natural interjectional utterance of doubt, for which independent origin can be safely presumed.[62]

Millavanda, on one view is to be connected with Milyas, in which case it would fall to be assumed that it formed part of what was at certain times reckoned as Lycian territory. The fact[63] that

59 See Brandenstein's criticism, *ibid.*, ii. 37. 60 Kretschmer, *Glotta*, xiv. 285.
61 Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik*, i. 65.
62 Jespersen, *Language*, pp. 314 ff.
63 Schachermeyr, *Hethiter und Achäer*, p. 55.

in the Hittite records of this period it is not included in the Luqqā lands does not rule out this identification; changes of overlordship and political connection can easily be admitted and must have been common.

It has also been suggested[64] that Millavanda should be equated with Miletos, but from the point of view of linguistics the proposal has no cogency. If at all, identity would have to rest on an argument from its position as a state lying between Aḫḫiyavā and the Hittite realm. If it were held that Aḫḫiyavā meant the main land of Greece, we could compare the position of the Ionian states as regards Sparta and Persia in the time of the younger Cyrus. But it is imperative to note that there is no other ground for the identification with Miletos.

The two outstanding theories of Greek connection at present are probably those of Drs. Kretschmer[65] and Schachermeyr,[66] both of whom accept connection between Aḫḫiyavā and Achaia, but who differ vitally in locating Achaia. The former believes the reference to be to an Achaian Greek realm in Cilicia, while the latter holds that the reference is to a great realm in Greece, whose centre of power was in Mycenae and Tiryns. For a state in Mysia and the Troad Dr. Götze[67] has contended.

Now it is essential to note that the linguistic evidence is by no means favourable to equating the names in question.[68] The old name recorded in Homer as Achaiis, and there is no evidence of the existence either of an Achaivā or an Acaiviyā; moreover neither form is at all probable. Formations of the type presumed are found in Homer only in respect of the names of non-Greek places such as

64 Schachermeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 68; Contra, Sommer, *IF.*, iv. 272.
65 *Glotta*, xxi. 213 ff.; xxiv 209 ff.
66 *Op. cit.*, pp. 134 ff.
67 *Kleinasien*, p. 171.
68 Sommer, *Aḫḫijavāfrage*, pp. 73 ff.; *Indogerm. Forsch.*, lv. 169 ff.

Phoinikē, though in the late Catalogue of Ships Arkadiē is recorded. We need not press this argument unduly; it suffices to note that we have no probability of the existence of either supposed form. But, even if we assume their existence, we are faced with the fact that the Hittite Aḫḫiyavā cannot be deemed to be a natural reproduction of either; the double *ḫḫ* and the ending *-iyavā* are alike strange, and, what is important, cannot be paralleled in the uses of Hittite. On the other hand we may say that changes in taking over a name are natural enough, but we must admit that all that is left to us is a general similarity in the names. We are assuredly not compelled to assume identity, and the difficulties thereof are often underestimated. It must be insisted that there is not a scrap of evidence that any person with a Greek name was connected with Aḫḫiyavā.

Importance attaches to the question whether Aḫḫiyavā was really an important kingdom. Dr. Forrer[69] was insistent on the fact that the Aḫḫiyavā king is greeted by the Hittite monarch as 'my brother', but the sufficient answer is that the same style is given to the ruler of Alašia who could not be deemed an equal of the Hittite monarch. The term has merely, as in modern usage, the point of treating the king addressed as an independent ruler, not a subordinate. There remains the fact that in the reference by the Hittite monarch to his peers, the sovereigns of Egypt, Babylon, and Assyria, there is added the ruler of Aḫḫiyavā, but the passage has been struck out. The most natural view seems still that of Dr. Sommer,[70] that the ascription of equality was given by error, and that in fact the ruler of Aḫḫiyavā did not rank as an equal in status as a Great King. We may readily admit that the state was of importance to the Hittites but there is nothing to induce us to look for an empire. In Asia Minor states seem to have attained from time to time substantial strength, only shortly after to sink into unimportance.

69 *Forsch.*, II. i. 246 ff.

70 *Aḫḫijavā-Urkunden*, pp. 65 f., 377.

Dr. Sommer has suggested that Aḫḫiyavā denotes the Cilician pre-Greek kingdom. We know that the Hittite king objected to ships from Aḫḫiyavā which traded with Amurru, no doubt the coast towns of the middle of Syria such as Byblos, carrying on trade with Egypt, and this would accord well enough with Cilicia. A further argument in favour of Cilicia may be found in a notice of Herodotos, who declares that the people were formerly called Hypachaioi.[71] The term has excited much controversy, not diminished by the existence of Achaioi on the north-east coast of the Black Sea; Dr. Sommer would render it, if treated as containing the preposition *hypo* in Greek, as referring to the people as Lower Achaeans, meaning that they dwelt on the sea below the Achaeans further inland, who were later driven to the north of the Black Sea, the term Achaean in both cases being merely a Greek rendering of a name of an Asianic people. But this is obviously very dubious, and it is far

71 Sommer (*Aḫḫijavāfrage*, pp. 8 ff.) deals conclusively with the idea of Dr. Kretschmer that Hypachaioi can denote sub-Achaeans in the sense of barbarised Achaeans (see *IF.*, iv. 209 ff. against *Glotta*, xxiv. 203 ff.). It is shown by him to be clearly possible that a geographical relation to Asianic peoples, whether the Aḫḫiyavā or the later Pontic Achaeans may be meant (the tribes might have been severed by immigrant Cilicians from the Troad or otherwise). But he admits that we may simply assume a Greek version of an earlier Asianic name which involved no relation to Aḫḫijavā and the later Pontic tribes. He shows (*IF.*, lv. 273 ff.) that all Schachermeyr's arguments against a location of Aḫḫijavā in some part of the later Cilicia are invalid, without claiming to prove location there. Forrer's effort (*Klio*, xxx. 135 ff.) to show that Arzava was Cilicia and that Aḫḫijavā was the Greek mainland, while the Hypachaioi were late Greek settlers after the Trojan war, and therefore unconnected with the Aḫḫijavā, is disposed of by Sommer (pp. 290 ff.). Burn (*Minoans, Philistines, and Greeks*, p. 121) takes 'Lesser Achaia' as meant, and for a Cilician location appeals to the Assyrian Kuweh (Qōe) in the south-east corner of Asia Minor, and to the Assyrian record of a barbarian leader in the Taurus (*c.* 658 B.C.) whose name Andaria, recalls Antaravaš, but none of this is of probative value. R. Ranoszek (*IF.* lvi. 40 f.) suggests that Kizvatna lay in east Cilicia, then Arzava to the west, then Luqqā, then Aḫḫiyavā, and that, perhaps under Tuthliyaš IV in the 13th century B.C., Aḫḫiyavā sought to advance to the east along the coast. This is ingenious, but the evidence is insufficient to establish any theory of the locations.

more likely that the two terms have nothing to do with each other, and that the names Hypachaioi and Achaioi as applied to the Cilicians and to a Pontic tribe are merely Greek adaptations of local names of non-Greek peoples. The name should therefore be ignored as supporting the case for Cilicians Aḫḫiyavā.

But that does not dispose of the matter. Nor is it fatal to this localisation that the texts show no actual conflict with the Hittites nor any making of treaties, which is hard to reconcile with the fact that at the time in question the Hittites controlled Syria and Cyprus in close proximity. On the other hand must be set the fact that Cilicia cannot be positively excluded, and there are definite suggestions that Aḫḫiyavā was in Asia Minor. We seem to learn of the Aḫḫiyavā ruler as present personally[72] in the river Seḫa area; in one passage Dr. Sommer[73] has thought to find a description of a boundary of Aḫḫiyavā; and another fragment[74] may definitely show Aḫḫiyavā to be in Asia Minor, while no text whatever requires us to locate it outside Asia Minor; all that is clear is that it had a sea coast. Further Cilicia cannot with any certainty be identified with any other land recorded, whether Kizvatna or Arzava. Again the territories with which Aḫḫiyavā was concerned were in Asia Minor, wherever we locate Millavanda, and above all Luqqā must be Lycia or somewhere near it. *Prima facie*, therefore, we must hold that Aḫḫiyavā was not a Greek country but was a state in Asia Minor, perhaps in the region of Cilicia, and Pamphylia,[75] but the location must be left undecided. Light may be thrown upon it by later discoveries which may show more exactly the geographical boundaries of the Hittite kingdom.

Dr. Kretschmer's view that Greek Achaeans in Cilicia are meant by Aḫḫiyavā lacks any foundation other than that given by

72 *Aḫḫijavā-Urkunden*, p. 319; *IF.*, lv. 278.
73 *Ibid.*, p. 328; *IF.*, lv. 279 ff.
74 *Hethiter und Achäer*, p. 43.
75 See Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, II, i. 546 ff.

the term Hypachaioi which has been dealt with above. There is also a serious objection from chronology to the theory that there was an Achaean kingdom. The Hittite knowledge of Aḫḫiyavā goes back to the time of Šuppiluliuma (*c.* 1395-55), and it is extremely dubious if Greek settlement were either early or strong enough to render possible the Hittite allusion to Aḫḫiyavā, if a country of Achaean settlement were meant. In Pamphylia we have evidence of Arcadian-Cypriot dialect,[76] but the country is not styled Achaia, and here again Greek settlement is comparatively late. Cyprus is ruled out by its possession of the name Alašia, and by the absence of any proof of an Achaean state of importance; the name Achaiōn Akte whose date is quite unknown marks a point of mercantile settlement, not of Empire,[77] and Greek relations seem to date later than those with Rhodes. The claim of Rhodes is championed by Dr. Hrozny,[78] and it has one point in its favour. The island was evidently thickly populated by Greeks as soon as the destruction of the Minoan supremacy at sea, rendered occupation easy. But the name Achaia was not applied to the island at any time. The later Dorian settlers described Ialysos as an Achaia polis, but this is valueless for the claim that the island could be Aḫḫiyavā. Moreover, the argument from chronology is not without value. The suggestion of Ionia as Aḫḫiyavā, supported by Dr. Götze,[79] has least attraction of all. We have to assume that Troy was an Achaean town, but that its Achaeans were on hostile terms with those of the mainland. Moreover, it is very hard to fit in the relations of Aḫḫiyavā with Millavanda and the Luqqā. The names Vilušaš[80] and Taruiša[81] which are found in Hittite records do not represent

76 Schwyzer, *op. cit.*, i. 89. It may however have come from Crete, Bechtel, *Gr. Dial.*, ii. 797.

77 Schachermeyr, *Hethiter*, p. 122.

78. *Archiv Orientalni*, i. 323 ff.

79 Criticised in *Hethiter*, pp. 125 ff.

80 Sommer, *Aḫḫiyavāfrage*, pp. 54 ff.

81 Sommer, *Aḫḫiyavā-Urkunden*, pp. 362 ff., 370.

places in Aḫḫiyavā, and there is no justification for equating them with Ilios and Troy.

There remains the suggestion of recognising the mainland of Greece as Achaia. We may for the purpose of the argument accept suggestion that there was a substantial kingdom of the Peloponnese whose sovereign had as his capitals Mycenae and Tiryns.[82] The Homeric tradition of the Trojan war may be adduced as evidence of the memory of such a realm, and archæological arguments from the nature of sites in the Peloponnese can be adduced. Chronology suits well enough, and we can see Miletos in Millavanda, and accept reference to Lazpaš as really meaning Lesbos. The latter point, however, is very dubious, for its settlement by Greeks seems to fall too late and the mere similarity of name cannot be pressed. On the other hand, all we have so far is possibility, and other considerations tell against this possibility. The Achaeans did not use cunneiform writing, and there is no trace in the archæological remains of such records. We must then suppose that the bearer of the Hittite missives interpreted them, and did not leave the originals with the illiterate monarch. He for his part would send his answer by an envoy who would interpret it if written in Minoan-Mycenaean script on papyrus, to the Hittite king, or merely give a verbal answer. Frankly, however ingenious the suggesion, it seems unconvincing. A further difficulty lies in the difference between the two cultures, and it is not disposed of by insisting on the maintenance of diplomatic relations between the Minoans of Crete and the rulers of Egypt. Moreover, it is a serious objection that the excavations at Boghazköi have failed to reveal Mycenaean pottery, common as that is elsewhere. Nor is it convincing to urge that other objects of art may have reached Ḫattušas as royal gifts, but have perished or been carried off in the disaster which ruined that city. It may be

82 Schachermeyr, *Hethiter*, pp. 137 ff.; Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, II. i. 242 ff.

that archæological evidence to strengthen this view will be found. At present the impression left is that identification of Aḫḫiyavā with an Achaean Peloponnese should be ruled to be very improbable.

Further, for Greeks of the mainland there is another serious difficulty. The Egyptian records show as mercenaries in the service of the enemies of Merneptah the Aqaiwaša.[83] But this is a much disputed rendering of *'ikjwš*, and it is quite impossible to lay any stress on it. Further, if the Aqaiwaša are the people of Aḫḫiyavā, then the name must be assumed to contain the Aegean suffix *-s-*,[84] which means that it came to the Hittites through Crete presumably before the Minoan catastrophe of 1400 B.C. Now the evidence[85] suggests very strongly that the Egyptians noted that these Aqaiwaša were circumcised. The effort[86] to disprove this view of Professor Meyer is ingenious, but it is not effective. Assuming, therefore, Aqaiwaša to stand for the people of Aḫḫiyavā, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that they were non-Greeks, or, if they were, they came from Asia Minor, where they had learned the practice, which was widespread among the Egyptians, from whom, according to Herodotos,[87] the Phoenicians and Syrians of Palestine copied it. In favour of the view that no reference is made to Greeks may be set the fact that the other peoples named are Šardana, Šekeleša, Luku and Turuša.[88] We can hardly doubt that we are to look for these people somewhere in the region of Asia Minor. The Luku are plainly Lycians, the Turuša suggest the Tiras of the

83 Sommer, *Aḫḫiyavā-Urkunden*, pp. 358 ff.; 396. *IF.*, lv. 288.

84 The Egyptian *s* is not *s* hence Streitberg's *Achaivōs* as the original will not do, and an ethnic suffix is denied by Sommer, *Indogerm. Forsch.*, lv. 288.

85 Sommer, *op. cit.*, pp. 358, n. 2, 395 f.; Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, II. i. 558.

86 Schachermeyr, *Hethiter*, pp. 141 ff. See Sommer, *IF.*, lv. 289 f. for a refutation.

87 ii. 104; Meyer, *op. cit.*, II. ii. 157.

88 Meyer, *op. cit.*, II. i. 555 ff., 564, 566, 578.

Old Testament, conceivably Hittite Taruiša,[89] doubtless the Greek Tyrrhenoi, and the Tursci or Etruscans, whose original connection with Lydia remains by far the most plausible account of their beginnings. Šardana, as will be seen below, must be connected with the later Sardis[90] rather than with Sardinia, and Šekeleša with Sagalassos rather than Sicily.

A very different view has been taken of Aqaiwaša which sees in them a tribe of the Syrtes region, whose name may be recognised in Agbia, inland from Carthage. This is arguable, seeing that they were connected with the Libyans, and on the whole it seems better to hold that there is no reason to connect Aqaiwaša and Aḫḫiyavā. The vague similarity of name leads to no certain result.

Much ingenuity has been devoted to discovering in Egypt evidence of the existence of the Danaoi, who are known to us from Homer as a branch of the Achaioi in Argos.[92] A letter found at Tell-el-Amarna gives a report from the king of Tyre to the Pharaoh (*c.* 1400), whence we learn that the king of the Danauna had died and had been peacefully succeeded by his son. It is true that *prima facie* the tribe concerned should be looked for in Canaan, but that point very probably cannot be pressed unduly. Reference, however, to events in Greece seems most unlikely. There is also, some two centuries later, a mention of this name as among the sea folk from the islands who made an assault on Syria and were repelled by

89 Suggested by Burn, *Minoans, Philistines, and Greeks*, p. 138.

90 Cf. Burn, *op. cit.*, p. 112; Meyer, *op. cit.*, II. i. 218 f.

91 Flinders Petrie, *Hist. of Egypt*, iii. 112. Cf. Glotz, *Aegean Civilization*, p. 405.

92 Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, II. i. 224, 556, 559, 561, 586, 591; Burn, *Minoans, Philistines, and Greeks*, pp. 120, 141 f., Childe (*The Aryans*, p. 73) suggests that the Danauna of Rameses III were scattered bands of Agamemnon's host returning from Troy. But, apart from other reasons, the date is hopeless, as the Trojan war cannot be placed earlier than late in the 12th century on archaeological grounds, and the traditional date (1194-84 B.C.) is impossible to defend; see Burn, pp. 52 ff. He rightly points out that there is no clear reference to the fall of the Hittite empire in Greek tradition; the legend of Pelops, which he suggests as possibly arising thence, cannot be so interpreted.

Rameses III. This suggests that we are not entitled to look far afield from the Danauna, and throws very serious doubt on their connection with Greece. It has, of course, not unnaturally been suggested,[93] as an alternative hypothesis, that the Danaoi and the Achaioi bear names of Asianic tribes, which later were for uncertain reasons transferred to Greek tribes, perhaps because they entered Greece and imposed their rule on early Greek peoples. But this is conjectural, and in the case of the Achaioi the sense 'spearmen' has been ascribed from Indo-European.[94] The mythological connections[95] of the Danaoi and Egypt leave us no real ground for accepting the Danauna and Danaoi as connected by more than accidental agreement on part of the name. Among the tribes enumerated at the same time are the Uašeš who may be connected with Oassos in Caria or Oasos in Crete, but not with the Oscars in Italy.

The Zakkari also recorded to have been placed in connection with the post-Homeric Teukroi, who have connections with Salamis in Cyprus, the Troad, and Pamphylia, as well as with Greece.[96] But the difference of name is too substantial to allow any value to the comparison. The Philistines[97] were among the attackers, and they succeeded in establishing themselves in Palestine. But the view that they are Indo-European, and that their name is to be compared with the Pelasgoi of Greek legend is a mere conjecture, and we have no real knowledge whether the Pelasgoi were Greek. Many peoples to whom the style was given were no doubt not Greek at all, and

93 Cf. Otto, *Hist. Zeitschrift*, cxlvi. 220.

94 Cf. Walde, *Vergl. Wörterbuch*, i. 608; ii. 327. The interpretation is quite uncertain.

95 See Kretschmer, *Glotta*, xxiv. 15 ff.

96 Meyer, *op. cit.*, II. i. 560 ff., 586 ff. They were settled later in Palestine in conjunction with the Philistines; *ibid.*, II. ii. 13, 16, 240. For alleged connection with the Teukroi, see Burn, *op. cit.*, pp. 155 f. Zakro in Crete, whence they and the Philistines came, is more plausible, as a connection.

97 Meyer, *op. cit.*, II. i. 218, 560 ff., 579, 586 ff. 590 f., 593; ii. 239 ff. Macalister, *Philistines*, p. 2; Burn, *op. cit.*, pp. 141 f., 146, 159 ff.

there is nothing really to show that we are to regard the Philistines as a Nordic people or a group of overlords over a Semitic population.

Of special interest is the case of the Ionians. Excavations in the region of the ancient Ugarit, known to us from the Amarna letters and other sources, have proved very close relations with Cyprus and the importation thence of Mycenaean pottery.[98] But the idea that it was an Achaean colony in the period 1400-1200 B.C. is clearly untenable. The Mycenaean weapons and dress are not adopted, and a special variety of *tholos* (tomb) appears. The effort has been made to find Greek names.[99] Nqmd is made out to be Nikomedes, but unhappily Niko- is not found early in Greek as the first part of a name. Then Ddm(a)j becomes Didumaioi, quite improbable, and Ym(a)n is rendered Ionian. That must be ruled impossible. The Akkadian Yāmanu, adduced in support, is to be read with a *v*, and the form would have to be Yvn as in Hebrew Yāvān, which may be traced to the beginning of the first millennium, though not with certainty.[100] The Hebrews may have received it via Lydia. It has been suggested that Egyptian *'iwn* as the name of Hittite auxiliaries under Rameses II (*c.* 1312-1246 B.C.) refers to Ionians, but the guess has no attractive character.[101] The word, as is well known, occurs only in a late Homeric line, and the name was presumably created late in history after the Ionians had occupied the Asian coast. An etymology is difficult, as they worshipped Apollon Iēios, the suggestion has been made that they were called from their religion cry of *ia*.[102] Patently no certainty is possible.

98 See Schachermeyr, *Hethiter*, pp. 107 ff.

99 Dhorme, *Revue biblique*, 1931, pp. 37 ff. Hrozny, *Archiv Orientalni*, iv. 169; but see Viroteand, *Syria*, xiv. 118; Sommer, *Aḫḫijavā-Urkunden*, p. 396.

100 Lehmann-Haupt, *Klio*, xxvii. 286 ff.

101 Bilabel, *Geschichte vorderasiens und Ägyptens*, i. 239, 398 f.; but see Sommer, *op. cit.*, p. 360 n. 2; *IF.*, lv. 288.

102 Kretschmer *Kleinas. Forch.*, i. 5 ff.; *Glotta*, xviii. 323 f.; xxiv. 239; Sommer, *IF.*, lv. 227 n. 1.

It would not be worth while investigating further traces of Indo-Europeans in Asia and the Aegean as immigrants from Europe. The questions regarding the Mitanni and the dynasts in Syria or the Hykšos in Egypt concern Indo-Europeans whose provenance was Asiatic, even if the ultimate I.E. home is to be located in Europe, at present an insoluble problem.[103]

IV. *Illyrians and Italians*

Mention has already been made of the pressure of Illyrians on the Dorians. But their activity extended undoubtedly to Italy also. We may confidently find in the Veneti of the north and in the various Iapygian tribes of the south, Daunii, Peucetii, Messapii, Calabri, and Sallentini, representatives of the Illyrian race and speech.[104] The dates to be assigned to the entry of the Illyrians are wholly conjectural; it may be taken for granted that they go back to the 10th century B.C. at least, but the archaeological evidence is quite impotent to tell us any more. Linguistically it has been claimed[105] that Venetic reveals to us a language which, like Hittite and Tocharian, belongs to an extremely ancient form of I.E. speech anterior to the development of centum and satem dialects as such. It is difficult to understand what is really meant by this claim. The extreme antiquity appears to be exaggerated, but it seems clear that Venetic in some words preserves I.E. palatals, and that it does not labialise velars.[106] The question of the ancestry of modern Albanian[107] is disputed, as Thracian influence is also alleged; for our purpose no importance seems to attach to the question. It has been shown[108] that there is between Illyrian and Germanic a certain amount of similarity, but that can be exaggerated, and is easily

103 See Keith, *IHQ.*, xii. 569 ff.; xiii. 201 ff.

104 Whatmough, *Foundations of Roman Italy*, pp. 126 ff. 105 *Ibid.*, p. 177.

106 E.g. Kluthiiaris (Messapic *Klaohizis*), and *ekupetharis*.

107 Schwyzer, *Griechishe Grammatik*, i. 66 f. see Georgiev, *KZ.* lxiv. 107 ff.

108 H. Krahe, *Hirt-Festschrift*, ii. 565 ff.

explained by the proximity of the early German speakers and the Illyrians, for the Illyrians, to judge from their names of places and similar tokens, appear to have occupied much of what later became eastern German lands.

There are also serious difficulties in determining when the Italians came to Italy.[109] There are easily distinguished two groups the Q- Italici, of whom those best known are the Latins, and the P-Italici, sometimes styled Safines,[110] including the Oscans and Umbrians. It appears for many reasons proper to assume that the ancestors of the Celtic and Italic peoples once dwelt together in close union,[111] and efforts have even been made to show that we can trace a special relation between the Q-Italici and the Irish group of Celtic speeches, and a less close connection of P-Italici and the Britannic group, but this must be deemed unproved.

When we seek to find a place in Italy for the joint existence of the Italici, we are invited[113] to find it in the Po valley, where archaeology reveals to us people dwelling in villages consisting of pile structures on dry land, incinerating their dead, the terramaricoli who spread over Italy in the 15th and 14th centuries B.C., though they nowhere exterminated the Mediterranean race, which is accepted as a rule as the oldest population to be traced. But the view that the Romans and Safines are really descended from the terramaricoli is not by any means universally accepted,[114] and must be regarded as incapable of being proved by the evidence available. There is a distinct civilisation, the Villanovan,[115] in Reggio Emilia and Tuscany,

109 Childe, *The Aryans*, pp. 68 ff. 110 Whatmough, *op. cit.*, pp. 109, 195.

111 Meillet, *Histoire de la langue latine*, ch. iii.

112 A. Walde, *Über älteste sprachiliche Bezielungen zwischen Kelten und Italikern* (1917). Cf. Kretschmer, *Sprache*, pp. 104 ff.

113 Childe, *The Aryans*, p. 71.

114 Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, I. ii. 792.

115 Whatmough, *op. cit.*, pp. 84 ff.; Randall MacIver, *Villanovans and Early Etruscans* (1924).

in the Early Iron Age, which on one and the most probable view cannot be derived from that of the terramaricoli, but must represent a new invasion, and it is usually supposed that the Umbrians introduced it. It is quite possible to hold that like the Umbrians, the Latins were not descendants of the terramaricoli at all, but represent a distinct and earlier wave of invasion of a people akin to but not derived from the Safines.[116] This is strongly supported by the fact that no terramare settlement has ever been found in Latium, and that the similarity of Roman town-planning to that seen in the terramaricoli's settlements can be explained easily by natural features and Etruscan influence. A distinct Villanovan element thus seems to have introduced Latin. On the whole, it seems best to disregard the terramaricoli doctrine, and to accept invasions from the north to explain the arrival of Italici of all kinds as Indo-Europeans by speech.[117] If this is so, then we have no definite means of suggesting any early date, before say 1000 B.C. for entry; how much earlier any I.E. speakers arrived must remain guesswork. We cannot be at all certain that the Italici as a unity ever resided in Italy; probably they did not.

An effort, however, to find Indo-European speech at a very early date in Italy has been made, the Ligurians being the chosen people.[118] Ancient tradition ascribes to Ligurians considerable areas of southern Gaul, Corsica, Elba, the north-west and centre of Italy, and the Po valley. It has been sought—by adducing place names with *-sc-* to establish the wide distribution of the people in ancient times, and, no doubt without sufficient warrant, the name has been claimed for the Mediterranean race. But it is also claimed that in

116 Whatmough, *op. cit.*, pp. 203 ff.

117 Meyer, (*op. cit.*) suggests arrival by the Adriatic sea, but Kretschmer (p. 106) prefers the land route along the coast. R. Much (*Hirt-Festschrift*, ii. 549 ff.) argues for a northern origin of the Italici from the linguistic similarities of Latin and German.

118 Whatmough, *op. cit.*, pp. 129 ff.

fact Ligurian was an I.E. speech, not agreeing with any other known speech.

In discussing the issue the so-called Lepontine inscriptions must be disregarded; they seem to show a Celtic speech,[119] affected by Etruscan influences, and can be held certainly not to be Ligurian in origin. The glosses given as Ligurian are of minimal value. They are said to have called themselves Ambrones, with which have been compared German Ambrones and the Umbrians,[120] but this is a mere guess, The stream Bodincus is said to mean 'without bottom',- and the Sanskrit *budhna*, Greek *puthmēn*, Latin *fundus*, German *boden*, are naturally compared, but *-incus* remains without solution.[121] The suffix *-asco* or *-asca* cannot with any plausibility be made out I.E. in character; the plea[122] that its frequency was due to the existence of river names in *-a* such as Macra or to that of common words in *-a* such as *pala* is quite unintelligible. The examination of the list of names ending in one or other of these suffixes shows that the earliest part of each is regularly without I.E, connections. With this accords the fact that characteristic Ligurian names, such as Ciminus or Alba, remain without I.E. relationships. There is no real doubt that the basis of Ligurian is not I.E. The idea that the neolithic inhabitants spoke an I.E. speech is really impossible, and commonsense dictates that we must admit the infiltration of I.E. speakers at some time to account for the scanty I.E. traces, which we must regard as signs of a new population movement, not necessarily at all important numerically. This view is supported by certain names,[123] patently Indo-European. Beregiema, a mountain, clearly contains the I.E. *bher-*, 'bear', and

119 Krahe, *Hirt-Festschrift*, ii. 241-7. Contrast Whatmough, *op. cit.*, pp. 134 f. who tries to make out the speech as Kelto-Ligurian.

120 Kretschmer, *Glotta*, xxi. 114.

121 Krahe, *op. cit.*, ii. 253 ff.

122 Whatmough, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

123 Krahe, *Hirt-Festschrift*, ii. 254.

gheyem-, 'winter, snow', but the form is not Latin, because the sonant aspirates are represented by sonants only, as opposed to *f* and *h* respectively in Latin. Porcobera again cannot be Celtic, on one view, since *p* is retained while Irish has *orc*. This is not decisive, and there are Celtic parallels in other cases, e.g. Comberanea, a stream, with which compare Irish *commar*, 'meeting' of streams etc. Bivelius, Irish *biu;* Roudelius, Old Irish *ruad;* Eburelia, Gall. *eburo-*. There is too little authority to allow yet of a decision whether we have a really independent I.E. speech, or merely a form of Celtic, or an another view a Karno-Illyrian dialect.[124]

Nor can we say of the speech[125] of the Sicels of Sicily and South Italy with what I.E. speech it is connected, nor when it was introduced. The scanty remains contain much that is like Latin, but borrowing cannot certainly be presumed. We have *leporis*, L. *lepus; duro*, Latin *durum; vino*, L. *vinum; brtom*, L. *gratum*, Oscan and Gaul. *bratom; nepos* as in Latin. Aitne compares with L. *aedes*, as *litra* with *libra*. For *maru* compare Umbrian and L. *maro;* for *moiton*, loan', L. *mutuum;* for *katinos*, L. *catinus*. There are fewer cases of Greek connection as in *hemitom* and *hemina*, while it is possible that in L. *miser*, G. *musaros*, we have a borrowing from Sicel via Sicilian comedy. On the other hand, the name for leader, Douketios, has the same ending as in Ill Peucetii, with the local name Brikinniai compare Messapic *brigannas*, and the fact that there were Sicels in Dalmatia, so that connection with Illyrian cannot be ruled out.

As already mentioned, we need not take seriously the idea that Sicels[126] took part in raids on Egypt. The early Sardinians have

124 K. F. Wolff, *Mannus*, xxii. 181 ff.; xxiii, 227 ff.

125 Whatmough, *op. cit.*, pp. 363 ff.; *Prae-Italic Dialects*, ii. 457 ff. Sicel *esti* is older than L. *est*.

126 Contrast Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, II. i. 573 ff. with Whatmough, *op. cit.*, pp. 338 ff. 356 f. on the movement from Sicily to Italy, not *vice versa*.

clearly scant right to I.E. character. We have no speech relics, only ancient local names, which have parallels in Spain, Liguria, and North Africa.[127] That they were among the tribes brought against Egypt is most unlikely; even if they cannot be treated as the people of Sardis,[128] it is illogical to go so far a field as Sardinia, and no archaeological evidence can be adduced to support the idea of location there.

The Etruscans can be briefly disposed of. The non-I.E. character of their language only becomes more apparent with every effort to arrive at a different conclusion.[129] Of more importance is the question of their date of arrival on the west coast of Italy. There is also the possibility or probability of more than one Etruscan arrival. Thus it has been suggested[130] that some came to eastern Italy from the Greek mainland, either by land or sea, while others came to the west direct from somewhere in the Aegean by sea. There is a variance regarding dates of advent, and they have been ascribed to the second millennium B.C.[131] But it is far more likely that we have to go down to about 850 B.C.[132] though there may have been settlements of less importance in the 10th century. There is far too little clear archaeological evidence to decide such a point as this. That for a time they extended an overlordship over large areas, including Latium, is plain. Against the idea of arrival by land must be set the fact that archaeological evidence, as well as tradition, strongly supports the view that traces of Etruscan speech

127 Whatmough, *op. cit.*, pp. 373 ff.

128 The original name is stated to have been Stard. We have a Sardene not an Asianic Home (Burn, *Minoans, Greeks and Philistines*, pp. 112 ff.) is more likely than Sardinia (Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, II. i. 57 f. 557).

129 E. Fiesel, *Etruskisch* (1931); Schachermeyr, *Etruskische Frühgeschichte* (1929).

130 Kretschmer, *Sprache*, p. 109; *Glotta*, xxii. 204; Whatmough, *op. cit.*, pp. 102, 189, wavers in opinion.

131 E. Kieckers, *Die Sprachstämme der Erde*, p. 93.

132 Whatmough, *op. cit.* pp. 208, 213.

among the Raeti,[133] who lived to the north and south of the Brenner pass, are due to penetration from the south, not to an entry from the north, by the Rasenna. The theory[134] that the Etruscans are aboriginal in Italy is quite impossible of acceptance.

Note should, however, perhaps be made of the suggestion[135] that beside our historic Etruscans there was a much older element in the population which arrived before the Indo-Europeans and was kindred to the historical Etruscans. It seems extremely difficult to make much of this suggestion and mere possibilities which cannot be verified are probably best left aside. The same observation applies to an ingenious effort[136] to see sober history in the legend of Aeneas and Rome to the extent that a body of sea-raiders may have landed somewhere south of the Tiber in the Early Iron Age and have aided the Latins against the pressure of the Sabellian wave of Italic stock.

The Celts did not reach Italy until somewhere about 400 B.C.;[137] they came rather from the east than the west, and their provenance may have been the Danube; in any case their importance for the early Mediterranean is negligible. Nor do any of the facts we have examined enable us to arrive at any conclusion helpful for the solution of the problem of the Indo-European home on which the late Professor L. de La Vallée Possin wrote with such prudent reserve in the appendix added in 1935 to his *Indo-européens et Indo-iraniens*.

A. BERRIEDALE KEITH

133 Whatmough, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
134 Schuchhardt, *Praehist. Zeit.* xvi. 109 ff.; Alterropa (1935), pp. 125 f.
135 See, e.g. Krahe, *IF.*, lv. 149.
136 Burn, *Minoans, Philistines and Greeks*, pp. 243 f. He gives (pp. 240 ff.) suggestions as to places whence the Etruscans came to Italy.
137 Whatmough, *op. cit.*, pp. 147 ff.

India and the Archæology of Malaysia and Indonesia

It is only recently that we are realizing the importance of the Malayan world for researches in anthropology and archæology. The ethnic history of the Malay peoples is still far from being clear. We find them mostly as a maritime race whom we may call the Oceanic Malays. But they have got their cousins on the mainland as well spreading over the Malay Peninsula and Indo-China, who may be called Continental Malays. The Proto-Malayas are sometimes called Oceanic Mongols spreading over the vast "Oceanic domain of Further Asia from Formosa to the Nicobars and Madagascar." And as Dr. Hutton observes in his paper on "Races of Further Asia,"[1] the Proto-Malayas are found "forming hybrid groups by fusion with Negritos, Papuans, pre-Dravidians or Indonesians." The present day Malays with dark-brown skin may thus very probably be the result of the fusion of the Yellow races from the North with the Black races of Southern Asia. Thanks to the researches of French scholars, we now know that the far off island of Madagascar is culturally and linguistically connected with the Malayan world, and the devoted workers of the École Française d'Éxtreme Orient in Hanoi (Indo-China) are supplying valuable materials for the study of the archæology of Malaysia. The history of the Proto-Malays and the Malays will, therefore, when adequately treated, enable us to follow the strange lines of expansion of the primitive peoples from Africa to Melanesia across the Indian Ocean to the Pacific.

The earliest, so far traced, of the Dark races to spread over Malayasia and South East Asia were the Negritos, precursors of the Negroids or Oceanic Negroes as opposed to the Continental Negroes now in Africa. The Negrito as a submerged

1 *Man in India*, vol. XII, No. 1, 1932.

Pre-Dravidian element in our Indian population, has been definitely identified by Dr. B. S. Guha, in the extreme South-Western strip of the Peninsula consisting of the hills and ranges along both sides of the Ghats. There we find such tribes as the Kadars, Irulas, Pulayans etc. who are basically Negritoid in character but modified by other racial elements specially the Proto-Australoid, spreading from the Gulf of Cambay to the coasts of Orissa now speaking mostly "Austric" speech common to the Kol, Munda, Santal, Juang and Savara tribes. A few others like the Bhil, the Gond, and the Oraons now speak corrupt forms of Dravidian or Aryan speech abandoning their tribal languages. These Proto-Australoids or Veddoids (as they are sometimes called from physical affinities with the Veddas of Ceylon) may be the earliest indigenous substratum interspersed with a later filtration of the Negritos whom we find in South India in the Andaman Islands, in Malay Peninsula (Semang races), in East Sumatra and in the Philippines (Aeta people). Agriculture and domestication of animals were unknown to the Negritos who were, mainly speaking, food gatherers and hunters with bow and arrow as their typical weapon (unknown to the Veddoid ancestors of the Australian aborigines).

After the Negritos we find the infiltration of the Oceanic Negroes represented by its Papuasian branch leaving their traces among the Naga and other tribes of Assam and those of Papua and Fiji in Melanesia. The earlier and later strands of this Melanesoid culture are just being distinguished as we shall presently discuss. Their cultural contributions may not be much but they supply valuable links in our study of the stone-age cultures of Asia.

Next to the Melanesian or Black races come the Indonesians composed of a Caucasic stock modified by Mongolian infiltration. Racially the Indonesians are "submerged" according to Dr. Hutton but the area once covered by the Mon-Khmer languages of the Indonesian stock embraces Cambodia and Yunnan in French Indo-

China, Wa and Palaung lands in Burma, Khasi Hills in Assam and the Munda zones of Chota Nagpur. In those areas have been discovered a special type (which we may call Indonesian) of polished stone adze "the tanged and shouldered cult." Other characteristics noted by Dr. Hutton are tatooing, canoe-drum, megalithic culture, head-hunting "to secure souls to add to the general village stock of soul matter which is required for the successful propagation of animal and cereal life," phallic cult, terrace cultivation, buffalo and plough cattle, among others. These are found in Assam, Burma, Malay Archipelago, the Philippines and in Formosa, Papua and Oceania. Along with these there appeared totemism, taboo, exogamy, matri-lineal society, Bachelors Hall, priest-chiefs and Prayer houses developing into temples in Indonesia and Polynesia. We have noticed how often the students of Micronesian, Melanesian and Polynesian cultures turned to Indonesia for the explanation of many customs and institutions in the remote parts of Oceania. Now Indonesian and Mon-Khmer cultures are considered by an eminent authority like Dr. Hutton to have their origin in Southern India (pre-Dravidian and Dravidian). Consequently Pre-Aryan India should be a most profitable field for those who aspire to contribute new chapters to the pre-historic and anthropological studies of Asia.

Next to Dr. J. H. Hutton's admirable survey of the "Races of Further Asia" prepared for the 14th Edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (1929), we should notice Dr. P. V. van Stein Callenfels' monograph on "The Melanesoid Civilizations of Eastern Asia."[2] Traces of Melanesoid civilization were discovered also in French Indo-China by Mm. Mansuy and Palle and Dr. M. Colani which came to be critically examined at the First Congress of the Pre-historians of the Far East (Hanoi, 1932). The second session of that Congress was in Manila (1936) when heaps of new materials

2 *Bulletin of the Raffles Museum*, Singapore, Series B. No. 1, May, 1936.

came forth for examination and a third session of the Congress was organised by the Raffles Museum in Singapore.[3]

In 1935 Dr. Callenfels was entrusted by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, with the task of making a systematic survey of the palæolithic and neolithic sites and human remains of Melanesoid and Indonesian affinities. He completed his report (dated Kyoto, Dec. 1935) of the first year's work (1934-1935) in course of which he regretted that "both Siam and Burma are still blank areas on the pre-historic maps."[4]

The conclusions of Dr. Callenfels as recorded in this, practically his last scientific communication on the subject, deserve close attention: Far from being confined to present Melanesia, the geographical extension of the composite Melanesoid culture takes us to the Tumba culture of West Africa where according to Dr. Menghin, we find "artifacts bearing a strong resemblance to the palæolithic types of Western Europe like Chellean, Levalloisian or Mousterian." These types have already been found in South India, Java and South China. So it seems probable that from Africa the home of the Dark races, the oval or ellipsoid chipped implements reached Western Europe on the one hand and *via* India to Java and the Far East on the other. We quote in this connection the following significant remarks of Dr. Callenfels who seemed to support the hypothesis of Dr. Hutton: "It seems now improbable that influences from India played a part in the development of the Melanesoid civilisations, and the theory that the cultures found in Malaysia had their origin solely or mainly from Tonkin (Hoabinhian) can no longer be maintained." In discussing a rare stone arrow

3 This information I gathered from the authorities of the Museum and from Prof. Otley Bayer of the University of the Philippines on my way to and from Polynesia and Australia (1937-38).

4 He collaborated with the French and the British workers and was preparing for a survey of Burma when suddenly he died in Rangoon, to the great loss of pre-historic studies in the Far East.

head found in north eastern Kedah, Dr. Callenfels opined that the arrow head, like the neolithic and bronze civilizations of the East coast of Sumatra, opposite Kedah, probably showed "Indian or Burmese influence." Another Dutch archæologist Dr. G. H. R. von Königswald who published his results on the "Early Palæolithic stone implements from Java"[5] definitely correlated the Pleistocene hand-axe cultures of Java and India[6] while reviewing the '*Stratigraphy of Java and its Relations to Early Man.*' To find implements comparable with the Javanese hand-axes we must go back, he says, "to the beginning of human industry, to the early palæolithic Chellean culture known from Europe, Africa and India, and indeed to the most primitive phase of this culture."

Dr. Callenfels, however, warned us against accepting mere typology as a reliable indication of age which can only be fixed by more convincing geological or palæontological evidence. But he agreed that probably the oldest wave of Melanesoid civilization reached Java. One of the earliest human fossils was found by Dubois in Trinil and another near Wadjak where probably a proto-Australoid type was discovered and within fifty miles from that site Dr. Köenigswald found stone-tools of the Chellean type. A very remarkable find was that in the rock-shelter called Guwa Lawa near Sampung (East Java). Here, between a layer with stone arrow heads below and one with polished stone-axes above, a culture was discovered using only bone and horn artifacts, nowhere else to be found associated with a Melanesoid culture. The proto-neoliths found near Malang, East Java resemble those from Celebes. Palæolithic tools have also been found in the Melanesoid remains near Galumpang in West Central Celebes and probably a Melanesoid bone culture reached Java via Celebes. Melanesoid palæolithic artifacts have also been found in Sarawak and in Dutch West Borneo.

5 *Bulletin of the Raffles Museum*, May, 1936. 6 *Early Man*, 1937.

Thousands of such stone-axes have been found in the East coast of Sumatra. This "Sumatra type" of tools consists of rounded pebble worked on one side only. Two other types could be distinguished: a broad flat axe and a thicker elongated pick. Polished neolithic axes and bronze axes have also been found in East as well as north Sumatra and in Nias, pointing to a later stage of culture derived from different sources. Grinding stones and slabs associated with hæmatite used as pigment have been found in Sumatra and in Malay Peninsula but are totally absent in Indo-China.

A very primitive type of culture has been found by the Swiss Anthropologist Dr. F. Sarasin, in the caves of Northern, Central, and Southern Siam. But systematic excavations have not yet been undertaken.

In Indo-China valuable relics of Stone Age culture have been found in Bac-son and Hoa-Binh. Suffice it to say that the palæolithic tools from those sites are associated with Melanesoid human remains and the proto-neoliths with the Indonesian strata which apparently succeeded.

In the Kwangsi province of South China an expedition sent by the Chinese Geological Survey discovered a late palæolithic culture with no polished celt or pottery. This Kwangsi culture appears to resemble the Stone Age cultures of Western Europe and it is described by Dr. W. C. Pei in his paper "On a Mesolithic Industry of the Caves of Kwangsi."[7] This may be the forerunner of the Bacsonian (early Neolithic) culture of Indo-China.

Palæolithic and proto-neolithic implements have been found, as we have described above, near the Laguna del Bay in Luzon and other parts of the Philippines which wait for systematic exploration.

Even far off Japan which is generally considered to be in the neolithic zone some apparently palæolithic tools were reported to have

7 *Bulletin: Geol. Soc. China*, XIV, 1935.

been discovered by prince Oyama among the kitchen-middens of Liu Kiu islands. In 1932 Dr. Callenfels could detect similar implements from Kiushiu, Hondo and Sendai islands. These tools have not yet received sufficient attention from the authorities of different Japanese Museums because of their pre-occupation with ceramic materials.

Malay Peninsula is the natural land bridge between India and Indonesia. Yet, owing to the cultural backwardness of the people inhabiting that country, few explorations have been undertaken. As early as 1880 Mr. L. Wray, former Director of F.M.S. Museums discovered shell and bone deposits at Gunong Pondok, Perak. In 1886 he excavated some rock shelters at Gunong Cheroh near Ipoh and reported finding human remains (neolithic?), red pigments and grinding stones but no palæolithic tools or flakes.

Between 1917-1921 Mr. I.H.N. Evans conducted excavations in several places; at Gua Kajang near Lenggong he found tools of palæolithic type but no protoneoliths, as he reported. He found proto-neoliths near Gua To Long in Pahang and thanks to the expert colloboration of Dr. Callenfels he could trace (in 1926-27) a definite Melanesoid culture in Gua Kerban rockshelter in Gunong Pondok (north Perak). Among the finds are mentioned palæolithic tools including Sumatra-type, protoneoliths approaching neoliths, crude pottery (very rare in lower levels), red pigment, grinding stones etc. with human remains.

Melanesoid palæolithic tools, worked on both sides (and not associated with any protoneoliths) were found by Mr. G. W. Thompson in 1921-23 near the Sungai Lembing tin mine in Pahang. In the alluvium of a small stream he found also "layers of flakes and chips" suggesting probably that it was an "ancient workshop." Some of the artifacts are of the unwieldy Indo-Chinese (Hoabinhian I) type and represent probably the oldest stage of the Melanesoid culture in the Malay Peninsula.

Under the auspices of the Carnegie Corporation (New York) several important excavations were made in 1934-35 and preliminary reports thereof were published by Dr. Callenfels.[8] In the Province of Wellesley three kitchen middens were excavated in 1934 at Guak Kepah where he found traces of secondary burial, hæmatite and pure neolithic "axes with an encircling groove" round the base for the attachment of a rattan handle. The forerunners of this type may be the "knob-handled axe" from Gulampang, Central Celebes or the type of tools found in Kalgan in Mongolia, Manchuria and Japan as communicated by Dr. Callenfels in the *Proceedings of the Second Congress of Pre-historians of the Far East*, Manila (1936).

In the lime stone hills of Baling in Kedah, a cave was excavated by H. D. Collings and inspite of difficulties in cultural stratification, was attributed by Dr. Callenfels to "the same wave of civilization as that of Gua Kerban showing protoneoliths developing into true neolithic tools with a straight edge and also of small chipped picks." Another site was excavated by Mr. M. W. F. Tweedie at Bukit Chintamani in Pahang. Here the oldest layers showed a culture without pottery and with palæolithic "Sumatra-type" tools which was succeeded by a later stratum with pottery and protoneoliths. The older type of pottery shows that netting was used for impressing the ornaments on vessels before baking. The later type of pottery probably belonged to Iron Age, and its inner surface was varnished probably with gum or lac which were used for coating (both externally and internally) in the pottery found by Mr. Evans in the Iron Age slab graves at Changkat Manteri and Sungkai.

Summing up his observations, Dr. Callenfels remarked that the oldest phase of Melanesoid culture in Malay Peninsula appeared to be that of Sungai Lembing with palæolithic culture. The protoneo-

8 *Bulletin of the Raffles Museum*, May, 1936.

lithic stage is reached in Gua Kajang, Gua Kerban and the Baling caves. Partially belonging to these stages and partially different from and later than those, stand the layers of the Chintamani caves where, both in the higher and the lower levels, secondary burials occurred. Ordinary burial is found in Gua Kerban rock shelter. Guak Kepah with its peculiar neolithic axes is quite distinct and seems to represent the youngest stage of Melanesoid civilization so far known, in this part of the world. The later Melanesoids evolved tools which appear to show that they employed them in some kind of primitive agriculture. And here as elsewhere "when human remains are found associated with protoneoliths and pottery, they include individuals with affinities other than Melanesoid." Dr. Callenfels admits the presence of the second race, the Indonesians living with the Melanesoids, practising burials with no trace of cannibalism.

In tracing the history of the relatively simple and unmixed Melanesoid races and culture we have often been puzzled by complicated problems which only further researches may solve. The difficulties are multiplied more and more as we proceed to tackle with the history of mixed races like the so-called Pre-Dravidians and Indonesians who seldom appear as pure races and only offer some "archaic survivals," the date or cultural sequence thereof, remaining often vague and perplexing. The theories and interpretations of the ethnologists and anthropologists often conflict, and no less conflicting are the opinions and observations of archæologists who worked in this much neglected field of Malaysian pre-history. Dr. Callenfels warned us against accepting mere typology as a reliable indication of age for he showed how apparently old stone culture and tools from Galumpung (Celebes), Gua Kerban (Malay) and Kwangsi (South China) which abound in so-called "Chellean types" are probably "younger than Mesolithic." So protoneoliths are often confused with neoliths and the neolithic culture has no clear chronological boundaries, some-

times, as in the history of Japan and some other countries, the neolithic age and culture reaching as late an epoch as the beginning of the Christian Era. Even the fossilisation of bones, wood etc. is found to take different spans of years in different climes and countries and so mere fossilisation is a most unsound criterion for age in case of a country like Java, (as observed by Dr. Callenfels), where, in some sites, bones and other objects get fossilised in a very short time. With all these reservations, we may nevertheless pursue the study of palæoethnology and prehistoric archæology of Malaysia.

Next to the Melanesoid Negritos, we notice the somewhat obscure group of pre-Dravidian spreading from India into the Malayan world. Dr. Hutton has identified them with the Sakai of the Malay Peninsula, the Toalas of the Celebes and their cousins in East Sumatra, the Ulu Ayar tribes of Dutch Borneo with the blow gun as their distinctive weapon. This pre-Dravidian strain in some of the hill tribes of Assam and Burma is admitted by Dr. Hutton. He considers the Indonesians as introducing the earliest and the most abiding cultural elements in Further Asia, from Assam to Fiji, from the Munda zone to the Polynesian world. The Indonesians were probably composed of a Caucasic stock which, according to Hutton, occupied South-East Asia at a very early date and was modified by Mongolian infiltration. These Indonesians were submerged by the flood of South-Mongoloid races, called by Dr. Hutton, as the Pareœan invasion represented by the North to South drive of the Shan, the Thai, the Burmese, the Anamites, down to the Kuki-Cachins of our own days. As result of such racial fusions there emerged the Oceanic Mongols, the Proto-Malays or the Indonesians. Leaving the mainland to the indigenous pre-Mongol folks and to the invading Southern Mongols, the Indonesians with a rare audacity and adaptability spread over Malaysia and Micronesia and again through Melanesia reached the farthest confines of the Polynesian world. This forgotten history has been partially reconstructed by W. F.

Perry in his *Megalithic Culture of Indonesia* and by Loeb and Heine-Geldern in their studies on *Sumatra*.[9] Recently Mr. Sheppard in his paper on the "Megaliths in Malacca territory"[10] concluded that "a wave of Megalithic culture may have passed through Malacca, *en route* for South Sumatra, Java and the South Pacific." He further pointed out that the megaliths of Talang Padang should be studied along with such other monuments found in Assam and Burma, in the Celebes, Nias and the little Sunda islands.

One of the best collections of Malaysian antiquities is to be found in the Raffles Museum of Singapore. Founded in 1844, it got a new building in 1887 with special galleries and departments on Zoology, Ethnography etc., of Malaysia and Indonesia. It is an institution for regional research containing a representative collection of finds from various expeditions in Malay Peninsula. The Museum has recently departed from its regional function by assembling in its new Hall of Asiatic Pre-history, a synoptical series of stone-implements and other objects from many regions in the east and southeast of Asia. Its *Bulletin* was mainly biological in character but it has, from 1936, opened its pages to non-biological research in its series, B, which gave the first survey of pre-historic research in the Peninsula.

The Perak Museum has been collecting tools and specimens from the Perak state, Kelantan, Pahang, Kedah and Negri Sembilan.

The Selangor Museum contains artifacts from Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang. Neolithic stone tools are very common in Kuala Tembeling, Kuala Kangsar and other places. Mr. Evans has classified them into four common types :—

(1) Stone adze-head with chisel-like edge

(2) Stone adze-head with slightly hollow ground at the point on the 'under' surface

9 Robert Heine-Geldern, Pre-historic Research in Indonesia in *Bibliography of Indian Archæology*, Leyden, 1934.

10 *Bulletin of the Raffles Museum*, May, 1936.

(3) Large stone adze-head

(4) Short adze-head ground on both sides towards the point.

Among the rarer types Mr. Evans refers to "quoit shaped" objects in black and greenish blue stone and also to a kind of "shouldered" tool found in Taiping. The latter is well-known from north-east India (Munda-zone), Burma, Siam and Indo-China." These neolithic implements followed the invasion of Malaya by a CroMagnon race (Indonesians,) who subjugated the palæolithic cave dwellers using Chelleo-Mousterian tools.

While there are plenty of axes and adze-heads, no stone knives, spears or arrow heads so far have been discovered. These, according to Evans, probably came to be made of hard wood or bamboo as we find in New Guinea; but in the Admiralty Islands, where obsedian (volcanic glass) is available, we find chipped points, so well known to the Maoris.

Some late neolithic objects are found mixed up with bronze or iron age finds e.g. in the Iron Age graves of granite slab, discovered at Changkat Mantri (near Bernam river, Perak) where have been found rough pottery, with carnelian beads, bronze vessel, iron tools, and stone bark-cloth beaters also found in Passo, middle Celebes and in so many places of Polynesia which developed the bark-cloth industry transmitted by their Indonesian forbears. Such dolmens and cists have been found also in East Java where the culture objects range from late neolithic to the iron age strata. Mr. Evans mentions granite megaliths at Linggi, Negri Sembilan and compares them with the megaliths found in Indonesia and north-eastern India "which are so intimately connected with Indonesia and Malay Peninsula." With this remark he refers to the standard works like *The Khasis* by P. R. T. Gordon and to *The History of Upper Assam*, by L. W. Shakespeare as well as to the Mikirs, Nagas, and Ho-Munda tribes who erect memorial stones for departed spirits as we find among many races of Malaysia and Oceania. This megalithic

culture, according to Dr. Hutton, takes the form of menhirs and dolmens, intimately connected with the cult of the dead and also with a phallic cult: "The general theory underlying it seems to be that the soul of the dead takes up its abode in the erect or the recumbent stone,[11] according as the sex is male or female and that the fertilization of the crops and propagation of all life is dependent on the action of the soul which is assisted by a process of sympathetic magic dependent on the symbolic form of these megalithic erections." The survival of this cult in Chota Nagpur, in Assam, in parts of Indo-China and in Madagascar suggests that it originated at a very early date and "perhaps preceded the expansion of the Proto-Malay race." Thus although the origin of the Mon-Khmer culture is still obscure, it is possible, says Dr. Hutton that India was "the source of the Indonesian and Mon-Khmer cultures." He compares very significantly the *aren* or soul-matter of the Ao-Nagas with the Polynesian *mana* or dynamic soul-principle. He refers also to the canoe-drum and canoe-cult spreading from the Naga and Khasi Hills, Burma, Malay Peninsula to Borneo, Melanesia, Fiji and even to South America.

In their cult of the Dead we find platform exposure (as among Australian aborigines), burial and burning (without any reference to Hindu influence), the ideas of "the Village of the Dead," and of the "overseas" colony of the Dead. Dr. Hutton refers also to urn-burial in Naga hills, saying that the "boat-shaped coffins are used, some times where boats are unknown," and that the construction of the war canoe is "attended in the Naga Hills by *tabus* identical with those attending the construction of canoes in Melanesia."

Another *tabu* among the Malays refers to the eating of the buffalo which has been definitely associated with Mon-Khmer culture

11 Cf. The guardian stones "used by the Nias islanders the Dusuns of British North Borneo and the Tingnians of the Philippines."

and irrigated terrace cultivation in Assam, Borneo and the Philippines. Headhunting and tatoo patterns referring to rank or to head hunting exploits are found among the Assam-Burma hill tribes, the Tai races, the Kayans of Borneo and other tribes of Oceania.[12]

Thus we find again and again traces of Indonesian races and cultures following in the wake of Melanesoid races, as we notice in so many ethnic and cultural survivals of Malaysia, Polynesia and Oceania. Definite chronology is out of the question but as we have noticed in our chapter on the race migrations into the Philippines, the Negritos reached there in the Old Stone Age, while the Inodnesians or Proto-Malays appeared with the New Stone Age cultures about 5000 B.C. Their history can thus be rarely studied with reference to surviving monuments but their tools and implements are being classified, helping us further in the study of palæoethnology of Oceania. It is significant that the Negritos still survive in Malay Peninsula, in Siam and the Philippines and Mr. Evans refers to a story reported by a Negrito woman to the effect that their people "came originally from Lanka when it was burnt." Hence are their curly hair and monkey affinities! These Negritos were pushed up into the hills by the invading Sakai people who were pre-Dravidians. With the Indonesian invasion, possibly both the Negrito and the Sakai began to borrow from the Mon-Khmer or Austric languages which influenced the Negrito and Sakai dialects. The Proto-Malay Indonesians or Austronesians fused with other races to form the present Malays who were pushed into the sea by the aggressive South Mongolian races, notably the Thai, and thus the overseas colonies and empires of the Malays gradually emerged in history.

Mr. Evans refers, in this connection, to the three pre-historic types of men so far traced in Indo-China: Negrito, Cro-Magnon and Melanesian. He further institutes a close comparison between

12 Skeat and Blagden, *Pagan Races of Malaya Peninsula*, 1906.

the pre-historic finds of Indo-China and Malaya. We summarize below his conclusions so far as they relate to Malay Peninsula:

(1) A Melanesoid palæolithic culture with chipped and grounded tools and flakes from the caves at Lenggong, Nyik (Pahang) and Gunong Pondok. This rude lithic culture, without any transitional type as we find in Indo-China, was followed by—

(2) A Neolithic culture of an invading Cro-Magnon people at Gunong Sennyum (Pahang) and in two places in Perak.

(3) Stones for grinding spices and colours: red paint to anoint the body.

(4) Cord-mark pottery followed by coarse glazed wares with basket design.

(5) Pounders with grip-depressions, associated with the lower neolithic culture of Malay.

(6) Ashes overlying human remains.

(7) Associated fauna not of the extinct types but of the surviving species. Fish bones are not common but plenty of Melania shells and turtles used for food are found together with marrowbones of monkeys, deer, pig, rhinoceros etc.

Evans and Callenfels traced a new "Sumatra" type of palæoliths made of pebble with only one face chipped. These are found in Sumatra, in Upper Perak and in the caves of Indo-China.

That the crude palæolithic Chelleo-Mousterian culture was followed by a neolithic culture with polished tools is fairly clear. But Malay Peninsula is as yet imperfectly explored and its pre-historic study is still in its infancy. Hence we are often confused by contradictory reports which may be cleared up with further excavations on scientific lines. At the end of the Neolithic Age we find plenty of metal objects as we may expect in this land ever famous for its mineral resources. But the systematic survey of the Metal Age of Malay has not yet been attempted. So we do not know yet what progress in metallurgy was made by the aborigines of the Malayan

world which came to be dominated by the Proto-Malay (Indonesian) and the Malay races.

Thus it is clear now that the Malaya served, in the pre-historic ages, as the transmitter of races and culture from India and the Pacific world. So in the historic epoch the same process continued. Yet strangely enough, the Malaya remained, till quite recently, almost a totally neglected field. Thanks, however, to the initiative of Dr. H. G. Quaritch Wales, the Greater India Research Committee of which he is the first Field Director, was formed. He undertook the systematic exploration of Malaya a few years ago, obtaining promising results. Dr. Wales published a summary of those results in a recent paper on the "Art and Archæology of Ancient Malaya" in course of which he observed: "The object of the work was primarily to gain by practical means, a fuller understanding of the processes of ancient Indian cultural expansion which led ultimately to the flowering of the Indo-Javanese and Khmer civilizations in the further East."

Malaya was on the main *sea route,* of all times, beween China and the West, as Dr. Wales rightly observed. But we must remember at the same time that Malaya was a most important *land route* for the migration of Indian culture into Siam and Indo-China. The Indian colonists often avoided the risky sea route round the coast of the entire Peninsula and preferred to pass through Kedah (Sanskrit *Kaṭāha*) into South Siam and thence into upper Siam, Laos, Cambodge and Champā, where we often find traces of simultaneous penetration of Indian culture by the land as well as by the sea routes.

During his recent excavations (1937-38) in the Malay States of Kedah, Perak and Johore Dr. Quaritch Wales made valuable additions to our knowledge of Malayan antiquities: In Kedah alone, he excavated some thirty ancient sites, dating from 4th to 13th century A.D. In an isolated hill on the Sala river (twenty miles north of Kedah peak) he discovered a stūpa with a stone inscription of the

usual Buddhist formula *Ye Dharma* etc. in south Indian script of 4th century A.D. In another laterite stūpa-base on the left bank of river Bujang (? Sanskrit *Bhujaṃga*) he discovered a sun dried clay tablet inscribed with three stanzas of a Mahāyāna text ascribed to the 6th century A.D. Thus it "antedates by more than a 100 years the dated Mahāyāna inscriptions from Sumatra previously believed to be the earliest evidence of the 'Great Vehicle' in this region."

The palæographical examination of the numerous clay tablets in the Raffles Museum and other epigraphic documents in Malaya will surely reveal that to reach the remote regions of Indo-China and Indonesia, Indian cults (both Brahmanical and Buddhistic) must have passed through Malay where more copious traces thereof, would be found with systematic explorations.

Kedah was at first a dependency of the ancient Malayan state known to the Chinese as *Lang-ya-hsin* which was renamed as Laṅkasuka with the assertion of independence of the Hindu colonies strengthened by the coming of the Pallavas towards the end of the 6th century A.D. This Hindu city of Laṅkasuka on the river Bujang after incorporating the older capital of Port Ligor, flourished in the 7th and 8th centuries.. Remains of ruined Śiva temples of this period have been found and Dr. Quaritch Wales is of opinion that "there was sufficient evidence to establish beyond doubt the Pallava affinities of the art of the colonies." He further observed that the shape and form of the roof of a miniature bronze shrine reminded him of the Sahadeva Ratha of Mamallapuram. It shows the Caitya window design, the Kalasa or flower-pot on the top and four Śaivite ascetics sitting cross-legged at the four corners of the bronze shrine found in the bed of the Bujang river.

Another beautiful Śiva temple has been discovered on a low spur of the Kedah peak and constructed with carefully shaped granite blocks, quarried nearby. In its foundations have been discovered many precious objects resembling silver capsules each containing a

ruby and a sapphire. Among the foundation deposits have also been found stone caskets with gems and gold objects. Gold and silver discs, jars with cult objects have also been found. While excavating the foundation of a pillared hall Dr. Wales found within an earthen jar an inscription, on silver, in the South Indian script of 9th century A.D. and also some Arab coins, one definitely dated A.D. 848. Another such pillared hall is ascribed to 9th-10th century A.D., when the Śailendra kings dominated over the state of Laṅkasuka and constructed many Buddhist temples (including the great Borobudor in Java) of Mahāyāna denomination specially favoured by the Śailendras.

Inside the brick-lined chamber of laterite flint was discovered a rare type of a bronze casket south Indian in design. It contains a silver bull, a bronze horse, a tin lion, and the shape of the miniature weapons deposited remind us of those represented on the bas-reliefs of Borobudor which show a special type of dagger depicted on the Mahiṣāsūra Maṇḍapa of Mamallapuram.

After the Pallavas the famous Cola kings, specially under Rājendra Cola the Great, extended not only the cultural but political domination over Malay as is well-known to students of Cola history and epigraphy. So it is natural that traces of a revival of Hinduism in Kedah during the 11th-13th centuries are found on the lower reaches of the Bujang river. Buddhism also probably lingered but several brick temples with Hindu images, terracotta Gaṇeśa and other cult objects seem to explain why the Malays were called *Hindus* when they were conquered by the Islamic invaders in the 15th century.

In an earlier communication on the subject published in the *Indian Art and Letters*[13] Dr. Quaritch Wales threw a new light on the route of migration of Indian culture into Indonesia through Malay

13 Vol. IX, no. 1, 1935.

Peninsula.[14] He supports substantially the theory of Dr. R. C. Majumdar on the origin of the Śailendras of Indonesia,[15] concluding that a state named Śrīvijaya existed in South-east Sumatra in the 7th century A.D. dominating the Malay Peninsula as far as Ligor or Śrī Dharmarāja. In 775 A.D. the Śrīvijaya kingdom was displaced and absorbed by the great Indianised empire of the Śailendras who probably belonged to the Gaṅga dynasty of Kaliṅga and Mysore and were Mahāyānists by religion. Reaching Ligor about the middle of the 8th century they spread their power over Further India, Cambodia, Champā and Ceylon bringing with them the Nāgarī script and the new name of Kaliṅga for Malaya.

They ruled over Malay Peninsula and Indonesia for nearly six centuries (8th to 14th). The Cola inscriptions refer to the Śailendra dynasty as reigning over Kadāra (Kedah) and Śrīvijaya came to be named as Javaka (Zabag of the Arabs). It is quite likely that the Śailendras adopted the name Śrīvijaya after conquering the earlier Sumatran state of the same name near Palembang which was considered by Coedes and Ferrand to be the capital of the Śrīvijaya empire. Prof. Majumdar, after shifting the political centre of gravity to north Malay, suggested that the capital might have been at Ligor or Nakon Śrī Th'ammarat; but Dr. Quaritch Wales concludes on the strength of archæological evidence that Jaya (abbreviation of Śrīvijaya) or Caiya was the earlier capital which was displaced later on by Nagara Śrī Dharmarāja. The early Indian colonists, after crossing the Bay of Bengal, appeared to have settled near Kedah. Their onward march was partially impeded by the Malay pirates swarming the straits of Malacca, forcing them to discover some safer land-route to the eastern coast of the Peninsula. According to Dr. Quaritch Wales the Takuapa harbour on the west coast formed a very good anchorage leading to the Bay of Bandon on the east coast.

14 *A Newly Explored Route of Ancient Indian Cultural Expansion.*
15 *Journal of the Greater India Society*, Vol. I, pt. II, 1939.

Near Takuapa has been discovered the ancient site of Tung Tuk which was identified by Gerini with the Takkola mart mentioned by Ptolemy (2nd century A.D.). Here the brick work of the vestibule of a temple site has been unearthed where stone sculptures and inscription have been discovered and ascribed to the eighth century A.D. Close by is the Pra No hill from the top of which a four-armed Viṣṇu image over 6 ft. high, with Gupta or Pre-Khmer affinities have been discovered. It is now kept at the National Museum of Bangkok. The ancient Sanskrit name of Giri-Rāṣṭra still survives near Ta Khanon. Another purely Indian settlement is Wieng Sra or the city of the lake. At its centre lay the site San Pra Naraí whence three Brahmanical statues were discovered and removed to the National Museum of Bangkok. Here a small sand stone figure of Buddha has been found dating from 6th or 7th century A.D. This Buddha image, only seven inches high, is of the Indian Gupta style. Several statues of Viṣṇu and of Śiva have been discovered in this area, these might have served as models to the makers of the earliest images of the Dieng Plateau, West Java. The male and female figures from opposite the Pra Narai hill, Takuapa, are charming samples of Gupta or Pallava art, proving thereby that successive waves of art and culture reached Indonesia through these Malayan colonies.

To the north of the Bay of Bandon lies the important city of Caiya with many remains of Brahmanical cults later submerged by Mahāyāna Buddhism. Here a small bronze Tārā of Indo-Javanese style has been discovered. The temple of Wat Pra Th'at bears according to Mon. Parmentier, close resemblance to the miniature edifices appearing on the bas-reliefs of Borobudor. Another ruined monument Wat Keu was discovered by Mon. Coedes in 1926. This is a big shrine "Constructed on a plan analogous to that of Candi Kalasan in Java, but of which the architecture recalls closely the cubic art of Champā and the Pre-Khmer art of Cambodia. From Caiya

several Brahmanic sculptures have been discovered which remind us strongly of Indian proto-types. Bronze Mahāyāna figures have also been discovered. The next important site on the east coast is the famous Buddhist city of Nakon Śrī Thammarat. Some of its architectural features remind us of Candi Kalasan of Central Java and the Cham towers of Dong Duong and Mi-Son.

In summing up the results of his investigations Dr. Quaritch Wales observed that there was a strong local tradition in favour of an early migration of the Indians across the route from the West and that colonies of Brahmins of Indian descent survive at Nakon Śrī Th'ammarat and Patalung. Through this country the far off Hindu Colony of Fu-nan (Cambodia) was Indianised by a sage Kauṇḍinya as recorded in *Liang Shu* about the end of the 4th century A.D. The most primitive in style of the Indian colonial temples are to be found near the colony of the Brahmins who traced the arrival of their ancestors from India by an overland route across the Malay Peninsula and not *via* Java or Sumatra. The primitive non-specialised type of Indian colonial architecture gradually influenced the pre-Khmer, Cham and Indo-Javanese architectural types just as the sculptures found in this Trans-Peninsular zone could have served as inspiration to the development of local forms in an Indonesian environment. Indian administrative ideas, ceremonials and the drama also most probably came to influence Siam and Cambodia on the one hand and Java and Bali on the other.

It goes without saying that there were possibly other land-routes and sea-routes in the propagation of Indian culture. It is probable that there were two periods in this cultural migration in the earlier period. There was a slow dissemination from the Bay of Bandon (Pan-Pan), to the then receptive and politically backward states in Fu-nan (Champa) and in wesern Java which, in the second period, gradually became politically and culturally conscious and creative. Then they were capable of pursuing within their borders the evolu-

tion of their own distinctive art and culture inspired by India. The Pan-Pan of Malay probably collaborated with Java, developing the great Śailendra empire. From the inscriptions we learn that the Śailendras were masters of the northern part of the Malay Peninsula in the 8th cenury A.D.

They were Mahāyānists arriving fresh from India and looking out boldly for fresh conquests beyond the seas. Thus gaining control over the Malay States they organised their conquests of Java and Sumatra. The few sculptures that have been found near Palembang in Sumatra are almost all of the late Javanese style. On the other hand at Caiya, probably the first capital of Śailendra empire, we have a range of sculptural types beginning with almost purely Indian forms. Scarcity of stone confined the architecture to bricks as was also the case in Champa. From the inscription of the Buddha of Wat Hua Wieng (1183 A.D.) we learn that Caiya was temporarily overrun by their aggressive neighbours the Cambodians and probably that was the reason why the capital was transferred further south to Nakon Śrī Th'ammarat in 1230 A.D. The great Śailendra empire which included Java in the 9th century was weakened, progressively by the disastrous war with the Coḷas in the 11th century by the attacks of the Khmers in the 12th and by an unfortunate expedition to Ceylon in the 13th century. It finally collapsed as a result of the simultaneous attacks by the Thai (Siamese) from the North and by the Javanese from the South.

KALIDAS NAG

The Date of the Sanskrit Inscription of Vo-canh (South Annam)

In a recent article in the *Journal of the Greater India Society* entitled the "Date of the earliest Sanskrit Inscription of Campā,"[1] Dr. Dines Chandra Sircar, who is now engaged in the study of the origin and development of classical Sanskrit style,[2] has proposed to bring down the date of the Vo-canh inscription to the first half of the 4th century which would be, according to him, the earlier limit.

This dating fits in ill with the palæography of the inscription. The previous writers were unanimous in placing the script in "a period which in no way seems to be later than the 3rd century A.D."[3]

Dr. Sircar is of opinion that palæography had misled these scholars. I have however doubts if this science can be so summarily condemned. Good logic may evidently require us to suppose that ancient forms of the alphabet continued to be used in the Hindu kingdoms of Indo-China and Indonesia several decades and even several centuries after their disappearance in India. But so far as the earlier times are concerned, when the relations between India proper and Further India were active and frequent, it is the contrary which has been noticed. Certain modes of writing and particularly the "box-head" alphabet of the 5th century were diffused with an astonishing rapidity.[4]

1 *JGIS.*, vol. VI, 1939, p. 57 (*Canh* is pronounced *Kañ* and not *Chañh*, as the author writes).

2 Cf. his article "Inscriptional evidences relating to the development of classical Sanskrit." *IHQ.*, March, 1939, p. 38.

3 These are the exact words of A. Bergaigne, *Inscriptions Sanskrites de Campā et de Cambodge*, p. 192, who adds later (p. 195): "It appears to be almost certain that this inscription is anterior to the 4th century A.D. and it is possible that it goes back to the 2nd century. On the whole, 3rd century may be considered to be approximately the most probable date."

4 A. Bergaigne, *loc. cit.*, pp. 195, 204.

The palæographic evidence of the inscription of Vo-canh may be set aside only by uncontrovertible arguments.

In order to bring down the date of this inscription to a century later than hitherto believed Dr. Sircar relies on the use of Sanskrit and the metre *Vasantatilakā*. In short he is not disposed to admit that a *kāvya* could be engraved on stone in Indo-China before the 4th century A.D.

That the inscription of Vo-canh may be palæographically either contemporary or later than the Girnār inscription of Rudradāman, which in Indian epigraphy marks the victory of Sanskrit over Prakrit, already occurred to A. Bergaigne.[5] "If we believe, he says, as we ought to do, that the relations with the motherland were frequent, there is no reason why Sanskrit should come into use in the epigraphic monuments much later than in India proper."

It may be added that the circumstances which might have retarded the general use of Sanskrit in Indian epigraphy did not exist in Indo-China where there was no long Prakrit tradition as in India. It is a noteworthy fact that in the linguistic Indianisation of Indo-China neither the Prakrits nor the vernacular languages did play any part. Excepting certain rare uses most of the borrowed words are Sanskrit.

But still it would be surprising if Sanskrit was found in Indo-China before its earilest occurrence in Indian epigraphy. The inscription of Rudradāman is of about 150 A.D. So A. Bergaigne was extremely wise in suggesting that the Vo-canh inscription might go back to the end of the century. But recently new documents have been published by Prof. H. Lüders[6] which attest the use of Sanskrit and even of the *kāvya* style proper since the 1st century A.D. in inscriptions discovered in the region of Mathurā. Amongst these

5 *Loc. cit.*, p. 195.

6 *Seven Brāhmī Inscriptions from Mathurā and its Vicinity*, pl. XXIV. January 1938, pp. 194-209.

inscriptions in Brāhmī script, it may be noted, there is one Sanskrit text written in the metre *Bhujaṅgavijṛmbhita* which belongs to the reign of Śoḍāsa. "The occurrence of this stanza, says Prof. H. Lüders, is of considerable interest for the history of Sanskrit literature. The metre *Bhujaṅgavijṛmbhita* is found also in Kumāralāta's *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā*, but our inscription is about 200 years earlier than that work, and if a most artificial metre such as *Bhujaṅgavijṛmbhita* is used here for a Sanskrit stanza, it is proved that the Sanskrit Kāvya poetry was fully developed in the 1st century A.D.". After this perhaps it would be less difficult for Dr. Sircar to admit that the verses in *Vasantatilakā* could have been engraved on the Vo-canh rock in the 3rd or even earlier, in the 2nd century.

It would be certainly easier to convince him of the great antiquity of this inscription if we could find out some Chinese synchronism for the king of the line of Śrī Māra at whose order the inscription was composed. There is perhaps one such synchronism that has so far been ignored by the historians probably because they have so long directed their investigations in Chinese texts relating to Campā only, being under the impression that the Vo-canh inscription was of Cham origin. Thus M. G. Maspero[7] for purely chronological reasons has identified Śrī Māra with K'iu Lien who, according to the *Tsin Shu*, had founded in 192 A.D. the kingdom which later on came to be known as Lin-yi, that is the Cham kingdom. On his part M. S. Sugimoto[8] has taken great pains to explain that the two variants K'iu Ta and K'iu K'ouei given respectively by *Leang Shu* and the *Shuei King Tchu* are translations of the name Māra or "the Evil One."

But already in 1927 M. Finot had expressed his doubts on the Cham origin of the Vo-canh inscription and formulated the hypothesis that the Hindu settlement of South Annam that has left

7 *Le Royaume de Champa*, Paris 1928, p. 51.

8 *Mélanges Kuwahara*, Kyoto, 1931, p. 213.

the inscription of Vo-canh (200 A.D.) was a small vassal kingdom of Fou-nan and older than the foundation of the kingdom of Campā in this region.[9]

I am tempted to go further than my late lamented teacher and to identify Śrī Māra with the king of Fou-nan called Fan-She-man who according to the Chinese Annals ruled over Fou-nan in the end of the 2nd and the beginning of the 3rd century A.D.[10] But although *She* accords well with *Śrī, man* is not correctly speaking a regular transcription of Māra. But this does not seem to be impossible as the use of a Chinese character with nasalised final syllable for the transcription of an open syllable followed by a syllable with initial *l* is as common as the elision of a character in the transcription. *She-man* seems to be either an abbreviation or a possible alteration of *She man lo* < Śrī Māra. As regards *Fan* it is well known that it is an equivalent of the termination of royal names with *varman,* interpreted by the Chinese as the name of family.

The great expansion of the kingdom of Fou-nan during the reign of Fan-She-man is attested by the texts. Thus M. Pelliot[11] writes: "Fan She-man was the principal artisan of the greatness of Fou-nan. He brought under submission the neighbouring kingdoms which were recognised as his vassals." There is therefore nothing unusual in discovering in a valley of South Annam an inscription emanating from one of his descendants. They were however few and the dynasty which Fan She-man had founded was of short duration. Upon his death his son Fan Kin-Sheng was deposed from the throne and was put to death by his cousin Fan Tchan who was the son of the elder sister of Fan She-man. Fan Tchan was the

9 *JA.*, CCX, 1927, p. 186.

10 P. Pelliot, 'Le Fou-nan', *BEFEO.*, III, pp. 257, 265, 291. The author places the death of Fan She-man about 205-210 A.D.

11 *Māra* is *Man* in T'ai, but the change of *r* into *n* in T'ai is a phonetic phenomenon quite peculiar to these languages and cannot be used as an argument in this case.

first king of Fou-nan to have entered into an official relation with an Indian king, that of the Muruṇḍas. He was also dethroned and assasinated by his cousin Fan Tch'ang the younger son of Fan She-man, who was the last prince of the dynasty.[12]

These successors of Fan She-man reigned in the 2nd and the 3rd decade of the 3rd century A.D.[13]

If my identification of Fan She-man with Śrī Māra is correct the inscription of Vo-canh emanated from a prince who cannot be placed later than 230 A.D.

This date which is in perfect accord with palæographical data is later respectively by '80 and 200 (about) years than the inscriptions of Rudradāman at Girnār and Śoḍāsa at Mathurā which are the most ancient specimens of Kāvya in Indian epigraphy. This interval is quite enough to explain the occurrence of similar literature in Indo-China.

George Cœdès

12 *Op. cit.*, p. 291.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 293.

The oldest Representation of the Sākta Cult in Bengal Art

In his recently published work entitled *Excavations at Paharpur, Bengal,*[1] Rao Bahadur K. N. Dikshit, while describing the terra-cottas of the main shrine, writes as follows: "Another plaque shows a man seated on a cushion, holding the top-knot of his head with the left hand and a sword in the right across his own neck as if in the act of striking. This may possibly refer to the life of Buddha himself when he cut off his long hair with his sword just before he turned a recluse."

In the absence of further references, it is not possible to trace this remarkable sculpture which is not illustrated in the volume under notice. Its significance, however, can be understood from the clear description given above.

Representations of the Buddha's cutting off his hair, preparatory to his renunciation, are by no means unknown to the Eastern school of sculpture to which category the series of terra-cottas at Paharpur belongs at least in part. This scene, for example, is represented in two *stêlae* hailing from a village in Jessore and from an unknown site in Behar, which have been described and reproduced by the late Mr. R. D. Banerjee.[2] But neither in these nor any other known specimens the Buddha is figured as holding his sword "across his own neck as if in the act of striking."

The clue to the correct interpretation of the Paharpur plaque is to be found in a series of four Pallava and Early Cola sculptures which were first identified by Dr. J. Ph. Vogel in a paper published in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies.*[3] In these sculp-

1 *Memoirs of the Archæological Survey of India.* No. 55, p. 67.

2 *Eastern Indian school of Mediaeval Sculpture,* pp. 46, 57, and Pls. XIX, *b,* and *c.*

3 *The Head-offering to the Goddess in Pallava Sculpture, BSOS,* VI, pp. 539-543, with four plates.

tures which are found in the Draupadī *ratha* and the Varāha Cave at Mamallapuram, the Lower Cave at Trichinopoli and the temple at Puḷḷamaṅgai (10 miles to the south of Tanjore), we have the identical *motif* of a pair of male figures kneeling by the side of a four-armed goddess who can be easily identified as Durgā or Mahiṣamardinī. Dr. Vogel, after a minute examination of the sculptures in question, concludes that in each of the above examples the person kneeling to the proper right of the goddess is shown in the act of offering his own head to the deity.

The description of the kneeling figures by Dr. Vogel in the above examples tallies in all essentials with that of the seated figure of the Paharpur terra-cotta, to which Mr. Dikshit refers. In the two clear specimens, those from Trichinopoli and Puḷḷamaṅgai, the personage seizes the tuft of his hair by the left hand while applying the sword held in his right hand to his neck. The difference viz., the absence of the goddess and the seated posture, is probably due to the fact that the Paharpur plaque was held to be not a cult-object, but a decorative design.[4]

A terra-cotta panel now deposited in the Mathura Museum enables us to trace the extension of this striking *motif* further afield in the region of the Upper Ganges valley as far back as the Gupta period. It "shows a bearded monk with emaciated ribs detaching his own head with a sword which has half entered his throat."[5] In this specimen the monk is shown as kneeling with the right hand grasping the sword and the left holding the tuft of hair

4 For the illustrations of the two specimens see Dr. Vogel's article cited above. A very similar motif (without the goddess) occurs in an old South Indian sculpture preserved in the Madras Government Museum. It is described as "showing a man holding his head by its hair with his left hand while he severs it from his body by means of a sword in his right" (F. H. Gravely, C. Sivaramamurti and other curators, *Guide to the Archæological Galleries*, Madras Government Museum, Madras 1939).

5 V. S. Agrawala, *Handbook of Archaeology*, Muttra, 1939, p. 51, and figure 39.

exactly as in the South Indian examples quoted above. As Mr. Agrawala kindly informs me, the terra-cotta was discovered from the bed of the Jumna at Muttra in 1938. Mr. Agrawala assigns it on grounds of style to the Gupta period.

The offering of his own head by the devotee is not unknown to our ancient religious literature. An early instance is found in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (Uttarakāṇḍa chaps. ix-x) in connection with the story of Rāvaṇa's austerities for matching the greatness of his half-brother Vaiśravaṇa (Kubera). How Rāvaṇa propitiated Lord Brahmā is told in the following lines:—

दशवर्षसहस्राणि निराहारो दशाननः ।
पूर्णे वर्षसहस्रे तु शिरश्चाग्नौ जुहाव सः ॥
एवं वर्षसहस्राणि नव तस्यातिचक्रमुः ।
शिरांसि नव चाप्यस्य प्रविष्टानि हुताशनम् ॥
अथ वर्षसहस्रे तु दशमे दशमं शिरः ।
छेत्तुकामे दशग्रीवे प्राप्तस्तत्र पितामहः[6] ॥

The above instance is only an isolated one. It is quite otherwise with the literature of the Śāktas, where we find repeated sanctions for ritual-offering of his own blood by the devotee in honour of the goddess. In the Devī-māhātmya section of the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa,* we are told how the king Suratha and the Vaiśya Samādhi, after hearing the story of the Devī's *māhātmya,* propitiated the image of the deity by various offerings and ended by making her an offering soaked with blood from their own bodies. The Devī being propitiated appeared before them and granted them their desires:—

तौ तस्मिन् पुलिने देव्याः कृत्वा मूर्तिं महीमयीम् ।
अर्हणां चक्रतुस्तस्याः पुष्पधूपाग्नितर्पणैः ।
निराहारौ यताहारौ तन्मनस्कौ समाहितौ
ददतुस्तौ बलिञ्चैव निजगात्रासृगुक्षितम् ।
एवं समाराधयतोस्त्रिभिर्वर्षैर्यतात्मनोः ।
परितुष्टा जगद्धात्री प्रत्यक्षं प्राह चण्डिका ।

6 *Rāmāyaṇa,* Uttara-kāṇḍa, Ch. X, 10-12.

देव्युवाच

यत् प्रार्थ्यते त्वया भूप त्वया च कुलनन्दन ।
मत्तस्तत् प्राप्यतां सर्व्वं परितुष्टा ददामि तत्[7] ।

The *Kālikā Purāṇa* has the following verses in praise of the practice of blood-offering from his own body by the devotee:

शार्द्दूलश्च नरश्चैव स्वगात्र-रुधिरं तथा ।
चण्डिकाभैरवादीनां बलयः परिकीर्तिताः ॥
... ...
सिंहस्य शरभस्याथ स्वगात्रस्य च शोणितैः ।
देवी तृप्तिमवाप्नोति सहस्रं परिवत्सरान्[8] ॥

With these may be quoted the verses from the same work sanctioning the offering of flesh by the devotee:—

यः स्वहृदयसञ्जातमांसं माषप्रमाणतः ।
तिलमुद्ग-प्रमाणाद्वा देव्यै दद्यात्तु भक्तितः ।
षण्मासाभ्यन्तरे तस्मात् काममिष्टमवाप्नुयात् ॥
... ...
येनात्ममांसं सत्येन ददामीश्वरि भूतये ।
निर्वाणं तेन सत्येन देहि हं हं नमो नमः ।
इत्यनेन तु मन्त्रेण स्वमांसं वितरेद्बुधः[9] ॥

The *Tantrasāra*, perhaps the most popular Tāntric nibandha work in Bengal, actually quotes rules relating to the offering of one's own blood before the goddess and the blessings supposed to follow from this act:

स्वगात्ररुधिरदाने तु
... ...
कण्ठाधो नाभितश्चोर्द्ध्वं हृद्भागस्य यतस्ततः ।
पार्श्वयोश्चापि रुधिरं दुर्गायै विनिवेदयेत् ॥
फलन्तु कुमारीतन्त्रे
... ...
स्वगात्ररुधिरं दत्त्वा नत्वा राजत्वमाप्नुयात् ॥
यः स्वहृदयसञ्जातं मांसं माष-प्रमाणतः ।
तिल-मुद्ग-प्रमाणं वा दद्याद्भक्तियुतो नरः ।
षण्मासाभ्यन्तरे तस्य काममिष्टमवाप्नुयात्[10] ॥

7 *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, XCIII, 7-11. 8 *Kālikā Purāṇa*, LXVII, 5 and 12.
9 *Ibid.*, LXVII, 172 and 184-185.
10 *Tantrasāra*, pp. 933-34, Bangabāsi ed. Calcutta, 1334 B.S.

In the late Tāntric nibandha work from Bengal, called *Prāṇatoṣaṇī* written (as we learn from the preamble) by Rāmatoṣaṇa Vidyālaṁkāra in 1743 Śaka (1821 A.D.), we have a quotation from the Matsya-sūkta of *Mahātantra*. Here we have a comparative list of the merits of different kinds of blood-offerings before the Devī including that of his own blood by the devotee.[11] It is a matter of common knowledge that the rule of offering blood nearest the heart before the goddess is very much observed by pious Hindu ladies of Bengal down to our own times.

The offering of one's own blood before the goddess was not approved as a general rule by all the authorities of the Śākta cult. The *Kālikā Purāṇa* forbids a Brāhmaṇa to offer his own blood along with other animals in the passage mentioned below:

सिंहं व्याघ्रं नरञ्चापि स्वगात्ररुधिरन्तथा
न दद्याद् ब्राह्मणो मद्यं महादेव्यै कदाचन ।
... ...
स्वगात्ररुधिरं दद्याच्चात्मवधमवाप्नुयात्[12] ।

To the same effect runs a text quoted in the *Tantrasāra*:—

मद्यं दत्त्वा महादेव्यै ब्राह्मणो नरकं व्रजेत्
स्वगात्ररुधिरं दत्त्वा आत्महत्यामवाप्नुयात्[13] ।

On the other hand the *Haratattvadīdhiti*[13a] while quoting similar inhibitory texts from the *Gāyatrītantra*, reproduces and explains away a text of the *Yoginītantra* expressly enjoining a Brāhmaṇa to offer his own blood to the Devī:—

यत्तु एवं विप्रो देवतायै स्वगात्ररुधिरं ददेदिति योगिनीतन्त्रषष्ठपटलवचनं तत्तादृशाधिकारिपरम् । पूर्व्ववचने स्वगात्ररुधिरदानस्य मद्यतुल्यनिन्दाश्रवणात् ।

It is interesting to observe that the conflict of authorities is reflected in the literature of folk-lore which as might be expected contains a number of references to such a peculiar rite as the head-offering ceremony. In Somadeva's *Kathāsaritsāgara* (11th century)

11 *Prāṇatoṣaṇī*, Basumati edition, Calcutta, p. 285.
12 *Kālikā Purāṇa*, LXVII, 50 and 52.
13 *Tantrasāra*, p. 934.
13a *Haratattvadīdhiti*, p. 329 Calcutta ed., 1907.

we have in two slightly different versions (LIII, 86-193 and LXXV, 5-120) the story of the Brāhmaṇa Vīravara who to save his royal master from his impending doom actually or nearly cut off his own head as an offering to the goddess Caṇḍikā, when the deity struck by this extraordinary act of devotion granted all his desires. In the other versions of the *Vetālapañcaviṁśati*, such as those of Śivadāsa, Kṣemendra (in the *Bṛhatkathāmañjarī*), and of Jambhaladatta, Vīravara is more properly described as a rājaputra and kṣatriya.[14] The *Hitopadeśa* (III, 8), which also gives the story of Vīravara, similarly characterises the same as a rājaputra.

Apart from these references, we have mention of head-offering before the goddess as a familiar *motif* in some other well-known tales of Sanskrit literature. Somadeva's *Kathāsaritsāgara* (LXXX, 4-51), Kṣemendra's *Bṛhatkathāmañjarī* (IX. 405-415) as well as Śivadāsa's version of the *Vetālapañcaviṁśati* contains the story of the washerman Dhavala and his brother-in-law (or friend) who cut off their own heads for presentation to the goddess Gaurī in a fit of excessive devotion. When the grief-striken wife of Dhavala prepared to follow suit, the goddess restored the dead persons to life. The same story is told in Jambhaladatta's version of the *Vetālapañcaviṁśati* with this difference that Dhavala there figures as a prince and is said to have won his bride by similarly offering to cut off his own head so as to propitiate the goddess.[15] Above all, the *Dvātriṁśatputtalikā* has a number of stories of King Vikramāditya the paragon of royalty who performs the same extraordinary act of sacrifice. In most of these stories (Nos. II, VII, VIII, XXVIII) the king interceding in favour of some suffering mortal prepares to strike at his own neck with his sword and thus successfully propitiates the goddess Ambikā or Bhuvaneśvarī or an un-named deity said to be fond of human

14 M. B. Emeneau, *Jambhaladatta's version of the Vetālapañcaviṁśati*, American Oriental Series, Vol. IV, p. 43.

15 M. B. Emeneau, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-63, and notes.

flesh. Only in one story (XXVII) the act of devotion is performed before a Bhairava or attendant of Śiva.[16]

The classical Tamil literature also refers to this dread rite which was known as *talai-bali*. Thus in the newly published work, the *Śilappadikāram*, translated by Mr. V. R. Ramacandra Diksitar (Oxford University Press 1939)[17] we are told of warriors who 'cut off their dark-haired heads containing such fierce red eyes as seemed to burn those upon whom they looked and willingly offered them upon the sacrificial altar (of the guardian deity) with the prayer that the conquering king might be ever victorious."

The popularity of the head-offering motif is shown by the fact that it finds mention not only in ancient Sanskrit and Tamil but also in modern vernacular literature of folk-tales. We have thus the pathetic story of Hamir the valiant Cauhan chieftain of Ranthambhor who had the audacity to defy the mighty Alauddin Khalji Sultan of Delhi and at last ended his life by cutting off his own head as an offering to the God Rudra. This story is told in four Hindi poems of the first half of the 19th century and is illustrated by at least three series of paintings of Kangra school belonging to that period.[18]

It thus appears that the religious rite of head-offering had an extensive vogue in Indian art and literature going back at least to Gupta times. Its motives are various, involving persuasion by the devotee to confer material favours upon himself or upon others. It is most often associated with the Śākta cult, though some examples of its connection with the cult of Śiva and other deities also occur. Examples of devotees cutting their necks in the famous centre of

16 Franklin Edgerton, *Vikrama's Adventures, the Thirty-two tales of the Throne*, Part I, trans. pp. 50, 52, 94, 215, 220.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 113, and the author's note, p. 113, *n*.

18 Hirananda Sastri, 'The Hamir-Haṭh,' *Journal of Indian Art and Industry*, October, 1915, pp. 35-40. I owe this reference to Prof. Suniti Kumar Chatterjee of the Calcutta University.

Śākta cult in Bengal, the temple of Kālī at Kālighat, occurred as late as 1855.[19] The religious literature of the Śāktas though it does not directly sanction this rite at least encourages the same by recognising offering of one's own blood to the goddess as an act of merit. From this point of view our present plaque possesses a unique historical significance. If our argument is accepted as correct, the Paharpur plaque would be the oldest known representation of the Śākta cult in Bengal. Of its date we can speak only in very general terms. It has been shown in recent times[20] that the Paharpur sculptures belong to three distinct chronological groups of which the first and second may be assigned to the Gupta tradition of Eastern India in the 7th century and the third to the indigenous tradition in the century following. The Paharpur terracotta, to which category our present specimen belongs, may be assigned to this later chronological stratum.

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19 See the article in the Bengali monthly magazine, *Bhāratavarṣa*, Śrāvaṇ, 1347, quoting two letters dated 17.6.1854 and 21.1.1855, deposited in the Imperial Records Office, Delhi.

20 S. K. Sarasvati, *Early Sculpture of Bengal* in *Journal of the Department of Letters*, Calcutta University, Vol. XXX, pp. 40-41.

Devices on some Tribal Coins

The symbols appearing on the Tribal coins of India have not been so far satisfactorily explained; the explanations that have been given by scholars are mostly conjectural. We may instance the different interpretations of the female figure bathed by two elephants on the Kosam coins and on some foreign ones. Except on the issues of the Kushan rulers Kanishka, Huvishka and Vasudeva, no attempt has been made to indicate the identity of the figures appearing on them. Our difficulties are enhanced in the case of symbolic devices and theriomorphic figures.

An obvious line of approach to the problem of identification of the symbols is to trace in them the rites, practices and beliefs of the people for whose use these coins were current. Sometimes it may also be possible to refer to the monumental representations of figures or devices closely resembling those appearing on the coins. On the other hand any attempt to explain symbols with the help of texts of a later date, dealing with the rites and practices of people removed by centuries from the period of the coins, would be open to the most serious objection.

With regard to the significance of the symbols appearing on the punch-marked coins, although Allan regards them as having no religious significance, either Buddhist or Hindu, Walsh has shown that some at least viz. the bull and the trident, of the symbols appearing on the older class of the punch-marked coins, are certainly Śaivite in character. In the case of many of the symbols (*rūpas*) appearing on the tribal coins we shall be similarly justified in recognising their religious character. As regards the significance of the individual figures especially theriomorphic ones, it may be noted that one and the same explanation would not necessarily hold good for all

periods and localities. Thus, for example, a bull shown within a shrine or inside an enclosure may probably represent or symbolise a deity (most likely Śiva) in his theriomorphic form; but the same bull shown standing before a *Yūpa* or sacrificial post should necessarily be taken as the animal ready for sacrifice. We can refer to the symbol and its variants which were differently described by earlier numismatists as a *Caitya* or a *Stūpa* (Cunningham) and very rarely as a particular mountain or hill (Bhagwanlal—*Sumeru*) and now almost unanimously identified as a mountain (Coomaraswamy indentifies it as typifying Śiva, described as a three-peaked hill with crescent at the top, *O.Z.*, 1927; this interpretation is challenged by C.C. Dasgupta in *JAOS.*, 1934). The late Mr. Jayaswal sometimes interpreted it as a partially pictographic manner of writing the name of the Maurya emperor Candragupta. But the symbol admits of different explanations in different settings. A glance at plate II of Cunningham's *Coins of Ancient India* (Taxila single-die coins) would enable us to test our hypothesis; coin no. 6 bears this particular symbol with an upright post to the left, which is described by Cunningham as a monolith standing beside the *Caitya;* single-die coins no. 9 and 11 show it flanked on the right by a peculiar device which consists of a pyramidal arrangement of nine balls (wrongly described by Cunningham as 'Pile of bales') and having a zigzag line below; on no. 14, a human figure stands just in front of the shrine with its right hand upraised and left hand on hip (a very characteristic attitude in early anthropomorphic representations of deities) and on the left field is the pile of balls; on no. 17 (inscribed with the name of *Vatasvaka* in early Brāhmī script on the left field), the symbol in question is super-posed on the so-called pile of balls and the human figure in that characteristic attitude stands on a taurine placed sideways. If we assume any close relationship among the individual symbols in the different arrangements noted above, we may throw out the suggestion that the main three-arched

crescent-topped device should be taken to stand for some sort of a shrine while the human figure, the pile of balls and the curved line below should be taken to stand for either the presiding deity of the local shrine or his votary, the mountain and river respectively. In some cases, the first device is flanked by a tree within railing and we shall not be far wrong if we find here the representation of the *sthala-vṛkṣa,* so frequently associated with Indian shrines (it should not necessarily be always identified and described as a Bodhi-tree, as Cunningham does). Yet there cannot be any doubt as regards the hill significance of the numerous other representations of this three-arched symbol on other coins, e.g. those of Besnagar, and those issued by the Śātavāhanas.

On some of the oldest types of the Yaudheya coins, we find a bull standing facing an upright slender pillar like object with a perceptible rounded curve at the top, placed on a basement (railing). A similar device is also to be found on some Ārjunāyana coins. Smith in his *Indian Museum Catalogue*, vol. I, p. 166 (Ārjunāyana, no. 2) describes the obverse of the coin as a railing with a curved object rising from it (he omits to note that the bull is in front of it which is distinctly to be seen in the Plate XX, 10, of his book). Allan in his *Coins of Ancient India,* p. 121, (Ārjunāyana, var. B. No. 2) describes the same device on the similar type of coins as 'Bull r. before lingam.'[1] In the case of an exactly similar type of Yaudheya coins, V. A. Smith describes the obverse type as 'Bull standing r., facing a railing with curved object ('pillar with pendent garlands'—Cunningham) rising from it,[2] Allan remarks about the same type 'The obverse type is a bull before , a sacrificial post? (*Yūpa*) in

1 The side designated by Smith as the obverse is mentioned as the reverse by Allan; but the other side according to V. A. Smith contains an elephant before a tree, while according to Allan it is a bull before a tree; the latter description is doubtful.

2 *IMC.*, vol. I, p. 180, pl. xxi, nos. 1, 13, 14 etc.

a railing.........The type is probably the same as that of the coins of the Ārjunāyanas who are regularly associated with the Yaudheyas in literature.'[3] With regard to the Ārjunāyana type Allan remarks in the introduction of his book (p. lxxxii) that 'the reverse type is certainly a bull before a liṅgam, as in var. a.' So, we see, that Allan is not definite about his explanation of this device. It seems that his suggestion that the object before the bull is a sacrificial post is perfectly supportable and the bull 'before liṅgam' explanation is unsupportable. The bull is the sacrificial bull and the symbol before it is the *Yūpa*. We cannot fail to recognise the latter in the Aśvamedha type coins of Samudragupta and Kumāragupta I, in which pennons are attached to it and in front of it the horse stands. A part of this symbol in these early coins of the Yaudheyas and Ārjunāyanas may also stand for pennons or streamers to which some times auspicious symbols are attached. The discovery of stone *Yūpas*, containing the inscriptions of some early Maukharī rulers, by Altekar (*Epigraphia Indica*, vol. XXIII, p. 42 ff. and plate) leave very little doubt that the coin device represents an identical object, as we find the same curvature at the top in both the cases. The stone *Yūpa*, containing the inscription of the Kushan king Vasishka (year 28), also bears a family likeness to the *Yūpas* noticed above. Reference can also be made to the Vijaygadh stone pillar, the dated inscription on which describes it as a *Yūpa* erected by Vārika Viṣṇuvardhana, in probability a feudatory of Samudragupta. The extreme top of the pillar is broken, but it has a metal spike projecting from it (Fleet, *Gupta Inscriptions*, p. 252 ff.). There are several references in literary and epigraphic records with regard to the erection of *Yūpas* by persons of importance to commemorate the celebration of different sacrifices offered by them. We may go a step further and suggest the

3 *CAI.*, pl. cxlvii-cxlviii, 267-270; pl. xxxix, 11-19; sometimes, the symbol before the bull is reversed.

probability of finding in this device on early coins a laconic representation of the *Śulagava* sacrifice, so elaborately described in the *Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra*, IV, 8. In sūtra 14 (or 15 acc. to the translator in SBE., Series) we are told:

> वैद्यं चरित्रवन्तं ब्राह्मणमुपवेश्य, सपलाशामार्द्रशाखाम्
> यूपं निखाय व्रतत्यौ कुशरज्जु वा रशने अन्यतरया यूपं
> परिवीयान्यतरयार्द्धशिरसि पशुं बद्धा यूपे रशनाया वा
> नियुनक्ति 'यस्मै नमस्तस्मै त्वा जुष्टं नियुनज्मीति' ॥

This passage has been translated by Oldenberg thus:—

'Having caused a Brāhmaṇa who is versed in learning and knows the practice (of this sacrifice) to sit down, having driven a fresh branch with leaves into the ground as a sacrificial post, (having taken) two creeping plants or two Kuśa ropes as two girdles, and having wound the one round the sacrificial post, and tied the other round the middle of the animal's head he binds it to the sacrificial post or to the girdle (which he had tied to that post) with (the formula), 'Agreeable to him to whom adoration (is brought), I bind thee.' It may be noticed that the implanted branch of the tree serves the purpose of the *Yūpa* and we also find in the *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra* (vi) a full description of how the selection of the suitable branch is to be made. But in later times, the *Yūpas* were apparently made of stone, as indicated by extant examples. In the device "Bull before a tree within railing," one of the commonest symbols in the indigenous tribal coins, we are tempted to find a hidden reference to the *Śūlagava* ceremony. It is not difficult to see why this particular rite should be adopted as a device on coins. Like the figure of Lakṣmī recognisable on so many indigenous coins, (which was also borrowed by some foreign rulers like Rajuvula and Azilises), it had some special reason for being reproduced on coins. The same *Gṛhyasūtra* informs us (iv. 8, 36); य एष शूलगवो धन्यो लोक्यः पुण्यः पुत्र्यः पशव्य आयुष्यो यशस्यः i.e. 'This spit-ox sacrifice procures wealth, (open) space, purity, sons, cattle, long life, splendour'. The

Yaudheyas had certainly special reason to associate their early coins with this particular rite. In these types of coins the name of the tribe is accompanied by an epithet which is correctly read by Rapson and Jayaswal as *Bahudhañake* (*Bahudhānyaka*). The *Mahābhārata* (Sahbāparva, 35, 5—Bombay edition) while referring to Nakula's conquest in the west says:

ततो वहुधनं रम्यं गवाद्य धनधान्यवत् ।
कार्तिकेयस्य दयितं रोहितकमुपाद्रवत् ॥
तत्र युद्धं महच्चासीत् सुरैर्मत्तमायूरकैः ।
मरुभूमिं सकार्तस्नेन तथैव वहुधान्यकम ॥

Bahudhānyaka came to denote a Sanskrit geographical term which was based on the enormous wealth and prosperity of the Yaudheyas.[4]

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4 Dr. Birbal Sahni has discovered a large number of seals and seal impressions at Rhotak, the Rohitaka of the *Mahābhārata* which were elaborately noticed by late Mr. K. P. Jayaswal, in the *Journal of the Bihar Orissa Research Society*.

COINS OF SĀTAVĀHANA KINGS



1 (Gautamīputra) Sātakarṇi (III); 2 (Vāsiṣṭhīputra) Puḷumāvi (II); 3 Sātakarṇi (IV); 4 Śiva-śrī-Puḷumāvi (III); 5 Skanda Sātakarṇi; 6 Yajña Sātakarṇi; 7 Vijaya Sātakarṇi; 8 Kumbha Sātakarṇi; 9 Karṇa Sātakarṇi; 10 Śaka Sātakarṇi; 11 Puḷahāmavi (Puḷumāvi IV).

A large Hoard of Sātavāhana Coins

A large hoard of Sātavāhana coins numbering more than 1500 has been discovered recently at Tarhāḷā, a village about 7 miles north by west of Mangrul, the chief town of the Mangrul *tāluka* in the Akola District of Berar. The coins were sent to the Nagpur Museum in October 1939. They have been thoroughly cleaned by the Coin Expert of the Meseum, Mr. M. A. Suboor, who kindly placed them at my disposal for publication.

The coins are of several kings of the Sātavāhana dynasty. They are struck in an alloy of copper, tin and lead to which numismatists have given the name of potin. All of them have the figure of an elephant with the trunk upraised and the name of the reigning king in Prakrit and the Ujjain symbol on the reverse. This is the second hoard of Sātavāhana coins to be discovered in the Central Provinces and Berar. The first one was found more than fifty years ago, in 1888, at a village in the Brahmapurī *tahasil* of the Chāndā District and is known to numismatists as the Chāndā hoard. The coins of that hoard which numbered only 183, were sent to the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, where they were examined by Dr. Hoernle. His report on them is published in the *Proceedings* of the Society for 1893, pp. 116-17. He found therein the coins of four kings, viz., Sātakarṇī, Puḷumāvi, Yajña Sātakarṇi and Kaṇu (Karṇa?) Sātakarṇi. He also noticed imperfect legends of three other kings whom he could not identify. The present hoard, which is much larger—perhaps the largest hoard of Sātavāhana coins discovered so far—is very important, as it contains the coins of several other kings and affords numerous specimens for study and identification.

This hoard contains the coins of the following kings, viz., Sātakarṇi, Puḷumāvi, Śivaśrī-Puḷumāvi, Skanda Sātakarṇi, Yajña

Sātakarṇi, Vijaya Sātakarṇi, Kumbha Sātakarṇi, Karṇa Sātakarṇi and Śaka Sātakarṇi. The legends on these coins contain the name of the reigning king with the title rājan in the genitive case prefixed to it such as *Raṇo Siri-Sātakaṇisa*. As in the case of the Chāndā coins, metronymics are altogether absent on these coins.

The first of the kings named above is plainly identical with Gautamīputra Sātakarṇi III who is known from the inscriptions at Nāsik and Kārle. Some of the coins exhibit the royal name as Sātakani with the dental *n* and that too with a curved base. These coins may, therefore, have been issued by another Sātakarṇi, perhaps Sātakarṇi IV (No. 24a in Pargiter's list).[1]

In the Chāndā hoard there was no coin which clearly exhibited the name of Śiva-Śrī-Puḷumāvi. Rapson was therefore doubtful if this king was represented at all in that hoard.[2] The name of Śiva-Śrī-Puḷumāvi was not known from any other coins. Recently Mr. M. F. C. Martin has stated that among the coins which he purchased from Mr. P. Thorburn, there is one from the Chāndā hoard which has the legend *Siva-Siri-Puḷumā* [*visa*] quite clear.[3] The present hoard has as many as 32 coins of Śiva-Śrī-Puḷamāvi, on which the royal name is unmistakable.

Skanda Sātakarṇi is mentioned in the Purāṇas as the son and successor of Śiva-Śrī-Puḷumāvi. His coins were found in the Chāndā hoard, but his name was wrongly read as *Ruḍa* by Rapson[4] and *Caḍa* by Vincent Smith.[5] The present hoard has more than twenty coins on which the name *Khada Sātakaṇi* (Sanskrit, *Skanda Sātakarṇi*) can be clearly read.

Yajña Sātakarṇi is of course the same as Gautamīputra Yajña-Śrī-Sātakarṇi known from inscriptions and coins. The coins of his

1 *Dynasties of the Kali Age*, p. 36.
2 *JRAS.*, 1903, p. 306.
3 *JASB.*, 1934, Numismatic Supplement, Art. 318.
4 *Coins of the Andhras* etc., p. 46, Pl. VII, 179.
5 V. Smith, *Catalogue of Coins in the Indian Museum*, p. 213, and Pl. XXIII, 24 (? 22).

son and successor, Vijaya, have not been reported before. In the Chāndā hoard, Hoernle found two coins with the fragmentary legend *-jño Va* or *rājno Va*.[6] They also probably belonged to this very king.

The names of Kumbha Sātakarṇi, Karṇa (Prakrit, *Kaṇa*) Sātakarṇi and Śaka Sātakarṇi do not occur even in the Purāṇas and are not known from any other source, inscriptional or numismatic. It is now plain that certain Chāndā coins which Rapson ascribed to Kaṇha or Kṛṣṇa Sātakarṇi,[7] belong really to Karṇa Sātakarṇi.

Finally, some coins in the present hoard have the legend —*Puḷahāmavisa*. This king Puḷahāmavi seems to be different from both Puḷumāvi and Śiva-Śrī-Puḷumāvi. He is perhaps identical with the last Puḷumāvi with whom, according to the Purāṇas,[8] the Āndhra dynasty came to an end.

V. V. Mirashi

6 *JASB.*, 1893, p. 117.
7 See his *Coins of the Āndhras*, etc., p. 48; *JRAS.*, 1903, p. 306.
8 *Dynasties of the Kali Age*, p. 43.

Symbols in Early Indian Jewellery

Jewellery is worn to adorn human body, and tastefulness forms the key-note in jewellery designs. Not unoften, however, such designs are met with in jewellery forms which neither convey any pleasing note nor display any artistic quality. In case of some of these, however, which are mostly stereotyped objects, a tendency towards making them adaptable in ornaments by characteristics such as polish, inlaying etc. is evident, but instances are not rare where ornaments are found to be grossly wanting in any such quality.

In the history of jewellery forms these designs have got a place of their own. They are traced in ornaments, almost all over the world from a very early age. The Cross in the west-Asiatic and European countries is a specific example of such use, and in India a number of such others can be traced. Most of these designs are associated with some common belief, magic or religious ideas and many have got deeply significant meanings.

Human belief in magic symbols contained in geometric or other designs is a very old one. In course of time probably, these designs came to be incorporated in portable charms and amulets so that the portents in them could be easily carried on persons. This gave rise to their coming into jewellery and forming parts of it.

In India such mysterious symbols are found to have been worn as jewellery from as early as the chalcolithic age. It is difficult to afford explanation for each and every symbolic design found in early Indian jewellery but a pursuit of the forms in themselves is an interesting one.

Symbols found in jewellery of the chalcolithic age are few and far between. Nothing being known about the religion of the chalcolithic people in India it is extremely difficult to associate any of the symbols found in chalcolithic sites with the popular belief.

But there are some symbols whose connection with some other well-known symbols found in other parts of the world can be easily established.

Jewellery of the chalcolithic age comes mainly from the excavated sites of Mohenjo-daro and Harappa. Of the symbols met with on these jewellery the most noteworthy are (i) a Maltese cross occurring on the bezel of a silver ring,[1] (ii) a heart shaped object made of gold and inlaid with faience[2] and (iii) two linear designs found on two ends of a band of gold.[3] The ring and the band hail from Mohenjo-daro, while the heart-shaped object was traced in a hoard containing various other jewellery in Harappa.

The Maltese cross is extensively met with in the Mediterranean countries and was also widely used in the early Indian cast and punch-marked coins. The purpose of its occurring on the bezel of the ring is not clear. It is known that in ancient world designs on rings were widely used for the purpose of putting impresssions on documents, but the cross, which was nevertheless a very common design, could not probably serve such a purpose and might have been used as a charm. The heart, hailing from Harappa is a neat little thing and might have in all probability served the purpose of a pendant in a string. The heart symbol was widely used in Mohenjo-daro as a decorative motif. The heart is one of the earliest symbols invented by man and its association with the common belief as a symbol of life comes down probably from the earliest days of human existence. In Mohenjo-daro it is seen to occur on animals represented on the seals evidently to mean life as was used by the cave dwelling people of Spain.[4] This shape of object is widely used in Bengal as necklace pendants even at the present age.

1 Marshall, *Mohenjo-daro* etc., p. 520, pl. cxlviii, fig. 13.
2 *ASI., AR.*, 1928-29, p. 76, pl. xxx, d
3 Marshall, *Mohenjo-daro*, p. 527, pl. cxviii, 14.
4 Von Herbert Kuhn, *Die Malerei Dereiszeit*, p. 42.

The symbols seen on the two ends of the band of gold, which was like other plain bands, worn as a fillet, closely resemble the object met with in almost all the seals, placed as an altar in front of the animals. Some have described it as a sacrificial altar, others as an incense burner. Sir John Marshall pointed out that it might be a cult object and in all probability, it may be said, the fillet with the cult object impressed on it, had some sacred bearing.[5]

Symbolic objects abound in Indian jewellery of early historic age. Here, some of the ornaments occurring on the earliest monuments will be noticed. Actual jewellery of the early historic period is rare, but there are ample evidences to prove that the Indians of this period had a great predilection for charms, amulets and jewellery with symbolic designs. The monuments of the early historic age, being mostly Buddhistic, they acquaint us with objects liked and venerated by the Buddhists. Buddhism, from its very beginning, brought several symbols and designs into close touch with the current social life. Many of these symbols were, however, existing in this country from an earlier age and the newly evolving religious faiths like Buddhism and Jainism adopted these to serve their purpose without any scruple. But Buddhism secured a most vital lease of life at this time and the zealous Buddhist devotees made an extensive use of the mysterious signs and symbols so much associated with their religious belief. It is no wonder that many of these symbols caught the fancy of the jeweller and ornaments having the shapes of various such designs found a ready appreciation among the devout Buddhists. The most venerated symbol of the Buddhists was the 'Triratna,' the symbol of the Buddhist trinity, Buddha, Dharma and Saṁgha. It was, however, not an exclusive property of the Buddhists and is often found to occur in Jaina objects also.

This symbol was readily incorporated in jewellery; it is found to have been used as ear-ornaments as is seen in Barhut and as neck-

5 Marshall, *Mohenjo-daro*, p. 69.

lace pendants, it occurs in Barhut, Sanchi and Mathura. The human figures of these monuments are found to wear various other curious symbols in their jewellery most of which surely had close connection with religious beliefs but the meaning of many of these cannot be brought out with any amount of certainty at present.

In some of these monuments there are figures which wear curiously composed ornaments exclusively from mysterious symbols. In the Buddhistic monument of Barhut the figure of Sirimā-devatā wears a curious necklace composed of two *pippal* tree leaves, two miniature elephant goads and a miniature 'triratna'. (Fig. 1). The symbolic meaning of the *pippal* tree leaves and the elephant goad is not clear. But the Buddhistic fervour of the whole monument leaves no doubt regarding a thorough Buddhistic association of the whole ornament which is further substantiated by the existence of the 'triratna' in it. The *pippal* tree reminds one of the great attainment of the Bodhi, and the elephant goad, as pointed out by Maisey, might have some connection with the white elephant and the dream of Māyā. The elephant goad and the *pippal* tree leaves are not infrequent in jewellery of this age but the 'triratna' had the fortune of coming into the most extensive use. The devoted jeweller tried his best to make it quite adaptable to the most artistic taste by putting various ingenious decorations on it. From the Barhut railings it appears that the 'triratnas' were used to be made of metal tubes and were profusely encrusted with small jewel-stones[6]

How far the zeal for symbolic ornaments can carry an artist, is evidenced by a pair of strings represented on the outer face of the north gateway, stūpa no. I at Sanchi.[7] These two strings occur as decorative devices on the face of the gateway along with a number of floral and jewellery strings, several of which again can be seen as worn by some of the human figures represented on the same

6 Cunningham, *The Stupa of Barhut*, pl. ix, fig. 11.

7 Maisey, *Sanchi and its remains*, pl. v, left.

monument. It may not be unreasonable to suggest that actual strings representing these curious ones had also been in use. One of these has got as many as eleven symbolic pendants while the other has thirteen, eleven of which are common to both. Besides the 'tri-ratna' and elephant goad already met with at Barhut, the pendants include spoked wheels, floral discs, battle axes, pairs of fish, round flat objects having necks which look more as miniature mirrors than as vases as suggested by Maisey, triangles with necks and projections, clusters of fruits or jewels etc.[8] (Fig. 2). There is apparently no attempt towards making the objects really attractive for wear. But instances of wearing extremely odd and inartistic objects are not rare among people having religious frenzy.

It is difficult to explain the inner significances of these symbols. Spoked wheels, pairs of fish, and triangles with necks and projections are quite common in early Indian cast and punch-marked coins[9] The floral shaped disc may have some connection with the Sun and bears resemblance with discs used in similar symbolic necklaces in ancient Iran. General Maisey, who made a strenuous effort to explain each and every symbol of these strings opined that these represented symbolic ornaments worn by the local monarch who made an offering of those to the deity worshipped[10] But I beg leave to point out here that the only object of worship of the people interested in the monuments of Sanchi was the Buddha. Maisey's suggestions are vague but nothing further can be said in this respect. The ornaments, however, hold a very curious position in the history of early Indian jewellery, and they deserve to be the subject of study with earnest attention and more weighty concern.

KALYAN KUMAR GANGULI

8 Maisey, *Sanchi and its Remains*, pls. xxxix, figs. 16 & 17.

9 *Ibid.*, pl. xxxix.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 19.

SYMBOLS IN EARLY INDIAN JEWELLERY



Fig. 1.



Fig. 2.

Proto-Indian Ceramics

The great importance for the study of proto-history of ceramics has been realised in the west, and, as is well known, the reconstruction of the story of pre-historic civilisations has been made possible by the scientific principles enunciated by Sir Flinders Petrie and Sir Arthur Evans. In India the excavations conducted hitherto (rather haphazard), have brought to light much material, but due to the lack of continuity, and local variations on account of many stages of culture in this vast country, a scientific classification has not yet been attempted. The excavations at Chanhu-Daro prove, according to Mackay,[1] the existence of three stages of culture on that site and since he has made an attempt to fix the chronology of the Harappa, Jhukar and Jhangar cultures, it is necessary to examine by a comparative study of pottery, whether his system of chronology can be taken as proved.

As a rough criterion of the evolution of the art of ceramics, the shape of pottery advances from the primitive ball of clay with a slight depression to models based upon basketry, gourds, leather vessels, chalices, beakers, ladles, spouted and handled vases, theriomorphic forms, tabular stands, twin-vases, wickerstands, stoppers, figurines etc. As regards colour, the earliest pottery sun-baked is generally brown and grey; pale, black, red, black and red, dark-grey, monochrome, polychrome and finally glazed. Of course this cannot be the invariable rule because of accidental colouring due to the composition of the clay; thus in Egypt, the Tasian ware is grey or black, due to uneven firing but blackened inside. At Merinde, it is generally black-faced and Badari pottery is brown or red and the rim and insides are blackened. The Nubian ware is black and incised, or white

1 *Bulletin of the School of Indic Studies,* Boston.

and incised following basketry and gourd models.[2] In Mesopotamia, the Al-Ubaid ware is grey with a fine slip of rich black and Uruk pottery is highly polished.[3] In Iran, seventy-feet below the temple of Manish-tushu (2450 B.C.) pale unpainted, hand-made and a few black, sherds have been found.[4] At Tell-Halaf, earlier than the famous polychrome pottery, a few monochrome black or. dark faced and burnished black sherds have been discovered. Thus in Egypt pottery of the earliest period begins grey-black and later red; in Asia with pale, often painted; in Anatolia the earliest was black or red monochrome and pale and painted as in Nineveh III.[5]

The red ware occurs in Badari, Nubia, Al-Ubaid, Musyan, Susa I.c., Halaf, I, Nineveh IV and Dabarkot (where fired red pottery occurs along with grey). Similarly Anau II ware has a red-mottled surface slip, occuring along with grey and black-ware. In Anatolia red or black monochrome is the earliest, whereas in Egypt red is later than black.

The mixture of black and red occurs in Tasian, Badari, Nubian, Amratian, Gerzean and Anatolic. The grey ware of Al-Ubaid has a black polish. At Fara, grey ware survives in the drab pottery of the Uruk period. Nineveh III, Hissar II and III, Anau II and Minyan ware of Anatolia have grey ware, probably intruding after the Halaf period. The pale ware at Al-Ubaid, Jemdet-Nasr, Nineveh I, Billah VI is often painted; but Asia continued the use of pale wares, often painted and not monochrome red or black as in Egypt.

Complicated patterns may generally be said to have begun with pale painted pottery, though a few simple geometrical designs occur

2 Childe, *New light on the Most Ancient East.*

3 Seton Lloyd, *Mesopotamia.*

4 *Ill. London News*, March 26th, Nov. 1932; Jan. 28th 1933.

5 Nōeldeke—*Uruk-Warka;* Childe, *New Light* etc.

in the earlier types also. In Egypt, the Gerzean red ware has white cross lines but in the late pre-Dynastic period painting dies out and only red and drab colours survive. At Al-Ubaid the earliest painted ware has black geometrical designs, especially the sigma as at Nal. Susa I has the colours applied directly on warm black and not on a slip and has the Svastika design. But Susa II and Musyan have red or dull-black designs on an yellowish slip. The designs include double-axes as at Jemdet Nasr and the Indian humped bull. Nineveh II has black or brownish red on unslipped surface. Halaf ware is painted warm-black, bright orange or red on a cream or buff slip; glazed as at Mycenæ. Tepe-Gawra and Billah, contemporaneous with Al-Ubaid and Samarra, have a warm purple or black colour on a green, buff, or creamy slip. The painted ware of Central Greece, the Black-Earth lands and the Danubian region is derived from Asiatic types.[6]

As regards polychrome pottery, Jemdet Nasr pots are painted plum-red on a heavy white slip, in broad bands, outlined in black. The registers are filled with red and the designs are chequers, lozenges, triangles, double-axes etc. On the Amri ware (supposed to be earlier than Harappa), warm-black or plum-red colours are painted on a pale pink slip as at Jemdet Nasr. The designs include chequers, triangles, double axes, lozenges, sigma figures as at Al-Ubaid. In technique, polychrome and designs, Amri ware resembles Jemdet Nasr. Susa II and Musyan have dull black applied on a yellow slip and the designs are semi-circles, wavy-lines, triangles, double-axes as at Jemdet Nasr. At Tepe Ali Abad birds, eagles, goats and Indian humped bull also occur. The Halaf poly-chrome ware is painted warm black, bright orange-red, sometimes white over black, with a genuine glaze paint. In the Indian and trans-Indian sites at Kulli and Mehi, the sigma, double-axe, and goats (as at Musyan, Elam,

6 Peake and Fleure, *Potters and Hunters.*

and Nineveh V), the humped bull and tigers, the sigma at Nal as at Amri are painted and the poly-chromy resembles Jemdet Nasr.

This rapid and brief review of the ceramic technique may be concluded by a stratigraphical diagram of the principal Mesopotamian sites.

Date	*Site*	*Pottery*
Al-Ubaid ware 4500 to 4000 B.C.	Susa I Samarra Al-Ubaid (Painted)	Plain incised ware—Nineveh and Arpachiya
Uruk ware 4000-3500 B.C.	Tell-Halaf Ur-red or grey (Khafaje)	Halaf (painted) Grey or black
Jemdet Nasr ware 3500-3000 B.C.	painted	painted
Early Dynastic ware	Reserved slip ware painted pottery, with animals	Nippur Telloh Susa II Fara

Coming to the pottery of the Indian and trans-Indian sites, some peculiarities of the Indus ware should be noted.[8] In spite of the vast distance between the sites of Harappa and Mohenjo-daro, no local variations have been observed. But the pottery of the smaller sites shows affinity with the more primitive cultures of the hill and lake dwellers near the Manchar lake. Wheel-turned pottery is the general rule and there are very few hand-made specimens. Controlled firing is seen, and circular kilns with under-ground heating arrangement and provided with flues have been found. It is assumed that the red slip is due to ochre imported probably from Ormuz. Another remarkable feature is the entire absence of handled pottery, so prevalent in Egypt and Mesopotamia. Again in the designs there is no human figure or human organ. The knobbed ware has parallel at Tell Asmar and Khafaje, the fast wheel was employed and pale or pinkish red colours were common. But controlled firing

8 K. N. Dikshit, *Prehistoric Civilisation of the Indus Valley.*

was employed sometimes to produce grey Uruk types. Possibly the earlier stage is represented by dark or dark-grey ware, sometimes with red or cream slips. Stoppers as at Jemdet Nasr occur and spouts are found only in the shallow feeding bowls. Narrow necked jars and bottles with long necks or flaring mouths are conspicuously absent. In decorations, imprints of cord on a creamy slip as in Sumer and knobs, painted black over dark-red as at Tell Asmar and Khafaje are observed.[9]

In the late M. D. poly-chrome ware, the black outlined patterns on a creamy ground are filled in with red, green or yellow. The Indus ware is unique in having black or red. The pale ware of M. D. has a comb design, probably a conventionalised bull.

Dr. Mackay after a study of the finds at Chanhu-Daro, has concluded that the dark-grey pottery, incised, and with a smooth and polished surface and no paint, belongs to the Jhangar type, probably belonging to a gipsy-like tribe. A triple cruet-like vessel has an analogy in South Beluchistan. Earlier than the Jhangar culture, the Jhukar culture with its painted pottery has no affinity with the still earlier Harappa culture. The colours employed by the Jhukar people were purplish-brown or purplish-black on a cherry-red or cream slip, the registers separated by broad bands of light or dark-red, edged by darker colour. Red and black on a cream slip between horizontal bands of red was also frequently employed as at Zayak and Tell Halaf. Dr. Mackay thinks that the Jhukar seals, with no legends but with designs of antelopes, flowers, stars etc. suggest Syro-Cappadocian influence but is inclined to dismiss the resemblance as fortuitous. In the Harappa levels, two of the uppermost were separated from the earlier (at least three) levels by sterile soil. Even these two levels are earlier than the uppermost levels of Mohenjo Daro—the pottery of which again is markedly different

9 Frankfort, *Tell Asmar, Khafaje and Ishchali.*

from Jhukar pottery. "Jhukar pottery resembles,—only in the designs and use of colours, not in the shape—those found at Tell Halaf in northern Assyria and Tell Chagar-Bazar......There seems no doubt that the pottery of the Jhukar culture has been influenced by the wares of Tell Halaf culture, and we must look to the Iranian Highlands for the region whence it was brought to India."[10]

Granting for the moment that Tell-Halaf influenced Jhukar culture and not *vice-versa,* the fourth and fifth cities of Chagar Bazar (3000-2700 B.C.) and Halaf maintained a close contact with Sumer and with Assyria.[11] The painted pottery (as at Nineveh-Tell Billah) becomes obselete after 2700 B.C. in Assyria, because the artisans of painted pottery were driven away eastwards into Iran and continued to work in Iran upto 2500 B.C. as at Hissar.[12] Hissar I (*c.* 3500 B.C.) has painted pottery—buff, hand-made, painted with geometrical and animal designs, allied to Elam and Susa I b. and in Hissar II as at Asterabad striped pottery occurs and in Hissar III (2000 to 1500 B.C.) painted ware completely disappears and is succeeded by grey ware, with lattice-like patterns. The offering-stand of the Harappa cemetry type is paralleled by Hissar. The lowermost layer in the cemetry at Harappa, where complete skeletons had been buried had flasks, water-bottles with narrow necks and trumpet mouths and in the upper level, where bones were preserved in jars, the large jars had flanges. Though the colour of pottery in both levels was pinkish or red and painted with black designs as on the earlier Indus ware, the forms and designs—stars, stylized peacocks and humped bulls, are different, and therefore may be assigned to the Jhukar style, (where also the devices are painted in black and red on a cream or pink slip) contemporaneous with or influenced by Tell-Halaf. Baron von Oppenheim is of the opinion that Tell-Halaf culture cannot be

10 *Ill. L. News,* November 21, 1936.
11 Mallowan: Brak and Chagar Bazar. *Ill. L. News,* 1935-38.
12 *Ill. L. News* March 26, Nov. 12, 1932; January 28th 1933.

later than 3000 B.C. and is due to Šubaraic-Hittite people.[13] The fair-haired Šubaraeans were the earliest settlers in Assyria and the Šubartu culture in the North Syrian sites as at Tell-Halaf, is distinguished by its poly-chrome pottery as at Carchemish, and Kafaje Genji of 4000 B.C., with funnel shaped necks, bulging jars, orange-red or black paint on a thick creamy slip, animal and bird designs and older than Jemdet Nasr pottery, and therefore the painted Uruk type was due to the Šubaraeans, who succeeded the earlier Al-Ubaid people in Mesopotamia and long before the black-headed Sumerians proper, came possibly from Elam or Arabia.[14] A dialect of Šubaraean was Ḫurri or Indo-Hittite spoken by the later Hittites, though it is said that the name of the original Hittite language was unknown. Hrozny[15] has read the pictographs of the original Hittites (or Šubartu) and finds some proper names:—Da-a-na-a-na-ś (Tyana); Gur-gu-m; A-ma-too (Hamath); Ir-hu-li-na (Irhuilna), God Ku-pa-pa (Cybebe) ^{m}Śa-ga-e^{r}-s (Sagaris); Ta-pa-sa-la-ā.[16]

Seton Llyod notes the existence of three races, the Martu or Amurru, a Semitic (?) people who colonised Akkad upto Šippar; the blond race from the north-east, the Šubaraeans who settled in Assyria upto the Persian Gulf; and the Bedawins from the deserts who already found in the land the black headed Sumerians, who had probably come from the hilly region of Elam.[17] Frankfort however, because of the continuity of culture at Al-Ubaid, Uruk and Jemdet Nasr thinks that there was only a single race—the Sumerians. Sydney Smith connects the Šubartu with the fair-complexioned Caucasian people who had migrated from the hills to the north and

13 Oppenheim, *Tell-Halaf.* 14 Sydney Smith, *History of Assyria.*

15 Hrozny, *Les Inscription Hittites Hieroglphique deciferment*, 1933. Gelb, *Hittite Hieroglphics.*

16 Hrozny gives the following names from the Carchemish Stele: Katuvas, son of Luhas and grandson of Astu Vatumajas; Aerars, Kamanes, Malia Tesupas, Asta Santajas, Vena Tesupas, Sagaris.

17 Seton Lloyd, *Mesopotamia.*

north-west of Assyria and came into conflict with the Sumerian black-heads, so that in the early Sumerian period, the population was predominantly Šubaraean, though the civilisation was Sumerian in character.[18] Hence the Šubartu people had already obtained a considerable degree of ascendency in Mesopotamia, before the Sumerians came from the East. They were also an eastern people of the Iranian and Caucasian high-lands and since Susa I (*c.* 3500 B.C.) and Halaf in Syria (*c.* 3500 B.C.) are Šubaraean, whereas Susa II shows Sumerian influence, it can be asserted that the Šubartu people migrated to Syria and Macedonia in the fourth millennium. If Syro-Cappadocian influence is seen in the Jhukar culture and if the polychrome pottery of the Jhukar period has analogy with Halaf, it is doing less violence to facts if we assume that in the fourth millennium B.C. a branch of these Šubartu folk was responsible for the Jhukar culture.

Regarding Frankfort's arguments as to the dating of the Indus finds in Mesopotamia, let us take first the two fragments of a cylindrical vase of green steatite on which a Sumerian is represented as seated before a building, in which a humped bull is standing near a manger. In a purely Mesopotamian setting, it is the rendering of an Indian cult of animal worship which was alien to the Sumerians themselves. It is clear that by about 3000 B.C. the Sumerians had adopted Indian cults but already the connection with India was difficult, because no Indian craftsman could have turned out such a clumsy figure of the bull and the Sumerian craftsman had to rely on crude copies whose original had long been lost. Similarly, at Khafaje, and at Tell Asmar, the cylindrical seal depicting a procession of elephant, rhinoceros, *ghariyal*, the carnelian beads, pottery with barbotine ornament, bone inlays of kidney shape, pottery drains, etc. are assigned to the period of Gimil Sin and his subordinate

18 Sydney Smith, *History of Assyria*.

at Eshnunna, in *c.* 2600 B.C. From this "precise" date it is argued that the Indus civilisation could not have existed earlier than 2700 B.C. It is acknowledged however that the Tell Asmar finds are crude imitations and artistically far inferior to the Indus specimens and on these copies (as on the Bull-vase of Tell Agrab) the Indian script is remarkable for its absence. If these cult objects were preserved in the Sumerian temples and worshipped as relics, without a proper understanding of the Indian religion, it is clear that the Sumerians of 2700 B.C. had already lost contact with India for a long time. Chanhu-daro, the great bead producing centre has its parallel in Brak, where a vast hoard of at least 40,000 beads of faience, carnelian and rock-crystal were found in the foundation of a building of 3100 B.C. It is proved that it was customary to sow the site with beads before a temple was erected.[19] Since at Chanhu-daro, in the Harappa levels few complete beads were found, it is assumed that all were exported probably to Mesopotamia. The kidney-shaped objects at Brak in black serpentine resemble those of Mohenjo Daro but the undersides are carved with antelopes and other designs, probably for divination. Similarly, Frankfort, discussing the pottery of the Jemdet Nasr period at Tell Asmar, Khafaje and Ishchali, notices a pottery vase with geometrical designs, on a shining red slip. The designs are painted on panels prepared with a special creamy white slip in black and red. "The actual age can only be guessed and should fall somewhere about 3500 B.C. according to the lowest reckoning."[20]

Other evidence as to the ante-dating of the Jhukar and Harappa cultures can be found in the pottery head-rest of Chanhu-daro and the "Sumerian" pottery head with deep-set eyes, small mouth and shaven hair of the Jhukar period, the coiled copper hair-pins, copper horse-shoe shaped razors etc.[21]

19 *Ill. L. News*, October 22, 1938.
20 *Ill. L. News*, September 14, 1935.
21 *Bulletin of the Boston Museum.*

The priority of the Amri culture[22] with its thin pottery painted with designs in black and chocolate or plum-red on a matt surface of pink or creamy pale is proved by the analogy of Al-Ubaid which is not Sumerian but "Elamite" according to Campbell-Thomson, Japhetite or Šubaraean according to Speiser.[23] Similar thin and fragile pottery with designs (including Svastika, battle-axes, bulls and even the h o r s e-stylised into mere decorations) is found in Susa I. a. which according to Frankfort is the parent of Susa I. Nal and Nundara culture is derived directly from the Amri and is distinct from the Harappa type. Peake inclines to the diffusionist theory and thinks that the idea of decorating pots with a coloured slip was disseminated from a common source. The provenance of painted pottery from North Syria to Susa, Anau, Iran, Beluchistan, Sindh, Punjab and China shows a continuity of culture with perhaps India as the original home. The excavations at Buxar[24] and near Gauhati seem to promise that the Gangetic and the Brahmaputra Valley might indeed prove to be the original home of this widespread culture. As far as South India is concerned the excavations at Paiṭhān,[25] Candravaḷḷi and other sites show no poly-chrome pottery, though there are some vessels with a few simple designs. This is in accordance with the lack of evidence of a copper age. At Paiṭhān copper, bronze, brass and glass articles are found along with iron and the argument from the terra-cotta figurines can have no validity.

To summarise the arguments from ceramics, it is safe to conjecture that the Amri culture was the parent of the Nal and Nundara cultures in India and of Susa I which was the parent in its turn of the Al-Ubaid culture, the earliest in Sumer. The discovery of the stylised horse in Susa I and of the horse-saddles in some of the lowest

22 Childe, *New Light.* 23 Speiser, *Tepe Gawrah Excavations.*
24 Bannerji-Sastri, in *Päṭhak Comm. vol.*
25 *Indian Arts and Letters*, xii, no. 2.

levels of Mohenjo Daro shows that the horse must have migrated westwards from north-western India. As said above the smaller sites in the Indus Valley have been influenced by Nal and Nundara, whereas Harappa culture follows a slightly different tradition. Above the five or seven layers of Harappa culture and separated from it, there is the Jhukar culture which influenced the Tell-Halaf culture in far away Northern Syria as early as 3500 B.C. This culture is probably Šubaraean. Casson has proved that Troy cannot any longer be considered to be a western out-post of the Minoan civilisation but is probably Ḫurrian or proto-Hittite.[26] The excavations at Cyprus and Crete have shown that the red polished bronze-age pottery assigned to *c.* 3500 B. C. has close resemblance to that of North Syria and Mesopotamia, according to Dr. Gjerstad. Therefore the almost static civilisation of Harappa must be dated at a conservative estimate as the fifth millennium B.C. and the Jhangar culture may be placed after the Jhukar culture had disappeared in *c.* 2700 B.C.

To these arguments from ceramics may be added some other considerations about the originators of this culture. I have long ago expressed the view that the arguments put forward by Marshall and others as to the non-Aryan authorship are baseless and that the culture might be Aryan.[28] The argument of some of the protagonists of the theory of the priority of Ṛgveda to Harappa culture[29] is invalid because as I have shown, the expressions "s a h a s r a m m ē d a d a t ō á s ṭ a k a r ṇ y a h" "a ṣ ṭ a k a r ṇ i g a u h" and "Akṣara" in Ṛgveda I.164.94 and IX.13.3. The symbol of

26 Casson, *Archæology upto now.*

27 Pendlebury, Excavations in Crete, *Ill. L. News,* March 5 1938, Excavations in Cyprus, *Ill. L. News,* 1935-36.

28 And not necessarily of Alpine Caucassian or Nordic race *Q.J.M.S.,* 1931, *Journal of the Kannada Academy,* 1933; *Vichāra Vāhini,* 1938; *Prabuddha Karnātaka,* 1938.

29 L. Sarup: *Gaṅgā,* 1933. *Ind. Cul.,* October, 1937.

m i t h u n a in the Atharvaveda (IX. 141) and in the *Maitrāyaṇīsaṃhitā* (VIII. 2. 6) clearly imply the existence of symbols for numerals and sounds. Prof. S. V. Venkatesvara has shown that Ṛgvedic culture is of the neolithic times because of the use of bone, stone, and wooden implements in sacrifices and that copper was a late intruder in the period of the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* whose culture was chalco-lithic.[30] E. J. Thomas mentions the necessity for a chronological foot-hold, possibly to be found in the Boghaz Kaya and Mitanni records of about 1500 B.C. But we can tentatively say that the references to the Martu or Amarru and Šubartu as the earliest colonisers of Syria, Assyria and Sumer and to the black-headed Sumerians who are said to have gone to Mesopotamia from Elam or Arabia can be corroborated from the Ṛgveda. The v i ś ā h a ś i k n ī h of the Vedas are the black or black-headed and brown-complexioned so-called Sumerians, though scholars have hitherto blindly accepted the suggestion that they are the aboriginal Dravidians. Both the Sumerians and the Dravidians can in no sense be called a n ā s a but *anāsa* may be taken to mean either 'shameless' speaking the nasals indistinctly (m ṛ d h ṛ v ā c i). But the Dravidian theory of Heras is unconvincing and opposed to the laws of Dravidian philology.[32] No connection has been proved between the phallic cult and Rudra-Śiva worship in the Vedic period. Therefore the so-called Sumerians might really be an Indian people who migrated to Elam and from the plains of Assyria to Mesopotamia, because Susa I is the parent of Al-Ubaid culture according to Frankfort. But even before their colonisation of Mesopotamia there were two other elements that had preceded them viz. the Šubaraeans and the Martu. It is tempting to identify the Šubaraeans with the Söbharis or Saubharis and the Martu with the Marut people. Max

30 *Ramakṛṣṇa Com. Vol., Aryan Path* 1930-31.
31 *I.H.Q.*, Winternitz Memorial No. 1938.
32 Alan S. C. Ross, Numerals of M.D. *Memoirs Ar. S. I.* no. 57.

Müller[33] collected all the imporant hymns about the Maruts and showed how at first they were mortals who first resisted the Indra cult. They were people of the mountains, their chariots were drawn by horses, the bridle passing through the nose; they are called the sons of Sindhu or of Rudra and Pṛśni. They crossed many mountains and rivers also, the Śarayanāvat, Susomā, Ārjīkiya and Pastyāvat countries; they were clothed in flounced or speckled woollen cloths. Rasā, Amitabhā, Kubhā, Krumu, Saraṇyu and Sindhu could not delay their chariots. They had knives or daggers of metal (v ā ś i, a r a) and carried K o ś a s in their chariots, the axle of the chariots was one with the solid wheels, so that it also revolved along with the wheels. The Maruts deserted Indra in the fight with Ahi, and Indra disputed the rights of the Maruts for divine honours. They were also at first the enemies of the Sobharis. The Sobharis shot arrows from their bow-strings at the golden chests (K o ś a) in the war chariots of the Maruts. Later the Saubharas are themselves called Maruts. The Maruts are dwellers in the mountains (g i r i ṣ ṭ h a) and in the a ś v a t t h a which implies also horse-stables and the western country. By these references it is clear that the Maruts and Sobharis were early adventurous tribes who migrated westward from India crossing many rivers and mountains and they were followed by the black-headed so-called Sumerians (V i ś ā h A ś i k n ī) whose original home might have been near the river Aśiknī and the northern mountains.

These considerations therefore force us to conclude that the Harappa culture cannot be brought down to such a late date as 2700 B.C., when the Jhukar culture itself has to be assigned to the Tell-Halaf period (3000 B.C.).

S. Srikantha Sastri

33 *Vedic Hymns*, vol. I, *S.B.E.*

Rūpamaṇḍana and the uncommon Forms of Viṣṇu

Abnormal in Indian Art

To the average uninitiate of the West, Indian art, particularly the figures of gods and goddesses like Viṣṇu, Śiva, Hari-Hara, Trimūrti, Ardhanārīśvara, Kārtikeya and Durgā in their numerous poses and functionings with their activities and qualities symbolised as hands, heads, weapons and *mudrās* appear a little out of the common if not uncanny or monstrous and do not yield that pleasant feeling of intellectual repose which they derive by gazing at a figure of Apollo or Venus d'Medici: whereas in the case of an Indian, their importance as religious objects for adoration and devotion is intensified by this very fact of extra limbs and weapons, and serves to focus his mind better as a preliminary to his enraptured ideal of silent contemplation. The uncommon or the out of way images of Viṣṇu such as Vaikuṇṭha, Ananta, Trailokyamohana and Viśvarūpa are the instances in point, not to mention the twenty-four varieties of the four-armed Viṣṇu.

Varieties of Hindu Icons in Rūpamaṇḍana

The text of "Rūpamaṇḍana" by Sūtradhāra Maṇḍana (15th century A.D.) records many varieties of Brahmanical images—such as those of Viṣṇu, Gaurī, Hari-Hara and others and they deserve to be studied thoroughly with the help of actual images that are very likely to be met with scattered over Western India, which ranges from Mt. Ābu in the north to the Elephanta Caves in the south covering the rich and extensive tracts of river-valleys—those of Sarasvati, Sābarmati, Mahi, Narmadā and Tāpti which fostered civilization and culture of the mediaeval Hindu India.

Latitude to sculptors and local varieties

The remarkable feature of Indian art that strikes even a casual student is the unchanging continuity of its traditions throughout

the course of centuries. Whether it be architecture, sculpture, painting or music the age-long traditions continue to exercise their dominating influence. The tradition in Hindu iconography is established and scrupulously guarded by the various compilations of the *Śilpa Śāstra*, the only latitude allowed being local varieties of the standard forms. The abnormal varieties in the forms of Viṣṇu in Gujarāt introduced through this paper are mainly due to this latitude and deserves attention of the students of Hindu iconography.

Sūtradhāra Maṇḍana: author of the Rūpamaṇḍana

Both Maṇḍana and his father Śrīkṣetra were under the patronage of Mahārāṇā Kumbhakarṇa, the celebrated king of Medapāṭa (Mewār), and an outstanding personality of the middle of the 15th century (reigned 1419-1469 A.D.). Rāṇā Kumbha was a distinguished hero, a man of letters and a noted builder of monuments. His *Kumbha-meru-prāsāda* at Chiṭor is well-known. It therefore stands to reason that Mahārāṇā Kumbha should be a patron of architects and sculptors just like king Bhoja of Dhārā to whom goes the credit of the compilation of the *Samarāṅgaṇa-sūtra-dhāra*, a work on mediaeval architecture, and like king Someśvaradeva who compiled his *Mānasollāsa* or *Abhilaṣitārthacintāmaṇi*, an encyclopædia on useful topics.

Maṇḍana's handbooks on Architecture and Sculpture

Thus it is evident that Maṇḍana's handbook on architecture and sculpture enjoyed considerable popularity with artists and craftsmen. Maṇḍana seems to have been a prolific writer of treatises on architecture and scuplture. The following is a list of works ascribed to him, the title ending with his name, viz: *Vāstu-maṇḍana*, *Prāsāda-maṇḍana*, *Rājavallabha-maṇḍana*, *Rūpa-maṇḍana* and others like the *Rūpāvatāra* and the *Ḍevatāmūrti-prakaraṇa*.

Popularity of his works

Maṇḍana's works seem to have enjoyed wide popularity throughout the length and breadth of India. In the unique library of Kavīndrācārya, (a Deccani Brahmin, and a very learned man, the head of the Paṇḍit community of Benares of his time, 17th century, who, however, ultimately took sannyāsa), copies of Maṇḍana's works were deposited (vide *Kavīndrācārya Grantha Sūcī,* G.O. Series, No. 17). Thus within two centuries after compilation, we find copies of Maṇḍana's text deposited in Benares, the great centre of Indian culture. From Benares Maṇḍana's works were probably taken to other places, westwards as well as eastwards. Numerous ms. copies of his works are met with both in public and in private collections in Gujarāt, sometimes embellished with running translations in Gujarāti archaic prose. The abnormal forms of Viṣṇu (vide illustrations) are mentioned in his work *Rūpamaṇḍana* alone and in no other text extant on Hindu Iconography in India.

Seated Viṣṇu images with hands more than four

The groups of seated images of Viśṇu with either eight, ten, twelve, fourteen, sixteen or twenty hands is peculiar to Western India sculpture only. The formula and description of these images are found in the Śilpa-texts of Maṇḍana—the *Rūpamaṇḍana* and the *Devatāmūrti-prakaraṇa*—and nowhere else.

It appears, however, that the *dhyānas* of such rare and unusual forms of images were subsequently modified or amplified in consideration of novel creations of their age. Hence no specimen of twelve-armed Viṣṇu has so far been traced by me; whereas specimens of ten-armed and fourteen-armed images—not noticed in any text,—are found to be not so rare.

Increase of hands from two to twenty.

One is led to think that from the original form of two-armed Viṣṇu developed many other icons, mostly according to the indi-

vidual tastes and conception of the authors and sculptors or the donors of such images. When the worshipper thought that his god did not look powerful enough, he thought of him in terms of innumerable hands, and thus came into vogue the variety of forms of the same god Viṣṇu. Varieties peculiar to the *Rūpamaṇḍana* alone —the twenty-four forms of four-armed Viṣṇu, the six-armed Hari-hara-pitāmaha or Dattātreya, the eight-armed Vaikuṇṭha, the ten-armed un-named form, the twelve-armed Ananta, the fourteen-armed variety probably of Ananta (however unnamed in the texts), the sixteen-armed Trailokyamohana and the twenty-armed Viśvarūpa,—show the gradual growth in the complexity of the idea about the image of Viṣṇu.

Śilpa-texts and stereotyped forms

Whether the texts induced the different types of images, or the types of images created the texts is difficult to ascertain. The former is however more probable in the case of Hindu gods and goddesses; for we find, that after a few centuries of remarkable growth and artistic spontaneity Hindu icons seem to be stultified and stereotyped through the disposition of the Śilpa-texts. This phase is marked by the appearance of a vast amount of Śilpa Śāstra works starting with the *Bṛhat Saṃhitā* of Varāhamihira (4th century A.D.).

Decadence in Art

Just as Hindu Kāvya (poetry) degenerated with the appearance of the formal Alaṃkāra literature (*Ars Poetica*) from *Kāvyādarśa* to *Sāhityadarpaṇa* and *Rasagaṅgādhara*, so the appearance of *Śilparatna* and *Śilpasāra*, *Śilpasaṃgraha* and *Mānasāra*, *Aparājita-pricchā* and *Rūpamaṇḍana*, signalised the stereotypization of Hindu iconography. It came to be more a matter of definition and faithful execution than of spontaneous creation, hence a lack of artistic urge in later copies of beautiful originals.

Artistic peculiarities of Gujarāti Sculptures

The artistic peculiarities of Gujarāti sculptures bear a close resemblance to the specimens of Bengali and Orissan sculpture. The delicate ornamentation, artistic expression, boldness of outline, definiteness of detail, and the pleasing effect produced on the mind of every onlooker make the images of this mediaeval period the product of the best days of Hindu art, particularly in Gujarāt.

From the Viṣṇu images introduced through this paper one will be able to see for himself that they are beautifully and yet delicately ornamented, and the expression of the face is natural, serene and peaceful (*saumya*). The form of the body, the garments, the various objects, symbols and ornaments are found depicted faithfully according to the texts; yet the hand of the artist is always there.

Times fostering Fine Arts

This was possible because Gujarāt enjoyed political tranquility during the reign of the Solaṅki kings—Mūlarāja, Bhīmadeva, Siddharāja, Kumārapāla, and kings of the Vāghelā branch: Vīradhavala, Viśala-deva and Sāraṅga-deva; though occasionally it was disturbed by the inroads of Muslim iconoclasts. Accordingly art, literature, trade, etc. could flourish well in the province. On casting a glance at the contemporary currents of Mediaeval Art in India, we find, that its best period ranged from the 9th century onwards to the 13th century before the general conquest of the various provinces by the Mahomedans, when the Hindu artistic talent got a set back and soon degenerated into a decadent art. This is the same period when the Pāla and Sena schools of art flourished in Bengal and the Utkala and Kaliṅga schools in Orissa.

Materials for Western School of Sculpture.

Hence we find that Gujarāt is veritably a rich mine of archaeological remains and deserves to be stuided as an art-province which

has a dialect of its own, although it is not unrelated to that of the contemporary currents in the other branches of the so-called "Western School of Indian Sculpture". From the beautiful specimens of sculpture that are coming to light, one is led to believe that Gujarāt of the palmiest days of rule by the Solaṅkis and the Vāghelās—say from the 10th century to the end of the 13th and a few centuries later,—had fostered the growth of a remarkable provincial school of sculpture.

Living tradition of Sculpture in Gujarāt

That the technique of sculpture in Western India, as found enunciated in the *śilpa*-texts of Sūtradhāra Maṇḍana was a living art and the tradition was handed down to posterity even upto the beginning of the 19th century as a guide to actual execution is corroborated by the find of an omnibus volume of Ms. from the Ms. collection of Śrī Ḍāhilaxmi Pustakālaya, Naḍiād. The volume contains Gujarāti prose-renderings of the *Rūpamaṇḍana*, *Rūpāvatāra*, *Devatāmūrti-prakaraṇa*, *Vāstusāra* and *Vāstumañjarī*, with original Sanskrit texts of some of them. The following relevant extract is given to convey an idea as to the nature of these "notes" meant for guidance in actual sculptures:—

"वैकुंठमूर्तिः | गरुडासन करवा | अष्ट बाहु करवा | गदा खड्ग बाण चक्र जिमणीं हाथिं करवा | आगलि जिमणी पुरुषाकार नृसिंह करवा | बीजी पासा श्रीभूषा करवी | ..."

"कृष्णशंकर मूर्तिः | कृष्ण शंकर एक अंग करवा | दक्षिणांगे रुद्र | वामांगे कृष्ण | दक्षिणे जटाभार | वामे मुकुट | दक्षिणे कुंडल | वामे मकरकुंडल | दक्षिणे अक्षमाला त्रिशूल | वामे शंख चक्र करवा | "

Six-armed variety of Viṣṇu: Hari-Hara-Pitāmaha

The *Rūpamaṇḍana* describes[1] Dattātreya under the name of Hari-Hara-Pitāmaha. According to this authority, this image should

[1] "एकपीठसमारूढमेकदेहनिवासिनम् ।
षड्भुजं च चतुर्वक्त्रं सर्वलक्षणसंयुतम् ॥

have four faces, six hands and a single body made to stand on a *pīṭha*. The right hands should carry the *akṣamālā*, the *triśūla* and the *gadā*, while the left hands should be made to hold the *kamaṇḍalu*, the *khaṭvāṅga*, and the *cakra*. We can easily recognise in these six articles carried in the hands of Hari-Hara-Pitāmaha that the *akṣamālā* and the *kamaṇḍalu* are emblematic of Brahmā, the *cakra* and the *gadā* of Viṣṇu and the *triśūla* and the *khaṭvāṅga* of Śiva. This variety has been noticed by T. Gopinath Rao in his *Elements of Hindu Iconography*, vol. 1, part 1, p. 255-56; but has not been able to illustrate it. (Plate I).

Plate I—illustrates an image of Hari-Hara-Pitāmaha from a temple in Pāṭan (North Gujarāt).

Tendency to add a set of two hands noticeable

The idea evidently is that Dattātreya is an incarnation of all the three deities of the Hindu Trinity; although in a special sense he is an incarnation of Viṣṇu in particular. However, it should be noticed that this composite form has been described in the chapter—not on Viṣṇu-images but on Śiva-images, along with other composite forms like Hari-Hara, Umā-Maheśvara and the like. The forward march in the addition of hands from the two of Viṣṇu-Sūrya to the four in the twenty-four varieties of four-armed Viṣṇu has shown a tendency to go on adding a further set of two hands in the composite form of the Trinity—I mean the Hari-Hara-Pitāmaha. The same tendency to go on adding a new set of two hands to the six-armed variety will be noticed while describing the form of eight-armed Vaikuṇṭha.

अक्षमालां त्रिशूलं च गदां कुर्याच्च दक्षिणे ।
कमण्डलुं च खट्वांगं चक्रं वामभुजे तथा ॥
—रूपमण्डने, अध्याय ४, श्लो. ३२, ३३.



Plate I

(6-armed Viṣṇu)
Hari-Hara-Pitāmaha

Plate II

(8-armed Viṣṇu)
Vaikuṇṭha

Plate III

(10-armed Viṣṇu)

Plate IV

(10-armed Viṣṇu)



Plate V

14-armed Viṣṇu
(A form of Ananta)

Plate VI

14-armed Viṣṇu
(A form of Ananta)

Dhyāna of Vaikuṇṭha

The description of Vaikuṇṭha in the *Rūpamaṇḍana* (Adh. III, Śls. 52, 53) is as under:—"Vaikuṇṭha I shall now describe, who is eight-armed and very powerful, rides on Garuḍa and is four-faced and should be made by those who desire peace. In the four right-hands should be placed the *gadā*, sword, arrow and *cakra;* and in the four left hands, the *śaṅkha, kheṭa* (stick), bow and lotus."[2]

Actual sculptures of 8-armed Viṣṇu

In the actual sculptures of Vaikuṇṭha, (illustrated here from an image in North Gujarāt), however, some change either in the order of the hands or in the nature of objects held by them is found. In *Plate II,* the fourth lower right-hand holds *śaṅkha* instead of *cakra,* as in the text, with a similar change of *cakra* in place of *śaṅkha.* The two faces on two sides of the face are not quite visible through the photograph, though they do exist. Viṣṇu is seated on Garuḍa. The round face of the image with a negligible chin is remarkable in this as well as in many of such images.

Actual Sculptures of 10-armed Viṣṇu

Goddess Pārvatī is commonly known as *daśa-bhujā*, purporting to hold sway over the ten directions. Similarly a kindred variety of Viṣṇu with 10 hands appears to have been conceived by sculptors and donors; and two specimens are located in the collection of the Prince of Wales Museum, Bombay, having been acquired from Taibpur, a village near Kapaḍvañj in Kairā Dist., (Central Gujarāt).

2 वैकुंठं च प्रवक्ष्यामि सोऽष्टबाहुर्महाबलः ।
ताक्ष्यासनश्चतुर्थश्च कर्तव्यः शान्तिमिच्छता ॥
गदां खड्गं शरं चक्रं दक्षिणे च चतुष्टयम् ।
शंख खेटं धनुं पद्मं वामे दद्याच्चतुष्टयम् ॥"
—रूपमण्डने, अ० ३, श्लो० ५२, ५३.

The two sculptures illustrated here (*Plates III & IV*) are almost identical in style, although there is a remarkable variety in the execution of the *mukuṭa*. The size of the image, which forms a part of a long panel is about 2 feet. They appear to belong to a period not later than the 14th century.

Palpable addition of two hands representing Yoga-mudrā

In this form, two front hands are in *Yoga-mudrā*, as in the case of 12-armed, 16-armed and 20-armed icons. Addition of two hands in *Yoga-mudrā* is the connecting link between the Vaikuṇṭha-variety on the one hand and the Ananta, Trailokya-mohana and Viśvarūpa on the other. Of the rest, the four hands on the right, beginning with the lower right are respectively in *varada-mudrā*, holding sword and wheel, and in *abhaya-mudrā;* those on the left have respectively a *kamaṇḍalu*, a citron, *gadā* and *abhaya-mudrā*. It appears to be a development of Vaikuṇṭha-form, as we find a similar development of Ananta in the 14-armed specimens.

Dhyāna of Ananta

Ananta has several forms and is conceived to be endowed with almost all the divine powers (*Śaktis*). "The image of this deity should have twelve hands and four faces, and should be seated on Garuḍa. One of the right hands should be in the *varada* pose, and the remaining five should carry the *gadā, khaḍga, cakra, vajra* and *aṅkuśa*, in the left hands should be held the *śaṅkha, kheṭaka, dhanus, padma, daṇḍa* and *pāśa*." *Rūpamaṇḍana* (Adhyāya III, verses 58, 59).

No specimen of 12-armed Viṣṇu

In spite of the injunction of the text for designing twelve hands for Ananta-mūrti, not a single specimen has so far come to my notice. We have instead an addition of two hands, one on each side in this type of image, with profuse variation in the

order of the objects and the side of the hands holding them. May be the protector of the 14 worlds (*loka*) might have been conceived to have an equal number of hands!

Actual Sculptures of 14-armed Viṣṇu

Plate V—illustrates a very beautiful piece of Gujarāti sculpture, found from the valley formed at the confluence of Sābarmati with Hāthmati in north-east Gujarāt, and is one of the finest of sculptures both from the aesthetic and the artistic points of view. It is now lying in a niche in the newly built temple of Koṭyārka in Khaḍāt-Mahuḍi village in Vijāpur Tāluka. The serenity of the face and the exquisite workmanship of the sculptor compels admiration for this skill. The three-fourths profile instead of the flat frontal pose so common in sculptures of gods and goddesses and even of Tīrthaṅkaras and of Buddha, makes it a piece of genuine art. It has two other faces on either side, the fourth being imagined at the back. Viṣṇu is seated at ease on Garuḍa, who is represented here in human form.

Stylistic differences and the quality of Art.

Plate VI—gives another specimen of a 14-armed Viṣṇu, with almost identical objects and symbols. The three-facedness of the image is clearly visible from the photograph. Even though this image is identical to the one described above, its aesthetic value and the quality of art and craftmanship differ a great deal. The second specimen is a formal execution of the sculptor, without any emotion. Even though it is actually in worship in a temple in Pāṭan (N. Gujarāt.) there is no expression on the face, and the whole execution is a tame affair. This suggests how the decadence in sculptural art had affected the level of craftmanship, and thus given rise to stylistic differences in two works, representing the same idea. The history of indigenous miniature-painting in Gujarāt affords a parallel to the art of sculpture in this respect.

Fourteen-armed variety of Viṣṇu

The 14-armed image of Viṣṇu, one is inclined to believe, is a very popular variety of the Ananta-form, which however has not been described in any text on iconography, uptil now known to us. Another, rather a conventional image of a 14-armed Viṣṇu from Ajmer Museum has been published by Mahāmahopādhyāya Gauri-śaṅkar Ojha (Lectures on '*Mediaeval Hindu Culture*' 1929). The progress from twelve hands to fourteen has a precedent in the ten-armed variety discussed above.

The third specimen from Saṇḍera, (*Plate VII*) a village in Siddhapur Tāluka, Baroda State Territory is a beautiful piece of sculpture. Viṣṇu is seating at ease on Garuḍa, with the left leg bent.

Miniature Viṣṇu-figure on the Head

The noteworthy feature of this icon is a miniature-figure of Viṣṇu on the top of the principal deity, and this shows the Vaiṣṇava origin of the deity. This suggests the influence of the Buddhist idea of the parental Dhyāni Buddha being placed at the top of the main deity, showing the origin of the deity or family to which the deity originally belonged. Thus in Buddhist images the miniature-figures of Akṣobhya, Amitābha, Ratnasambhava, Amoghasiddhi and Vairocana on the crown show that the main deity is an emanation of one or the other of the Dhyāni Buddhas and belongs to his family. We shall note this fact again later on while describing the sixteen-armed image of Trailokya-mohana.

Dhyāna of Trailokya-mohana

"The figure of Trailokya-mohana has double the number of hands that Vaikuṇṭhanāth has, i.e., sixteen. In six of the right hands are to be placed respectively the *gadā*, *cakra*, *aṅkuśa*, *bāṇa*, *śakti*, and *cakra* (?); the seventh right hand is to be in the *varada* pose; in seven of the left hands should be placed similarly the *mudgara*, *pāśa*, *dhanus*, *śaṅkha*, *padma*, *kamaṇḍalu* and

Plate VII
14-armed Viṣṇu
(A form of Ananta)

Plate VIII
(16-armed Viṣṇu)
Trailokyamohana

Plate IX
(16-armed Viṣṇu)
Trailokyamohana

Plate X
(20-armed Viṣṇu)
Viśvarūpa

Plate XI
(20-armed Viṣṇu)
Viśvarūpa

Plate XII
(20-armed Viṣṇu)
Viśvarūpa

sṛṅga (a horn); the remaining right hand and left hand are to be held in the *yoga-mudrā* pose."[3]

Actual Sculptures of 16-armed Viṣṇu

The two varieties of Trailokyamohana very well illustrate the *dhyāna* given in the text, however, with a few variations. *Plate VIII* is from the Viṣṇu temple at Vālaṃ, Vijāpur Tāluka (North Gujarāt). It has three visible faces, the front one looking like that of Nṛshiṃha. Some of the hands are broken. It is riding on Garuḍa as distinguished from the sitting-at-ease posture in the 14-armed variety discussed above.

The other specimens of the same Trailokyamohana variety (*Plate IX*) is from Sanḍera village, Siddhapur Tāluka. It was first illustrated in my paper on "Gujarāti or the Western School of Mediaeval Indian Sculpture", in the *Indian Historical Quarterly* for September 1938. It also has a miniature figure of Viṣṇu on the *mukuṭa*.

Dhyāna of Viśvarūpa, the 20-Armed Viṣṇu

The image of Viśvarūpa is remarkable for its iconographic peculiarities and its rarity. "It is four-faced and is endowed with twenty hands. He shows the *patākāmudrā*, ploughshare, *śaṅkha*, *vajra*, *aṅkuśa*, arrow, *cakra*, citron and the *varadamudrā*. In the left hands are shown the *patākā* (flag), *daṇḍa*, *pāśa*, *gadā*, sword, lotus, horn, *mūṣala* and rosary. Two other hands show the *yoga-mudrā*."[4]

3 "... ... ...अत्र त्रैलोक्यमोहनः ।
स षोडशभुजस्तार्क्ष्यारूढः प्राग्वच्चतुर्मुखैः ॥
गदाचक्रांकुशो बाणं शक्तिश्चक्रं वरः क्रमात् ।
दक्षेषु मुद्गरः पाशः शार्ङ्गशंखाब्जकुण्डिकाः ॥
शृंङ्गी वामेषु हस्तेषु योगमुद्रा करद्वयम् ।
नरश्च नारसिंहश्च शूकरं कपिलाननम् ॥"
—रूपमण्डने अ० ३, श्लो० ६०, ६१, ६२.

4 "विंशत्या हस्तकैर्युक्तो विश्वरूपश्चतुर्मुखः ।
पताका हलशंखौच वज्रांकुशशरांस्तथा ॥

Actual Sculptures of 20-Armed Viṣṇu

Out of the three specimens given here to illustrate the Viśvarūpa form of Viṣṇu, the sculpture (*Plate X*) is now at the temple of Koṭyarka, newly built in Khaḍāta-Mahuḍi village, Vijāpur Tāluka. It has three faces: and the position of the objects answers well the description quoted above.

The second specimen (*Plate XI*) is from Mehsānā, the head-quarters for Mehsānā Dist. two of whose principal hands holding *yoga-mudrā* are broken. The remarkable thing about this image is the third face to the left, which has a similarity to the face of man-lion.

Third specimen (*Plate XII*) is the image worshipped even to-day in the Nārāyaṇjī temple at Pāṭan, the awkward new enamel eyes, mustaches and the *tilaka* are easily marked out from the genuine workmanship in marble. The seated image is about 3.5 feet high.

Iconographic peculiarities

The Viśvarūpa image of Viṣṇu is remarkable for its iconographic peculiarities and its rarity in Indian sculpture. These images are made of marble which admits of fine workmanship; and hence occasional varieties in the position of objects in the various hands are met with. These iconographic peculiarities are the result of the stone material used by the sculptor, who fashions the objects according to his convenience. The Viśvarūpa image reminds us of the Viśvarūpa-darśana given by Lord Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna. It may

चक्रं च बीजपूरं च वरो दक्षिणबाहुषु ।
पताका दण्डपाशौ च गदाशाटोत्पलानि च ॥
शृंगो मूषलमक्षं च क्रमात् स्युर्वामबाहुषु ।
हस्तद्वयं योगमुद्रा वैनतेयोपरि स्थितः ॥
क्रमान्नर-नृसिंह-स्त्री-वराहमुखवन्मुखः ।”

—रूपमण्डने अ० ३, श्लो० ५५, ५६, ५७.

be that this variety might have had its suggestion from such references to the All-mighty form of Viṣṇu.

Viṣṇu images with four faces

Two types of Viṣṇu images according to the number of faces have been noticed. First type is a one-headed smiling figure with either two or four or even twenty arms. The second type represents him as having four faces as in the special forms of Viṣṇu: viz. Hari-Hara-Pitāmaha, Vaikuṇṭha, Ananta, Trailokyamohana and Viśvarūpa. These are faces of a man, a man-lion, a woman and a boar. (See plates mentioned above).

Order in the varying number of hands not suggested in the Rūpamaṇḍana

I have tried above to evolve and formulate a sort of an underlying order possibly at work in the development of the special forms of Viṣṇu, with the gradual addition of a set of two hands to every subsequent form. The order in which Maṇḍana describes them in chapter III on Viṣṇu Images is as under: Firstly, 8-armed Vaikuṇṭha (verses 52, 53, 54), then 20-armed Viśvarūpa (verses 55, 56, 57) then 12-armed Ananta (verses 58, 59) and then lastly 16-armed Trailokyamohana (verses 60, 61, 62).

Naturally we have no text to justify the order suggested by me above on the strength of actual sculptures; but it may be taken as highly probable.[5]

M. R. MAJMUDAR

5 It may be remarked, however, that all the icons illustrated in this paper are exclusively from North Gujarāt. Extensive tours, therefore, in ancient sites extending over the whole of Gujarāt, Kāṭhiāwāḍ and Cutch are bound to furnish numerous finds, rich in artistic value as well. I am indebted to the University of Bombay, whose sympathy and financial help enabled me to undertake a preliminary study of rare Hindu sculptures in Gujarāt.

Alexander's Invasion of India: a revised Study[1]

Alexander's cautious Advance eastward

After the collapse of the Achaemenian power in the battle of Gaugamela or Arbela in the spring of 331 B.C. and the burning of the magnificent palace at Persepolis in 330 B.C., Alexander formed plans to realise his ambition of conquering India, and thus outrivalling Herakles and Dionysos whose achievements were the subject of many a popular song and legend. Accordingly, unmindful of the rigours of climate and of the numerous other obstacles, Alexander set himself with his habitual foresight to the task of subjugating the lands that lay on his route in order to maintain free and uninterrupted communication with his distant base. He first occupied Seistan, and then emerged into the regions of southern Afghanistan, where "at a point commanding the roads" he founded a city called 'Alexandria-among-the-Arachosians', now represented by Kandahar. The following year, he appeared in the Kabul valley with his invincible hosts, but before he could direct his energies towards India he had to subdue Bactria and other adjacent territories, which upheld the Persian cause under a prince of the blood royal. Alexander found no difficulty in subduing them, and when all opposition was laid low, he recrossed the Hindu-Kush in ten days and arrived at the strategic outpost of 'Alexandria-under-the-Caucasus', which he had founded in 329 B.C., two years before his hurricane campaign beyond the mountains. He then advanced towards Nikaia, situated "between Alexandria and the Kabul river;"[2] here or somewhere "on the way to the river Kabul"[3] Alexander divided his army into two sections.

1 A paper submitted to the *Third Indian History Congress*, Calcutta.

2 *Cambridge History of India*, vol. I, p. 348. Smith locates Nikaia to the west of modern Jalalabad (*Early History of India*, 4th ed., p. 53), whereas Holdich puts it at Kabul.

3 *Cambridge History of India*, vol. I, p. 348, note 3.

One was placed under the command of his trusted generals, Hephaestion and Perdiccas, with instructions to go ahead and construct a bridge over the Indus for the safe passage of his forces; and the other was led by Alexander himself against the warlike tribes and recalcitrant chiefs of the frontier.

The Aspasioi routed

The Aspasioi (cf. Iranian *Aspa* or Sanskrit *Aśva* = horse) of the Alisang-Kunar valley were the first to be subdued by Alexander, who captured 40,000 men and 2,30,000 oxen, transporting the choicest among the latter to Macedonia for being employed in agriculture. Arrian (IV, 25), however, deposes that with these people "the conflict was sharp, not only from the difficult nature of the ground, but also because the Indians were.........by far the stoutest warriors in that neighbourhood."[4]

Nysa

Alexander next attacked the hill-state of Nysa, which probably occupied a site on the lower spurs and valleys of the Koh-i-Mor.[5] It was governed by a body of aristocracy consisting of 300 members, Akouphis being their chief. The Nysaens readily submitted to Alexander, and placed at his disposal a contingent of 300 cavalry. They claimed descent from Dionysos, and in proof of it pointed out that the ivy grew in their country and the mountain near the city was the same as Mêros. This gratified the vanity of Alexander, and he, therefore, allowed his weary troops to enjoy rest and Bacchanalian revels for a few days with their alleged distant kinsmen.

Defeat of the Assakenoi

Continuing his advance, Alexander defeated the Assakenoi (Sanskrit *Aśvakas* or *Aśmakas*, perhaps a branch of, or allied to, the

4 M'crindle, *Ancient India, Its Invasion by Alexander the Great*, p. 65.

5 *Early History of India*, 4th ed., p. 57, note.

Aspasioi), who opposed him with an army of 20,000 cavalry and more than 30,000 infantry,[6] besides 30 elephants.[7] Their main stronghold Massaga[8] was considered almost impregnable, being protected on the east by "an impetuous mountain stream with steep banks", while to the south and west nature had "piled up gigantic rocks, at the base of which lay sloughs and yawning chasms."[9] These natural fortifications were re-inforced by a deep ditch and a thick wall. The citadel appeared to baffle the military ingenuity of Alexander, but it could not hold out long after its chief Assakenos had been killed by a chance shot.[10] Thinking further resistance useless, his wife Kleophis[11] surrendered herself to Alexander, and it is said that as a result of their romance she subsequently gave birth to a son bearing the name of the great conqueror.[12] It is interesting to note here the part played by nearly 7,000 Indian mercenary soldiers in the defence of Massaga. We learn that Alexander guaranteed them safe passage if they evacuated the city, but when they had actually retired to a distance he suddenly fell upon them and made "a great slaughter of their ranks." Diodoros says that the Indian mercenaries at first "loudly protested that they were attacked in violation of sworn obligations, and invoked the gods whom he had desecrated by taking false oaths in their name."[13] To this, Alexander retorted that "his covenant merely bound him to

6 38,000 infantry, according to Curtius (VIII, 10; M'crindle, *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 194).

7 Arrian, IV, 26; *Ibid.*, p. 66. The siege of Massaga is put before the capitulation of Nysa by Arrian, and after it by Curtius.

8 Identification uncertain. Was it the same as Sanskrit Maśakāvatī? Vincent Smith places it "not very far to the north of the Malakand Pass (*E.H.I.*, 4th ed., p. 57).

9 Curtius, VIII, 10; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 195.

10 Arrian, IV, 27; *Ibid.*, p. 68.

11 Curtius, however, calls Kleophis the mother of Assacanus, who is said to have died before Alexander invested Massaga (VIII, 10, *Ibid.*, p. 194).

12 Justin, XII, 7; *Ibid.*, p. 322.

13 Diodoros, XVII, 84; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 269.

let them depart from the city, and was by no means a league of perpetual amity between them and the Macedonians."[14] Undaunted by this unexpected danger, the Indian mercenaries fought with great tenacity and "by their audacity and feats of valour made the conflict, in which they closed, hot work for the enemy."[15] When many of them had been killed, or were in the grips of deadly wounds, the women took the arms of the fallen and heroically defended the citadel along with the men. After fighting desperately they were at last over-powered by superior numbers, and in the words of Diodoros "met a glorious death which they would have disdained to exchange for a life with dishonour."[16] The episode, no doubt, reveals to us that India had her own Joans of Arc in those bygone times, but it does not speak well of Alexander's chivalry and sense of respecting agreements, and Plutarch rightly observes that it "rests as a foul blot on his martial fame."[17] After the fall of Massaga, Alexander advanced further, and in the course of a few months' hard fighting captured the important and strategic fortresses of Ora, Bazira, Aornos, Peukelaotis (Skt. Puṣkarāvatī, modern Charsadda in the Yusufzai territory), Embolima and Dyrta.[18]

Situation in North-Western India

Thus having subjugated the frontier regions and posted adequate Greek garrisons to maintain his authority there,[19] Alexander felt himself free to press onward to India. The odds were undoubtedly in his favour. The Panjab and Sind, which were to bear the brunt of his arms, presented the sorry spectacle of a disunited house.

14 *Ibid.* 15 *Ibid.*, p. 270. 16 *Ibid.*

17 Plutarch, Ch. LIX; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 306.

18 The identification of these places is not quite certain. Minor towns of the lower Kophen (Kabul) valley were occupied with the help of local chiefs named Kophaios and Assagetes (Aśvajit?)—Arrian, IV, 28; *Ibid.*, p. 72.

19 For instance, Nikanor was appointed satrap of the country to the west of the Indus, and Philippos was put in command of a garrison at Peukelaotis (*Ibid*).

There was no towering personality of the type of Candragupta Maurya, who successfully repelled the invasion of Seleukos Nikator two decades afterwards, but on the other hand north-western India was parcelled out into a number of states, monarchies as well as clan oligarchies, engaged in petty internecine feuds and jealousies, due to which some of them found their chance in seeking alliance with an alien aggressor. Indeed, the gates of India were, so to say, unbarred by the Rājā of Taxila, who lost no time in proffering allegiance to Alexander, and who also rendered every assistance to the advance body of the Macedonians under Perdiccas in bridging the Indus and securing the submission of the tribes and chieftains, like Astes (Hasti or Aṣṭakarāja?),[20] whose territories lay on their route.

Taxila and Abhisāra

About the beginning of spring 326 B.C. after offering the customary sacrifices and allowing his tired troops a short respite, Alexander crossed the Indus safely somewhere near Ohind (modern Und, a few miles above Attock), and was welcomed at Taxila by Omphis or Āmbhi,[21] son of the deceased Taxiles, with rich and attractive presents consisting of silver and sheep and oxen of good breed.[22] Gratified at these gifts, Alexander returned them, adding his own, and thus won not only the loyalty of the ruler of Taxila but also a contingent of 5,000 soldiers from him.[23] Similarly, Abhisares, the astute king of Abhisāra (Poonch and Nowshera districts), and other neighbouring princes like Doxares[24] surrendered to Alexander of their own accord, thinking resistance would be of no avail.[25]

20 The capital of Astes was stormed by Hephaestion in thirty days, and his principality was given to one Sang-gaios (Skt. Sañjaya)—Arrian, IV, 22; *Ibid.*, p. 60.

21 Sylvain Lèvi, *Journal Asiatique*, 1890, p. 234.

22 Arrian, V, 3, M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 83; Curtius, VIII, 12; *Ibid.*, p. 202.

23 Arrian, V, 8; *Ibid.*, p. 93.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 92.

25 Diodoros would, however, have us believe that Embisaros (Abhisares) had

Poros

However, when the latter reached the Hydaspes (Jhelum) he found the great Poros (Paurava?) on the other side of the river ready, no doubt, to meet him in response to his summons from Taxila, but at the head of a vast army eager for the fray.[26] Alexander finds it difficult to cross the stream, and there ensues a battle of wits between the two august opponents. Ultimately, the invader decided "to steal a passage" (Arrian), which he did with about 11,000 of his picked men near a sharp bend several miles up the river from his camp in the dead of night when a severe storm accompanied by rain and thunder had lulled the vigilance of Poros. Further, Alexander camouflaged his intentions and movements by leaving a strong force under Krateros in his camp and another with Meleager midway between it and the place where the river was crossed.[27] Detecting that he had been foiled in his attempt not to allow Alexander to land his troops on the eastern side of the Hydaspes, Poros despatched his son "at the head of 2,000 men and 120 chariots"[28] to obstruct the advance of his audacious adversary. The young Poros was, however, easily routed and killed by Alexander.

Alexander and Poros face each other

At last, Poros himself moved and put against Alexander 50,000 foot, 3,000 horse, above 1,000 chariots, and 130 elephants. In the centre, the elephants formed a sort of front wall, and behind them stood the foot-soldiers. The cavalry protected both flanks and in front of the horsemen were the chariots. As Alexander viewed the equipment of the Indian forces and their disposition in the Karri

made an alliance with Poros and was preparing to oppose Alexander (XVII, 87; *Ibid.*, p. 274).

26 Curtius, VIII, 13; *Ibid.*, p. 203.

27 Guards were also posted all the way to ensure free communication.

28 Arrian, V, 14; *Ibid.*, p. 101. According to Curtius, the detachment was commanded by Poros' brother, Hages (VIII, 14; *Ibid.*, p. 207).

plain,[29] he was constrained to remark: "I see at last a danger that matches my courage. It is at once with wild beasts and men of uncommon mettle that the contest now lies."[30] In the engagement which opened with the furious charges of the Macedonian horsemen, the Indians fought with great vigour, and, as Plutarch says, "obstinately maintained" their ground till the eighth hour of the day,[31] but eventually the fates went against them.

Causes of Poros' Defeat

The main strength of Poros lay in the chariots, "each of which was drawn by four horses and carried six men, of whom two were shield-bearers, two, archers posted on each side of the chariot, and the other two, charioteers, as well as men-at-arms, for when the fighting was at close-quarters they dropped the reins and hurled dart after dart against the enemy."[32] On this particular day, however, these chariots were of no use at all, for the violent storm of rain "had made the ground slippery, and unfit for horses to ride over, while the chariots kept sticking in the muddy sloughs formed by the rain, and proved almost immovable from their great weight."[33] Besides, owing to the slippery condition of the ground it became difficult for the archers to rest their long and heavy bows on it and discharge arrows quickly and with effect.[34] Furthermore, the Indian army was far too unwieldy to withstand the masterful manoeuvres of the mobile Macedonian cavalry, or the attacks of the disciplined phalanx-

29 *E.H.I.*, pp. 69, 88.

30 Curtius, VIII, 14; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 209.

31 Plutarch, Ch. LX; *Ibid.*, p. 308.

32 Curtius, VIII, 14; *Ibid.*, p. 207.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 208.

34 Arrian deposes that the bow "is made of equal length with the man who bears it. This they rest upon the ground, and pressing against it with their left foot thus discharge the arrow having drawn the string far backwards: for the shaft they use is little short of being three yards long.............." (*Indika*, Ch. XVI; M'crindle's *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian*, p. 225).

es. And lastly, the elephants, on whom Poros had put so much reliance, got frightened when the Macedonians began to hack their feet and trunks with axes and choppers. Thus the beasts fled from the field of battle "like a flock of sheep" and they spread havoc among their own ranks and threw their drivers to the ground, who were then trampled to death.[35] Whatever may have been the causes of this disaster, Poros, a magnificent giant of over six feet in height, did not shrink from the stress of battle, or abandon the field like Darius Kodomannos of Persia, but true to the injunction of Manu संग्रामेष्वनिवर्तित्वं (vii, 88) he stuck to his post in spite of the "nine wounds" that he had received, and continued hurling darts against the enemy with dogged tenacity, perhaps thinking to himself:

"With fame though I die, I am content,
Let fame be mine, though life be spent".

When Poros was ultimately captured and brought before Alexander, he was not at all "broken and abashed in spirit"[36] but boldly met him as one brave man would meet another brave man after a trial of strength, and he made the proud demand, "Treat me, O Alexander! as befits a king."[37]

35 Curtius, VIII, 14; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 211.

36 Arrian, V, 19; *Ibid.*, p. 109.

37 *Ibid.* In a recent paper (*Proceedings of the second Indian History Congress*, Allahabad, 1938, pp. 85-91), Dr. H. C. Seth of the Nagpur University has tried to show on the basis of a dubious passage occurring in the Ethiopic version of the *Life and Exploits of Alexander* (E. A. W. Badge's Translation, p. 123) that the great invader received his first set-back in the battle of Jhelum and he sought peace with Poros. It is difficult to appreciate the force of the learned Professor's observations, for firstly we do not know with certainty the date of the Ethiopic Text. Secondly, it utterly goes against the uniform testimony of all the five classical authors, and there is no reason to believe that they deliberately conspired to record what was untrue. Thirdly, if Poros was the victor, as Dr. Seth would have us understand, how could Alexander then advance right upto the bank of the Hyphasis. A consummate general like him would never have done so, if at the very gate of India he had to bow to the arms of Poros.

Re-instatement of Poros

Justin informs us that Alexander "out of respect for his valour restored him (Poros) in safety to his sovereignty".[38] Perhaps the chivalrous instincts of Alexander were to some extent responsible for the generous treatment he accorded to Poros, but there must have been stronger reasons as well, for politics hardly knows of any such magnanimity. In the first place, the stout resistance of Poros, which is further apparent from the high casualty list,[39] must have conveyed its own lesson to Alexander. The latter also knew that as he was hailing from distant Greece it was impossible for him in the very nature of things to compel all the conquered lands to continue rendering him obedience without enlisting local loyalty, assistance and co-operation. Then again, his ambition to found a permanent empire in the east largely remained unfulfilled, and it was, therefore, necessary for him to pursue a policy of conciliation, to adopt—so to say—the method of capturing wild elephants by means of tame ones. Accordingly, Alexander extended to Poros the olive branch of peace and friendship by re-instating him in his former dignity and sovereignty. And in doing so, Alexander was not only acting in consonance with the dictates of diplomacy and statecraft, but strangely enough he was also following the traditional policy of Hindu conquerors, advocated by Manu[40] and Kauṭilya,[41] of placing either the vanquished monarch or some scion of his family upon the throne instead of resorting to direct annexation.

38 Justin, XII, 8; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 323.

39 Diodoros says that 12,000 men were killed and 9,000 captured (XVII, 89; *Ibid.*, p. 276). According to Arrian, however, the loss in killed was 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry and all the chariots were broken to pieces (V, 18; *Ibid.*, p. 107).

40 Cf. Manu, सर्वेषां तु विदित्वैषां समासेन चिकीर्षितम् ।
स्थापयेत्तत्र तद्वंश्यं कुर्याच्च समयक्रियाम् ॥ (VII, 202).

41 Book VII, Ch. XVI, p. 313.

Foundation of two Towns

Alexander then founded two towns; one was called Boukephala after the name of his faithful charger which died in India,[42] and the other, Nikaia, meant to commemorate his victory, in the battle with Poros.

Defeat of the Glausai and younger Poros

Next, having propitiated the Greek gods, Alexander marched into the territory of a nation called the Glausai or Glaukanikai (=Sanskrit Glaucukāyanakas of the *Kāśikā*), taking thirty-seven of their cities "the smallest of which contained not fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, while many contained upwards of 10,000."[43] At this stage Alexander heard of revolts against him; Nikanor, the satrap of "India-West-of the Indus", was assassinated and Sisikottos i.e. Śaśigupta, who held the citadel at Aornos on behalf of Alexander, too sent urgent messages for help. The neighbouring satrap Tyriaspes and Philip, the 'Resident' in the Kingdom of Taxila promptly responded and thus averted any immediate danger to Macedonian authority. After the arrival of Thracian re-inforcements and the re-submission of the ruler of Abhisāra, Alexander crossed the Akesines (Skt. Asiknī or Chenab) and subdued the younger Poros, nephew of the great Poros. His territory, known as Gandaris,[44] as also that of the Glausai was added by Alexander to the kingdom of his quondam enemy—the senior Poros (Paurava).

Capture of Pimprama

By August 326 B.C. the Macedonian arms penetrated beyond the Hydroates (Paruṣṇi or Irāvatī i.e. modern Ravi), and Alexander won fresh laurels by capturing Pimprama belonging to the Adraistai (Ariṣṭas of Pāṇini ?).

42 Boukephala stood on the Hydaspes at a point where it was crossed.

43 Arrian, V, 20, M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 112.

44 Cf. Strabo, M'crindle's *Ancient India*, p. 37.

Sangala stormed

Soon afterwards Alexander invested Sangala, the stronghold of the Kathaians (Skt. Kaṭhas), who "enjoyed the highest reputation for courage and skill in the art of war."[45] Strabo, quoting Onesikritos, informs us that among the Kathaians beauty was highly valued and "the handsomest man was chosen as king."[46] Every child was examined by public authority two months after its birth to determine "whether it has the beauty of form prescribed by law and whether it deserves to live or not."[47] Men and women among them chose their own partners, and the wives burnt themselves along with their deceased husbands.[48] These Kathaians fought with great dash and stubbornness, so much so that even Poros came to the aid of Alexander with "a force of 5,000 Indians."[49] At last when the fortress fell no less than 17,000 of the defenders gave up their lives and more than 70,000 were captured together with 300 waggons and 500 horsemen.[50] This resolute resistance of the Kathaians incensed Alexander to such an extent that he razed Sangala to the ground. Then with a view to guard the rear he sent Greek garrisons to the conquered cities, and himself marched towards the Hyphasis (Beas) to realise his cherished dreams of planting the Hellenic standards in the easternmost ends of India.

The Greek army refuses to advance

But when Alexander reached the river, his ever-victorious troops, which had braved many a danger and privation so far, suddenly laid down arms and refused to go further for the sake of fame or plunder.[51]

45 Arrian, V, 22; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 115.
46 Cf. Strabo, M'crindle's *Ancient India*, p. 38. 47 *Ibid.* 48 *Ibid.*
49 Arrian, V, 24; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 119. 50 *Ibid.*
51 Plutarch, Ch. LXII; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 310; Arrian, V, 28; *Ibid.*, p. 127.

The Greek soldiers were war-worn, home-sick, disease-stricken, and destitute;[52] and many of them were ill-equipped, for it was now increasingly difficult to transport and supply garments from Greece, and not a few were depressed because their friends had perished by disease or fallen victims to sanguinary battles. But was there any other ground for their conduct which doubtless savoured of mutiny? Plutarch gives us some clue to this mystery, for he indicates that even after the contest with Poros the Macedonian forces were considerably dispirited, and it was with reluctance that they had advanced as far as the Hyphasis at Alexander's bidding. He says: "The battle with Poros depressed the spirits of the Macedonians, and made them very unwilling to advance farther into India. For as it was with the utmost difficulty they had beaten him when the army he led amounted only to 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry they now most resolutely opposed Alexander when he insisted that they should cross the Ganges."[53] The Greeks had been impressed by the heroism and skill of the Indian soldiers. Indeed, according to Arrian, "in the art of war they were far superior to the other nations by which Asia was at that time inhabited."[54] That is perhaps why the Greeks showed even after fighting against Poros that they had "no stomach for further toils in India." But when Alexander egged them on to march onward it was like putting the proverbial last straw on the camel's back. During their progress towards the Hyphasis Alexander's troops had heard all sorts of alarming rumours that beyond it there were extensive deserts, impetuous and unfathomable rivers, and what was more disquieting, powerful and wealthy nations maintain-

52 Cf. Koinos: "We have conquered all the world, but are ourselves destitute of all things"—Curtius, IX, 3; *Ibid.*, p. 229.

53 Plutarch, LXII; *Ibid.*, p. 310. Plutarch has here under-estimated the strength of the army, and instead of the Hyphasis he has mentioned the Ganges.

54 Arrian, V, 4; *Ibid.*, p. 85.

ing huge armies. Curtius represents Phegeus (Phegelis?).[55] identified with Bhagala,[56] as giving the following information to Alexander: "The farther bank of the Ganges was inhabited by two nations, the Gangaridae, and the Prasii, whose king Agrammes kept in the field for guarding the approaches to his country 20,000 cavalry and 2,00,000 infantry besides 2,000 four-horsed chariots, and what was most formidable force of all, a troop of elephants, which ran upto the number of 3,000."[57] Similarly, Plutarch says that "the kings of the Gangaritai and Praisiai were reported to be waiting for him with an army of 80,000 horse and 200,000 foot, 8,000 war-chariots and 6,000 fighting elephants. Nor was this any exaggeration, for not long afterwards Androkottos who had by that time mounted the throne, presented Seleukos with 500 elephants and overran and subdued the whole of India with an army of 600,000 men."[58] The substantial truth of these statements is also borne out by indigenous sources, which tell us of the enormous riches and power of the Nanda monarch holding sway over the Gangaridai and Praisiai nations.[59] Arrian's deposition, too, is much to the same effect, but he seems to refer to the country immediately beyond the Hyphasis. He observes. "It was exceedingly fertile, and the inhabitants were good agriculturists, brave in war, and living under an excellent system of internal government; for the multitude was governed by the aristocracy, who exercised their authority with justice and moderation. It was also reported that the people there had a greater number of elephants than the other Indians, and that those were of superior size and courage."[60] These details spurred the indomitable spirit of Alexander and made him all the more keen to

55 Curtius, IX, 2; *Ibid.*, p. 221. 56 *Cam. Hist. of India*, vol. I, p. 372.
57 Curtius, IX, 2; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, pp. 221-22.
58 Plutarch, LXII; *Ibid.*, p. 310.
59 Raychaudhuri, *Pol. Hist. of Anc. Ind.*, 4th ed., pp. 188-91.
60 Arrian, V, 25; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 121.

advance into the heart of India. The Macedonians, on the other hand as affirmed by Arrian, "now began to lose heart when they saw the king raising up without end toils upon toils and dangers upon dangers."[61] Indeed, the army held conferences "at which the more moderate men bewailed their condition, while others positively asserted that they would follow no farther though Alexander himself should lead the way."[62]

Alexander's Appeal

Alexander made a fervent appeal to his comrades to divest their minds of these false rumours and follow him with "alacrity and confidence." He declared: "I am not ignorant, soldiers, that during these last days the natives of this country have been spreading all sorts of rumours *designed expressly to work upon your fears,* but the falsehood of those who invent such lies is nothing new in your experience."[63] This assurance was, however, of no avail, The troops persisted in their refusal to enter into further contests with the Indians beyond the Beas, "whose numbers," so answered Koinos, "though purposely exaggerated by the barbarians, must yet, as I can gather from the lying report itself, be very considerable."[64] Alexander made his last desperate attempt to rouse the spirits of his forces by threatening to march on even if forsaken by them: "Expose me then to the dangers of rivers, to the rage of elephants, and to those nations *whose very names fill you with terror.* I shall find men that will follow me though I be deserted by you."[65]

No Response

But the Macedonian troops were so struck by the energetic resistance and bravery of the Indians, whom they had met on the

61 Arrian, V, 25; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 121.
62 *Ibid.*
63 Curtius, IX, 2; *Ibid.*, p. 223.
64 Curtius, IX, 3; *Ibid.*, p. 229.
65 Curtius, IX, 2; *Ibid.*, p. 226.

battle-fields, and they were so unnerved and terrified by the reported military strength of the nations beyond the Hyphasis that even this threat, this grim prospect of Alexander plunging headlong into the depths of the enemy's country and may be, losing his life there, was simply met by silent tears. This brought the situation home to Alexander, who exclaimed in utter dismay: "I have all along been knocking at deaf ears. I am trying to rouse hearts that are *disloyal and crushed with craven fears*."[66] He then gave orders for retracing their steps homewards. Thus the cherished dreams of Alexander to found an eastern empire vanished, and that brilliant military leader and the hero of a hundred fights had to give way to the fears of his troops, although such fears were altogether foreign to his own dashing nature. And when Diodoros Siculus informs us that the greatest nation in India was the Gangaridai, "against whom Alexander did not undertake an expedition, being deterred by the multitude of thier elephants."[67] we are not to understand that he himself had any misgiving about his strength, or reluctance to embark upon further adventures, but it was chiefly due to the pusillanimous attitude of his troops that his progress was arrested and he was forced to retreat.[68]

Altars

It is said that with a view to marking the extreme point of his advance eastward, Alexander gave directions for the construction of twelve colossal stone altars, dedicated to the chief Greek gods.[69] When these massive monuments were completed, Alexander offered sacrifices, accompanied by appropriate ceremonies, for a safe return home.

66 Curtius, IX, 2; *Ibid.*, p. 226.
67 *Ancient India as described in Classical Literature*, p. 201.
68 *J.A.S.B.*, New Series XIX, 1923, pp. 765-769.
69 These altars must have been on the right bank of the Hyphasis and not on its left side, as Pliny would have us believe (VI, 62).

Retreat: Scheme of Administration

The Macedonian storm having swept over the Panjab receded in September 326 B.C., and probably except hearing its rumblings the peoples of the Gangetic plains knew nothing of its devastating fury. Soon Alexander reached the bank of the Hydaspes (Jhelum), which was the scene of his conflict with Poros. Here Alexander made proper arrangements for keeping the conquered parts of the Panjab under his subjection. He placed his new ally, Poros, in charge of all the tract between the Hydaspes and the Hyphasis, and Omphis or Āmbhi of Taxila was given full jurisdiction over the Indus-Hydaspes Doab. Likewise, the ruler of Abhisāra had his authority extended over Kashmir with Arsakes of Uraśā (Hazara district) as his vassal. And as a counterpoise to the rule of these Indian princes, Alexander stationed adequate Greek garrisons in cities founded by himself on the Indian soil. These Greek settlers were meant to be the sentinels or guardians of his overlordship, so that no enterprising Indian monarch may be able to revolt in order to shake off the alien yoke.

Sophytes

Alexander then made preparations for sailing down the rivers, but before the voyage actually began he cleared the path of all potential enemies by bringing about the submission of Sophytes (Saubhūti?), whose kingdom had "a mountain of fossil salt which could supply all India."[70] He was thus the chief of the country of the salt range.[71] Incidentally, it may be noted that according to Strabo the land of Sophytes had dogs of "astonishing courage" and mettle, and Alexander even witnessed their fight with a lion.[72]

70 Strabo, M'crindle's *Ancient India*, p. 38.

71 According to Curtius, however, the kingdom of Sophytes was on the west of the Hyphasis (IX, 1; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 219).

72 *Ibid.*, p. 220; Strabo, *Ancient India*, p. 38.

Curtius further avers that the people of Sophytes "excelled in wisdom, and lived under good laws and customs."[73] Like the Kathaians, they held beauty in great esteem and marriages were contracted not with high birth but by looks. Each infant was medically examined and if they found "anything deformed or defective in the limbs of a child they ordered it to be killed."[74]

Voyage down the River

Towards the close of October the signal for the departure was given with the sound of the trumpet, and the Macedonian boats glided down the river in grand array, protected on both banks by troops under the command of Hephaestion and Krateros respectively, until they reached the confluence of the Akesines and the Hydaspes.

The Siboi and the Agalassians

Here Alexander disembarked to measure swords with the Siboi (Skt. Śivis), who were preparing to oppose him with an army of 40,000 infantry,[75] and the Agalassians (Agraśreṇis), who had mustered an equally great force of 40,000 foot and 3,000 horse.[76] The Siboi, who "dressed themselves with the skins of wild beasts, and had clubs for their weapons," were routed; but the Agalassians gallantly defended their capital and at first repulsed Alexander with serious losses. Curtius observes that realising their desperate position the defenders "set fire to their houses, and cast themselves along with their wives and children into the flames."[77] Thus the Agalassians anticipated the mediaeval Rajput custom of *Jauhar*.

73 Curtius, IX, 1; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 219.
74 *Ibid.*
75 Curtius, IX, 4; *Ibid.*, p. 232.
76 Diodoros, XVII, Ch. XCVI; *Ibid.*, p. 285.
77 Curtius, IX, 4; *Ibid.*, p. 232.

The Malloi and the Oxydrakai

Close upon the heels of the Agalassoi operations followed Alexander's campaign against the Malloi (Mālavas) and the Oxydrakai (Kṣudrakas), the "most numerous and warlike of all the Indian tribes in those parts, who were ready to give him a "hostile reception" after "having conveyed their children and their wives for safety into their strongest cities."[78] Curtius says that these two nations were formerly at enmity, but when the gravity of the peril threatening their liberty dawned upon them, they coalesced together and gathered an army of 90,000 foot soldiers, besides 10,000 cavalry and 900 war-chariots. The Macedonian soldiers, who had begun to think that they had come to an end of all hazardous tasks, were struck with "an unexpected terror" at the prospect of meeting fresh opposition, and in the words of Curtius "began again to upbraid the king in the language of sedition,"[79] saying that he had not ended war, but only shifted its theatre. Fully determined not to allow a repetition of the story of the Hyphasis, Alexander made a moving appeal to them "to permit him to return from India with honour, and not to escape from it like a fugitive."[80] This time it had the desired effect; the troops were galvanised into fresh activity and they rose to such a high pitch of war-frenzy that without giving any warning Alexander suddenly swooped down upon the Malloi, when they were working unarmed in the fields.[81] A large number of them were mercilessly slain, but this did not break the backbone of their resistance. Some of the Malloi shut themselves up within the city, but it was stormed and 2,000 persons lost their lives. Others took shelter in a city of the Brachmans or Brahmans, where Alexander hotly pursued them. Arrian remarks: "As they were men of spirit, a few only were taken prisoners" and most of

78 Arrian, VI, 4; *Ibid.*, p. 137.
79 Curtius, IX, 4; *Ibid.*, p. 234.
80 *Ibid.*, p. 235.
81 Arrian, VI, 6; *Ibid.*, p. 140.

them perished by the sword.[82] Next, Alexander assailed the main stronghold of the Malloi, situated somewhere near the boundary of the modern Jhang and Montgomery districts.[83] Here Alexander received a dangerous wound,[84] which spread fury and consternation among his troops, for their safety mostly depended upon his leadership and prowess. Consequently, they perpetrated a ferocious massacre of the Malloi sparing "neither man, woman, nor child."[85] The indiscriminate slaughter of women and children was undoubtedly an act of wanton cruelty, which casts a slur on the war-code of the Greeks in India. When Alexander recovered, the submission of the Malloi became a *fait accompli.* The confederacy being thus dissolved, the Oxydrakai saw no better alternative than to send ambassadors to negotiate peace with Alexander. They declared that "they were attached more than others to freedom and autonomy,"[86] and it was due to the will of the gods, and not through fear, that they had bowed to his steel.[87] Alexander appreciated their dignified bearing and entertained their leading men with marked courtesy and lavishness, which even excited the jealousy of some of his generals. Next, to impress upon these two nations that Greek authority had come to stay, Alexander appointed Philippos[88] as satrap over them.

Abastanoi defeated

The invader then moved down the rivers until he reached the junction of the Akesines and the Indus, where he waited for Perdikkas, who during the course of his march had subdued the

82 *Ibid.*, VI, 7; *Ibid.*, p. 144.

83 *E.H.I.*, 4th ed., p. 100 and note.

84 Arrian distinctly mentions that the accident befell Alexander among the Malloi, and not the Oxydrakai (Arrian, VI, 11; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander,* p. 149.)

85 *Ibid.*

86 Arrian, VI, 14; *Ibid.*, p. 154.

87 Curtius, IX, 7; *Ibid.*, pp. 248-49.

88 The jurisdiction of Philippos was subsequently extended much further southwards.

Abastanoi or Sambastai (Skt. Ambaṣṭhas). Diodoros deposes that they were "inferior to none in India either for numbers or for bravery. They dwelt in cities in which the democratic form of government prevailed."[89] Like the other tribes, they also collected a large force consisting of 60,000 foot-soldiers, 6,000 horse and 500 chariots to oppose Alexander, but fortune was no more favourable to them.

Subjugation of the lower Indus Valley

Among other communities which submitted to Alexander during his progress to the Indus delta were the Xathroi (Kṣatri of Manu), Ossadioi (=Vasāti of the *Mahābhārata*), Sodrai (Śūdras?) and the Massanoi; unfortunately we do not get any details about their hostilities. Alexander also subjugated a number of kings, viz., Mousikanos (lord of the Mūśikas?), Oxykanos,[90] and Sambos (Śambhu),[91] who were too proud to acknowledge Alexander's suzerainty, despite their being mutually at war. Mousikanos had his capital at Alor (Sukkur district), and, according to Onesikritos, his people were distinguished for their healthy living and longevity—their term of life extending to 130 years.[92] Some of their other characteristics have also been noted: "to have a common meal which they eat in public........, their food consisting of the produce of the chase; to use neither gold nor silver though they have mines of those metals; to employ instead of slaves young men in the flower of their age; to study no science with attention except that of medicine; to have no actions at law but for murder and outrage," for if contracts were violated one must pay the penalty for reposing too much trust on the other party.[93]

89 Diodoros, XVII, Ch. cii; *Ibid.*, p. 292.

90 Diodoros (*Ibid.*) calls him Portikanos. For the site of his capital, see M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 158, note 1.

91 The capital of Sambos was Sindimana or Sihwan.

92 Strabo, M'crindle's *Ancient India*, p. 41.

93 *Ibid.*

Brāhmanic Opposition

One interesting feature of the political situation in this part of the country was the enormous influence wielded by the Brāhmaṇas and their active participation in politics. For instance, we are told that they instigated Mousikanos and Oxykanos to revolt and shake off the ignominy of foreign thraldom. They followed their advice and lost their heads along with a large number of Brāhmaṇas. The suppression of Brāhmanical opposition must not have been an easy task for Alexander, since they were not only respected throughout the land, but they were themselves, in the words of Arrian, "men of spirit."[94] The taking up of arms by the meek Brāhmaṇas must not be regarded as a strange phenomenon or a mere figment of Greek imagination. Apart from the epic examples of such Brāhmaṇa warriors as Paraśurāma, Droṇācārya, and Aśvatthāmā, we know that Kauṭilya actually refers to Brāhmaṇa armies which were distinguished for their mildness towards the prostrate enemy.[95] Besides, the Hindu law-givers explicitly permit them to exchange the *Śāstra* for the *Śastra* in evil times and in defence of their country and Dharma. Thus says Manu:

शस्त्रं द्विजातिभिर्ग्राह्यं धर्मो यत्रोपरुध्यते ।
द्विजातीनां च वर्णानां विप्लवे कालकारिते ॥[96]

Pattala

Having overcome the opposition of the Brāhmaṇas and kings of the lower Indus valley, Alexander reached Tauala or Pattala, "a city of great note, with a political constitution drawn on the same lines as the Spartan; for in this community the command in war was vested in two hereditary kings of two different houses, while

94 Arrian, VI, 7; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 144.
95 Shamashastri, *Arthaśāstra*, 3rd ed., p. 373.
96 *Manusmṛti*, VIII, 348.

a council of elders ruled the whole state with paramount authority."[97] According to Curtius, one of its kings was named Moeres.[98]

Homeward Route

About the beginning of September 325 B.C., Alexander finally quitted the scene of his memorable exploits. He divided the army into two sections, one was led by Nearchos by way of sea, and the other marched with Alexander along the southern coast of Gedrosia (Baluchistan). A part of it had, of course, already been sent under the command of Krateros through the Bolan pass. Alexander chose the most difficult and cheerless route for himself through the territories of the Arabitae and the Oritae, and he reached his destination after a good deal of anxiety and suffering.

Conclusion

It would be evident from the foregoing account, which is based entirely on the evidence of the Greek and Roman authors, that the progress of Alexander's arms in India was by no means easy or smooth. No doubt, some of the Indian potentates and autonomous communities "bowed low before the blast." But others fought bravely, and this coupled with the prospect of unending wars in India even created apprehensions in the minds of the Greek veterans, who had blown off the mighty Persian forces almost like chaff. Nor did India "plunge in thought again" after the great meteor had flashed across her political skies, and within a few years of Alexander's departure and death in June 323 B.C. all vestiges of Greek occupation were destroyed and swept away.

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97 Diodoros, XVII, Ch. civ; M'crindle's *Invasion by Alexander*, p. 296. Pattala has been identified with modern Bahmanabad.

98 Curtius, IX, 8; *Ibid.*, p. 256.

The Andhras and their Position in Brāhmaṇical Society

The speakers of Telugu or Tenugu, a member of the Dravidian family of languages, now call themselves Andhra. The *Linguistic Survey of India* (IV, p. 577) reports, "The Telugu country is bounded towards the east by the Bay of Bengal from Barwa in the Ganjam district in the north to near Madras in the south. From Barwa the frontier line goes westwards through Ganjam to the Eastern Ghats and then southwards crosses the Sabari on the border of the Sunkam and Bijji taluks in the state of Bastar, and thence runs along the range of Bela Dila to the Indravati; it follows this river to its confluence with the Godāvarī, and then runs through Chanda cutting off the southern part of that district and farther eastwards including the southern border of the district of Wun. It then runs southwards to the Godāvarī at its confluence with the Mañjirā, and thence farther south towards Bidar where Telugu meets with Kanarese. The frontier line between the two forms of speech then runs almost due south through the dominions of the Nizam. The Telugu country farther occupies the north-eastern edge of Bellary, the greater eastern part of Anantapur and the eastern corner of Mysore. Through North Arcot and Chingleput the border line then runs back to the sea." According to the report of the *Census of India*, 1931 (I, i, p. 371), the Telugu speaking population numbers 26,374,000.

Andhra as the name of a people is mentioned in the *Aitareya Br.* (VII, 18), together with the Puṇḍras,[1] Śabaras,[2] Pulin-

[1] They are the people who founded the city of Puṇḍravardhana, modern Mahāsthān in the Bogra district, Bengal. They might have originally dwelt in the Vindhyan region.

[2] The Śabaras are identified with the Savaras or Saoras of the Vizagapatam Hills and the Savaris of the Gwalior territory, and with the Suari of Pliny and the Sabarae of Ptolemy (*P.H.A.I.*, 4th ed., p. 79).

das[3] and Mūtibas,[4] who became outcastes as a result of the refusal of the fifty elder sons of Viśvāmitra to accept his adoption of Śunaḥśepa. The *Śāṅkhāyana Śr. Sū.* (XV) also mentions the Andhras, but omits the Pulindas from the list and adds Mūcīpas (=Mūtibas). Another interesting fact is that while the *Ait. Br.* calls the tribes *udāntyaḥ* (beyond the border), the *Śāṅkh. Śr. Sū.* has *udañcaḥ* (northern), and scholars think that the latter reading is wrong.[5] Migration was however a remarkable feature of Indian tribes in early times,[6] and it is not impossible that originally the Andhras actually dwelt on the northern border of the Aryan occupied portion of India or at least to the north of the land where the *Śāṅkh.* was composed. In any case, the Andhras were recognised as non-Aryans (*dasyu*) in the days of the *Ait.* and the *Śāṅkh.* R. E. XIII of Aśoka mentions the Andhras together with the Palidas (obviously the same as the Pulindas) as a people within the dominions of the Maurya emperor; but says nothing about their habitat or social position. Early classical authors[7] refer to "the Andarae (=Andhras) as a still more powerful race which possesses numerous villages and thirty towns defended by walls and towers and which supplied an army of 100,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 1,000 elephants." If this statement does not prove anything about the original home of the Andhras, it certainly speaks of their great power and prosperity.

Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar[8] thinks that the Andhras were originally a Vindhyan tribe whose course of migration was from west to east

3 Prof. Raychaudhuri thinks that Pulindanagara (capital city of the Pulindas) lay to the south-east of Daśārṇa i.e. the Vidiśā region (*ibid.*, p. 9).

4 The Mūtibas (=Mūcīpas=Mūvīpas) are identified with Pliny's Modobae who are associated with the Uberae (=Śabaras?). The confusion regarding the spelling of the name may suggest that they are the same as the Mṛtapas of the *Mahābhāṣya* (*I.H.Q.*, XV, p. 637).

5 *Vedic Index*, I, p. 23.

6 Sircar, *Successors of the Sātavāhanas*, 1939, p. 11, note.

7 McCrindle, *Ancient India*, 1926, p. 140. The statement appears to refer to the period before the Maurya conquest.

8 *Ind. Ant.*, 1913, p. 276 ff.

down the valley of the Godāvarī and the Kṛṣṇā. Dr. Bhandarkar[9] points out that Andhapura (capital city of the Andhras) is placed by the *Serivānija Jātaka* on the Telavāha river which he identifies with the modern Tel or Telingiri. The suggestion that the Andhras at some early period occupied the region about the upper Deccan is possibly supported by the existence of the Śabaras in the Gwalior territory and of the Pulindanagara not very far from the Vidiśā region. Prof. Raychaudhuri however thinks[10] that Andhapura of the *Jātaka* may be identical with Bezwada. Whatever might have been the original habitat of the Andhras, it is certain that the people settled down in the district near the mouths of the Kṛṣṇā long before the time of the Pallava king Śivaskandavarman (1st half of 4th cent.) The Epics, Purāṇas, works like the *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* and the classical authors place the Andhra people or their country in the southern or south-eastern part of India. The Mayidavolu grant of Śivaskandavarman mentions Andhrāpatha having its headquarters at Dhānyakaṭa (Amarāvatī).

The aboriginal tribes of India must have been thought of as alien and antagonistic by the Aryan people when the latter entered India. The bitterness gradually calmed as the two groups lived side by side for centuries and became more or less influenced by one another's culture. The cerebral consonants which are numerous in the *Ṛgveda*, but are doubtless borrowed from the Dravidians, offer a definite proof that the Aryans often took their wives from the Dravidian tribes and thereby very soon modified the speech of their descendants.[11] With such a state of things, it is only natural that the Aryans very soon could not think of a society without their neighbours. The case was the same with foreign peoples, and Patañjali's reference to the Śakas (Scythians) and Yavanas (Greeks) as "clean"

9 *Ind. Ant.*, 1918, p. 71.

10 *P.H.A.I.*, p. 78.

11 The Brāhmī alphabet appears to be a selection from the alphabet of the Indus Valley people.

Śūdras is not at all unintelligible.[12] But a more or less clear picture of the position of aboriginal and foreign tribes in relation to the orthodox Brahmanical society is first noticed in law-books like the *Manusaṃhitā*, supplemented by the works of Yājñavalkya and other later law-givers.

The *Manusaṃhitā* tries to connect all tribes living within or on the borders of India by blood relations, in the same manner as peoples of other parts of the world nourish the theory of a common ancestor for all men. It recognises the four *varṇas* or castes[13] together with the groups, Vrātyas and Dasyus.

"The Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya and Vaiśya are the three twice-born castes; the fourth is the one caste, Śūdra; there is no fifth (X, 4).

"Among all castes, those only who are produced by fathers on the virgins of their own caste wedded in the natural order are to be regarded as of the same (caste as the fathers) (X, 5).

"The sons that the twice-born men beget on wives of equal caste, but who[14] for not fulfilling their sacred duties become excluded from the *Sāvitrī* should be designated as *Vrātyas* (X, 20).

"All the races of the world which are outside the pale of the people 'born of the mouth, the arms, the thighs and the feet (i.e. Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra) speaking the barbaric (*mleccha*) or the refined (*ārya*) language are called *Dasyu* (X, 45)".

All other castes (*jāti*), i.e., tribes or tribal castes are sprung, according to the *Manusaṃhitā*, from an intermixture of the

12 *I.H.Q.*, XV, p. 636 ff.

13 The terms *Brāhmaṇa* (priest-class), *Kṣatriya* (a fighting class), and *Vaiśya* (common folk) have derivative meanings. *Śūdra* which has no such meaning appears to have been derived from a particular non-Aryan tribe of that name, living in the Punjab region.

14 According to another reading, "who are born of unfaithful mothers." Medhātithi says, "The assertion that these peoples have become 'low-born' is based upon the fact that in these countries we do not meet with any clear division of the four *varṇas*." In R. E. XIII of Aśoka the Yavana country is said to have no Brāhmaṇa or Śramaṇa in its population. Cf. also *P.H.A.I.*, p. 198.

above classes. The general rule regarding the social position is that the issues of higher class fathers and lower class mothers are considered purer than those born of lower class fathers and higher class mothers. "If a child is somehow born to a Brāhmaṇa father by a non-Aryan mother, and another to a non-Aryan father by a Brāhmaṇa mother—with which of these would the superiority lie? (X, 66). The decision is that—one born to an Ārya by an Anārya woman may be an Ārya in quality; but one born to an Anārya even by an Ārya woman is always an Anārya (X, 67)." The theory however recognises the elevation of a low caste to a high one as a result of the gradual diminution of "low" blood by the infiltration of "pure" blood. "If the child born of a Śūdra woman and a Brāhmaṇa goes on being wedded to a person of superior caste—the inferior attains the superior caste within the seventh generation (X, 64), and *vice versa*. The Śūdra attains the position of the Brāhmaṇa and the Brāhmaṇa sinks to the position of the Śūdra; the same should be understood to be the case with the offspring of the Kṣatriya and the Vaiśya (X, 65)."[15]

The attached table may be useful in showing the inter-connections of the Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, Śūdra, Vrātya and Dasyu producing the numerous tribal castes according to the theory of the *Manusaṃhitā*.

Of course it is not possible to accept the scheme of the *Manusaṃhitā* literally. A cursory glance at it convinces anybody that the attempt to connect all Indian tribes to the conventional four *varṇas* is arbitrary and absurd. Of more than fifty names of the so-called mixed or degraded castes, the Malla, Magadha, Ābhīra,

15 According to Medhātithi, on the principle enunciated here, if a maiden born from a Śūdrā to a Brāhmaṇa is wedded to a Brāhmaṇa, and the girl born of this marriage is again married to a Brāhmaṇa, and this goes on for seven generations, then in the seventh generation the child born is a regular Brāhmaṇa. The child born from Brāhmaṇa and Vaiśya attains the superior caste in the fifth generation, and that from Brāhmaṇa and Kṣatriyā in the third generation.

Castes and their Inter-connections



16 Medhātithi says, "the son of a Brāhmaṇa from a Kṣatriyā or of a Kṣatriya from a Vaiśyā is 'equal' to the father, but not the very same......This declaration of 'equality' implies that the sons are superior to the mother but inferior to the father." Later authorities give distinct names to these mixed castes. The issue of Brāhmaṇa and Vaiśyā is thus called Mūrdhābhiṣikta whose profession is *hastya-svarathaśikṣā* and *astradhāraṇa*.

17 They are 'touchable' and their profession is the art of healing, (X, 47). According to Gautama the son of Brāhmaṇa and Vaiśyā is called Bhṛjjakaṇṭa.

18 They worked in leather, (X, 49).

19 Their profession is the killing of fish (X, 48). Medhātithi thinks that Niṣāda born of Brāhmaṇa and Śūdrā and Niṣāda father of Pukkasa, etc. are different.

20 Their profession is the killing and catching of animals living underground, (X, 49).

21 The name Kaivartta is used by the people of Āryāvarta. They live on boats, (X, 34).

22 They worked in leather (X, 36).

23 Medhātithi says, "The livelihood of these men may be the one implied by the name itself (i.e. Snake-catching), or something else may be found." Kūlluka suggests "watchman on the outside of jails" (X, 37).

24 See note 19 above.

25 Their business is the management of horses and chariots (X, 47). According to some authorities, the issue of Vaiśya and Kṣatriyā is also Sūta whose business is that of a professional bard.

26 See note 18 above. According to some authorities, they are called Māhiṣya and their duty is *nṛtya-gīta-nakṣatra-jñāna* and *śasyarakṣā*. Māhiṣya appears also to have been the name of a people; cf. Māhiṣaka in *Vāyu P.*, 46, 125.

27 They are 'touchable' and their profession is the killing and catching of animals living underground as of the Kṣattṛs and the Pukkasas (X, 49). The Ugras are of the stuff of the Kṣatriya and Śūdra and are cruel in their deeds and dealings (X, 9).

28 The writer caste; cf. the titles Karaṇika or Kāyastha, though sometimes we get such officers as Karaṇa-Kāyastha. See Bhandarkar, *List of Inscriptions*, Nos. 34, 49, 188, 207, 350, 451, 1828, etc., etc. See also note 32 below.

29 "But by the omission of the sacred rites and also by their neglect of Brāhmaṇas (or, by transgressing the injunctions pertaining to Brāhmaṇas; or, for not consulting the council of Brāhmaṇas in questions regarding expiatory rites, etc.) the following Kṣatriya castes have gradually sunk to the position of the low-born (*vṛṣala*)." X, 43. Note that Drāviḍa and Khasa are common to the two lists, and that the 'castes' of the first list are described (X, 22) as "born of the Vrātya Kṣatriya."

30 They are 'touchable' and their profession is the service of women (X, 47).

31 See note 25 above. Their business is trade (X, 47).

32 See note 18 above. They are called Karaṇa by some authorities. The duty of a Karaṇa (as also of Pāraśava and Ugra) is *dvijātiśuśrūṣā, dhanadhānyādhyakṣatā, rāja-sevā* and *durgāntaḥpura-rakṣā* (Kūlluka on Manu, X, 6).

33 Their profession was the beating of drums; cf. the root *Veṇ*, "to play on an instrument."

34 "The Maitreyaka who is like the *Madhūka* and who serves as the bell-ringer at sunrise (to awaken the king or a rich man)."—X, 33.

35 The Andhras and Medas have their dwellings outside the village (X, 36). The profession of the above two and of the Cuñcus and Madgus is the killing of wild animals. Cuñcu appears to be the same as the Cañcukas of the *Bṛhatsaṃhitā*, XIV.

36 See note 35 above.

37 They are 'touchable.'

38 Their business is carpentry (X, 48). The Āyogava women wear the clothes of the dead, are ignoble and eat despised food (X, 35).

39 They are the lowest of men (X, 12). "The dwellings of Caṇḍālas and Śvapacas shall be outside the village; they shall be made *Apapātra*, and their wealth shall consist of dogs and donkeys (X, 51). The clothes of dead bodies shall be their dress; they shall eat in broken dishes; their ornaments shall be of iron; and they shall be constantly wandering (X, 52). One who follows the law shall not seek intercourse with them; their transactions shall be among themselves, and their marriages with their equals (X, 53). Their food should be given through others and in a broken dish; they shall not wander about in villages or cities during the night (X, 54). During the day they may go about on business distinguished by royal signs; they shall carry out corpses of people without relations; such is the law (X, 55). They shall always execute criminals in accordance with law under orders of the king; and they shall take away the clothes, beds and ornaments of those executed (X, 56)." For *Apapātra*, see Medhātithi on X, 51; cf. *aniravasita* of the *Mahābhāṣya*, *I.H.Q.*, XV, p. 636 ff. Verse X, 50, which refers to the base born castes in general, says, "Near worshipped trees and cremation grounds, on hills and in groves, these shall dwell, duly masked, subsisting by their respective occupations." If a man touches a Caṇḍāla, he should purify himself by a bath (V, 85).

40 They deal in bamboos (X, 37). According to Medhātithi, they buy and sell bamboos, and make mats and other things of the kind.

41 They live by executing criminals and are wicked and despised by good people (X, 38). See Medhātithi for a different interpretation.

42 They live by burning the dead body in the cremation ground and are despised even by out-castes (X, 39).

43 They are skilled in toilet and attendance and, though not slaves, make their living like slaves, and also live by catching animals (X, 32).

ANDHRA, Āvantya, Kārūṣa, Khasa, Kirāta, Śaka, Pauṇḍra, Ambaṣṭha, Kāmboja, Palhava, Pāraśava, Darada, Drāviḍa, Vāṭadhāna, Sairindhra, Oḍra, Veṇa, Yavana, Cīna, Sāttvata, Meḍa, Nisāda, etc., are known to have been tribes or peoples from the lists furnished by the Epics, Purāṇas, works like the *Bṛhatsaṃhitā*, and other sources.[44] The inclusion of such well known names as the Yavana (Greek), Śaka (Scythian), etc. in the list of degraded Kṣatriyas and the Ābhīra, Andhra, Ambaṣṭha, etc. in that of the mixed castes makes the spirit of the arbitrary scheme very clear. It must be noticed that particular professions have been assigned to particular mixed castes; this fact and the very names of many of the castes prove that a good many of the list indicate professional castes (cf. Naṭa, Sairindhra, Sūta, Antyāvasāyin, etc.). Names like Māgadha, Āvantya, Vaideha, etc., appear to refer rather to geographical divisions than to tribes. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that all the mixed or degraded castes represent in fact some early sect or tribe or people. The Andhras, for example, live in a particular region of India and are more than 2½ crores in population. If they were actually offsprings of Brāhmaṇa-Vaiśya-Śūdra, how is it that such admixture was impossible in other parts of India? Their huge population is obviously against the idea of mixed origin.

The position of the castes in the table and the notes regarding their profession are much more important from the historical standpoint than the scheme itself. It will be seen that the Andhras are placed clearly in the lowest grade, and this is echoed in the passage referring to the society as—

प्रतिवासिनो ब्राह्मणोत्तरांश्च महोत्तमोत्तम-कुटुम्बि-पुरोगमेदान्ध्र-चण्डाल-पर्य्यन्तान् यथार्हं मानयति बोधयति समादिशति च

in a number of early medieval inscriptions.[45] It is really difficult to understand why the Drāviḍas (the Tamil people) are included in the

44 E.g., *Mbh.*, VI, i, § 9; *Mārkaṇḍeya* p., 57-58; *Bṛhatsaṃhitā*, 14 & 16, etc.
45 E.g., *Gauḍalekhamālā*, p. 96.

list of Vrātya-Kṣatriyas, but the position given to the Andhras (the Telugu people) is no better than that of the Caṇḍāla. The undernoted three factors may be pointed out as the causes for the leaders of the orthodox Brāhmaṇical society to look down upon the Andhras in the age of law-books, such as the *Manusaṃhitā*:

First, the Andhra country was in early times one of the greatest strongholds of Buddhism in India. The great stūpas of Dhānyakaṭaka (Amarāvatī) and Vijayapura (in the Nāgārjunikoṇḍa valley), the stūpas at Jaggayyapeṭa, Ghaṇṭaśāla and other localities of the country, and renowned sects of Ācāryas like the Pūrvaśailīyas, Aparaśailīyas, etc. go to prove the extent of heretical influence over the Andhra country.

Secondly, for many centuries after the Maurya occupation there was no great political power ruling over the whole of the Andhra country which was probably divided into a number of small principalities. It may be noticed that the king of the Andhra is hardly found in the lists of Indian kings found in connection with an Epic or Purāṇic description of such events as a Svayaṃvara, a Rājasūya and the like.[46] The political condition appears to be the same in the 4th century A.D. when Hariṣeṇa mentions several principalities in the Andhra area and Kālidāsa, the poet of the Gupta age, does not mention the Andhra king either in connection with Raghu's *Digvijaya* or with Indumatī's Svayaṃvara.

Thirdly, the Aryan authors were possibly familiar more with the primitive and backward than with the advanced elements in the population of the Andhra country.

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46 This seems to be an additional proof that the *Sātavāhanas* were not Andhras. The Purāṇas call them Andhra (or Andhrabhṛtya) possibly because, just before their decline (in the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D.) the Sātavāhanas were ruling in the Andhra country.

A New Light on the History of the Cāhamānas

The country around Ajmer and Rajputana was formerly known as Śākambharī, Sapādalakṣa, or Jāṅgala. The Cāhamānas held sway over it from the eighth to the end of the twelfth century. In the last quarter of the twelfth century the Cāhamāna Pṛthvīrāja III, son of King Someśvara, was on the throne. During his reign Muhammad Ghori invaded Hindustan. The *Tāj-ul-Ma-āsir* of Hasan Nizāmī, *Tabakāt-i-Nāsirī* of Minhāj-us-Sirāj, *Ta'rīkh-i-Firishta*, and *Hammīra-Mahākāvya* of Nayacandrasūri are utilised here for the reconstruction of the history of the conflict between the Moslems and the Cāhamānas.

Hasan Nizāmī[1] (A.D. 1205-1229), opens his work "with the transactions of the year 587 H. (1191 A.D.) when Muhammad Ghori undertook his expedition to India to retrieve the dreadful disaster he had a short time before experienced on the field of Tarāin, near Thānesar." He next relates that[2] Pithora Rāe (Pṛthvīrāja) opposed him with three lacs of horse, obtained from the Rājās of Hind. Muhammad Ghori made a proposal for truce. The leaders of the Cāhamāna army minimised the strength of the Moslems, "and without any care or concern, fell into a slumber of remissness." Muhammad Ghori attacked the Cāhamānas, who were quite unprepared, and defeated them. Pithora Rāe was taken prisoner, and killed near Sursutī. After this victory Muhammad Ghori marched towards Ajmer, defeated Kola (natural son) of the Rāī of Ajmīr, and conquered the country. The son of Rāī Pithaura was appointed its governor.[3] Sometime afterwards Kutb-ud-dīn received an information from Rūh-ud-dīn Hamza, who was at Rantanbor, that Hirāj, brother of the Rāī of Ajmīr, threat-

1 Elliot, II, 210.

2 *Tabaqāt-i-Nāsiri*, Raverty, vol. I, p. 466 fn. 1.

3 Elliot, II, 214.

ened to siege the fort of Rantanbor, and that the son of Pithaura was in a state of extreme danger. He forthwith marched against Hirāj who without giving any battle fled away. The son of Rāi Pithaura was favoured with a robe of honour.[4] The *Tāj-ul-Ma-āsir* subsequently states that[5] in 589 H. (A.D. 1193) Kutb-ud-dīn was informed that Hirāj, the Rāi of Ajmīr, became hostile to him, and that Jīhtar, attacked the border of Delhi. Kutb-ud-dīn advanced against Jīhtar, who lost courage to meet the Moslem army, withdrew to the fort of Ajmīr, and committed suicide. The Moslems easily conquered the fort of Ajmīr.

Minhaj,[6] after describing the first battle of Tarāin, which took place in 1191 A.D., states that in the following year in 1192 A.D. Muhammad Ghori again appeared in the battle field of Tarāin. The Cauhans were defeated. Pithaura was taken prisoner in the neighbourhood of Sursutī and was killed. He does not tell us anything about the successors of Pṛthvīrāja.

Firishta[7] (sixteenth century) reports that Pṛthvīrāja was slain near Soorsutty by the Moslems. Muhammad Ghori captured Ajmīr, and delivered the country to Gola, the natural son of Pithow Raj, on the latter's promise to pay tribute. Meanwhile Hemraj, a relation of Pithow Raj, expelled Gola from Ajmīr. Kutb-ud-dīn marched against Hemraj from Delhi in 591 H. (A.D. 1194), defeated and killed him. Kutb-ud-dīn then appointed a governor of his own faith to control the Rāj.

The *Hammīra-Mahākāvya*[8] states that Pṛthvīrāja once took Muhammad Ghori prisoner but released him. After this the Moslem general attacked him seven times without success. On the next occasion Muhammad Ghori captured Delhi. Pṛthvīrāja, who was overconfident of his success, met the enemy with a small army. The Sultan succeeded in seducing secretly to his side Pṛthvīrāja's master

4 Elliot, II, 219. 5 *Ibid.*, 225. 6 Raverty, I, 457-463; 465-469.
7 Briggs, I, 177. 8 *IA.*, VIII, 60, 61.

of horse. When the Sultan attacked the Cāhamānas, the horse styled Nāṭyārambha, engaged by that master of the horse for the occasion, and on which Pṛthvīrāja was mounted, began to dance keeping time with the war music. "The king was diverted with this performance for a time, and forgot the all-important business of the moment." The king was taken prisoner by the Moslems. Udayarāja, the commander-in-chief of the Cāhamānas, was late in reaching the battle field. The Sultan apprehending an attack by Udayarāja retired to the fort of Delhi, and assassinated Pṛthvīrāja. Udayarāja fought with the Moslems and lost his life. After this Pṛthvīrāja's brother Harirāja ascended the throne. He performed the funeral ceremony of the deceased king. Sometime afterwards Harirāja lost his life in a battle with Muhammad Ghori. Ajmer was occupied by the Moslems. Govindarāja, grandson of Pṛthvīrāja, founded a kingdom in Ranastambhapura (Ranthambhor). There is an inscription[9] which shows that the village Taṃtūṭhī (mod. Tantoti, in the Ajmir District) was in the fief of Pratāpadevī, queen of Harirāja, in V.S. 1251 (=A.D. 1194).

The attention of scholars may be drawn to one more source of evidence, which throws some new light on the subject. The colophon of the book *Viruddha-vidhi-vidhvaṃsa*, dealing with the disputed point of (sacred) law, by Lakṣmīdhara, runs as follows:—[10]

ब्राह्मणा ब्राह्मणा जाता जाता ये गुणसागराः ।
नागरा नागराजार्हहारोयानर्हयद्गुरः (। or जर्हेंहारेयोनर्ह०) ॥१॥
तदन्वयेऽष्टगोत्राणामष्टगोत्रोन्नतिश्रिताम् ।
मध्याद्गोत्रेशसंशुद्धे गोत्रेऽजायत काश्यपे ॥२॥
श्रीमदानन्दनगरस्थाने स्थानेश्वराभिधः ।
पंडितो यः स्वविद्याभिश्चतुर्दिग्विदुषोऽजयत् ॥३॥

[In the lineage of the Nāgara Brāhmaṇas, in the *Kāśyapa Gotra*, in the place, Ānandanagara, was born the learned named Sthāneśvara, who conquered the scholars of the four quarters by his own learning (vv. 1-3)].

9 *An. Rep. Rajputana Museum*, 1911-1912, 2, 5.
10 *Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Library of the India Office*, Pt. III, p. 490.

श्रीमदानंदनगरे नागरेभ्यो गृहांश्च यः ।
सप्तविंशतिविप्रेभ्यः प्रददौ सपरिच्छदान् ॥४॥
षण्मुखः षट्सु तर्केषु चतुर्वेदी चतुर्मुखः ।
मीमांसामांसलप्रज्ञो यो ऽभूत्तस्यान्वयेऽभवत् ॥५॥
स्कंद स्कंदपितुः प्रत्तानंदकंदस्त्वमंदधीः ।
शाकंभरीशितुः सोमेश्वरदेवस्य भूभृतः ॥६॥
सांधिविग्रहिकामात्योऽरात्यौघकरिकेसरी ।
सोढस्तस्य सुतोऽसोढः शत्रुभिस्तत्पदेऽभवत् ॥७॥
तस्य पुत्रावभूतां द्वौ भूतांतर्भूतकीर्तितौ ।
स्कंदवामननाम्ना तावाम्नातावनीमतौ ॥८॥
सर्वामात्यपदं ताभ्यां पृथ्वीराजोऽददन्मुदा ।
सेनाधिपत्यं स्कंदाय प्रदाय च सुखी स्थितः ॥९॥
सेनापतित्वं स्कंदाय प्रदाय धृतशक्तये ।
महादेव सुतायाति दग्रूपो[a] भूपवत् (?) ॥१०॥
सांधिविग्रहिकाद्यं तु पदं संपाद्य वामने ।
स्कंदो राजेऽर्पितानंदोऽवधीन्नित्यं तुरुष्ककान् ['तुरु°] ॥११॥

[Who made a gift of houses (furnished) with goods and chattels to twenty-seven *Nāgara* (Brāhmaṇas) in the prosperous Ānandanagara (v. 4).

Who was six-faced (Kārttikeya) in the six members of the science of Logic, and the four-faced (Brahmā) with (his knowledge of) the four Vedas, and whose intellect was developed by (the study of) *Mīmāṃsā*. In his lineage was born (v. 5) Skanda, who, of sharp intellect, gave extreme delight to his father, was a minister of peace and war to the king *Someśvara*, lord of *Śākambharī*, and was a lion to the elephants in the form of the host of enemies. His son was Soḍha, who was unbearable to the enemies, succeeded to his post (vv. 6-7).

He (Soḍha) had two sons named Skanda and Vāmana, who were praised by those living within elements, were learned in the Vedas, and were praised by the (people) of the earth. (v. 8).

Pṛthvīrāja gave them with delight the posts of the chief councillors, and became happy by making over the command of the army to Skanda. (v. 9), just as the lord (of gods, whose form is not visible) rested at ease after giving the post of the commander of the army to Skanda (Kārttikeya), the son of Mahādeva, and the bearer of (the missile named) *Śakti* (v. 10).

After conferring the post of the minister of peace and war etc., on Vāmana, Skanda, who gave delight to the king, killed the *Turuṣkas* continually. (v. 11)].

a The metre is incomplete—so the reading रूपसुरभूपवत् is suggested.

सदा स दानानि ददौ द्विजेभ्यो दंडनायकः ।
या काप्यपरिणीतायात् तस्य [ा] वैवाहिकं त्वदात् ॥१२॥
स्कंद[b] स्कंदेति वर्णेषु वर्ण्यमानेऽत्र नागरः ।
ब्राह्मणं[c] कोऽपि कोपेन कंपिताधरमुक्तवान् ॥१३॥
स्कंद स्कंदेति वदथ किं विप्राः प्रतिवासरम् ।
मदीयहृदये नायमप्यर्धस्कंदखंडिका ॥१४॥
इत्येते नागराः प्रोचुर्यत्त्वं यात्वा तदंतिके ।
वद द्विजैवं वचनं यद्यस्ति तव योग्यता ॥१५॥
कोपात्सपादलक्षे द्वादशे शाकंभरीं पुरीम् ।
प्राप्य विप्रो राजकुलाद्ययांतं[d] (!) दंडनायकं ॥१६॥'२२॥
गतेऽन्यसंगरे स्कंदे निद्राव्यसनसन्नधीः ।
व्यापादितस्तुरुष्कैः स राजा जीवन्मृतो युधि ॥२३॥
हरिराजमथो राज्ये शाकंभर्या निवेश्य सः ।
स्कंदस्तत्र कियत्कालं स्थित्वा तुर्याश्रमं श्रितः ॥२४॥
द्रम्माणां लक्षविंशत्या विंशत्यश्च (' त्या च) शतैः समं ।
वामनः सकुटुम्बो (ऽ) णहिल्लपाटकमाट तु ॥२५॥

[He (Skanda), the leader of the army, always made donations to the twice born, and celebrated the marriage of those virgin girls, who approached him (for the purpose). (v. 12).

When he was being extolled here with the words 'Skanda is (really) Skanda (Kārttikeya)' among the castes, a certain Nāgara Brāhmaṇa said with his lips trembling with rage (v. 13).

'Why, oh Brāhmaṇas, do you say every day 'Skanda is (really) Skanda'; in my heart he is not even half of a part of Skanda (Kārttikeya) (v. 14).

The Nāgaras replied. "If you have the fitness, oh twice born, then go to his presence and say this.' (v. 15).

Out of rage that Brāhmaṇa reached the city of Śākambharī, in Sapādalakṣa Twelve, and from the royal palace went to that leader of the army (v. 16).

When Skanda went to another battle, the king, whose intellect was shrouded by the vice of sleep (for vice and sleep), who, though alive, was as good as dead in battle, was slaughtered by the *Turuṣkas* (v. 23).

Then Skanda placing *Harirāja* over the kingdom of Śākambharī, lived there for a while, (and then) took to the fourth stage (of life). (v. 24).

And then Vāmana with twenty lacs and twenty hundred Drammas went to Anahillapāṭaka. (v. 25)].

b Read स्कन्दः

c Read ब्राह्मणः

d Read राजकुलाद्ययौ तं

श्रीमदानंदनगरे नागरेभ्यो गृहांश्च यः ।
सप्तविंशतिविप्रेभ्यः प्रददौ सपरिच्छदान् ॥४॥
षण्मुखः षट्सु तर्केषु चतुर्वेदी चतुर्मुखः ।
मीमांसामांसलप्रज्ञो यो ऽभूत्तस्यान्वयेऽभवत् ॥५॥
स्कंद स्कंदपितुः प्रत्तानंदकंदस्वमंदधीः ।
शाकंभरीशितुः सोमेश्वरदेवस्य भूभृतः ॥६॥
सांधिविग्रहिकामात्योऽरात्यौघकरिकेसरी ।
सोढस्तस्य सुतोऽसोढः शत्रुभिस्तत्पदेऽभवत् ॥७॥
तस्य पुत्रावभूतां द्वौ भूतांतर्भूतकीर्तितौ ।
स्कंदवामननाम्ना तावाम्नातावनीमतौ ॥८॥
सर्वामात्यपदं ताभ्यां पृथ्वीराजोऽददन्मुदा ।
सेनाधिपत्यं स्कंदाय प्रदाय च सुखी स्थितः ॥९॥
सेनापतित्वं स्कंदाय प्रदाय धृतशक्तये ।
महादेव सुतायाति दग्र पो[a] भूपवत् (?) ॥१०॥
सांधिविग्रहिकाद्यं तु पदं संपाद्य वामने ।
स्कंदो राजेऽर्पितानंदोऽवधीन्नित्यं कुरुष्ककान् ['तुरु⁰] ॥११॥

[Who made a gift of houses (furnished) with goods and chattels to twenty-seven *Nāgara* (Brāhmaṇas) in the prosperous Ānandanagara (v. 4).

Who was six-faced (Kārttikeya) in the six members of the science of Logic, and the four-faced (Brahmā) with (his knowledge of) the four Vedas, and whose intellect was developed by (the study of) *Mīmāṃsā*. In his lineage was born (v. 5) Skanda, who, of sharp intellect, gave extreme delight to his father, was a minister of peace and war to the king *Someśvara*, lord of *Śākaṃbharī*, and was a lion to the elephants in the form of the host of enemies. His son was Soḍha, who was unbearable to the enemies, succeeded to his post (vv. 6-7).

He (Soḍha) had two sons named Skanda and Vāmana, who were praised by those living within elements, were learned in the Vedas, and were praised by the (people) of the earth. (v. 8).

Pṛthvīrāja gave them with delight the posts of the chief councillors, and became happy by making over the command of the army to Skanda. (v. 9), just as the lord (of gods, whose form is not visible) rested at ease after giving the post of the commander of the army to Skanda (Kārttikeya), the son of Mahādeva, and the bearer of (the missile named) *Śakti* (v. 10).

After conferring the post of the minister of peace and war etc., on Vāmana, Skanda, who gave delight to the king, killed the *Turuṣkas* continually. (v. 11)].

a The metre is incomplete—so the reading रूपसुरभूपवत् is suggested.

सदा स दानानि ददौ द्विजेभ्यो दंडनायकः ।
या काप्यपरिणीतायात् तस्य [ा] वैवाहिकं त्वदात् ॥१२॥
स्कंद[b] स्कंदेति वर्णेषु वर्ण्यमानेऽत्र नागरः ।
ब्राह्मणां[c] कोऽपि कोपेन कंपिताधरमुक्तवान् ॥१३॥
स्कंद स्कंदेति वदथ किं विप्राः प्रतिवासरम् ।
मदीयहृदये नायमप्यर्धस्कंदखंडिका ॥१४॥
इत्येते नागराः प्रोचुर्यत्त्वं यात्वा तदंतिके ।
वद द्विजैवं वचनं यद्यस्ति तव योग्यता ॥१५॥
कोपात्सपादलक्षे द्वादशे शाकंभरीं पुरीम् ।
प्राप्य विप्रो राजकुलाद्ययांतं[d] (!) दंडनायकं ॥१६॥ '२२॥
गतेऽन्यसंगरे स्कंदे निद्राव्यसनसन्नधीः ।
व्यापादितस्तुरुष्कैः स राजा जीवन्मृतो युधि ॥२३॥
हरिराजमथो राज्ये शाकंभर्या निवेश्य सः ।
स्कंदस्तत्र कियत्कालं स्थित्वा तुर्याश्रमं श्रितः ॥२४॥
द्रम्माणां लक्षविंशत्या विंशत्यश्च (' त्या च) शतैः समं ।
वामनः सकुटुम्बो (ऽ) णहिल्लपाटकमाट तु ॥२५॥

[He (Skanda), the leader of the army, always made donations to the twice born, and celebrated the marriage of those virgin girls, who approached him (for the purpose). (v. 12).

When he was being extolled here with the words 'Skanda is (really) Skanda (Kārttikeya)' among the castes, a certain Nāgara Brāhmaṇa said with his lips trembling with rage (v. 13).

'Why, oh Brāhmaṇas, do you say every day 'Skanda is (really) Skanda'; in my heart he is not even half of a part of Skanda (Kārttikeya) (v. 14).

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Out of rage that Brāhmaṇa reached the city of Śākambhari, in Sapādalakṣa Twelve, and from the royal palace went to that leader of the army (v. 16).

When Skanda went to another battle, the king, whose intellect was shrouded by the vice of sleep (for vice and sleep), who, though alive, was as good as dead in battle, was slaughtered by the *Turuṣkas* (v. 23).

Then Skanda placing *Harirāja* over the kingdom of Śākambharī, lived there for a while, (and then) took to the fourth stage (of life). (v. 24).

And then Vāmana with twenty lacs and twenty hundred Drammas went to Anahillapāṭaka. (v. 25)].

b Read स्कन्दः c Read ब्राह्मणः d Read राजकुलाद्ययौ तं

मल्लदेवोऽभवत्तस्य पुत्रः पुत्रवतां वरः ।
सुभाषितावलीकर्ता भर्ता भूतलवर्तिनाम् ॥२६॥
सहस्रसंख्या साहित्ये लक्ष्यलक्षणसंख्यया ।
कौटिल्याद्यर्थशास्त्रेषु कोटिशो यन्मतिर्मता ॥२७॥
स श्रीदेवीति नाम्नात्मनाम्ना तां परिणीतवान् ।
लक्ष्मीशवत्ततो लक्ष्मीधरोऽभूद्वरधीधरः ॥२८॥
भगवद्बोधभारत्याख्यश्रीपादप्रसादतः ।
आसादितसदानंदाद्वैतज्ञानानुभावकः ॥२९॥
श्रीमति श्रीशवदणहिल्लपाटकपत्तने ।
मल्लदेवः सहामात्यसभ्यः स्मृत्यादिनिर्णये ॥३०॥
वेदांतस्मृतिसिद्धांतश्रांतः स्वांतः (?। क्रांतः) कवेः पथि ।
पांथोऽप्रतिमरामाख्यं महाकाव्यं चकार यः ॥३१॥
प्रत्यक्षीभुतभारत्येवितः (?) स्मार्तमहत्तमः ।
विरुद्धविधिविध्वंसं व्यवधान्मुग्धवुद्धये ॥३२॥[11]

[His son was Malladeva, the best of those having sons, the author of the *Subhāṣitāvali*, and the supporter of the inhabitants of the earth. (v. 26).

Whose (Malladeva's) many sided erudition in literature, divided according to the number of *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa*, as well as in the works on the science of politics of *Kauṭilya* and others, was established. (v. 27).

He married (a girl), celebrated by herself with the name Śrīdevī, and from him, who was like the lord of Lakṣmī was born *Lakṣmīdhara*, the possessor of the best intellect (v. 28).

(Malladeva) was the expositor of the ever blissful knowledge of Advaita, which he received through the mercy of the holy feet of the revered Bodhabhārati. (v. 29).

Like the lord of Śrī, Malladeva (continued to live) in that prosperous city of Anahillapāṭaka, and being tired with the conclusions of *Vedānta* and *Smṛti* in determining laws etc. passed over as a traveller to the path of a poet and composed the *Mahākāvya* named *Apratima-rāma*. (vv. 30-31).

With speech brought to sight (?), the greatest of the *Smārtas* (Lakṣmīdhara) accomplished the *Viruddha-vidhi-vidhvaṃsa* for enlightening the dullards, (v. 32)].

11 The manuscript was copied in Saṃvat 1582=A.D. 1525. I am indebted to Mr. S. C. Banerji, M.A. of the MSS. Dept. Dacca University for drawing my attention to these passages. I am also thankful to Dr. R. C. Hazra, M.A., Ph.D., for helping me in writing this paper.

The *Viruddha-vidhi-vidhvaṃsa* is obviously a nearly contemporary work on the subject. Lakṣmīdhara had every means of knowing the correct information on the conflict between Muhammad Ghori and the Cāhamānas. So the work is of great historical value. We know from it the existence of a family of ministers under the Cāhamānas. If it is studied with the report of the Moslem historians, it will appear that Pṛthvīrāja's success in the first battle of Tarāin was due to the military skill of his general Skanda. Skanda's absence in the second battle of Tarāin and Pṛthvīrāja's indolence were responsible for the defeat and death of the king at the hand of the Moslems. It has been made clear that Pṛthvīrāja's habit of sleeping untimely marred his political career. It seems that when the news of Pṛthvīrāja's death reached Ajmīr, Skanda declared Harirāja as the king of the country. So long Skanda was the leader of the Cāhamāna army the Moslems could not conquer Ajmir. But after the retirement of the valiant general, Muhammad Ghori took possession of the country by defeating Harirāja.

The work also supplies some valuable information regarding the history of Sanskrit literature of the ancient period. It is important to note that keen interest was taken by the scholars in the study of Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* even in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries A.D. Baudha Bhārati was the author of *Sāṅkhyavācaspativyākhyā*.[12] It cannot be said definitely whether he was identical with Bodhabhārati, mentioned in v. 29 above.

D. C. GANGULY

12 *Catalo. Cat.*, I, 377 B.

Nīlakaṇṭha the Śaiva

Nīlakaṇṭha the Śaiva, who is different from his more famous name-sake whose fame rests on his commentary on the *Mahābhārata*,[1] was the author of a number of Purāṇa and Tantra works, not so well-known. He has given but meagre information about himself in his works. We are told[2] that he was born in a family of Śaivas. Mayūreśvara of this family, the great grandfather of our author, earned for the family the surname Śaiva. The son of Mayūreśvara was Nīlakaṇṭha whose son, the father of our author was Raṅganātha, the poet. Raṅganātha had his son Nīlakaṇṭha by his wife Lakṣmī. Both the parents are referred to by name in the colophons as well as in the introductory and concluding verses of his works. He also refers to his preceptors Kāśīnātha and Śrīdhara,[3] as well as to one Ratnaji at whose instance he is stated to have composed his commentary on the *Devībhāgavata*.[4] He seems to have hailed from the Marhatta country as he refers to a number of dialectic words of the place in this commentary (VIII. 24. 25-7).

Nīlakaṇṭha does not mention his date but an approximate idea may be formed of his time on the basis of the references he makes

1 He is also different from Nīlakaṇṭha, author of the *Śrīkaṇṭhabhāṣya*, a commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, though this Nīlakaṇṭha is also called a Śaiva.

2 श्रीमच्छैवकुले शिवार्चनरतो जातो मयूरेश्वरः
श्रीशम्भोर्वरदानतो यमलभच्छैवोपनामोत्तमम् ।
सूनुस्तस्य शिवार्चकः समभवच्छ्रीनीलकण्ठाभिध-
स्तत्सूनुः कविराजराजिमुकुटः श्रीरङ्गनाथाभिधः ॥१४।
तत्सूनुः खलु नीलकण्ठ इति यो नाम्नास्ति लक्ष्मीसुतः ।

—Concluding verses of the *Devībhāgavataṭīkā*.

3 श्रीलक्ष्मीं मातरं रङ्गनाथाख्यं पितरं गुरुम् ।
काशीनाथश्रीधराख्यौ गुरू नत्वा यथामति ।

—Introductory verse of *Saptaśatyaṅgaṣaṭkavyākhyāna*.

4 रत्नजीप्रेरितेनैव पुराणान्यवलोक्य च ।

—Introductory verse of the *Devībhāgavataṭīkā*.

to authors and works. He mentions in his commentary on the *Devībhāgavata*, among others, to the *Mantramahodadhi* (of Mahīdhara, composed in 1589 A.D.), the *Guptavatī* (of Bhāskararāya, composed in 1741 A.D.) and to Nāgojibhaṭṭa (17th-18th century). It would therefore appear that Nīlakaṇṭha flourished at a time not earlier than the middle of the 18th century.

Of works and authors referred to by Nīlakaṇṭha mention may be made of the following noticed in the commentary on the *Devībhāgavata*:

Ācārahnika, XI. 16. 24.
Ācāradarpaṇa, XI. 22. 43.
Kālottara, Introduction to the commentary (p. 31, 38 of the Calcutta edition).
Kṛtyatattva, IX. 9. 36.
Guptavati of Bhāskararāya, IX. 50. 85.
Cidvalītantra, XII. 7. 20.
Durgātaraṅgiṇī, III. 26. 16.
Durgāpradīpa of Mahesa Ṭhakkura, Introduction, p. 10, III. 26. 33.
Nityāhnika, XI. 17. 1.
Pṛthvīdharācārya, III. 11. 45.
Bhuvaneśvarīpārijāta, VII. 31. 24, III. 3. 40, 44.
Bhuvaneśvarīrahasya, III. 3. 44, VII. 38. 3.
Bhuvaneśvarīsaṃhitā, XII. 11. 106.
Bhuvaneśvarīhṛdaya, III. 3. 44.
Bhuvaneśvaryupaniṣad, III. 3. 44.
Mantramahodadhi, III. 26. 26.
Mādhava's commentary on the *Sūtasaṃhitā*, III. 10. 14.
" commentary on the *Rudrabhāṣya*, VII. 13. 31.
" commentary on the *Sūtagītā*, VII. 33. 11.
Rasāloka, IX. 19. 5.
Śivarahasya, III. 3. 35, IX. 1. 1, XII. 10. 3, VIII. 8. 19-20.
Śivasūtra, V. 16. 35.
Śrīkramadīpikā, Introduction, p. 25.
Siddhāntaśekhara, XI. 24. 42.
Saubhāgyakalpalatā, Introduction, p. 26.
Saurasaṃhitā, V. 1. 27, IX. 2. 26.
Haṭhapradīpikā, XI. 16. 64.
Hemādri, Introduction, p. 10, 20.

About half a dozen works of Nīlakaṇṭha are known or have been mentioned. A list of these is given below:

1. Commentary on the *Kātyāyanītantra*, *Mantravyākhyāprakāśikā* by name. A manuscript of Paṭalas 20-23 of the work is noticed by Stein (*Descr. Cat. Sans. Mss. Raghunath Temple Library*, Jammu, Kashmir, No. 228).

2. Commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Referred to in the commentary on the *Devībhāgavata* (III. 30. 28, XI. 18. 28). The only known manuscript of the work belongs to the Vaṅgiya Sāhitya Pariṣat.[5]

5 *Descr. Cat. Sans. Mss. Vaṅgīya Sāhitya Pariṣat*, p. 17.

3. Commentary on the six accessories of the Devīmāhātmya Section of the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, called *Saptaśatyaṅgaṣaṭkavyākhyāna*. Referred to in the commentary on the *Devībhāgavata* (Introduction, p. 38, V. 8. 33, V. 33. 57-9) But it seems to be rather curious that the latter commentary is also referred to in the present work. Only one incomplete manuscript of the work, comprising the *kavaca* portion, is recorded in the *Catalogus Catalogorum* (II. 166). The Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal possesses two manuscripts of the work one complete and the other incomplete.[6]

4. *Śaktitattvavimarśinī*. Referred to in the commentary of the *Devībhāgavata* (Introduction, p. 38) and the *Saptaśatyaṅgaṣaṭkavyākhyāna*.

5. Commentary on the *Kenopaniṣad*, called *Candrikā*. Referred to in the commentary of the *Devībhāgavata* (IV. 19. 15).

6. Commentary on the *Kāmakalārahasya*. Referred to in the commentary on the *Devībhāgavata* (IV 15. 12).

7. Commentary on the *Devīgītā*. Referred to in the commentary on the *Devībhāgavata* (VII. 34, 50, VII. 35. 46, 62, VII. 40. 40-6).

8. *Devībhāgavatasthiti* or simply *Bhāgavatasthiti* which seeks to demonstrate the authenticity of the *Devībhāgavata*. It is referred to towards the end of the introduction (p. 38) of the commentary of the *Devībhāgavata*. This introduction which also deals with the same topic is referred to at the end of the present work. A manuscript of the work is found in the collections of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal.

9. *Devībhāgavataṭīkā*. Two manuscripts of the work are referred to in the *Catalogus Catalogorum* (I. 261, II. 56). Two editions of the work are known: one, published in Bombay (1789 S.E=1867 A.D.), the other, published in three volumes by Haricaran Vasu (Sabdakalpadrum office, 71, Pathuriaghata Street, Calcutta, 1809 Ś.E=1887 A.D.). This latter edition has been referred to in these pages.

Of these works the commentary on the *Devībhāgavata* appears to be the only work that has so far been printed. It also seems to be one of the latest, as references to almost all the other works are traceable in it. It is not possible however, at this stage to suggest a strictly chronological arrangement of the other works, especially because in the case of some of his works mutual references between two works are noticeable. Thus, as has already been pointed out, the *Saptaśatyaṅgaṣaṭkavyākhyāna* and the *Devībhāgavatasthiti* both refer to and are referred to by the *Devībhāgavataṭīkā*.

6 *Descr. Cat. Sans. Mss. Royal Asiatic Soc.*, vol. VIII, Nos. 6409-10.

The value of this commentary lies in the fact that incidentally it seeks to elucidate the real nature and the supreme importance of the worship of the Divine Mother who is sought to be identified with the Brahman.[7] We have here an interesting discussion regarding the propriety of sacrificing animals in connection with the worship of Śakti. It is stated that Śakti is the presiding deiy of Brahmavidyā which aims at an annihilation of this mundane existence; so it is that Śakti prefers the sacrifice of animals.[8] Nīlakaṇṭha gives an ingenous explanation of the inconsistencies in the cosmogonical accounts as given in various systems of philosophy. It is pointed out that the world is but an illusion for which there is scant regard of spiritual aspirants and hence the description of the process of creation is nothing but an eye-wash meant for the satisfaction of the ignorant mass.[9] Some of the views expressed in the work may

7 देवी सर्ववेदान्ततात्पर्यभूमिः—*Devībhāgavataṭīkā*, III. 9. 33.

देव्या मायाविशिष्टब्रह्मरूपत्वात् क्वचिन्मायोपसर्जनब्रह्मरूपत्वेन वर्णनं क्वचिद्ब्रह्मोपसर्जनमायारूपत्वेन वर्णनम् ।—*Op. cit.*, III. 18. 37-42.

सर्वथापि ब्रह्मोपासना शक्तिसहितब्रह्मण एव यथा तथा शक्त्युपासनापि ब्रह्मविशिष्टशक्तेरेव ।—*Op. cit.*, IV. 19. 7.

Elsewhere Nīlakaṇṭha thus elucidates his views on the point:

केचिद् भ्रान्ता वदन्ति मायारूपाया भगवत्या उपासना शास्त्रेषूक्ता । तथा च मायाया मिथ्यात्वान्मुक्तौ तस्या अनन्वयाच्चाच्छेद्येयमुपासनेति······श्रुतिभिस्तथा स्मृतिभिश्च ब्रह्मरूपिण्या भगवत्या एवोपासनाकथनात् ।......किमर्थं मायादिशब्दैर्व्यवहारो भगवत्याः शास्त्रेषु क्रियते लक्षणादिदोषाभावाय स्पष्टप्रतिपत्तये ब्रह्मादिशब्दैरेव कुतो न व्यवहारः क्रियते इति तेच्छृणु । चतूर्व्यूहात्मकं हि ब्रह्मणो रूपं विराड्ढिरण्यगर्भाव्याकृतब्रह्मरूपम् । तत्र देव्युपासना व्यूहान्तर्गतस्य कस्य पदार्थस्येति शङ्कायां विराड्ढिरण्यगर्भाव्याकृतानां तदधिष्ठातॄणां ब्रह्मविष्णुरुद्राणां च मैत्रायणीयश्रुतौ एकैकगुणमयत्वकीर्तनात् गुणत्रयसाम्यावस्थाया मायायाः प्रकृत्यादिशब्दवाच्यत्वेन तदेव मायाविशिष्टं तुरीयं ब्रह्मैव भगवत्युपासनायां ग्राह्यमिति बृहदर्थप्रकाशनार्थं तथा मायादिशब्दैर्व्यवहारस्य करणात् ।

—Introductory portion of the *Saptaśatyaṅgaṣaṭkavyākhyāna*.

8 यतः कारणाद्देवी ब्रह्मविद्याधिष्ठात्री भवति ब्रह्मविद्यायाश्च स्वभावो जीवदशा नाशयितव्येति तस्माद्देव्याः प्रियो बलिर्भवति ।—*Devībhāgavataṭīkā* III. 26. 33.

9 अत्रेन्द्रियसृष्टिविषये च शैवसांख्यवेदान्तिनां परस्परं बहुविरोधो दृश्यते तथापि सृष्टेर्मायिकत्वेन मिथ्यात्वात्तत्रादराभावेन यथाकथञ्चिदिन्द्रजालवद्दृश्यमानस्य निरुक्तिर्मूढजनबुद्धिशङ्कानिवारणार्थं काञ्चिदपि प्रक्रियामाश्रित्य कर्तव्या ।—*Devībhāgavataṭīkā* III. 7. 38.

not unlikely have been based on one or other of the different systems of Tantra philosophy of which Nīlakaṇṭha refers to five belonging to five principal schools of Tantra[10] According to the Śākta system the world is stated to consist of ten categories.[11]

Nīlakaṇṭha has taken pains in the introduction of the commentary to demonstrate the authenticity of the *Devībhāgavata.*[12] But he is not a blind admirer and he has been careful in examining the relative value of the different recensions[13] as well as variants found in different manuscripts.

Nīlakaṇṭha follows the Bengal recension of the work in preference to the Southern recension, distinctive features of which are still unknown.[14] He rejects the first eleven ślokas of chapter II of Book III found in the Southern recension but missing in the Bengal

10 शैवशाक्तसौरगाणेशवैष्णवनास्तिकमतप्रतिपादकानि षड्दर्शनानि सन्ति ।
—*Op. cit.*, IV. 15. 12.

11 तत्र शक्तिदर्शनमते श्रीभुवनेश्वर्या दश तत्त्वानि सन्ति । क्वचिन्नव तत्त्वान्यपि ।...... तत्त्वशब्देन सर्वप्रपञ्चस्य यत्रान्तर्भावस्तत् तत्त्वमुच्यते ।—*loc. cit.*

12 A number of independent treatises on the topic including one, already referred to, by Nilakaṇtha himself are known. One of these e.g., the *Durjanamukhacapeṭikā* by Kāśīnātha Bhaṭṭa Bhaḍa was translated into French by Burnouf (*Le Bhāgavata Purāṇa,* Preface, p. lxxxv).

13 References to peculiarities of various recensions and older manuscripts evidently go to disprove the Vaiṣṇavite theory about the spuriousness of the version of the work as known at present, which is stated to have been the composition of one Rāmacandra Ghule (19th century) of Benares who manufactured it, as the genuine work was alleged to be not available. (*Bhāgavatānukramaṇikā*, a Bengali work of Janamejay Mitra, *Sāhitya Pariṣat Patrikā*, vol. 34, pp. 15-16). If Ghule was really responsible for a version, it must be different from the one commented on by Nilakaṇṭha, which enjoys popularity to an extent scarcely to be expected for so late a version as that of Ghule. Further, the chronological relation between Ghule and Nilakaṇṭha being unknown it is difficult to suppose that the version of the former was accessible to the latter.

14 तत्रैतस्य सप्रमाणस्य देवीभागवतस्य क्वचिद् द्राविडगौडसम्प्रदायपाठभेदेन द्वैविध्येऽपि गौडपाठस्य समञ्जसत्वात् तमालम्ब्यैव यथामति व्याख्यायते ।(Calcutta edition, vol. I, p. 26).

recension as well as in old manuscripts.[15] Similarly he omits to comment on eight whole chapters after XII. 6 which are not found in old manuscripts, are deemed irrelevant and are suspected to have been interpolated from Vaiṣṇava works[16] He was evidently of the opinion that he was the first to comment on the work.[17] But two more commentaries, the dates of which are not known, have been referred to in the *Catalogus Catalogorum* (I. 261).

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15 अत्र व्यास उवाचेत्यत उत्तरं यत् त्वया चेत्यतः पूर्वमेकादश श्लोका दाक्षिणात्यपाठे सन्ति। परन्तु सोऽपपाठः सङ्गत्यग्रहात् पुनरुक्तिदोषाच्च गौडपाठे प्राचीनपुस्तकेषु तेषामनुपलम्भाच्च।—III, 2, 1.

16 अत्राधुनिकपुस्तकेषु अष्टावध्याया वैष्णवतन्त्रस्थाः केनचित् प्रक्षिप्ता दृश्यन्ते। तत्र शक्तिदीक्षाप्रकरणे तत्कथनस्यासङ्गतेः प्राचीनपुस्तकेषु तेषामदर्शनाच्च सोऽपपाठः। ततः प्राचीनपुस्तकपाठमनुरुध्यैव व्याख्यायते। —XII, 7, 1.

Nīlakaṇṭha refers to variants in several other cases also, e.g., IX, 1, 92, XII, 6, 90.

17 देवीभागवतस्यास्य व्याख्यानरहितस्य च।
व्याख्यानं क्रियते सम्यक् तिलकाख्यं महत्तरम्॥

—Last introductory verse of the commentary.

देवीभागवतस्यास्य व्याख्यानरहितस्य च।
तिलकाख्यां महाव्याख्यां सम्यग् यः कृतवान् शुभाम्॥

—Concluding verse at the end of the *ṭikā* of each Book.

The Authoress Bīnabāyī

Bīnabāyī is the only woman whose contribution to Paurāṇic literature is extant to-day. Her only work that is known to-day is the *Dvārakā-pattala*. The work has not been published as yet; the only MS. of it that is known to exist belongs to the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. It furnishes us with a fairly good account of the personal history of the authoress.

It is stated at the beginning of the MS. that the work belongs to the Rāmānuja school.[1] It is dated 1518.[2] So Bīnabāyī must have flourished after Rāmānuja (12th century) and before 1518.

The authoress states that her father was king Maṇḍalika who flourished in the Yadu race and excelled all others in royal qualities.[3] It is likely that this Maṇḍalika was one of the Cūḍāsama Maṇḍalika kings of Girnar, Kathiawar. Mandalika I flourished at the beginning of the 11th century[4] and Rāmānuja was born a few years later. So Maṇḍalika I cannot be Bīnabāyī's father. King Maṇḍalika, father of Bīnabāyī, is, probably, one of the other four Cūḍāsama Maṇḍalikas known to us.[5]

1 रामानुज-मतस्यायं ग्रन्थः cp. also श्यामं रामानुजं कान्तं...नमामि, etc.

2 संवत् १५७८ वर्षे भाद्रपद-शुक्ले १३ सोमे लिखितम् ।

3 See the beginning of the work *Dvārakā-pattala*.

4 C. Mabel Duff's *Chronology of India*, London, 1899, pp. 283-284; *A.S.W.I.*, ii, 164 (given in appendix).

5 Maṇḍalika III, IV and V ruled at the beginning of the thirteenth, end of the fourteenth and middle of the fifteenth century; Duff's *Chronology of India*, p. 284. For various inscriptions referring to the different rulers of the family and their lineage, see also *Ep. Ind.* vol. xx, p. 105, Inscription no. 751, (dated Vikrama 1473), no. 805, p. 112, (Vikrama 1507: Maṇḍalika III); no. 867 (Vikrama 1554: Maṇḍalika III); no. 1719, p. 243 (undated: Maṇḍalika II); also no. 1865, p. 243 (undated). See also *Rev. Lists of Ant. Rem. of the Bombay Presidency*, p. 347.

The SMV. quotes a verse by one king Maṇḍalika (Mahīpati Maṇḍalika), p. 64 of the appendix, G. O. S., vol. LXXXII.

There are two interesting MSS. called Maṇḍalika-nṛpa-carita about the Maṇḍalika kings in the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (see *Descriptive Cata-*

Further we know from the same work that Bīnabāyī was the chief queen of Harasiṃha, son of Vīrasiṃha, grandson of king Pratāpa, a Vaiṣṇava by religion, who ruled in Pāṭalipura situated on the Ganges. The only information we get about him in the work is that he was a descendant of Cāhuvāna and under the circumstances it is difficult to identify him.

Thus it may be concluded that Bīnabāyī flourished probably at Girnar, Kathiawar, between the 12th and the 15th century.

Though highly learned, Bīnabāyī displays admirable womanly modesty while speaking about herself and disclaims of any great scholarship or genius on her own part. She describes herself as a humble student of scriptures, not an erudite scholar. Of course, this is disproved by the work itself which indubitably testifies to the deep erudition of the authoress and her great mastery over scriptures, Smṛtis and Purāṇas. Bīnabāyī, further, declares herself an humble devotee of Kṛṣṇa to whose service she has dedicated her whole life and fortune. Her sole object in undertaking to summarise the Dvārakā-māhātmya, forming a part of the Prabhāsakhaṇḍa of the *Skanda-purāṇa*, in the form of the present work *Dvārakā-pattala*, is, she points out, to render some religious service to humanity.

Bīnabāyī seems to have made extensive tours all over India. According to her own statement, she visited many holy places and practised extensive charity.[6]

For all these reasons, she was held in high reverence by her subjects and by all those with whom she came in contact. She has

logue of Sanskrit and Prakrit MSS. in the library of the Bombay Branch of R. Asiatic Society, compiled by H. D. Velankar. vol. II, Hindu Literature, pp. 339-340). But they contain no reference to our authoress Bīnabāyī.

6 See the end of chapter I called तीर्थ-यात्रा-विवेक, "विहितानेकसत्तीर्थ-यात्रयाऽति-पवित्रया" etc.; end of 2nd chap. called प्रणामादिविवेक, "कन्यया मण्डलीकस्य दृष्ट-संस्पृष्ट-तीर्थया", etc.; and also end of 3rd chap. called अर्घ-स्नान विवेक, "विहितानेक-सत्तीर्थ-स्नानया बहुमानया", etc.

been eulogised as the Kalpa-taru or the celestial wish-fulfilling tree, and as the Ganges,—purity and holiness incarnate.[7]

The work is divided into four chapters. At the beginning of the work, as we have seen, the authoress gives us some personal informations. The first chapter begins with quotations from the *Skanda-purāṇa* showing the importance of the holy place Dvārakā and deals with the acquirement of religious merit by the pilgrim who visits Dvārakā or by his helpers. In this connection it is stated that the pilgrim acquires at his every step towards Dvārakā from home the same religious merit as accrues from the performance of the horse-sacrifice. The helpers too acquire various sorts of religious merit. Thus one inducing some other person to go on pilgrimage to Dvārakā goes to the realm of Viṣṇu. One speaking sweetly to such a pilgrim acquires the merit of playing at Nandana. One offering a conveyance to a tired pilgrim on his way to Dvārakā goes to Heaven in an aeroplane with swans. One supplying food to a hungry pilgrim on his way to Dvārakā acquires the merit of satisfying the manes with food and drink for ever and so on.

The 2nd chapter deals with the ritualistic directions in connection with bowing down to various deities, etc., while paying visit to them at Dvārakā. On reaching Dvārakā one pays homage to Gaṇeśa, then to Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa in succession. After that he visits the river Gomatī. On the eighth, ninth or fourteenth day of the moon he visits Rukmiṇī with the object of getting all desired objects. Then he visits Cakratīrtha, the Dvārakā-Gaṅgā, and Śaṅkhoddhāra, finally he bathes in the Gomatī with the object of getting rid of all sins committed during the previous births.

The third chapter is connected with the offerings of rice, dūrvā grass, flowers, water, etc., and baths at various shrines. The appropriate formulae to be uttered and the ritualistic directions to be observed while offering or bathing are given here.

7 Cp. the last three verses of the *Dvārakā-pattala*.

On reaching the Gomatī the pilgrim prostrates himself straight on the shore. He then washes his hands and feet and takes hold of kuśa grass, touches the auspicious objects mixed with unhusked barley-corns and with his face towards the east he makes the offering along with the utterance of the appropriate formulas. In the Cakra-tīrtha, he makes an offering of the five auspicious things, mixed with flowers, unhusked rice and sandal paste with his face towards it, uttering the prescribed formula. He pays homage to Varuṇa and the Gomatī with one half of the materials mixed up. The offerings to Viṣṇu should consist of fruits, flowers, unhusked barley-corn and sandal paste. The pilgrim makes an offering to Gaṅgābdhi as well, as prescribed.

Next the pilgrim bathes in the Gomatī with the object of getting Hari. He walks down to naval-deep water, makes a circle of four cubits, invokes the Ganges with the prescribed mantras, takes some water in his folded palms, purifies it by mantras and sprinkles it on his head four, five or seven times. Then taking some mud in his hand, he similarly purifies it, rubs the same on his forehead thrice and plunges into water three times. After that he sips water twice, comes back to the shore and pays homage to Yakṣman with a view to atone for the sin committed by him in defiling the water. Now he dresses himself, washes his knees, hands and feet three times with mud and water, sips the water thrice and seats himself for making offerings to the deities. Then he announces the various sorts of religious merits he wants to acquire by bathing in the Gomatī.

The wishes (*saṃkalpas*) uttered by the pilgrim during the bath at the confluence of the Gomatī and the sea are very interesting, as they furnish a list of the religious merits he wishes to acquire and as he prays here for the salvation of not only himself but also of his kith and kin by birth or matrimony as well as of friends of any description. One is enjoined to make these wishes on the sixth day of the moon called Kapilā or the 12th lunar day. The

wishes to be made during bath at the Cakratīrtha, Rukmiṇī lake, Maya tank, Gopikā tank, Varadāna and Śaṅkhoddhāra are also prescribed here in a neat and clear-cut way.

At the end of the chapter the pilgrim is instructed how to offer oblations of water at the Gomatī, and at the Nṛga well after bath.

The fourth chapter deals with the worship of Kṛṣṇa. The pilgrim is enjoined to worship Kṛṣṇa with saffron mixed with camphor, musk, sandal and aloe, along with incense burning. Then the deity is presented with lights, *naivedya*, and betel. The devotee then goes round the image of Kṛṣṇa and prostrates himself straight. He puts on the garland of Tulasī beads and wood with the prescribed mantras.

Then the authoress gives ritualistic directions for making various gifts. Here she does not follow the *Skanda-purāṇa* but refers to other Purāṇas. She describes the procedure of worship etc., while making gifts of a cow, a bull, a bull with diamond, an ox and a horse. She lays special stress on the gifts of diamond; in giving directions for this, she follows *Śiva-purāṇa* as well as *Viṣṇu-dharma-purāṇa*. Then she prescribes the regulations for the gift of silver, jewels, paddy, cotton garments and for the offer of food to mendicants.

After this, the authoress speaks of the *śrāddha* to be performed in the Gomatī as well as at the confluence of the Gomatī and the sea.

Finally, she dwells on the procedure of Viṣṇu's worship, how to bathe Him, to offer Him ordinary garments, incensed garments, ornaments, etc. Here the book ends. But we have three more verses eulogising the authoress which do not seem to be the composition of Bīnabāyī herself, as the modesty displayed by her at the beginning and other parts of the work goes ill with any self-eulogy at the end. These verses seem, rather, to be a homage of the scribe to the laudable qualities of the queen.

The work though professedly[8] based on the Rāmānuja school of the Vedānta, contains no reference to any of the philosophical

8 1st. verse and "रामानुज-मतस्यायं ग्रन्थः ।"

doctrines of the school. It is purely ritualistic and probably tries to develop the ritualistic and practical side of the school by laying down rules for various devotional ceremonies.

The authoress has, no doubt, written the work on the basis of the Dvārakā-māhātmya, but her originality lies in the fact that the ritualistic development of the work and the modes and procedures enunciated are characteristically her own. As a matter of fact, the arrangement of the whole work is her own. She has quoted at places the Dvārakā-māhātmya verbatim, but in the choice of the Mantras she has displayed much cleverness. Also the ritualistic wishes (*saṃkalpavākyas*) and the procedures of worship, etc., appear to be the productions of an eminent ritualistic authority. The work is very short; nevertheless, it contains in a nutshell all the essential informations given in the Dvārakā-māhātmya. Being a ritualistic work, it naturally omits legends related in the Dvārakā-māhātmya. At times, the authoress has brought in materials from other Purāṇas which much enhance the value of her own work. The diction of Bīnabāyī is simple and graceful and the few verses at the beginning and the end of the work amply testify to her great poetic genius.

In religion, Indian women have always held a prominent place. Their opinions are of great weight and have been quoted by eminent authorities.[9] Specially they have always been accepted as authorities in the sphere of customary rites (ācāras).[10] It is a matter of great social and religious importance that a woman should write a ritualistic work the procedure, directions, formulas, etc., which are to be followed during religious observances.

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9 E. g. the *Aitareya* (v. 29) and *Kauṣitaki* (II. 9) quote the authoritative opinions of a venerable learned maiden (Kumārī Gandharva-gṛhītā) that the Agnihotra ritual which was once performed on both days is now to be performed on alternate days only.

10 E. g. *ĀpGs.*, 2.15; here he recommends that the ceremonies that are required by custom should be learnt from women; cp. *ĀpDhs.*, II. 6. 15.9, II. 11. 29. 11-12; *AśvGs.*, I. 14. 8; etc.

On the Identity of the two Patañjalis

The belief in the identities of the author of *Mahābhāṣya* (*Bh.*) and that of the *Yogasūtra* (*Ys.*), has never ceased to maintain itself vividly enough among the Indologists in the West as well as in the East, although it was refuted on several occasions and particularly in a very well reasoned way by H. Jacobi (*JAOS.*, XXXI, p. 25). We have seen since then, a trustworthy scholar, B. Liebich (S. B. Heid 1919, 4, p. 7. 1921, 7, p. 57) collecting in support of this identity new arguments, whilst the great translator of the texts on Yoga, J. H. Woods (*Yoga system*, p. xv., Cf. Jacobi, *op. cit.*, p. 27) bringing into evidence the divergent conceptions which the two works attest, in regard to the question of "substance" (*dravya*) and "quality" (*guṇa*).

Jacobi p. 26, had brought into account certain compounds of *Ys.* which violate the rule of precedence defined by *Pāṇ*. II. 2. 54. It is true that Liebich (S. B. Heid, 1919, p. 8) remarks that this precedence is not without exceptions. In fact, the grammatical vṛttis point out on several occasions to the inconstant (*anitya*) character of the rule *alpāctaram* or of its vārttika, and we know that Pāṇini himself goes against this rule in the text of several of his sūtras. But it remains that *Bh.* is strict as to the application of the precedence in the dvandva, and it is doubtful that the author of the *Bh.* should have allowed compounds such as *pracchardanavidhāraṇa* or *grahitṛgrahaṇagrāhya*, which are found in the *Ys.*

Liebich brings also to account that the grammatical theory of sphoṭa is admitted by the Yoga philosophy. But the argument has no weight in deciding the identity of Patañjali, for on the one hand the term does not appear in the *Ys.*, and on the other hand it is only employed incidentally in the *Bh.* and does not enable us to

ascertain if the complex notion attached to it by the theorists of grammatical philosophy, is found already implied therein.

Let us try and see if a more complete examination of the vocubulary confirms the general impressions which are derived from the discussions summarised above.

It is certain that the contents of a collection of aphorisms on the principles of a technique has the chance of being far enough from that of a treatise of grammatical criticism, that on the other hand, the composition in sūtra implies other stylistic requirements than the composition in bhāṣya.

This alone could justify the difference between the two texts, if one forgot that the *Bh*. carries a very strong philosophical imprint, and that, from the formal point of view, it tends towards an axiomatic expression which brings it near the style of sūtra. One knows besides that the *Bh*. follows verbally and comments on the vārtika of Kātyānana, the language and style of which are obviously related to those of the philosophical sūtra. Thus the two works could and should meet on the plan of lexicopraphy.

In fact there are a few common terms: how could it be otherwise? This is because both the things are either one or contain commonplace terms such as every theoretical exposition contains from one end to the other of Sanskrit literature. Let us take the most important, *svarūpa*, *ānantarya*, *viśeṣa* (the *Ys*. do not utilise the opposition *sāmānya/viśeṣa* without which the use of *viśeṣa* is hardly conceived in the *Bh*.), the opposition *bāhya/abhyantara*, the expression *tatparatiṣedhārtham* or *aniṣṭaprasaṅgāt*.

Or one finds that the words are employed in entirely different senses in the two works. Without speaking of the word *yoga* itself, we have thus the term of grammar *dvandva* which appears in *Ys*. in the sense of "contrasted notions" (such as "hot and cold," Vyāsa). This use does not appear to be older than the *Mahābhārata*. In the same way, one has a series of words of the grammatical terminology

(*pratyāhāra, upasarga, pratyaya, vikaraṇa* etc.) which appear in the Ys. with quite different values. Among the more general terms, let us note also the case of words like *liṅga, sādhana, saṃskāra, vikalpa, atiprasaṅga*. Liebich (*loc. cit.*) recalls that *Ys.* use the words *antar* and *bahir-aṅga*, which are well known in grammatical argumentation. But the meaning which these words are given in the *vṛtti* and in the *Bh.*, "(operation of which) the cause is situated in the interior relatively: in the exterior i.e. in front or behind the complementary operation, and which takes its place before or after the latter, when the two operations work for the formation of the same word)" is as removed as possible from that which *Ys.* assigns to it "(means) immediate or direct (relatively indirect or accessory, for attaining the Yoga)": "indirect," says Vyāsa, because even without them Yoga is possible. There is not in the *antaraṅga/bahiraṅga* of grammarians any plan of relative preponderance; only that question arises as to which of the two operations should be effected in the first place.

It is remarkable in this connection, that nowhere the author of *Ys.* utilises the pregnant values of *ca, vā, iti* etc. that the grammatical commentators following *Bh.*, always bring out from the Pāṇinian Sūtra.

Number of terms which the grammatical comments and the Vākyapadīya largely use are not found in the *Bh.*, (where one expects to find them legitimately) whilst they are attested in the *Ys.*: e.g. *pratiprasava, yogyatā, dharmin, vastu, pratiyogin, abhiniveśa, vāsanā, svasvāmin, viniyoga*. The language of *Ys.* attests to a development in the sense of analysis and abstraction which rests assuredly on a long evolution. *Bh.* has *smaraṇa* or *smṛta*, the *Ys. smṛti; Bh. anukaraṇa*, the *Ys. anukāra*. A word as important as *samādhi* is lacking in *Bh.* which knows *samādhāna*, as it has *antardhi* or *-dhā* in respect of *antardhāna* of the *Ys.* One will note still in the *Bh.* the absence of important terms *śakti, bhāvana* (°*nā*), as also the use of °*bhūmi*

as the last member of the compound, characteristic of *Ys.* One would expect that the designation of the texts revealed by *ānuśravika* (*Ys.*) might appear at least once in the *Bh.* which, on the other hand does not contain the commonplace use like *tajja, tatstha*, etc. The expression *etena vyākhyātāḥ* of the *Ys.*, which one notes in certain Kalpasūtras, and in the sūtras which the bhāṣya of Kauṭilya has absorbed, is lacking in the *Bh.*, as also a phrase like *tadā kiṁ syāt*. The list of familiar uses in the *Bh.* of which the *Ys.* do not contain any trace is almost without limit.

From a strictly grammatical point of view, it must be remembered that the *Ys.* are a finished model of the nominal style, with what this linguistic expression carries along: that is to say a usage much developed in the nominal composition, the use abounding in the suffix *-tvā-* having the effect of rendering into substantive the bahubrīhi (type—*viśeṣārthatva* "the fact that (its) object is particular") or the tatpuruṣa adjectives (type *manojavitva* "the fact that its rapidity is comparable to that of thought"). Not one of these procedures is customary in the *Bh.* which is noticeable on the contrary in the technical prose of Sanskrit, by the extensive use of the verbal sentence, by the moderate use of the composition, by the fact that suffixation concerns the word and not the compound of which the word is a part. It is thus that it has not the forms at Samāsānta-*ka*-like °*pūrvaka* or °*pramāṇaka* of the *Ys.*. In the same way, it knows less abstract derivatives in *-ya-* of the type of *vairāgya, saumanasya* and formations like *kathaṃtā* and *asmitā* are hardly conceivable in the language of the *Bh.* that is pure and free from pedantism.

The *Ys.* make use of *dvandva* formed of the positive adjective and the adjective with (*a*) °priv., *puṇyāpuṇya, jñātājñāta, dṛṣṭādṛṣṭa, kliṣṭākliṣṭa*. This procedure is recognised by grammarians, at least when the adjective is a verbal one in *-ta-* as in the last three examples. But it remains very rare up to the development of the philosophical texts of Buddhism, or of the Brahmanical literature called

classical. The *Bh.* does not use them. In the same way, combinations like *grahītṛgrāhakagrāhya* or *draṣṭṛdṛśya* which abound in the commentaries of the later period have no equivalent in the *Bh.*

It is little likely that the bhāṣyakāra would have ratified a compound such as *saṁhatyakāritva*, where the first member is an absolutive; compounds of this kind, with the exception of some isolated cases in the *Mahābhārata* or the *Kauṭilīya*, are confined to the technical treatises of Buddhism.

The *Ys.* have compounds in °*heya* (*pratiprasavaheya, dhyānaheya*) in which the last member is a verbal of obligation (*kṛtya*). Such formations do not appear in the *Bh.* except in the kārikā (F. Kielhorn, *I.A.*, XV, p. 232 n.) which as we know do not cite the authority of Patañjali.

The type "*cvi*" is represented in the *Ys.* by the forms *vaśīkāra* and *avisayībhūtatva*: it is clearly avoided in the language of the *Bh.*

The adjective *ṛtaṃbhara* of the Ys. goes out of the limit of the sentence *saṃjñāyām* of the sūtra of Pāṇ. III, 2. 46.

The use of the prefix *sa°* *is* also widespread in the *Ys.*, and is relatively small in the *Bh.*

Certain pronominal and adverbial forms offer some interest for the discrimination of the author: *sadā*, known to *Ys.*, lacks in the *Bh.* (if we leave out of account the metrical quotation). The use of the adverb *itaratra* takes place in both, but in clearly divergent acceptations. The *Bh.* often utilises the form *aneka*, but nowhere the plural (*anekeṣām*) which the *Ys.* give and which the grammarians consider as generally incorrect (compare—Nāgojībh. ad. *Bh.* II, 26, Durghaṭavṛ *ibid.*, cf. also *uttareṣām Ys.* "for the following.") The *Ys.* use derivatives *dṛśi, citi*, in the sense of the nouns of action "fact of seeing, thinking": *Bh.* limits this mode of derivation to the designation of the verbal root, conforming to III, 3 108 vt. 2. In its use, *dṛśi* for example is the "root *dṛś*."

We have referred above to certain expressions of *Ys.* the most direct correspondent of which is to be found in the technical texts of Buddhism. It is not out of place to mention in this connection the triad *maitrī, karuṇā, muditā*, of the *sūtra* 133. These are the three well known elements of Buddhist terminology, the form *muditā*, that is to say the use of the feminine of a verbal in *-ta-* as noun of action is a feature of the Buddhist language of which one would search for in vain examples in the classical literature of earlier times.

The term *prāgbhāra* seems to belong equally to the Buddhist and Jaina schools, from where it has passed at a late date into the Brahmanical lexicons. At last *ariṣṭa,* in the sense of "(presages of) death" comes into use at the stage of *Gṛhyasūtra-Mahābhārata,* sanskritising perhaps P. *ariṭṭha.*

In brief, the vocabulary of the *Ys.* is radically distinct from that of the *Bh.* The divergences do not constitute a simple opposition between the propriety of the sūtra style and that of the bhāṣya style, still less (as it has been supposed) a mere difference which might exist between a younger Patañjali and the older Patañjali. We have to do with two different authors and everything leads to believe that a considerable lapse of time occurred between the date of the *Bhāṣya*—which can pass to-day for almost sure—, and that, late by a few centuries, which marks the completion of the *Yogasūtra*, the development of the style and the philosophical dialectics.

L. Renou

A Persian Inscription from Gwalior State

The inscription dealt with below, though noticed as early as 1865 by General Sir A. Cunningham,[1] does not appear to have been published so far. The epigraph was listed recently by the State Archæological Department and is being edited by the courtesy of the Director of Archæology, Gwalior State.

The epigraph hails from Nurabad (26°-24′ N., 78°-6′ E.), a decaying village on the bank of the river *Sankh*. It lies 15 miles north of Gwalior, along the Delhi-Gwalior-Bombay Trunk road and is a flag-station on the main line of the G.I.P. Railway.

The site of Nurabad may be said to have bad luck as it could not retain its prosperity which fell to its lot during the late regime of the Mughals as also under the present rule of the Marathas. Originally a hamlet, called Sihora, stood at the site, and the then road to the Deccan, under the Muslim kings, passed by it. The river *Sankh*, flowing below this hamlet, being a fairly big one, would have obstructed passage across, specially during the rains. This fact is probably responsible for making this place a regular stage on the royal road. This surmise is corroborated further by the presence of an old large *Sarai* here and a fine bridge near it, both being the work of the Muhammadan rule.

It seems that with the construction of the *Sarai* mentioned above, Sihora, the original name was abandoned and the place re-named, as the tradition current is that the town and the *Sarai* were founded by Nur Jahan Begum, the well-known Queen of the Mughal Emperor Jehangir, and named after her. Naturally the imposing *Sarai* and the bridge here made the place fully known in the country round, but it does not seem to have progressed other-

1 *CASR.*, II, p. 327.

wise as no trace of its development into a town exist at or near the site. One more attempt was made by the late Maharaja Sir Madho Rao Scindia[2] for its development but it bore no fruit.

The inscription under notice is, at present, built up on the inner face (near the floor) of the northern wall of the prayer-hall of a small modern mosque, which stands outside the *Sarai*, adjacent to its north-west corner. The very position in which the inscription is set up shows that it cannot belong to this modern mosque. Besides, it is said, that it originally belonged to a mosque (now extinct) inside the *Sarai*, which seems probable as *Sarais*, elsewhere, contemporary with that of Nurabad, generally have a mosque inside them. Cunningham has found this inscription possibly on the original mosque, but his description does not clearly tell us as to whether the mosque stood within or outside the *Sarai*.[3] Though it is difficult now to narrate the circumstances in which the original mosque ceased to exist, it, however, admits of no doubt, that the inscription was picked up from some ruins, and stuck up in its present setting by the builders of this modern mosque.

The inscription is cut on a stone measuring 4′-4″ × 1′-7″ all over. The epigraph is cut in relief and is enclosed by a one inch wide border, uniformly cut on all its sides and in the centre, dividing the tablet lengthwise into two halves. The record consists of three verses in Persian language, written in the *Nastaliq* style with a deflection of characters, which gives the engravure a pleasing effect; and refers to the founding of a mosque by one Nur, during the reign of Alamgir in the year 1072 A.H. (=1661 A.C.) It gives neither the name of the place nor mentions anything about

2 In order that the place may grow into a town, the late Maharaja, stationed here the head-quarters of a Sub-Division and provided the place with other modern facilities, but, as the ill-luck would have it, all these, could develop the place.

3 *CASR.*, II, p. 327. Cunningham mentions a contemporary record on the *Sarai* as well.

the founding of any town. The date is given, both, in figures and in a chronogram. The last hemistisch of the third or the last verse of the composition is the chronogram and just below it is engraved the date in numerals as well, which reads 172. But it ought to be 1072 which is the correct date as deduced from the chronogram. The mistake is due to the negligence of the executors of the inscription who omitted to write 'o' between one and seven—an omission not uncommon in old inscriptions.

The persons named in the inscription are Alamgir and Nur. Of these Alamgir is undoubtedly the Mughal Emperor, Aurangzeb (A.C. 1658-1701) who was first to assume the title of *Alamgir* (conqueror of the world). Besides the date of the inscription, *viz*., 1661 A.C. falling in Aurangzeb's reign, leaves no doubt about it. The name of the other person given as 'Nur' is rather incomplete being bereft of its appellations presumably for the convenience of poetical technique. So it is a little difficult, if not impossible, to trace him in the records or to find his actual place in history. It is certain, however, that Nur must have been a personage of high dignity, on account of which he was accorded the honour of laying the foundation of a mosque—a no mean honour of those days.

The mosque, as well as, the *Sarai* and the bridge[4] at Nurabad are presumably the works of Aurangzeb's rule, both on the basis of the inscription under notice and the style of architecture of the edifices which is clearly later Mughal. According to Cunningham, Motamid Khan, who also bore the title of Nur-ud-din[5] and who was the then Governor of Gwalior under Aurangzeb, built these structures. Thus in the absence of any other information about 'Nur' of this inscription, the foregoing assertion seems to fit in cor-

4 *CASR.*, II, p. 325. William Finch a merchant-Traveller did not find this bridge when he passed this way in A.C. 1610.

5 It is also corroborated by inscriptions met at Gwalior. Cf. Inscriptions at Gwalip's mosque and Nur-Sagar in Gwalior Fort.

A Persian Inscription from Nurabad, Gwalior State



rectly. His full name may have been omitted from the composition partly for the sake of poetry and partly for the simple reason that Motamid Khan was too well-known in those days to need fuller description. It also follows automatically that the place was named Nurabad after this very Governor on or about 1662 A.C. and not after Nurjehan Begum as current in the local tradition.

The text of the inscription as read by me is given below: —

Text of the *Inscription* from Nurabad.

(1) (a) بروز کار خلافت خدیو عالمگیر

(b) که فیض لطف عمیمش رسیده هر که و مه

(۲) (a) ز نور یافت بنای مبارک این مسجد

(b) بیا بصدق دل اینجا و تن بطاعت ده

(۳) (a) چو خواستم خبر از ابتدائش هاتف گفت

(b) سر نیاز بدرگاه کردگار بنه

۱ ۷ ۲

سنه

TRANSLATION

1. (*a*) During the reign and monarchy of Emperor Alamgir.
   (*b*) (The) bounty of whose universal favour reaches every small and great.
2. (*a*) From *Nur* got this mosque its auspicious foundation.
   (*b*) Come, with sincere heart and body; unto this place (in the mosque) and offer prayers and supplications (to God).
3. (*a*) When I enquired news about its beginning (founding of the mosque) *Hatif* (the unknown) said.
   (*b*) [Find it from the words]. Put your head in modesty at the feet of the creator. *year*: 1 [0] 72.

RAM SINGH SAKSENA

The Arab Conquest of Sind

The Arabs were not quite unfamiliar with the land or the people of Sind, when in 711-12 A.D., Karimuddin Muhammad Kasim[1] led the expedition which resulted in its subjugation. It was ruled by men of their faith for over a thousand years. In the course of a number of ineffectual invasions of the country the Arabs had obtained a good deal of information regarding the manners and customs and the laws of peace and war which prevailed in 'Sind and Hind.'

Though our sources of knowledge are scanty, they indicate clearly that there was some cultural and commercial intercourse between the two peoples. The 'commercial understanding or alliance' between Arabia and India which the *Periplus* speaks of could not have been extinct at this time, while Buddhism, which was a predominant force in the life of the Indus valley, must have continued to serve as a cultural link.

There is some evidence of emigration to and from Arabia and *vice versa* even at this time. The knowledge we have of Indian families settling in Muslim lands (such as the ministerial family of the Barmaks) relates to a slightly later date. We know, however, for certain from the *Chachnāmah* that Arab mercenaries had already begun to seek their fortunes in Sind, e.g., Muhammad Alafi enter into the service of Dahar with five hundred Arabs of his clan, and was entrusted with important military commissions; another Muslim, named Amir Ali-ud-Dowla, was appointed governor of the fort

1 This is the name given in the *Chachnāmah*. In the *Tarikh Maasumi* he is called Muhammad son of Kasim, and in the *Tuhfatul Kiram* Muhammad Kasim son of Ukail Sakifi. (See the *Chachnāmah* translated by Fredunbeg, vol. 1, p. 101). All references to the *Chachnāmah* in this article are, unless otherwise stated, to the *Chachnāmah* translated from the Persian by Mirza Kalichbeg Fredunbeg, Karachi, 1900.

of Sikka (near Multan) by Chach, after his conquest of the place;[2] Wazil, a secretary of Dahar, was also a Muhammadan.[3]

It is generally believed that the expedition sent by Hajjaj under Muhammad Kasim was a measure of retaliation against the ruler of Sind who had refused, on the ground that they were not his subjects, to punish some pirates who had robbed a few vessels containing presents from the king of Ceylon to Hajjaj.[4] Mr. Amir Ali in his *History of the Saracens* substantially accepts this version of the story when he says that the expedition was a punitive one designed to prevent constant harassments by the tribes living in Sind.

Although the alleged piratical act might well have served as a pretext for the invasion of Sind, another and more definite ground for their invasion was their desire to carry on a religious war. The first expedition so sent had been despatched as early as the Caliphate of Omar (634-44 A.D.), and it resulted in the defeat and death of its commander, Mughairah. In the reign of Usman, a man was sent at the head of an expedition to make a full report on the situation. His reply was discouraging. During the Caliphate of Ali (656-61 A.D.) another expedition was sent, and yet another in the reign of Muawiyeh (661-680 A.D.). From this time onwards it became the practice to designate a commander of an expedition in advance as the 'governor' of Sind. When Abdul Malik, son of Marwan, became the Khalifah, he appointed Hajjaj to be governor of Iraq, *Hind and Sind*, long before the alleged piracy could have taken place. Hence, the piracy, if it had really occurred, came in very conveniently to reinforce the usual argument for a holy war and to persuade the wavering Khalifah to despatch a force.

2 Elliot: *History of India by its own Historians*,—The *Chachnāmah*, vol. I, p. 142.

3 Fredunbeg, *Chachnāmah*, vol. I, p. 71. Not only from the evidence of his name but also from the fact that he was engaged by Dahar to read letters addressed to him in Arabic by Muhammad Kasim.

4 The *Tarikh Maasumi* gives a somewhat different story.

Most historians represent the conquest of Sind by the Arabs as a romantic story of the victorious march of a small army of inspired soldiers under a heroic seventeen-year old commander, whose mission of the conquest of Sind and Hind was left unfulfilled only on account of a terrible misunderstanding which led to his tragic death. Some have ascribed the conquest to the superstitious beliefs of the Hindus, which prevented them from taking the necessary military steps for the defence of the country at the right time. Others, like Mr. R. D. Banerjee, and Mr. C. V. Vaidya[5] represent the Buddhists of Sind as the knaves of the story, and make them the scapegoats for India's failure against Muslim invaders.[6]

A superficial perusal of the *Chachnāmah* and, besides, a study of the work in its inadequate translation in the first volume of Elliot may well lead us to one or other of these views. This book, which is our almost sole authority for the Arab conquest of Sind, is a product of the times, and betrays in every page the prejudices and shortcomings of the age in which it was composed. Fortunately, it contains a solid substratum of facts, though embedded in layers of questionable materials, such as scandalous gossips, and hearsays of various kinds and it will be the object of this paper to find out the solid facts.

In the eighth century India was a land divided and subdivided within itself, where no political frontier was permanent, and no two neighbours were at peace with each other. At a time when no ruler in India could be expected to rush to the aid of a brother prince in difficulties, the comparative geographical isolation of Sind made the prospect of assistance very remote, while it made it particularly

5 R. D. Banerjee, *Prehistoric, Ancient, and Hindu India*, p. 237; C. V. Vaidya, *History of Mediæval Hindu India*, vol. I, p. 173.

6 Modern research has established the fact that the failure of the Arabs in their larger aim of conquering India was due to the successful resistance of the Rajput princes, notably the Pratihāras of Kanouj.

vulnerable to the attacks of invaders from the west. A careful study of the *Chachnāmah* shows that, though apparently a state of respectable size, Sind under Dahar was a ramshackle political organisation, utterly wanting in cohesion and inhabited by a heterogeneous population. A feudal state, it was, divided into four provinces, whose governors were so independent of each other and of the central authority that some of them are designated as 'kings'. Their only liability, when they chose to fulfil it, was to render military assistance to the king of Sind. The latter's authority was further limited by the power of the ministers, and an Assembly of Five Hundred.[7] Dahar's minister, Buddhiman, was so influential that the king had his name mentioned in the coinage. The Assembly seems to have been a feudal gathering of chieftains, who were consulted on occasions.

Much controversy has raged round the question of the caste and tribe to which Chach, the father of Dahar, belonged. Mr. R. D. Banerjee adheres to the view that he was a Rajput of the Samna (Samba) tribe of the Yādava clan.[8] The *Chachnāmah* says that he was a Brahmin who had usurped the throne by the guilty aid of Suhandi, the queen of the previous sovereign. There is some room for disbelieving this story, which is of the cock and bull type, but it is difficult to set aside numerous and positive statements in the *Chachnāmah* to the effect that Chach was a Brahmin, and that his nearest relatives were ascetics or *pujāris*. There should have been no doubt on the subject if it were not for the statement of Hiuen Tsang[9] that the ruler of Sind when he visited the country (who could not have been any other than Chach) belonged to the Shu-to-lo race, which is variously interpreted to mean a Kṣattriya, a Śūdra, and a

7 *Chachnāmah*, vol. I, p. 46. Dahar consulted this body, when, according to the *Chachnāmah*, he decided to marry his step-sister.

8 *Prehistoric, Ancient, and Hindu India*, p. 237.

9 Elliot, vol. I, p. 411.

Rajput of the Chatur or the Chitor tribe. Some colour is lent to this view by the statement in the *Chachnāmah* that a daughter of Chach was married to the king of Kashmir. But this does not necessarily mean that he was a Rajput. It seems safer to accept the categorical statements of the *Chachnāmah* in preference to the conjectural interpretations of a doubtful word of the pilgrim. The point is interesting to us, for, if we accept the story of the usurpation, it gives us an additional explanation of the readiness of the provincial governors, some of whom were partisans of the dispossessed family, to join the Muslim invaders in their desire to wreak a vengeance on the usurping dynasty.

Each change in the succession after Chach seems to have occasioned fratricidal quarrels and something of a division of inheritance among brothers and cousins. When Chach died, his brother Candra succeeded to the throne in preference to the sons of Chach. After Candra's death, his son Bachera (Vajra?) became ruler at Siwistan, while two sons of Chach, viz., Dahar and Daharsiah, received Alor and Brahmanabad respectively. It is related in the *Chachnāmah* that, on account of an astrological prediction that his step-sister, Main or Bai, would never go out of Alor and would marry none but a king, Dahar married her himself, though the marriage was not intended to be and was not consummated. It is further stated that this led to a quarrel between the brothers during the progress of which Daharsiah died.

The story of the so-called marriage looks like a scandalous gossip, and, though the author of the *Chachnāmah* harps on it, in at least one reference to Bai, viz. in describing her heroic death, he forgets it, and calls her simply 'Dahar's sister.'[10] The quarrel between the brothers seems really to have been of a political nature. When Daharsiah invaded Alor, he sent the following message to

10 *Chachnāmah*, vol. I, p. 153. "Dahar's sister, Bai, then collected all the women of the fort, etc."

his brother, "I have come not to fight with you. This fort was the capital of my father, and from him it has descended to me. You received it from me as my agent, and the kingdom is mine. There never have been two crowns in one country." The *Chachnāmah* relates that after the death of Daharsiah, Dahar made Chach, son of Daharsiah, ruler of Brahmanabad, and made an alliance with him. It was thus a country, suffering repeatedly from political convulsions, that had to bear the brunt of the first Muslim invasions of India.

The story that the Buddhists of Sind handed over their motherland to the foreign invaders does not stand a close scrutiny of the facts as related in the *Chachnāmah*. The Buddhists formed an important element of the population of Sind, and in many of the towns, e.g., Armabel, Nerun, Maoj, Budhiya, etc., they held the post of governor. Some of these governors no doubt showed the utmost cowardice in face of the invaders, and sometimes acted treacherously. But it was not all Buddhists who did so, and it was not all Hindus, who fought for their land and ruler. At Budhiya, says the *Chachnāmah*,[11] which was, even as the name implies, a Buddhist strong-hold, the Budh headmen came to their rulers and expressed their determination to make a night attack on the Muslim army. They did make the attempt, but they failed, because they lost their way in the wilderness. The people of the same town, it is interesting to note, had stopped the victorious march of Sinan, the commander of a previous expedition, had killed him and dispersed his troops.

On the other hand, it was a Brahmin from the garrison of Debal, who betrayed to Kasim the secret which led to the fall of the town. Some historians are so obsessed with the fact of Buddhist influence in Sind, that they smell some Buddhist plot or treachery

11 *Chachnāmah*, vol. I, p. 95.

in every case of the surrender of a town or fort to the Muslims. Thus, though it is distinctly stated in the *Chachnāmah* that it was a body of one thousand Brahmins in Brahmanabad, who had shaved their heads and beards because their king had died and who betrayed to Kasim the hiding place of the royal family, Sir Henry Elliot[12] asserts that they were Buddhists. Shaven heads do not always make Buddhist monks; and it is a custom, which prevails in some Rajput states even at the present day, for the orthodox people to shave off their heads clean, including their eyebrows, on the death of the ruler.

It is stated in the *Chachnāmah* that the Buddhists in certain places refused to fight the invaders on the ground that killing was forbidden in their religion. That all Buddhists in Sind did not advance such an argument is evident from the fact, as has been stated above, that the Buddhists did fight in certain places. It was a Buddhist monk who was responsible, according to the *Chachnāmah,* for the stiff resistance put up by the citizens of Brahmanabad against Chach. As a matter of fact, the people who tamely submitted were certain classes of the civil population, such as merchants, monks, agriculturists, who, having no means of resistance, were at the mercy of the invaders, and were Hindus as well as Buddhists. This happened not only in Sind, which was dominated by Buddhism, but in all parts of India.

A plausible explanation of the conquest of Sind by the Muslims is the prevalence of communal jealousies among the Hindu and the Buddhistic elements of the population. Mr. C. V. Vaidya thinks that the usurpation of the throne by Chach represented a brāhmanical reaction against Buddhist dominance of Sind.[13] The *Chachnāmah*, however, describes it as a simple palace revolution, and we have not got the slightest evidence to infer that it was any-

12 Elliot, vol. I, p. 506.

13 *History of Mediæval Hindu India*, vol. I, p. 163.

thing different. Chach rebuilt a Buddhist temple in Brahmanabad. His brother was a patron of Buddhism.[14] Dahar had a white elephant. During their reigns, the Buddhist influence in society and government was not in the slightest degree reduced, as we have overwhelming evidence of the fact of such influence at the time of the conquest.

Though we have not got sufficient data for making an estimate of the population of Sind, there are some evidences to indicate that it was small. Brahmanabad, one of the biggest towns in that country, had a population of only ten thousand, according to a census taken by Kasim after the conquest.[15] On the other hand, the invading host was large. Over and above an advanced guard under Abu-l Aswad Jaham, which joined Kasim on the borders of Sind, he had six thousand picked horsemen from Syria and Iraq, six thousand armed camel-riders, and a baggage train of three thousand Bactrian camels, which, however, Mir Masum converts into three thousand infantry. At Makran, again, he was joined with other reinforcements by Muhammad Harun, while five catapults, each requiring five hundred men to work it, were transported by sea to Debal.[16] When Kasim left for Multan for proceeding to the north, his army, according to the *Tarikh-i-Sind* and *Tuhfatul Kiram*, consisted of no less than fifty thousand men, besides those he had left in the forts and garrisons of Sind.[17] It went on swelling partly because of the Jats, Luhanis and other tribes, who joined him.

This is a plea for explaining rationally and by reference to natural causes the story of human failures and human successes.

14 *Chachnāmah*, vol. I, p. 37—"he promulgated the religion of the monks and hermits."

15 'All the people, the merchants, artists, and agriculturists were divided separately in their respective classes and ten thousand men, high and low, were counted.'—The Chachnāmah in Elliot, vol. I, p. 153.

16 Elliot, vol. I, p. 434.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 435.

The Arab conquest of Sind is not explained by the superstitious faiths and beliefs of the conquered, for the conquerors also were superstitious, and believed in witchcraft and magic. The theory of Buddhist treachery does not stand examination; and it is high time we should give up demanding a scapegoat. As has been explained above, Sind under Dahar was in no position to offer a suitable resistance to the Arabs. It was too weak, politically and militarily, to do so while the Arabs were in the high tide of their national rise. It had no hope of assistance from other parts of India, while Kasim had a numerous and disciplined army, determined to conquer or die for the faith, and was backed by the resources of a mighty empire.

SAILENDRA NATH DHAR

An Examination of the Nature of Indo-Aryan and Indo-Islamic Polity

The genesis of Indian polity lies in the Ṛg-Vedic age, when the Indo-Aryans were living in the Saptasindhu country i.e. modern Punjab and Peshawar. Into this country they brought the concept of a cosmic order,—the Ṛg-Vedic Ṛta, and the cult of fire sacrifice,—the Yajña. The former they thought, manifested in the Socio-moral order, called the Society; and the latter embodied the spirit of self-dedication to that order. Both these formed the basis of Indo-Aryan religion, which subsequently determined the nature of their polity.

The Indo-Aryan Polity in the Vedic age assumed two forms—monarchical and republican. The office of the king was more often elective than otherwise. To start with there were popular bodies to assist the king, but later with the rise of extensive kingdoms they were replaced by royal councils. The republican governments were of the nature of oligarchies, and resembled the monarchical governments in their internal working. Whether monarchical or republican, they could not make laws, they could not tax at will, they could not command the indivisible allegiance of the people. Indeed they, like the people, dedicated themselves to the service of the society, and lived for it in the same way as the Greek did for his city-state. This spirit of self-dedication, or self-effacement, left no room for individual self-assertion or self determination, the lack of which effectively stifled the growth of democratic institutions.

But with the spread of the Indo-Aryans over the vast sub-continent of India, the ideal of self-dedication to the service of the society and therefore subordination of all the human institutions to its service received a set-back. As the Indo-Aryans came in contact with new peoples and new cults, they began to forget their own heritage, and the *Brāhmaṇas* had to be compiled to preserve it intact. About this time the caste-system became an indispensable feature of their

society. The Brāhmaṇas gave a religious colouring to all that comprised the ancient heritage of the Indo-Aryans, and this ancient heritage, embodied in the *Brāhmaṇas* became the religion of the people. No distinction was made between what was purely popular and purely religious. Hence kingship and all the popular rites connected with it, became a part of the religion; and ancient Indian kingship corresponded to modern sovereignty in content and thus was the symbol of the state. By canonizing kingship and the ceremonies connected with it religion dominated the state as it did the society, for now, the Brāhmaṇical religion had become for the Indo-Aryan what the Bible became for the Puritan in England in the 17th century.

But this subservient attitude of the state did not long continue. Buddhism, Jainism and other so-called heretical systems arose and preached new social ideals and foreshadowed new social structures. To add to the embarrassments of the Brāhmaṇical society the frequent intermarriages forbidden between castes introduced fresh complications, and threatened to destroy not only the smooth working of the caste system but the whole social structure. In this social crisis all turned to the king, to the political organization to maintain the equilibrium of the society. The *Dharma-sūtras*, the law codes, the *Artha-śāstras*, i.e. the science of Government were composed and therein the king was made to symbolise the state and safeguard the society. It was thus as the Sustainer of the Society—no more subservient to it—that that state attained to ascendancy. With the Maurya empire, the climax was reached; and under Aśoka, the state regulated morals, adjusted the claims of the competing creeds by a policy of tolerance, prohibited undesirable religious ceremonies and shaped the social ideals of the people. Even though all these were attempted in a spirit of altruism, yet it marked the triumph of the state over religion, and since religion had dominated society it actually meant the domination of the state over society.

Hence the Maurya empire marks the climax in the growth of the Indo-Aryan polity.

After the Maurya empire the prestige of the state declined because of the decline of Jainism and Buddhism, and of the triumph of the old Vedic religion. But that did not adversely affect the personal prestige of the king, who, on the other hand, by his alliance with the priesthood, and the protection he gave to the people against foreign invasions—of the Śakas, Yuechis and Hūṇas, attained to an apotheosis never dreamt of before. The Epics and the Purāṇas preached a divine right of the king, which paved the way for royal despotism. The triumph of Vedic religion installed the Vedic ideal of self-effacement in the service of the society, and since the society was dominated by religion, it actually meant self-effacement in the service of the religion. This new development proved detrimental to the growth of the state, and the domination of religion soon degenerated to a despotism, which was worse than royal despotism. But it was now the combination of both—royal despotism and religious despotism, which destroyed individual initiative, and social co-operation, and tore the society into shreds of petty interests and jealousies. There was no political cohesion and less social vitality when the country received the first shock of Islamic invasion.

After years of intermittent raids the first Indo-Islamic empire was established in 1206. Islam introduced an entirely new ideal into India. It is both a church and a state and here each dedicates itself to the interests of the other. Hence the ideals of the Islamic state could be best attained in an Islamic country. In India however that was out of the question because of the vast mass of non-Islamic population. Hence very early the interests of the Dar-ul-Islam and Dar-ul-Harb were opposed and this opposition created an incompatibility between the ideals of the Indo-Islamic state and church. That was the beginning of the duel between the Muslim kings and the Muslim priesthood in India.

But in the earlier days of the Muslim rule in India the kings had depended upon the priesthood for strengthening their own position because they could not emulate the prestige of Mahammad or the Caliphs. Further the exotic character of Islam had made hearty co-operation between all the sections of the Indo-Islamic peoples—the civilian, the soldier and the priesthood, though the line of demarcation between them was very thin, a matter of the utmost consequences. This fact alone had contributed to weld them into a caste—though a privileged because ruling caste. Now this state of affairs lasted so long as the Islamic rule had not been accepted as a matter of course by the people of this country. But once it was so, the militant character of Islamic conquest and creed gradually wore away and the Muslim kings found support from their subjects and *vice versa*. There arose a desire for mutual understanding between the Muslims and the non-muslims. This desire blossomed forth in the evolution of the Urdu language, and a number of religious movements breathing a spirit of love and liberalism. In the political field this desire manifested in a new adjustment of the relations between the Islamic state and the Islamic church. The first principle of Muslim theocracy viz. regulating the state by the laws of the Quran was given up and the king ruled as he thought, was good for his people. This was the ideal of Alla-ud-din Khilji. The next principle of Islamic state-craft, viz. disarming the non-muslims and excluding them from Government employ, was abandoned by Mahammad bin Tughlak and Sher Shah. The latter's son went a step further when he imposed his own authority on the custodians of religion. The consummation of this process was reached in the reign of Akbar, who definitely made himself like Henry VIII the head of the religion. His was the final authority in all matters and he represented the state. Thus the state shook off the tutelage of religion and grew to its full stature. But this growth was soon after undermined by the inherent defects of Muslim rule and Muslim

society in India. The kings degenerated into pleasure-loving despots or religious bigots. The Indo-Islamic state had become bankrupt in ideals as well as in energy. New peoples rose to power in India and after them the Europeans came with their organized strength and occupied India.

Thus to conclude, there was an atttempt in Ancient and Medieval India, to dissociate the state from religion, to subordinate the latter to the former, and whenever that attempt was successful, there was great political development and social progress in all its manifold aspects whenever that attempt failed, it spelt disaster and despotism for the country.

H. N. Sinha

A forgotten treaty between Shujauddaulah and the English

That Verelst's regime marks an interesting stage in the growth of the English ascendancy over the Vazir of Oudh has been generally overlooked by historians. Verelst's achievement in respect of his Oudh policy is of more than ordinary interest, inasmuch as he not only averted through personal influence and diplomatic pressure a threatened rupture with Shujauddaulah, but cemented the existing alliance with him by means of a fresh treaty.

Towards the close of 1767 when the Company's troops in Oudh had been partly withdrawn an account of the war with Haidar Ali in the South, alarming reports began to reach Calcutta regarding the views and intentions of the Vazir. In October[1] Col. Smith reported from Allahabad that the Vazir was busily engaged in raising troops, both horse and foot, and was in correspondence with the Marathas, the Jats, the Rohillas, and other powers including Nizam Ali. He warned[2] the Select Committee, "If we collect all these circumstances into one point of view, I think there appears but too just grounds for suspicion of the Nabob's fidelity to his engagements with us."

Col. Smith had evidently serious apprehensions of an alliance between the Marathas and the Vazir against the Company. His suspicions were excited by certain letters which had recently passed between the Marathas and the Vazir, and were all the more confirmed by a letter which Malhar Rao's widow had recently written to her vakil. These letters[3] which Col. Smith forwarded to Calcutta

1 Letters from Col. R. Smith, October 17 and 19, 1767.

2 Beng. Sel. Com. November 3, 1767.

3 Letter from Madhu Rao to the Vazir. (Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 393 A.) Letter from the Vazir to Madhu Rao. (Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 393 B.) Letter

amply reveal that the Marathas were at this time eager to gain the alliance of the Vazir. We find Madhu Rao's vakil actually offering to the Vazir the support of his master, and referring significantly to the general rumour that the Vazir was not on good terms with the English. From Malhar Rao's widow's letter to her vakil it appears that the Vazir had secretly written to Januji "urging him to assemble forces to advance and settle things on their former footing."[4] With reference to this letter Col. Smith represented, "If the contents of this letter are facts, there no longer remains a doubt of Sujah Daolah's intentions."[5]

Verelst and the Select Committee, however, did not take the representations of Col. Smith seriously. They were of the opinion that the time had not yet arrived when the Vazir could attempt to carry into execution any of his alleged anti-English projects, and that gratitude, policy, and necessity would for some years longer bind him strongly to the English interests. In support of this view, the Select Commitee wrote[6] to Col. Smith that the parties whom the Vazir could wish to engage in a general confederacy were either too remote by situation, too distrustful of each other, too jealous of him, or too feeble in themselves. And, with regard to the levies mentioned by Col. Smith, the Select Committee further urged. "So far from rendering himself formidable Shujah Doulah has not yet raised the number of troops which we would wish to see maintained for the protection of his country and without which he will ever require the assistance of our troops contrary to the spirit and intention of the orders repeatedly transmitted by our Hon'ble masters."

from Babuji Pandit to the Vazir. (Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 428 A.) Letter from Vazir to Babuji Pandit. (Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 428 B.)

4 Letter from Malhar Rao's widow to her Vakil (Beng. Sel. Com. Nov. 3, 1767).

5 Letter from Col. R. Smith, October 19, 1767.

6 Letter to Col. R. Smith, November 3, 1767.

It is interesting to note that although the authorities refused to believe[7] that the Vazir was preparing for a rupture with the English, they decided to keep a watchful eye on the former's conduct and at the same time avoid the appearance of suspicion and distrust. They directed Col. Smith to observe the Vazir's conduct with circumspection, and ordered the First Brigade also to remain in their present position until the least apprehension of danger should exist on that side.[8]

That the Vazir had lately begun to make considerable additions to his forces was known to Verelst. In fact, the latter had himself[9] encouraged and permitted him to augment[10] his "week and ill-appointed"[11] army in view of the danger from the Abdali and Mir Qasim. We find the Vazir reporting as early as April that "by the favour of God" he had now "a chosen troop" of 30,000 horse and foot, and was still making fresh levies.[12] After the disappearance of the Abdali menace, however, there remained no ostensible justification for the enlargement of his army, but it appears that the Governor was aware of the Vazir's ambition to annex the Rohilla country[13] and Bundelkhand.[14] It must be stated, however, that Verelst did not encourage his warlike designs; on the contrary he strongly urged him to promote the welfare of his own existing possessions.[15]

The war between Haidar Ali and the English as well as the possibility of a Maratha invasion in the North afforded the Vazir a

7 Letter to Court, December 16, 1767. "It is unlikely that he will think of fighting the English.

8 Beng. Sel. Com. November 3, 1767. Letter to Court, December 16, 1767. It had been decided earlier to send the First Brigade to the South, but the Select Committee evidently changed their opinion on the representation of Col. Smith (vide his letter, October 16, 1767).

9 Beng. Sel. Com. Nov. 3, 1767.

10 Trans. I. 1766-67, Nos. 95, 110, etc.

11 Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 269.

12 Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 223.

13 Cop. I. 1766-67, No. 108.

14 Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 203. Vide. also Beng. Sel. Com. January 16, 1767.

15 Transs. I. 1768-67, No. 170.

more plausible plea for pushing on his military preparations. In order to justify his levy of troops, he warned the Governor of the danger of a Maratha diversion in Hindustan,[16] and strongly advocated the formation of a league with the Jats and the Rohillas as a precautionary measure. Verelst, however, assured the Vazir in October that although "a lasting alliance with this insidious, grasping people was impossible," the Marathas were not likely to disturb the English for the present.[17] The Vazir reiterated his warning that the Marathas had bad faith, and he asked accordingly permission "to prepare for the quarrel before it commenced." He informed the Governor that he had already directed two or three "potent 'Jamadars'" at Delhi to bring each of them a body of one or two hundred horse.[18] In November, the Vazir offered[19] to assemble "near the stirrup of His Majesty" a body of 100,000 men and make a diversion by way of Bundelkhand into the Nizam's territories.

On being repeatedly warned[20] by Col. Smith of the obvious danger from the Vazir's military preparations, Verelst at last wrote to the Vazir asking him "to rest from his labours and not to incur superflous expenses or attend to fruitless preparations."[21] The Governor and Select Committee, however, assured[22] Col. Smith that if the Vazir still continued to augment his forces in defiance of their recent remonstrance, it would then be time to show the latter that they were not blinded by an implicit confidence. For the present they hoped that the Vazir would readily reduce the number of his forces to a bare sufficiency in deference to their wishes.[23] Col. Smith himself had no doubt about the fact that the Vazir meant a rupture with the Company. On the 5th of November he wrote, "I am con-

16 Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 379.
17 Trans. I. 1766-67, No. 193.
18 Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 390.
19 Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 432.
20 Beng. Sel. Com. November 17 and 29, and December 11, 1767.
21 Trans. I. 1766-67, Nos. 202 and 231.
22 Letter to Col. R. Smith, Nov. 17, 1767.
23 Beng. Sel. Com. December 22, 1767.

vinced he bears no goodwill to our nation."[24] On the 24th of the same month he again warned,........."he views us rather with the eye of revenge than with the sentiments of gratitude......... he has pursued just such measures as I should suppose he must adopt preparatory to a rupture with us."[25] Verelst still saw no reason to deviate from his favourable opinion with regard to the Vazir's conduct. He informed the Directors also that the Vazir had lately levied troops for the sole purpose of acting in conjunction with the Company's troops in the Deccan, and that he would shortly give a convincing proof of his attachment by a speedy reduction of his forces.[26]

Meanwhile[27] Col. Smith paid a visit to the Vazir at Fyzabad avowedly in response to the latter's invitation,[28] but really to make a personal investigation into the informations he had received regarding the latter's conduct, and also to afford him "a handsome opportunity of changing his sentiments."[29] The Vazir arranged for a grand display of his troops on the occasion of Col. Smith's visit. He, however, assured the latter that his attachment to the English was inviolable. He also strongly repudiated the false and malicious reports propagated by evil-minded persons, and finally as a token for his friendship he offered Col. Smith a present of two lakhs of rupees. The present was, however, instantly declined by Col. Smith. In their meeting of the 27th of January, 1768, the Select Committee approved[30] of the latter's refusal to accept the present, and decided

24 Beng. Sel. Com. November 29, 1767.

25 Beng. Sel. Com. Decem. 11, 1767.

26 Letter to Court, Jany. 5, 1768.

27 Col. Smith proceeded on the 20th December.

28 Letter from the Vazir to Col. R. Smith, received December 3, 1767. Letter from Col. R. Smith to the Vazir, December 4, 1767. Beng. Sel. Com. January 27, 1768. "......nor should I ever have proposed an interview had he not himself made this overture......" (Letter from Col. R. Smith, February 16, 1768). Beng. Sel. Com. March 2, 1768.

29 Letter from Col. R. Smith, Jany. 3, 1768.

30 Beng. Sel Com. Jany. 27, 1768.

to ask him to make "a very particular enquiry" in respect of the Vazir's alleged designs against the English.[31]

Early in February,[32] Col. Smith sent a detailed report of the vast improvements made by the Vazir in his army.[33] It appears from his report[34] that the Vazir had already completed seven battalions of sepoys, the better part of which had firelocks, the remainder having excellent matchlocks with bayonets. The men who composed the battalions were, according to Col. Smith, chiefly Rajputs and other Hindus. At the time of enrolment the names of the villages and of the parganas where the sepoys resided were noted, and by this means deserters were easily apprehended and severely punished. The sepoys were now better paid, and arrears were no longer allowed to accumulate in the old fashion. The system of Court-martial had also been lately introduced. The Vazir enquired into all military matters himself, and he was said to be so attentive to the minutest details regarding his army, so diligent in the detection, and severe in the punishment of every fraud and misdemeanour that a commandant of one of his battalions had, according to Col. Smith, been recently banished to the Chunar fort for twelve months for having dismissed one sepoy without leave. Another commandant was confined in the same fort for some malpractice concerning the pay of sepoys. Col. Smith admitted in the course of his report, "I did not expect to see his troops so well formed."

The most interesting part of Col. Smith's report is what relates to the Vazir's remarkable success in the manufacture of fire-arms.

31 Beng. Sel. Com. Jany. 27, 1768.

32 Letter from Col. R. Smith February 6, 1768.

33 For a detailed account of Shujauddaulah's army *vide Imadus Saadat* (Lucknow Text) pp. 101-103. *Tarikh Farahbaksh* (Tr. Hoey, II, pp. 7-8) Dow's *History of Hindustan*, II, p. 357. Gentil's *Memoirs*, pp. 263-4, Beng. Sel. Com. November 3, 1768, etc. etc.

34 Beng. Sel. Com. February 23, 1768.

The small arms and cannon[35] used by the troops were all cast by certain natives of Bengal[36] in the Vazir's service, and were, according to Col. Smith, by no means inferior to those used by the Company's forces. The artillery which was being regularly increased was in the charge of a French officer. The latter superintended the construction of the carriages and tumbrils. The firelocks for the sepoys were made after the English model, and Col. Smith found them in every respect equal[37] to the ones imported from Europe. A hundred and fifty to two hundred firelocks were being completed every month in the workshops at Fyzabad and elsewhere. A large number of matchlocks[38] with bayonets were also produced in several other places besides Fyzabad. A huge magazine of military stores had been collected, and in every city the Vazir was making shots or rockets, pipes, swords etc. and herein he spared no labour or expense. The Vazir spent the morning time in inspecting regimental exercise and in overseeing his founders and gunsmiths with whom he spent two or three hours daily. Col. Smith wrote, "I can not but admire the man for the great progress he has already made in his new system."

Col. Smith, in short, tried to make out that all the aforesaid military preparations of the Vazir were really directed against the Company, and urged, "I have had occasion to observe that the idea of dependence on us hurts him beyond measure.........it is highly expedient for us to resolve on some efficacious means to check his rising power." His conviction was fully shared by Col. Barker,

35 700 heavy guns were manufactured, according to Imadus Saadat (Lucknow Text), p. 103.

36 "........two blackmen (Bengallees) have the direction of casting his guns ...."(Col. R. Smith's minute, August 3, 1768).

37 "To enable you to form the most perfect idea of the military improvements of the Nabob Sujah-ul-Dowlah, I send you, by *Captain Purvis*, a musket which was one of his first attempts, and also a lock which is of his last and best manufacture." (Vide Letter from Verelst to Court, September 26, 1768).

38 "The English flintlocks were nothing to their matchlocks for quickness in loading and rapidity of firing." (*Tarikh Farahbaksh*, Tr. Hoey, II, p. 7).

Commander of the Third Brigade, who too reported[39] at this time that the indefatigable attention the Vazir gave to his military department and the progress he had already made in his army was "beyond conception."[40] Col. Barker also warned the Select Committee that the Vazir had "an inclination to try the strength and courage of his newly disciplined army."

The implicit confidence[41] of the Governor and Select Committee in the Vazir was at last shaken in some measure when it came to their knowledge in July that the latter was secretly procuring arms from Chandernagore and Chinsura.[42] The fact came to light quite accidentally. Some boats belonging to the Vazir while returning from Calcutta were detained[43] on suspicion by the Customs officials at the confluence of the Ganges and the Dehwa, and were found to be laden with arms. On search being made, more arms were found buried in the sand near the bank of the Dehwa. There remained in consequence no doubt about the fact that these had been concealed there for despatch to Oudh.[44] These arms appeared to have been collected from the French and the Dutch, and were all "old and bad" in the opinion of Verelst.[45] But, what surprised the authorities most was the fact that the detained boats had left Calcutta under cover of a 'dastak' obtained by the Vazir's vakil expressly for empty boats.[46] It was apparent therefore that arms were being

39 Beng. Sel. Com. March 2, 1768.

40 Letter from Col. Sir Robert Barker, February 17, 1768.

41 Letter to Court, March 28, 1768 "......his whole revenue can never support a force which can be really formidable to us..........."

42 Beng. Sel. Com. July 23, 1768.

43 Letters from Mr. T. Rumbold, June 19, 20, and 30, 1768. Letter from Mr. G. Waller to Mr. T. Rumbold, June 18, 1768. Letter from Mr. T. Rumbold to Mr. G. Waller, June 19, 1768.

44 Statement of Agha Riza Mughal (Enclosed in Mr. T. Rumbold's letter, June 30, 1768).

45 Verelst's minute. Beng. Sel. Com. July 23, 1768.

46 *Ibid.*

systematically smuggled out of Bengal in a clandestine manner.[47] In reply to the Vazir's seemingly innocent protest[48] against the unauthorised detention of his boats, the Governor strongly remonstrated[49] with the latter against his secret importation of arms from Bengal, and warned him, "Now that your Excellency's people carry away arms in this clandestine manner, it has a very ill appearance between friends."

No difference of opinion now remained as to the urgent need for some effective action to check the warlike preparations of the Vazir. The matter was discussed in detail by the Select Committee in their meeting of the 3rd of August.[50] Col. Smith who was present at this meeting maintained that the Vazir was keen on recovering Corah and Allahabad, and had in the early part of the year actually offered him four lakhs of rupees as a price for his support. He argued that the Committee had wrongly put trust in the Vazir "when the latter wrote that he was arming to assist us in the war of the Deccan," and in support of his suspicions against the Vazir pointed out, firstly, that the latter was in regular correspondence with the Marathas, the Nizam, and Haidar Ali, secondly, that he had persistently refused to dismiss M. Gentil, thirdly, that he had been secretly importing arms from Bengal in boats which had the Governor's 'dastak' to pass as empty, fourthly, that he had entertained[51] French Officers and troops in his service, and had raised an efficient and formidable army, fifthly, that he had spared no pains to manufacture musketry and cannon, and lastly, that he had amassed

47 The Directors prohibited the export of arms and cannon from Bengal to Oudh. (Letter from Court, November 11, 1768.)

48 Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 218.

49 Letter from Verelst to the Vazir, July 27, 1768. Beng. Sel. Com. July 27, 1768.

50 Beng. Sel. Com. August 3, 1768.

51 600 French troops were enlisted, (M. Gentil *Memoirs*, p. 264.)

a vast amount[52] of wealth to serve as sinews of war. Col. Smith complained of the delay that had occurred in adopting suitable measures against the Vazir, and quoted extensively from the numerous letters[53] he had received since the last year from Capt. Harper on the subject of the Vazir's military preparations to show that his suspicions were not without foundation.

That the Vazir's military preparations[54] were such as was likely to give cause for suspicion is undeniable, but it must be pointed out that the contemporary evidence does not fully warrant the assumption that he actually contemplated a rupture with the English. M. Gentil who was with the Vazir during this time asserts[55] that if the English had declared war against the Vazir, the latter instead of fighting them, would have gone down to Calcutta with his wives and children to seek the protection of the Council, and to demand justice from the King of England. M. Gentil further suggests that it was actually Col. Smith who sought[56] to force a war on the Vazir with a view to make a fortune for himself. This insinuation is, however, hardly fair, and may be said to have been inspired by M. Gentil's known prejudice[57] against Col. Smith. Even Verelst who

52 "...........has now more than one crore of rupees in his treasury, and we have not one lack..........." (Col. Smith's Minute, August 3, 1768.)

53 Letters from Capt. G. Harper to Col. R. Smith, June 12, September 25, 30, October 25, 31, November 6, 9, 15, 20, December 2, 5, 10, 1767, January 16, 25, April 8, May 20, June 6, and July 10, 1768.

54 The exact strength of the Vazir's army is difficult to ascertain. According to the estimate of the Deputation, it was as follows:—

Cavalry 15325, Infantry 26285, Matchlockmen and Peons 6660, Camels 164, Boatmen 525, Artillery 64 guns (4 to 12 pounders) and a number of small arms not exceeding 50. (Beng. Sel. Com. November 3, 1768). The number of troops in 1182 A.H., according to Imadus Saadat (Lucknow Text, p. 103) was as follows:—

Cavalry 11,000, Infantry 133,000, Footmen 18,000. According to *Tarikh Farahbaksh* (Tr. Hoey, II, p. 7), the infantry itself consisted of 80,000 regular, and 40,000 irregulars. There were in addition 22,000 messengers and spies.

55 M. Gentil; *Memoirs*, p. 271.

56 *Op. cit.*, pp. 271-2.

57 Col. Smith had offended him by "addressing complaints against" him. *Op. cit.*, p. 272.

had for a long time disbelieved the reports against the Vazir, and whose honesty[58] M. Gentil does not dispute was ultimately compelled to change[59] his former sentiments with regard to the Vazir's conduct. It may be stated, however, that Verelst was never fully convinced of the fact that the Vazir meant to break with the English.[60]

While subscribing wholeheartedly to the principle that the English policy should aim at restricting "any one power in Hindostan from rising too high above the general level,"[61] Verelst, however, reminded his colleagues that the Vazir was not bound by any article of his treaty with the Company to limit his forces to a fixed number. He therefore suggesed that the Vazir should be made to reduce his army under orders secured from the Emperor, which could be lawfully enforced by the Company in case the Vazir refused to comply with them. As Col. Smith strongly opposed[62] the plan of the Governor on the ground that it might lead to a war with the Vazir, the consideration of the matter was postponed for the next meeting.

On the 10th of August,[63] Messrs Floyer, Becher, and Cartier expressed their considered views on the conduct of the Vazir, and were unanimous on the point that the latter's military preparations

58 *Op. cit.*, p. 271.

59 Letter to Court, September 13, 1768. Vide also Verelst's view etc. "...... the war upon the Coast had drained the treasury of Bengal, and the most alarming accounts were industriously spread of the instability of the Company's affairs. Allured by the tempting occasion, Sujah ul Dowlah began to listen to the voice of ambition."

60 Letter to Court, September 25, 1768 "......no satisfactory evidence appears of the nabob ever proposing a war with us..........."

61 Verelst's minute, August, 3, 1768.

62 Col. Smith's Minutes of August 3, and 14, 1768. "......if the King should require of Sujah Daulah to disband any part of his forces, his haughty disposition would induce him to treat such orders with contempt."

63 Beng. Sel. Com. August 10, 1768.

were highly alarming. Mr. Floyer was of the opinion[64] that the Vazir meditated hostile measures against the English, and he accordingly supported the plan of an embassy to the Emperor and the Vazir. Mr. Becher apprehended a junction between the Marathas and the Vazir, and proposed[65] that the latter should be plainly warned that the English would not "suffer him to keep a larger force than 10,000 foot and 5,000 horse." Mr. Cartier stated[66] that the Vazir had made himself "the most formidable prince in India," and that conciliatory methods alone might not answer in this case. Eventually after much discussion the Select Committee agreed to the proposal of a deputation to the Emperor and the Vazir. Col. Barker was at the same time directed to reinforce the garrison at Chunar in case he had convincing proofs of the Vazir's hostile intentions.[67] The authorities at Bombay[68] and Madras[69] were also requested to get hold of any letters that might pass between the Vazir and his suspected allies in the Deccan.

On the 17th of August,[70] the details regarding the deputation were finally agreed upon after a prolonged debate. As the Governor had not been keeping good health for some time past,[71] the Select Committee appointed Mr. Cartier, Col. Smith, and Mr. Russell as members of the proposed deputation. It was unanimously agreed that the deputies should take with them two letters addressed to the Vazir. The first letter should contain "a fair and candid representation of facts," and was to be delivered to the latter by the

64 Mr. C. Floyer's Minute, August 10, 1768. "...we should prevent a rupture with that prince......unless we are reduced to it by the most absolute necessity."

65 Mr. R. Becher's minute, August 10, 1768.

66 Mr. J. Cartier's minute, August 10, 1768.

67 Letter to Col. Sir Robert Barker, August 10, 1768.

68 Letter to the President and Council of Bombay, August 10, 1768.

69 Letter to the President and Council of Fort St. George, August 10, 1768.

70 Beng. Sel. Con: August 17, 1768.

71 Verelst's view etc. Appendix, p. 79.

deputation who were "to use their utmost endeavours to accomplish the reduction of the Nabob's military strength by friendly arguments and mild exhortations." But in case such efforts proved ineffectual, the deputation were to present the second letter which should require in plainer terms the immediate reduction of the Vazir's forces. The Select Committee further resolved, "The deputies should also be entrusted that if they find the negotiation must end in a rupture, to apply to the king requesting of his Majesty to issue his orders to the Vazer for disbanding part of his forces and that the deputies should acquaint the Vizier of our determination to enforce obedience to the King's orders, as we deem such a reduction essentially necessary to the preservation of the general tranquillity of the Empire."

The drafts of the two letters addressed to the Vazir were approved by the Select Committee at their meeting of the 13th of September.[72] The first letter stated that instead of disbanding his forces the Vazir had in fact been making fresh levies of troops "without any pretence being assigned for such measures." The Vazir was finally thus admonished, "Now it becomes necessary that we should not walk in the dark any longer. One single question naturally occurs, for what purpose is your Excellency making all these military preparations? Your dominions enjoy perfect tranquillity and we are yet your friends." The second letter which was to be presented in the event of the first proving ineffectual briefly informed the Vazir that the Emperor had been graciously pleased to direct him to reduce the number of his forces, and the Vazir was warned, "It is our determined resolution to enforce his royal commands." Meanwhile, the Governor wrote friendly letters to the Vazir intimating that on account of ill-health he himself was unable to leave Calcutta, but that a deputation would shortly preceed to Allahabad

72 Beng. Sel. Com. September 13, 1768.

"to silence the rumours of the evil minded people,"[73] and to demonstrate the stability of our treaty and friendship."[74]

The detailed instructions[75] given to the deputation amply indicate the intentions of the authorities. As they were conscious of the fact that under the existing treaty the Vazir was not obliged to limit his forces, they were desirous of concluding a fresh treaty whereby his military power might be restricted within a safe limit. They thought that an army of ten or twelve thousand horse, and eight or ten thousand disciplined sepoys[76] was sufficient for the requirements of the Vazir, and would not also endanger the safety of Bengal.[77] They, however, saw no objection to allowing a few thousand peons extra for the work of revenue collection alone. They would not allow the English garrison to be withdrawn from Chunar in any case, nor would they agree to the recall of the Third Brigade which they considered to be "a check on all our neighbours, and more particularly on the Vizier."[78] They were fully sensible of the fact that to a man of the Vazir's "ambitious and vainglorious disposition" there could not be a greater humiliation than the public knowledge of the enforced reduction of his forces. They accordingly suggested to the deputation that the Vazir's disgrace might be prevented, if he could be prevailed upon to make a tender of the supernumerary sepoys as recruits to the Company's brigades.[79]

The deputation left Calcutta early in October,[80] and reached Benares on the 17th of November.[81] Unwilling to meet them at

73 Abs. I. 1766-71, No. 107. 74 Abs. I. 1766-71, No. 131.

75 Letter of Instructions to the Deputation, September 13, 1768.

76 Letter to the Deputation, October 26, 1768.

77 Letter to Court, November 21, 1768. "From this force we can have nothing to apprehend; and we think it will be sufficient to enable him to preserve that respect from the neighbouring powers, which he had hitherto maintained."

78 Letter to Court, September 13, 1768.

79 Letter to the Deputation, op. cit.

80 Letter to Court, November 21, 1768.

81 Beng. Sel. Com. January 4, 1769.

Allahabad in the presence of the Emperor, the Vazir set out with a small escort,[82] and after repeated marches arrived at Benares on the 18th of November,[83] and pitched his tents on the banks of the Barna.[84] At his first conference with the deputation, the Vazir heard them with the utmost attention, and freely acknowledged the reasonableness of many of their observations. He however, bitterly inveighed against the baseness of designing men who had misrepresented his intentions to his allies and claimed that he had never acted contrary to the pleasure and satisfaction of the English 'Sardars.'[85]

During the next and subsequent interviews, the Vazir assumed a totally different attitude, and showed no inclination to acquiesce in the proposed reduction of his army. He advanced a number of arguments[86] against the proposal of the deputation. In the first place, there was no clause in the existing treaty restricting his army to any particular number. In the second place, as he had in no way violated the former treaty, it was unjust to propose a fresh treaty which required him to reduce his army. In the third place, he enlarged on the strength of his forces in former times. In the fourth place, he required a large and efficient army not only for the defence of his own dominions, but also for rendering assistance to the English when they needed it. In the fifth place, he urged that the demand might have been made with greater force on the Rohillas. Lastly, he explained that he had recently enlisted fresh troops only to make up the deficiency caused by death, desertion, and rejection. He hoped therefore that the false insinuations of the calumniators would

82 Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 317. "Sans escorte" (without escort), according to M. Gentil (*Memoirs*, p. 272).

83 Letter from the Deputation, November 30, 1768.

84 Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 316.

85 Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 315.

86 Letter from the Deputation, *op. cit.*, Trans. R. 1767-68, No. 236. Beng. Sel Com. January 4, 1768.

not be believed, and that no new treaty would be forced on him at their instigation alone.

Finding all their remonstrances fruitless, the deputation presented the first letter of the Select Committee to the Vazir. This had apparently some effect, as the letter "at length moderated in some degree."[87] The deputies thereupon assured him that they had proposed no new treaty, but merely an agreement explanatory of the first article of the existing treaty, wherein it was expressly stipulated that neither party should give any cause for suspicion or jealousy. After much discussion, the Vazir declared "with great firmness"[88] that he required, for the protection of his dominions and the collection of his revenues, a force of not less than 35,000 men, of which only seven or eight thousand should be horse.

Anxious for an amicable settlement of the issue, the deputation acquiesced in the Vazir's demand for 35,000 men. They, however, sought to prescribe the strength of the various bodies of which that force was to be composed of. For example, the infantry was fixed at 7000. As the Vazir would not accede to this, the deputation consented to ten battalions of 1000 each being retained. After this point had been conceded, the Vazir further demanded that the number of the irregulars as well as the mode of discipline should be left to his own option. In short, as the deputation wrote to the Select Committee, "The nearer we came up to his terms the higher he grew in his demands."[89] The Vazir would hear of no other terms, and talked of going down to Calcutta, unless these were accepted.

The obdurate attitude of the Vazir obliged the deputation to break off the negotiations. They accordingly took leave of the latter, and intimated their intention to proceed to Allahabad on the

87 Letter from the Deputation, *op. cit.*

88 *Ibid.*

89 Beng. Sel. Com. January 4, 1769.

next morning. This communication produced a remarkable effect. The Vazir at once relented, and sent a message to the deputation stating that he was afraid they had altogether misunderstood him. The deputation replied through Capt. Harper that unless he was willing to accept the terms proposed by them, any further conference was unnecessary, and that they were determined to proceed to the royal presence. The Vazir thereupon communicated his willingness to comply with their wishes.[90]

Next day the Vazir readily consented to nearly all that the deputation had proposed. Only one or two alterations were made in the draft of the agreement at his earnest request.[91] The treaty was finally agreed upon and signed[92] on the 29th of November. It[93] required the following words to be inserted as an explanatory clause in the former treaty: "It is, by the advice and consent of the President and Council aforesaid, agreed that His Highness shall not entertain a number of forces exceeding 35,000 men, whether sepoys, cavalry, peons, artillery men, rocketmen or troops of any denomination whatever. Of these 10,000 are to be cavalry, 10 battalions of sepoys including subadars, jamadars, havildars and all ranks of officers not to exceed 10,000 men. The Nudjib Regiments consisting of 5000 men with matchlocks to remain always in its present establishment. Five hundred men for the artillery and that number never to be exceeded. The remaining 9,500 men are to be irregulars, neither to be clothed, armed, or disciplined after the manner of the English sepoys or Nudjib Regiments. And, His Highness also engages to arm none of his forces besides the 10,000 men mentioned in this treaty after the English manner, nor to train them in the discipline of the English troops. In consideration thereof the said

90 Trans. R. 1769, No. 31.
91 Letter from the Deputation, *op. cit,*
92 Beng. Sel. Com. December 13, 1768. Letter to Court, January 3, 1769.
93 Beng. Sel. Com. January 4, 1769. Letter to Court, January 6, 1769.

John Cartier, Colonel Richard Smith, and Claud Russell engage in behalf of His Excellency the Nabob Syfet Dowlah, and the English Company aforesaid, that whilst His Highness Sujah ul Dowlah aforesaid and his successors shall abide by the articles of the Treaty neither the present Council of Fort William, nor any future Council shall hereafter introduce any new matter relative hereto besides what has been firmly agreed to and is now concluded upon."

The Vazir also wrote a separate agreement,[94] promising to reduce his forces to the number specified in the aforesaid treaty within three months.[95] The agreement was executed by the Vazir in his own hand, and was worded thus, "I promise to disband all the troops I now entertain exceeding the number of 35,000 horse and foot, and to comply with all the articles stipulated in the treaty within the space of three months."[96] According to the estimate[97] of the deputation, the Vazir was to disband not less than 15,000 men. After the execution of the treaty and the agreement, the Vazir accompanied[98] the deputation to Allahabad, where the treaty was formally ratified by the Emperor.[99] The Select Committee also approved of the treaty, and passed a resolution of thanks to Messrs Cartier, Smith, and Russell for their services in connection with the deputation to the Vazir.[100]

The new treaty with the Vazir was a diplomatic development of no mean importance. The Vazir's military dependence on the

94 The agreement is dated the 19th of Rajab, 1182, A. H. (corresponding to November 26, 1768.)

95 "We have allowed him three months from the date of the Treaty" Letter from the Deputation, November 30, 1768.

96 Beng. Sel. Com. January 25, 1769.

97 Beng. Sel. Com. January 4, 1769.

98 Letter from the Deputation, December 31, 1768 and Letter to Court, January 6, 1769.

99 Letter to Court, February 3, 1769.

100 Beng. Sel. Com. January 25, 1769.

English was confirmed as a result of this treaty, and his ambition to build up a formidable force of his own was finally curbed[101] without war and bloodshed. The number of troops that he was now allowed to retain was no more than a bare minimum, and the English therefore could have no apprehensions of danger[102] from Oudh hereafter.

NANDALAL CHATTERJI

101 "............we do not find he has raised or added a man to his army since the treaty at Benares." Letter to Court, April 6, 1769.

102 "By the stipulated reduction of the Nabob's troops, he is still permitted to retain a number which will render him respectable among the powers of Hindostan, though in no degree sufficiently formidable to trouble the repose of these provinces." Letter to Court, January 6, 1769.

The Ostend Company in Bengal

The Ostend Company, floated by the merchants of Flanders and formally chartered in 1722, was permitted by Murshid Quli Jafar Khān to establish a factory at Bankybazar situated on the eastern side of the Hugli river at a distance of fifteen miles above Calcutta. But their growing commercial prosperity in Bengal soon excited jealousy of the Dutch and English trading companies. In 1730 Captain Gosfright was sent by the English at the head of a squadron to blockade the Hugli river against the Ostenders. Of the two Ostend ships, anchored between Calcutta and Bankybazar, one was captured by the English but the other escaped to Bankybazar. Again in course of two or three years, Shujāuddin Muhammad Khān, successor of Murshid Quli as the Subahdār of Bengal, instigated by the English and the Dutch, passed orders prohibiting the Ostenders "from trading to Bengal." The *faujdār* of Hugli sent a body of troops under the command of an officer named Mīr Jafar, who besieged their factory and harassed them. The Council in Calcutta wrote to the Court of Directors on the 16th January, 1733, that the English had "agreed with the Dutch to send a sloop each to give notice to the Guard ships in case of any Ostender's arrival." On the arrival of the 'Concord', a licensed Ostend ship, in Bengal, the English issued a "public notice" on the 29th August, 1732, "forbidding all under their Protection to trade with her."[1] They, "in conjunction with the Dutch," then satisfied the Nawāb of Bengal by the payment of two lacs of rupees for his "connivance at their taking the Ostend ships."[2] The "expedition" against the Ostenders cost the English Rs. 14,212.[3]

1 Letter to Court, 16th January, 1733, para 29.
2 *Ibid.*, para 101.
3 Letter to Court, 14th February, 1733, para 31.

According to Mr. Stewart the factory of the Ostend Company in Bengal was now razed to the ground and their ships left Bengal for the last time in 1733 A.D.[4] But there are certain references in the contemporary correspondence of the Council in Calcutta with the Court of Directors[5] which show that the Ostenders still continued to trade in Bengal in their 'licensed ships' and the English remained jealous of them. Thus the Council in Calcutta wrote to the Court of Directors on the 26th December, 1733: "Shall prevent any Dealings being carryed on with them (Ostenders) or other new traders by those under their protection." At the beginning of 1733 Monsieur de Schonamille, Resident for the Ostend Company, had written to the Council in Calcutta that he had been appointed Governor General of Bankybazar and "the Factorys thereon depending by His Imperial Majesty."[6] In May 1734, at the suggestion of the Dutch, the English had a conference with them "to consider about Mr. Schonamille's hoisting the Imperial flag at the Ostend Factory."[7] There are also some references to the Ostend Factory at Bankybazar in the Council's letters to the Court of Directors, dated the 31st December, 1737[8] and the 28th January, 1739[9] respectively. It was in 1748 A.D. that Nawāb Alivardi, "on some contempt of his authority, attacked and drove the factors of the Ostend Company out" of the Hugli river.[10]

Kalikinkar Datta

4 Stewart, *History of Bengal*, pp. 480-83.

5 Transcripts of these records were obtained by me from the Imperial Record Department, New Delhi.

6 Letter to Court, 1st January, 1733.

7 Letter to Court, 24th January, 1735, para 102.

8 Para 36. 9 Para 19. 10 Orme, *Indostan*, vol. 2, pp. 45-46.

Baghaura Nārāyaṇa Image-inscription of Mahīpāla

This image inscription was dug out of a pond in the village of Baghaura in the sub-division of Brahmanbaria in the Tippera district, Bengal. The inscription is incised under the lotus seat of a standing image of Nārāyaṇa. The characters belong to the N.E. variety, generally known as Kuṭila, which gave birth to modern Bengali script. The image is dated in the third year of a certain king named Mahīpāladeva, and the inscription records that the image was the meritorious work of *Paramavaiṣṇava Vaṇik* Lokadatta, belonging to Bilakīndaka in Samataṭa.[1]

The identification of king Mahīpāla of this inscription has recently given rise to some controversy.[2] As no indication is given about the lineage of this prince it is possible to identify him either (i) with a hitherto unknown local prince of Samataṭa, (ii) or with either of the two Pāla princes of Bihar and Bengal of the same name, (iii) or with the Gurjara-Pratihāra emperor of Kanauj bearing the same name.[3] Now, though duplication of kings on insufficient data is undesirable, will it be right to argue that there was no local prince bearing the name Mahīpāla in Samataṭa at the time of the record under discussion? Recently attention of scholars was drawn by me to some instances[4] of princes bearing identical names but who ruled separately in adjoining territories about the same period. To add to what has been said there, we may refer to three princes bearing the name 'Dharmapāla' within the limits of Bengal and

1 *Epigraphia Indica, (EI.)*, vol. XVII, pp. 353-55; Ray, *Dynastic History of Northern India (DHNI.)*, Calcutta University Press, vol. I, 1931, p. 311.

2 *Indian Historical Quarterly (IHQ.)* vol. XVI, 1940, pp. 179 ff.

3 As the connection of *Mahārājādhirāja Mahīpāla* (954-55) of the Bayana inscription of Citralekhā with the Gurjara-Pratihāras of Kanauj is rather doubtful, he is not being taken into account in this discussion. See Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 591, 611.

4 *IHQ.*, vol. XV, 1939, p. 510, p. 510 fns. 11 & 12.

Assam roughly during the period *c.* 800-1100 A.D.[5] Again, following Dr. R. C. Majumdar, I had occasion elsewhere[6] to point out the extensive character of the Pratihāra empire of Kanauj. Mahīpāla (*c.* 914-43 A.D.) of this line inherited an empire that extended from the Eastern Punjab and Kathiawar to North Bengal. It was shown that "there is reason to think that Mahīpāla during the first part of his reign succeeded in preserving the mighty empire that was handed down to him by his predecessors."[7] After scrutinizing the list of Mahīpāla's victories as given in Rājaśekhara's works and such epithets as "*Mahārājādhirāja* of Āryāvarta" given to him by that author, I found them when applied to the first part of his reign as mainly true.[8] Thus it is not wholly outside the range of possibility that this power might have extended during the first part of his reign to S.E. Bengal as well. But as yet there is no evidence to support this suggestion. There is nothing on record to prove that the Candras of E. Bengal were at any time feudatories of the Gurjara-Pratihāras even if we assume for argument's sake that Pūrṇacandra ruled in the latter half of the 9th century. The argument that they came from the Shahabad district of Bihar[9] rests, as we shall presently see, on a very weak foundation. On the other hand, the outlandish character of such names as 'Layahacandradeva' always tempts some scholars to think that perhaps some of the Candras of Eastern Bengal might after all be connected with the Mongoloid peoples of Arakan.[10]

The third possibility that the 'Mahīpāla of the Baghaura image-inscription' belonged to the Pāla dynasty of Bihar and Bengal,[11]

5 Ray, *DHNI.*, vol. I, pp. 254 ff., 285 ff., 318 ff.

6 Ray, *DHNI.*, vol. I, pp. 569 ff. See also Majumdar, *Journal of the Department of Letters,* Calcutta University, vol. X, pp. 1-76.

7 Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 576. 8 *Ibid.*, p. 577. 9 *EI.*, XII, pp. 136 ff.

10 *EI.*, XVII, p. 350; *DHNI.*, vol. I, p. 323, fn. 2. Note in this connection that some kings of the Arakan area bore names ending in *taing-candra*. These are mentioned in local chronicles. See *infra*, p. 635.

11 As the Pāla prince Mahīpāla II had a short and troublesome reign, the

though not free from difficulties, has been accepted by a few scholars.[12] To accept this it is not absolutely necessary, as I have shown elsewhere,[13] to believe that Vigrahapāla II, "after losing his kingdom, took shelter in the eastern country where water abounds" or to hold that the Candra *Mahārājādhirājas* were feudatories of the Pāla prince Mahīpāla I, at least during the first part of his reign, though this is more probable[14] than the suggestion that they came from Bihar and that they were vassals of the Pratihāra empire. The Baghaura image-inscription palæographically should be placed roughly during the period *c.* 975-1050 A.D. Dr. Bhattasali, the editor of the record, places it about 976 A.D. If he is right then it would be perhaps hazardous to push it so early as about the first decade of the 10th century. Moreover, there is no evidence, as I have already said, that the Pratihāras had any thing to do with any part of S.E. Bengal during the period represented by the script of the record. I have shown elsewhere that the Pratihāras rapidly declined after *c.* 918 A.D.[15] On the other hand, some scholars believe that the Pāla sovereign Mahīpāla I played the rôle of a Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi, reviving the fortunes of his family and extending its limits in every possible direction. These scholars hold that the western limits of his dominions even extended as far as Sarnath. The limited nature of the success attained by the Pāla prince Mahīpāla I was perhaps for the first time pointed out by me by an analysis of the existing sources.[16] But it is not quite beyond the range of possibility that for a brief period during the beginning of his reign he

inscription is usually attributed to Mahipāla I (*c.* 992-1042 A.D.); see Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 311.

12 *EI.*, vol. XVII, pp. 353-55; Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 311.

13 Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 315-16.

14 During this period the relation of the Candras to the Pālas of Bengal and Bihar might possibly have been like that of the Candrātreyas to the Pratihāras of Kanauj in the tenth century. See Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 674 ff.

15 *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 581 ff; vol. II, p. 680.

16 Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 315-24.

might have achieved considerable success in the East. It was very likely during this period that the Baghaura inscription was caused to be incised by the Paramavaiṣṇava Vaṇik Lokadatta of Vilakīndaka[17] in Samataṭa[18] in the *rājya* of Śrī-Mahīpāladeva. Those who are somewhat familiar with the strange vicissitudes of history know that this would not be impossible even if it could be proved that during the third year of Mahīpāla, the Candras[19] held the territory between Samataṭa and the western possessions of the Pāla prince.[20] As the dates of this period largely depend upon the rather 'elastic' evidence of palæography, who could positively deny the possibility of the Pāla Mahīpāla I, the date of the Baghaura image inscription, extending his power in the east to Samataṭa, sometime before when Trailokyacandra's efforts were still concentrated on becoming the king of the "island which had the word 'Candra' prefixed to it?,"[21]

The idea that the Candras were feudatories, at least up to the 3rd year of the Pratihāra prince Mahīpāla I, of the Kanauj empire, has, as I have already said, very little to support it. The suggestion that the Candras originally came from Shahabad District, Bihar, seems also to rest on no stronger foundation. The Rāmpāl grant of Śrī-Candradeva states that the *Candravaṃśa* ruled over [R]ohitāgi[ri?].[22] The upper part of the first letter read as *R* is broken and the final *ri* is

17 The identification of this place with Bilakenduai near the findspot of the inscription is not definite.

18 As the image was set up in Samataṭa, my previous suggestion that it might have come from some region further west outside *Vaṅgāladeśa* (*DHNI.*, I, 324) requires modification.

19 Dr. Bhattasali suggested that the Candras were probably connected with the Candras of Arakan (*EI.*, XVII, 350). Though this suggestion may require modification, we shall presently see that it is not so absurd as is supposed by some See *infra*, p. 635 ff.

20 Compare for instance the position of East Prussia and the rest of Germany separated by the Danzig Corridor during the period 1918-38 A.D.

21 *EI.*, vol. XII, p. 139, v. 5.

22 *R* is bracketed by me after an examination of the plate.

absent from the plate. The only certain portion is *hitāgi*. Dr. Basak plausibly suggested that by adding *'ri'* at the end, apparently to meet the needs of metre, the word could possibly be read as *'Rohitāgiri'*.[23] By retaining the query sign after *ri* he gave sufficient indication that his reading was entirely tentative. He then with some hesitation said—"It may probably refer to Rohtasgadh or Rohitāsgaḍh, a hill-fort in the Shahabad District, where the seal-matrix of Śaśāṅkadeva was discovered." The learned editor was quite right in offering a probable solution to a problem. But he was the first to admit that it was far from certain, and all reasonable scholars would agree that to build dogmatically on this slender evidence the theory that the Candras came from Bihar would be rather risky. The further suggestion that the Candras were feudatories of the Pratihāra emperors of Kanauj, at least up to the third year of Mahīpāla I, in the absence of any Candra record bearing the names of their over-lords, is again, as we have seen, on present evidence, improbable.[24] On the contrary, the suggestion of Dr. Bhattasali, that the Candras might have originally come from Arakan and might be connected with the princes of that region whose names ending in *Candra* are found in the native chronicles, coins, and stone inscriptions of that area appears to be less improbable. I have already pointed out that at least one Candra prince of Bengal bears an outlandish name. Local chronicles of Arakan preserve names of princes which end in *candra* or *taing-candra*. Phayre's *Coins of Arakan* mentions a num-ber of coins whose legends contain royal names ending in *candra*. Some (but not all) of these names agree with the names of princes contained in a Nagari inscription which was found on the platform

23 In reading *Rohitāgiri* Dr. Basak might have been influenced by the fact that the word had actually been read in an Orissa epigraph by Prof. N. Chakravarti, see *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1909, vol. V. (N. S.), pp. 347-50; also Ray, *DHNI.*, vol. I, p. 419 fn. 3.

24 Geographical factors add to this improbability. Consult Map No. 6, Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. I.

of the Shitthaung temple at Mrohaung in Arakan by Forchhammer. The record is damaged but Mr. Hirananda Sastri's reading of the inscription was given by Mr. Blakiston in 1925-26.[25] Mr. Sastri's version seems to indicate that the inscription contained twelve names which ended in *Candra*. As there were in this inscription at least three other names of princes which did not end in *Candra*, and as the dynasty did not trace its descent to the Moon or any prince of the Lunar race the dynasty could not properly be called *Candra*. It was according to Sastri's reading called Śrī-Dharmarājānuja-vaṃśa by the composer of the record. Now it is quite possible that some of these princes or their children whose names probably ended in *Candra* might have entered Bengal *via* the Chittagong coast; but it is perhaps more probable that some of these princes with their men first came to the Bakerganj area directly by the sea route. Later on this region possibly came to be known after them as *Candradvīpa*. The arrivals of large numbers of seadogs and other adventurers from Arakan to Barisal and other neighbouring areas were recorded up to comparatively recent times. Even now a considerable remnant of these Arakanese adventurers occupies the southern part of Barisal. During one of my hunting excursions near Kuokâṭā in the southern part of Patuakhali subdivision in the Barisal district some of these men who still profess Buddhism acted as beaters and trackers. This suggestion is further strengthened by the fact that the Rāmpāl inscription of Śrī-Candradeva seems to indicate clearly that the Candras first became rulers of some portions of the area now known as Bakerganj, Faridpur and Khulna.[26] One of the fiscal divisions of Bakerganj is still called Candradvīpa.[27] Subsequently these Candras, as I have already indicated above, gradually extended their hegemony over the whole or considerable portions of Harikela (= Vaṅga = por-

25 *Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey of India*, 1925-26, (published in 1928), 146 ff.

26 *DHNI.*, vol. I, p. 322.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 322, fn. 1.

tions of what we now know as E. Bengal) and Puṇḍravardhana (=N. Bengal). This intrusion of the Candras of Candradvīpa into the North and North-east, which might have happened, as I have said, sometime after the third year of the reign of the Pāla king Mahīpāla, apparently put an end to Pāla rule in Samataṭa.

As our materials are extremely scanty we do not yet know for certain whether the founder of the Candra dynasty in Bengal belonged to the so-called *Dharmarājānuja-vaṃśa* or to some other line referred to in local annals and coins of Arakan. But even if he belonged to the *Dharmarājānuja-vaṃśa* that would not absolutely prevent his line from being called Candravaṃśa in Bengal. Dynastic names in India were not always formed from surnames. They were somtimes derived from the endings of personal names. When a Gopāla founds a Pāla line or a Śrī-Candra belongs to the Candravaṃśa, the names of the dynasties form an essential part of their personal names. When by accident or choice the personal names of the successors contained the same ending as that of the founder of the line, the dynasty was often called after that ending (Pāla, Candra etc.). Sometimes, as in the case of the Gupta line, the personal name of the first prince gave the name to the dynasty.[28] Thus though the name of the second prince of the line did not end in Gupta, the line itself continued to be called "Dynasty of Gupta." Again many dynasties in India claimed to belong to the *Candra-vaṃśa* or the *Sūrya-vaṃśa* as they rightly or wrongly believed that they were descended from the Sun or the Moon. There are some cases where dynastic names were derived from real or fictitious professions of the progenitors (the Pratihāras, Rāṣṭrakūṭas, etc.). Sometimes even if the names of all the members had the same ending the dynastic name was not derived from such common endings. Thus in the Gāhaḍavāla dynasty, if we except Yaśovigraha who is never given

28 Cf. Raghukula, Ikṣākuvaṃśa, Puṣpabhûtis, Maukharis, Guhilots, etc.

any royal titles and in some records altogether omitted, all the names from Mahīcandra to Hariścandra end in *candra*, but the line was never called Candravaṃśa even though the real founder of the line was called Śrī-Candra.[29] When we further consider such dynastic names as Pallava, Kadamba, Cālukya, Kacchapaghāta etc. we realize that the principles which governed dynastic names in ancient and early mediaeval India were bewilderingly various and confusing. But as I have said above, when the line of Gopāla is called Pāla, it is quite clear, that it is based on the accidental convention which grew up in his family to give his successors names ending in °*pāla*. The same is the case when we find that the successors of Pūrṇacandra, without claiming to be descended from the Moon, assume names ending in *-candra* and the official *praśastikāra* call the line *Candravaṃśa*. It is clear therefore that the dynastic names in India were often the results of accidental coincidence and not always of careful deliberation. If such is the case, it is not at all impossible for one of the Arakan princes, whose names, we know from local annals, coins and inscriptions, ended in *-candra,* to come to the Bakerganj area and found a line whose members had, by accidental convention personal names ending in *candra*. Subsequently the record writers and *praśastikāras* rferred to them as belonging to the *Candravaṃśa* for want of a better family name.

In many periods of Indian history, facts are still so scanty that it is quite risky to be dogmatic in our assumptions and theories. In this paper I have therefore discussed a chain of probabilities and possibilities. The conclusions, if any, would require substantial strengthening before they can be regarded as in any way certain.

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29 Cf. the first two names in the Pāla genealogy of Bengal and Bihar (Vapyaṭa and Dayitaviṣṇu) also did not end in °*pāla*.

Place of Faith in Buddhism

Saddhā (=Sans. *Śraddhā*) in Buddhism carries two distinct meanings: one is faith (*pasāda*), producing *pīti* (serene pleasure) and the other is self-confidence, producing *viriya* (energy). *Saddhā*, when it is *pasāda* (faith), is an antidote to *vicikicchā* (doubt about the greatness of Buddha, excellence of his teaching, and uprightness of his disciples) and *moha* (deluded state of mind),[1] its characteristic, according to the *Milindapañha*,[2] *Visuddhimagga*[3] and *Abhidharma-kośa*[4] being serenity of mind (*sampasādana*). *Saddhā*, when it is self-confidence, puts energy (*viriya*) into one's mind to achieve an object which another person like him has achieved. It makes him rely on his capabilities and work out the same to their fullest extent. Siddhārtha was not willing to take Rudraka Rāmaputta at his words and decided to find out the truth himself as he possessed like his teacher *saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi* and *paññā*. By *saddhā*, he meant confidence in his abilities to develop the powers necessary to achieve his object.[5] It is mostly in the latter sense that *saddhā* is used in the compounds *saddhindriya* and *saddhābala*.

1 Anāgārika B. Govinda writes in his work on the *Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy* (pp. 166, 234) that "it is a form of inner confidence which arises from an intuitive or intellectual insight into the truth of the *dhamma* and which grows in the course of meditation on account of profound and direct experience into a state of certainty and knowledge in which the last traces of delusion are removed."

2 *Milindapañha*, p. 35. 3 *Visuddhimagga*, p. 156; *Atthasālini*, p. 304.

4 *Kośa*, I, p. 156; *Vyākhyā* (C. O. Series), p. 43: *Śraddhā=cetaso prāsadaḥ* (see *Jñānaprasthāna sūtra*, 1. 19). It is the dharma, with the association of which, the thoughts disturbed by *kleśa* and *upakleśa* become clear as the disturbed water becomes clear by the presence of alum. The *Vyākhyā* (p. 43) explains *śraddhā* in detail thus:—सत्येषु चतुर्षु रत्नेषु च त्रिषु कर्मेषु च शुभाशुभेषु। तत्फलेषु च इष्टानिष्टेषु सन्त्यैवैतानीत्यभिसंप्रत्ययोऽभिसंप्रतिपत्तिः श्रद्धेति।

Kośa, II. 25: चित्तविशुद्धिः श्रद्धा; II, 32: प्रेम एव श्रद्ध

5 Cf. *Milindapañha*, p. 35: *sampakkhandanalakkhaṇa*.

The object of this paper is to show how far *saddhā* in the former sense (i.e. *pasāda*) came to be regarded as a means for the attainment of Nibbāna.

Three Paths leading to Nibbāna

The first and well-known path leading to Nibbāna is the aṭṭhaṅgikamagga, in other words, all those practices connoted by the words *sīla, citta* and *paññā.*[6] It is an out and out practical code for physical, mental, and intellectual discipline and hardly offers any scope for faith (*saddhā.*) Let us call it *'sīla-citta-paññā'* path or process.

The second but not so well-known as the previous one is the path of *satipaṭṭhāna* or the close observation of what is passing within and outside one's mind and body. It gives particular attention to mental discipline, and attaches little importance to physical discipline or to faith (*saddhā*). By *satipaṭṭhāna* alone, it is said, that *nibbāna* is attained, so let us call it *'satipaṭṭhāna'* path or process.[7]

In a few places in the Nikāyas *saddhā* is recognised as the third path for the attainment of Nibbāna, inspite of the fact that it does not go well with the rationalistic principles, of which the Buddhists are the avowed champion. But this third path, which we may call *'aveccappasāda'* path or process, is particularly important for the laity whose interest is almost ignored at the early stage of the religion, and so it is not improbable that the third path came to be recognised only at a later date but in any case, before the Pali canon was closed.

Saddhā and the Laity

In early Buddhism, the laity had no place in the scheme of spiritual advancement, for none but a recluse could derive the benefit

6 Exhaustively treated in the *Visuddhimagga*. See my *Early Buddhism*.
7 Ekāyano ayaṃ maggo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā. *Dīgha*, II, p. 290.

of the teaching. It is frequently stated in the Nikāyas that it is not easy for a householder to practise the *brahmacarya* which is thoroughly pure and complete in all respects.[8] The utmost that a householder could practise were the five *sikkhāpadas*,[9] or temporarily the eight *sikkhāpadas*,[10] and that also for the purpose of *uposatha*. The teaching to be imparted to a householder was limited to *dānakathaṃ sīlakathaṃ saggakathaṃ kāmānaṃ ādīnavaṃ okāraṃ saṃkilesaṃ nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ* (talks relating to charity, moral precepts, and heaven, the evils of indulging in worldly desires, and the good effects of renunciation)[11] and a bhikkhu imparting to a householder deeper or subtler teaching was punished according to the rules of the *Pātimokkha*.[12] The highest spiritual teaching that could be imparted to a householder and that also only in special cases was the exposition of the four *ariyasaccas*. The householders were allowed to practise only *dāna* and *sīla*, later on they were advised to develop *saddhā* and *paññā*. By *saddhā* was meant cultivation of faith in Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha, and by *paññā* comprehension of the four truths, and in some cases, also *paṭiccasamuppāda*. The programme of duties laid down for the laity is detailed thus:[13] An ariyasāvaka is to develop firm faith in Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha, and then he should perfect himself in the five *sīlas* (*sikkhāpadas*), be liberal in gifts,[14] and lastly he should try to comprehend the four truths, and, if possible also the *paṭiccasamuppāda*.[15]

8 Nayidaṃ sukaraṃ agāraṃ ajjhāvasatā ekantaparipuṇṇaṃ ekantaparisuddhaṃ brahmacariyaṃ carituṃ. *Majjhima*, II, p. 55.

9 Pāṇātipātā veramaṇī, adinnādānā v., micchācārā v., musāvādā v., surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhānā v.

10 The three additional are vikālabhojanā v., naccagītavāditavisukadassanamālāgandhavilepanadhāraṇamaṇḍanavibhūsaṇaṭṭhānā v., and uccāsana-mahāsayanā v.

11 Cf. *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 209.

12 Cf. Pācittiya, 3: Yo pana bhikkhu anupasampannaṃ padaso dhammaṃ vāceyya pācittiyaṃ.

13 *Aṅguttara*, II, p. 212; IV, p. 271.

14 *Muttacāgā payatapāṇi vossaggaratā yācayogā dānasaṃvibhāgaratā.*

15 *Aṅguttara*, V, p. 184.

A person endowed with these four,[16] which are called *sotāpattiyaṅgas*, becomes a sotāpanna, and may rest assured that he will be reborn as a god, and will never be reborn in the hells, or in the *preta* world and that in the long run he is destined to attain *sambodhi.*[17] The above account shows that *saddhā* (faith) was primarily meant for the laity and formed one of the vital items of practice for their spiritual uplift. Deep *saddhā,* in some cases, produced *pīti* (serene pleasure) and helped concentration of mind, but in any case, Nibbāna, according to the early Buddhists, was unattainable by a householder.

Saddhā and the Bhikkhus

The expression frequent in the Nikāyas: *saddhāya kulaputtā agārasmā anāgāriyaṃ pabbajanti* (out of faith sons of good families retire from home to homeless life) shows that the bhikkhu-life generally commenced out of *saddhā* (faith). The first duty of a bhikkhu is to become a sotāpanna by removing the *nīvaraṇas,*[18] one of which is *vicikicchā.* The removal of *vicikicchā* can only be effected by developing *saddhā* as stated above (vide p. 639). Again, in the sixteen moments of comprehension of the four aryan truths, *jñāna* is always preceded by *kṣānti* (i.e. faith)[19] and so *saddhā* was not wholly dispensed with by the bhikkhus. But the bhikkhus are warned against growing *saddhā* for the teacher for it is akin to *prema* (affection) and works more as an obstacle than as an aid to spiritual progress.[20] It is said that Ānanda's spiritual progress was hampered on account of his *saddhā* for Buddha.

16 *Saddhā, sīla, cāgā, paññā.*

17 *Aṅguttara,* V, p. 182.

18 Sakkāyadiṭṭhi, sīlabbataparāmāsa, vicikicchā.

19 E.g., (i) duḥkhe dharmajñāna-kṣānti, (ii) duḥkhe dharmajñānaṃ, (iii) duḥkhe anvayajñāna-kṣānti, (iv) duḥkhe anvayajñānaṃ.

20 *Kośa,* II, 32; cf. *Vyākhyā* (C.O. Series), p. 54: प्रेमैव श्रद्धा न गौरवम् । नतु श्रद्धैव प्रेम ।........दुःखसमुदयसत्ययोः श्रद्धैवभिसंप्रत्ययरूपा । न प्रेम अस्पृहनीयत्वात् ।

The two dhūras

It is worth while to refer in this connection to the two *dhūras* mentioned in the Buddhist texts, viz., *Saddhā-dhūra* and *Paññā-dhūra*. *Saddhā*, however, does not play an important part in *Saddhā*-dhūra, for, the distinction made between the two dhūras is not on account of the degree of predominance of *saddhā* or *paññā* but on account of the dullness or sharpness of the faculties of monks. *Saddhā-dhūra* is prescribed for monks with dull faculties while *Paññā-dhūra* for monks with sharp faculties. Though the *saddhānusāris* do not make *saddhā* their main prop, they first grow faith in, and regard for, the Tathāgata,[21] and then acquire the five indriyas[22] including *paññā*. Likewise the *dhammānusāris* do not dispense with *saddhā* but make *paññā* their first item of acquisition[23] and then develop the other indriyas including *saddhā*.[24]

It will be observed that *saddhā* is explained here as faith or affection but not as self-confidence, which is the usual sense in which *saddhā* is interpreted when it is grouped with *viriya* and other indriyas. It seems that in the Buddhist texts the two meanings of *saddhā* have not always been carefully distinguished. *Saddhā* as an *indriya* (predominating factor) and *bala* (force) should ordinarily mean "self-confidence" and not faith.

Saddhā (faith) as a means to liberation

There are passages in the *Majjhima* and *Aṅguttara Nikāyas* where emphasis is laid on faith (*saddhā*) as a means to liberation. In the *Majjhima* (I, p. 480-1) it is stated that there are bhikkhus who

प्रियतारूपा तृष्णा नाभिसंप्रत्ययरूपेति श्रद्धा न भवति । सार्धविहारिणः अन्त्येवासिनः । तेषु पुत्रादिषु प्रेम न गौरवं क्लिष्टमक्लिष्टं वेति संभवतः । गौरवं न प्रेम ।

21 Tathāgate c'ssa saddhāmattaṃ hoti pemamattaṃ.

22 Saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi and paññā.

23 Tathāgatappaveditā c'assa dhammā paññāya mattaso nijjhānaṃ khamanti.

24 Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 478 f.; *Kośa*, vi. 31.

have taken resort to Buddhism out of *faith*. They believe that Bhagavā knows everything while they do not, that his teaching is forceful and attractive, and that they should exert for the goal until their bodies are dried up leaving only the bare skin, bones and sinews. These monks, the texts state, acquire the highest knowledge in this life, or at least, the *anāgāmi* stage.

'*Aveccappasāda*' *process*

In the *Vatthupama Sutta*, a complete course of training is prescribed for those monks who intend to make *pasāda* (faith) their main prop for the attainment of liberation. The process is as follows:

I. An adept should first get rid of the mental impurities such as *abhijjhā* (strong attachment), *macchariya* (avarice), *makkha* (hypocrisy), *māyā* (cheating others), *sāṭheyya* (double-dealing), *thambho* and *sārambho* (pride and haughtiness), *māno* and *ati māno* (conceit); *mada* (pride or excitement caused by attachment to one's own acquisitions),[25] and *pamāda* (carelessness).[26]

II. After the removal of the above-mentioned impurities, which may well be compared to the *sīla* practices of the 'sīla-citta-paññā' process, the adept is required to develop unflinching faith in Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha. The usual terms in which the faith is to be expressed are as follows:—

(1) *Bhagavā* the enlightened is endowed with knowledge and good conduct, he is the knower of world, the guide in disciplining men, the incomparable, the teacher of men and gods.

(2) The *Dhamma* preached by Bhagavā produces fruit in this life, invites every body, knows no limitation of time, leads one to the goal and is realisable only by the wise within one's own self.

25 *Kośa*, II, 33: मदः स्वधर्मरक्तस्य पर्यादानं तु चेतसः

26 See *kleśa*, *upakleśa*, *paryavasthāna* and *anuśaya* in the *Kośa*, ch. V.

(3) The *Saṅgha* consists of monks who are in one of the eight stages of sanctification, and righteous, who are exerting for knowledge, observing good conduct, who are worthy of gifts and praise and respects, and who are fit recipients of gifts from laymen.

III. The more the mental impurities are removed the stronger becomes his faith in Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha. This faith produces in his mind the satisfaction that he has achieved something good. This satisfaction in its turn produces joy and a sense of deep pleasure (*pīti*) which makes the body calm and the mind serene, and ultimately, the mind gets concentrated.[27]

It will be observed that all the processes, be it 'sīla-citta-paññā' or 'satipaṭṭhāna' or 'aveccappasāda,' aim at *samādhi* (concentration of mind). In the 'sīla-citta-paññā' process, this is achieved by means of the four jhānas. By the first jhāna one acquires 'vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ',[28] by the second 'samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ',[29] and then by the third and fourth, he dismisses the *pīti-sukha* in order to develop 'upekkhā' (equanimity). In the 'aveccappasāda' process, *pīti-sukha* subsides, giving rise to *samādhi*, i.e., it skips over the processes of the third and fourth jhānas.[30]

IV. After developing concentration of mind, the adept is required to practise the four *brahmavihāras*, i.e., he is to extend *mettā* (love), *karuṇā* (compassion), *muditā* (feeling of joy at others' success) and *upekkhā* (feeling of equanimity) to all beings of all the corners of the world.

V. After attaining perfection in the practice of the *brahmavihāras*, the adept realises the four truths,[31] and destroys the three

27 *Sukhino cittaṃ samādhīyati.* 28 "Deep pleasure due to solitude."

29 "Deep pleasure due to concentration of mind."

30 Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 37-38 and p. 21-22.

31 Expressed thus:—Atthi idaṃ, atthi hīnaṃ, atthi paṇītaṃ, atthi imassa saññāgatassa uttariṃ nissaraṇaṃ.—*Majjhima*, I, p. 38.

āsavas, *viz.*, *kāma*, *bhava* and *avijjā*.[32] He is now convinced that he has completed his task and has nothing more to do and that he will have no more rebirth.

It is remarkable that in this process the practice of *brahmavihāras* is made an integral part, while no mention is made of the *samāpattis*. As a rule, the *brahmavihāras* are excluded from the list of practices prescribed in the 'sīla-citta-paññā' process. These are not even included in the thirty-seven *bodhipakkhiya dhammas*. In the Nikāyas the *brahmavihāras* are hardly mentioned, and if at all, in such suttas which are Mahāyānic in character.[33] The *brahmavihāras* go best with the pāramis, as is clearly shown in the *Visuddhimagga*.[34]

Another remarkable feature in course of training this is that there is no insistence on the observance of the Pātimokkha rules, and as such it can be followed by a person who has not embraced the austere life of a Buddhist monk. This latitude is particularly noticeable in the remark that a person following this course of life is free to take luxurious food, as that will not be a hindrance to his spiritual progress.[35]

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32 It will be noticed that *diṭṭhi-āsava* is not included, for the question of *diṭṭhi* does not arise in this process.

33 This *'aveccappasāda'* process with the inclusion of the practice of the *brahmavihāras*, it seems, was an outcome of the Mahāyānic influence, and that the Suttas, which speak of the *brahmavihāras*, belong to a date when Hīnayāna was in the state of transition to Mahāyāna. The *Vatthupama* and *Makhādeva suttas* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* should therefore be ascribed to a date when the Mahāsaṅghika school was making its influence felt in the Buddhist circles.

34 *Visuddhimagga*, ch. IX.

35 *Majjhima*, I, p. 38: Sa kho so bhikkhu evaṃ silo evaṃ dhtammo evaṃ pañño sālīnaṃ ce pi piṇḍapātaṃ bhuñjati vicitakāḷakaṃ anekasupam anekabyañjanaṃ n' ev' assa taṃ hoti antarāyāya.

Nairātmya and Karman

(THE LIFE-LONG PROBLEM OF LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN'S THOUGHT).

The man and his antinomy

Many a scholar's intimate development can be followed in all its stages on the track of a single problem, as the landmarks of the history of his thought are laid down in the successive attempts either at a definite solution of the problem or at a definite explanation of its irresolvability. The difficulty not always lies with the problem itself: often, at least so far as such life-long problems are concerned, it lies with the scholar. And to an eye sufficiently familiar with the ways of his thought the underlying antinomy may reveal itself as the reflection of an antinomy inherent in his intellectual life.

Louis de La Vallée Poussin was a fervent lover of Buddhism as well as a fervent Christian. The former fact, although rarely and only indirectly disclosed in conversation (in his playful way he would elude the formulation of such personal attitudes and shift the subject to a strictly objective plane), is too abundantly witnessed by the patient and fruitful labour of his life to require any incidental evidence. On the other hand, the convictions of Christian truth were so firmly and exclusively established in his mind as not only to bar the admission that any heterogeneous ideology could have a share in the most personal life of his spirit, but even as to produce certain inhibitory restrictions in the earnest pursuit of his thought intent on retracing the outline of Buddhism as a coherent religious doctrine. Whenever La Vallée took up the attempt at such a synthetic reconstruction—and he did so many times in his life, and from many different viewpoints—the natural crystallization of his effort seemed to be checked by one single problem, practically always the same. One of the classical problems—not of Buddhism in fact, but of Buddhology, the coexistence of the axioms of *nairātmya* and *karman* seemed

to baffle the usual perspicacity of La Vallée: a perspicacity which had none of the cheaper qualities of glittering and hazardous dialectics, but on the contrary, coupled as it was with a rare erudition—putting at his disposal fairly complete surveys of the extant texts relative to particular points and so enabling him in many cases to decide on philological grounds where others had been groping and guessing—chose to attire its conclusive statements in the humble garb of provisional solutions. Nor could it be surmised that any sort of misplaced fidelity to a line of agreement once adopted (an effect of egotistic pride often mistaken by scholars for a proof of dignified consistency and placed as a self-made stumbling-stone across the path of their further progress) might have prevented him from finding his way to a satisfactory solution by a thorough revision not only of his former judgments, but of the very formulation of the problem and of the perspective in its background. La Vallée was as free from such fetters of self-complacency as any scholar who ever wielded a pen: his was the highest courage of uncompromising honesty, the most difficult virtue of a thinker's ripe age: whenever the progress of his research set its results at variance with his own previous conclusions, he, unhesitatingly, proclaimed to have changed his opinion and pointed out the fallacies of his earlier arguments: there was no other critic of his work as severe and unprejudiced as himself. Many would, on such grounds, belittle his achievements in the line of historical research and classify them as mere experiments not to be valued higher than their author himself was going to do in his next exposition of cognate subjects: I may confess that this singular attitude of untiring self-criticism attracted me most in my first contacts with La Vallée's work, while my reactions to his actual trends of analysis and argumentation were as yet decidedly negative: this was before a more exhaustive familiarity with the multiple aspects of La Vallée's scholarly interests and finally the personal acquaintance with the man and thinker enabled me to appreciate the depths

that lay beneath the apparent unconcern and detached curiosity: the depth not only of unrelenting effort of an intellect that in its pursuit of truth alone did not stop revising its own ways to the very last, but the depth of tragic struggle of a heart to which two great devotions of different kind laid equal claim and that ceased to beat on the eve of a possible reconciliation, of a solution of the personal antinomy underlying the life-problem of his thought. As destiny would have it, the categoric imperative that bid him choose between the two great visions of reality—that which dominated his human life and that which absorbed his scholarly effort—prevented him to the last from doing full justice to Buddhistic positions, on the subconscious assumption that, if the second greatest religion of mankind is to be based ultimately on a fallacy, there must be a crack in its speculative edifice. The fallacy could not be looked for anywhere else but in the negation of an individual soul, eternal *à part poste*. The crack must needs be the apparent incongruity between the absence of such a surviving entity and the perpetuation of the karman.

On the part of Western Buddhology it was doubtlessly due, to a very large extent, to a superimposition of subjective mental categories upon the fundamental outlook of its object that the tenet of *nairātmya* was preeminently interpreted as the negation of an individual soul as substratum of man's activities and destinies, the latter being indiscriminately identified with the Upanishadic ātman, against whose existence the main trend of Buddhistic reaction was assumed to have been directed. If some of the canonical polemics (but against what?[1]) lend a certain amount of likelihood to such an assumption, on the other hand, in the ample and complex bulk of records of Upanishadic ātman-doctrine there is very little to justify it even apparently. Even if we let the mere lexicological criterion be our guide in the survey of available data, we see that in an over-

1 See below, fn. 25.

whelming majority of instances the definitions or epithets of ātman point to something utterly different from an individual soul or principle of individual life, thus evidencing the misconception inherent in standard-renderings such as "I" or "Ego", adopted by several scholars, and to a lesser degree even in the more current and more anodyne rendering of *ātman* by "Self," based on a purely linguistic equivalence without regard to the technical specifications of the term. When the fundamental incommensurability of the outlooks underlying the trends of ancient Indian thought on one hand, of modern Western thought on the other (or shall we say those of yesterday's Western thought, still predominant on the popular level of philosophy and science), will be fully appreciated, Indologists will doubtlessly decide by general agreement to leave certain untanslatable terms untranslated—unless some prefer the thankless toil of coining equivalents by means of cumbrous neologisms none of which could render the whole scale of implications inherent in the original terms. After all the task of the philologist, even in his marginal rôle of a translator, is to make things clear and rightly understood rather than to make them palatable to a reader unwilling to part for the time with his own habits of thinking. But before the reading public is summoned to renounce the original sin of intellectual egotism, those who have the charge of its guidance to spheres of thought remote in space or in time must first prove their determination to eradicate it from their own minds. As, however, getting rid of one's congenital mental atmosphere and completely identifying oneself with views seemingly extinct since a score of centuries—moreover indirectly and incompletely transmitted to our knowledge—may be considered an endeavour full of risks, let us follow the great example of humility set by our deceased friend by proposing the solution of his problem, inspite of all the evidence of straight unequivocalness it may convey to us, as only a provisional one—as befits all human things.

The true Christian humility that led La Vallée's steps in scientific research often brought him very near to the admission that an adequate understanding of Buddhist (and not only Buddhist, but most ancient Indian) conceptions requires a complete reorientation of mental habits on the part of the student. But in admitting this difficult condition he considered it as a partly insurmountable barrier to our understanding. This was less due to a conviction that a human mind cannot free itself from the tradition into which it is born than to that subconscious safeguard against abandoning in any circumstance the outlook connected for him with the highest spiritual values. Very unlike so many other known scholars who turned their limitations into an attitude of superiority, severing the *granthas* of their exegesis by summary judgments on the amount of logic to be expected from their sources, La Vallée was keenly alive to subjective difficulties and returned to his problem again and again, ever trying, never satisfied with half-way issues. That one most personal reservation he could not throw into the bargain, although aware at times that a mind intent on disclosing the essentials of a religious idea must allow itself to be fully merged in it. This is why he smilingly declined any far-reaching discussions on such questions of outlook, saying that after all he was but a philologist or too old to start anew. His works contradicted both the statements.

I still remember the scene of a youthfully enthusiastic attempt to win him over to my optimism concerning our natural possibilities of comprehension of ancient Indian thought, by pointing out that it is not all too long since such trends of experience and thought had become extraneous to us, that they had been essentially ours too, that such a revulsion of our mental categories would mean after all no more than a return to the tradition of Clemens and Augustinus, of Dionysius and the Victorians and down as far as some 19th century Christian thinkers not only, but up to the very tradition of St. Paul and St. John. I had even more powerful living allies in the imminent

resplendent presence of the highest peaks of the Alps crowning the valley to which we both used to return year after year. A concrete visualisation of cosmic-hypercosmic infinity, an unearthly island of silence in the midst of the turmoil of Europe—a vision by whose presence an intent mind is effortlessly led to transcend itself and expand into a consciousness of omnipresence and limitless quiet fulfilment and cessation of all its human yearnings and strivings; a vision comparable only to that of the snowy ranges of the Himalayas by whose presence many portions of the Upanishads seem to have been inspired.[2] I could not help perceiving the strongest, if wordless, argument in favour of the notion I had gathered of La Vallée's spiritual pursuit in his untiring fidelity to this spot, to which no alpinistic valley could attract him, and to which he bade reluctantly farewell only in the last year of his life when the contingent arguments of medical science decided that a temperate climate was more likely to preserve his declining vitality than the fulfilment of his wish of passing a last summer at the feet of Mont Blanc. I could not help believing that it was here that La Vallée was instinctively seeking and possibly already experiencing in a half-conscious way the solution of his inner antinomy, the point of coincidence—or shall I say of common fulfilment?—of the two great aspirations of his life. And who could say but this solution would have finally crystallized in the unravelling of the problem that accompanied his scholarly career,—during this last summer of which medical wisdom cheated the wisdom of his heart? For, in spite of his humorous denials, the

2 Cf. e.g. *Bṛh.* III, 8, 12 *etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane...nadyaḥ syandanti śvetebhyaḥ parvatebhyaḥ*......The first ideal of the cosmic saviour is *giriśa* or *giriśanta* (uncertain reading of *Śvet.* III, 6) and the first ideal of the pure seer is the *kūṭastha*. The lightning-vision of Brahman attained by the intimate Indra is attributed to the illuminating presence of Umā Haimavatī (*Kena* 25-27), Vāc divine. And what of the Ṛgvedic "mountains" from which she descends in a shower of *dharma* or *amṛta*—when will a more adequate exegesis restitute them to their literal meaning?

progress towards such a fundamental revision of his understanding of Buddhistic thought was so clearly evidenced in the successive stages of his tackling of the problem of nairātmya and karman, that it is difficult to doubt but the conclusive stage was near at hand and that, had his last summer been left to his choice, he could have gone hence as one whose life had been fulfilled.

The successive solutions

In 1902, La Vallée[3] adopts the opinion still largely prevalent amongst those critics of Buddhist origins who foster the genetic point of view: from pre-existent Brāhmanical doctrines Buddhism had inherited the theory of karmic retribution and continuity of existence; but for therapeutical reasons it was intent on eradicating the belief in self, deeply rooted in those doctrines as their actual mainspring, holding, as the Buddha did, that the attachment to the I is the fundamental motive of desire. Not being originally concerned with metaphysics, its position was not shaken by the inherent contradiction between the assertion of the act and the negation of the agent. Later philosophically minded Buddhists obviated this difficulty by assuming a substitute for the ego, which, while agreeing with the orthodox tenet of impermanence, could furnish a rational substratum for the karmic process: such a substitute was found in the *vijñānasaṃtāna*, the autonomous flux of consciousness-instants. Pre-formed to a certain extent in the older sources, where the term *saṃtati* as well as a rudimental notion of its later import can be found, it agreed with the older conception of vijñāna, constituting in its mobility and its constant reproduction the centre and the raison d'être of the aggregation of the skandhas. Thus the *saṃtāna* of the Abhidharma constitutes a perfect equivalent of the *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhyas.

3 *Dogmatique Bouddhique. La négation de l'âme et la doctrine de l'acte. Journal Asiatique*, sept.-oct. 1902, pp. 237 ff.

"Only the final term of their Odyssey differs—and after all are we entitled to see any difference between the nirodha of the arhat who realizes the saṃtānasya uccheda and the definite isolation of the puruṣa who sees the end of the Dancer's performance?," (p. 289).

Thus the notion of the intellectual series provides Buddhist dogmatics with a self, continuous and responsible but liable to interruption; as soon as this notion is embraced and expressed, Buddhism appears as a coherent system.

But the oldest Buddhists had not quite got rid of the notion of the imperishable self. If, of the Yamakasutta, "only the first phrase be taken into account, we have in it a valuable vestige of the old faith: it is wrong to assume that the Tathāgata perishes; the compiler of the Saṃyutta has interpreted this ancient proposition in his own manner, in conformity with the spirit dominating in the Piṭakas: 'Anathème celui qui affirme la destruction du Tathāgata; pour périr il faut avoir existé!'"

This was years before Mrs. Rhys Davids started her campaign in favour of a primitive 'Sakyan' doctrine of the Self as distinct from body and mind. Nor is the contention yet in any way analogous. La Vallée tried to trace, not Buddhist origins, but pre-Buddhist heterodox survivals in his hypothetic reconstructions of the primitive form of problemologies apparently reducible to the question of the persistence of a self beyond the gates of Nirvāṇa; not arguments available in support of a primary "positive" and hence "congruous" position of Buddhism, but arguments to illustrate the extremely contradictory position to which Buddhism was driven by its consequential negation of an enduring self: so far as to deny the very reality of the Tathāgata. The plausible objection that such all-round negations of any possible conception of the Tathāgata's condition, either here or hereafter, might but point to his absolutely transcendent nature, inconceivable in terms of thought and speech, does not

yet occur to La Vallée who as yet seems satisfied with the current interpretation in favour of an "annihilationism" mitigated by obscurity for the use of minds unable to bear its full brunt. His present verdict: "Nous connaissons, hélas! ce qu'il faut entendre par la profondeur insondable de l'existence qui n'existe pas" (p. 246 fn.) has as yet the ring rather of Oltramare's and A. B. Keith's solutions than of La Vallée's own later "provisional" delvings.

A year later (II. *Nouvelles recherches sur la doctrine de l'acte, JA.*, nov.-déc. 1903, pp. 357 ff.) La Vallée proceeds by a further step in tracing the history of the presumed contradiction inherent in the foundations of the Buddhist system: the negation of any existent self-reality brought about as the inevitable result of the denial of causality and hence of karman itself, as evidenced in the Madhyamaka-position.

Ten years later (*La série des douze causes*, Ghent 1913) we witness the important admission that the conception of rebirth not as a "transmigration" but as the production of a new effect from determinant causes, results from a principle formulated as early as the *Dīgha-Nikāya*. The conclusion is at hand that the negation of a permanent migrating soul-substratum could not affect the coherent doctrinal structure of pre-scholastic Buddhism: but it is not drawn; for, ultimately, the underlying issue of La Vallée's criticism is not that of an intrinsic logical coherence, but that of the respondence to a certain postulate of religious truth, namely, the existence of an immortal soul.

The following twelve years are those of La Vallée's intimate ripening, through extensive wanderings to all points of the wide Buddhistic horizon and intensive delvings into each of these varieties of doctrine, years in which this personality both of a philologist actively concerned with the coordination of doctrinal details and of a historian of ideas vividly alive to the peculiar rhythm of every one of those thought-currents grows to its exceptional dimensions.

In 1925[4] the problem of "basic conceptions" is taken up again from a new point of view: no more from that of doctrinal syllogisms and dogmatic constructions, but primarily from the point of view of religious experience. Self-evident as it is, the fact that Buddhistic axioms were in the first place data of religious life was yet to be discovered in European Buddhology. The pioneers of this awareness were the two so different and yet so kindred spirits, Oldenberg and La Vallée—both in the last decades of their life. Both recognize in the seemingly abstract and inconceivable notion of Nirvāṇa the counterpart of the Upanishadic Ātman, so far at least as religious aspiration is concerned; for both are equally disinclined to admit that it could have been a specific and concrete realization. This is why only the evidence of the parallel terminology (*ajātam, accutaṃ padam, akatam, anakkhātam* etc.) is observed, whereas no attention is accorded to the evidence of the parallel ideology concerning the essence itself of Nirvāṇa. For the Buddhist of the first ages—such is now the conclusion of La Vallée—the existence and reality of Nirvāṇa is as indisputable as for the Vedānta the existence and reality of Brahman;[5] but what is Brahman, what is Nirvāṇa, is for both a "reserved" question to which the answer is refused or given only by negations.

But the admission of the primitive Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa as an *ens realissimum* implies for La Vallée the assumption of a primitive belief in an immanent immortal self. The very simile of the extinction of a fire, once used as the argument par excellence of the annihilationist theory, is now employed in the service of the opposite interpretation. "Pour le remarquer en passant, cet Udāna dit avec toute la clarté souhaitable que ni le feu ni le saint ne sont anéantis..." [True, the exegesis of some later Buddhistic schools avails itself of the theory of the persistence of the fire as reduced to the invisible

4 *Nirvāṇa.* Paris 1925.

5 *"Brahman"* is here taken throughout at *paramam brahma* and a simple synonym of *ātman.*

"subtle" fire-element; but the famous parable, equally current, by the way, in Upanishadic as in Buddhist texts, does by no means point to such a learned solution, as it expressly states that the fire has not gone anywhere, but is just "extinct": the comparison of the Udāna does not however refer to the *ens* Tathāgata, but, as explicitly, to the five skandhas composing the contingent personality definitely extinguished at death, and from which no designations can be derived for a reference to the Tathāgata's own essence "deep, vast, measureless even as the Great Ocean (of Nirvāṇa)".]

Ever since La Vallée carefully re-examines the Sutta-passages that could be or had been interpreted as implying the assumption of an immanent self. "Quelques textes, peu nombreux mais d'un singulier intérêt, opposent aux skandhas impermanents, l'ātman, le soi, un principe transcendant, 'ce que je suis véritablement, ma vraie substance.' A en juger d'après ces textes, certain Bouddhisme ne serait qu'une branche ou une variété de la philosophie des Upaniṣads ou philosophie de l'ātman." (*Le dogme et la philosophie du Bouddhisme*, 1930, p. 100). This new interest is also extended to the tenets of the Pudgalavādins, now judged to have been the true if timid heirs of the oldest "Upanishadic" Buddhism.

Once that point of conformity with the fundamental postulate of religious truth seems safely harboured from controversy, the subjective hindrance to a fuller appreciation of Buddhism—as a conception fit to satisfy the needs and aspirations of human spirit—is removed: the former quarrel between Buddhism and the *sine qua non* of religion is now transposed into a quarrel between a primitive Buddhism and the later doctrinal standpoint evidenced since the Piṭakas: "A l'origine un Bouddhisme qui croyait à l'âme, à la transmigration de l'âme et au Nirvāṇa; qui d'ailleurs n'était pas un "théorème" et condamnait les seules doctrines immorales et qui sont des entraves ou obstacles à la vie religieuse. Plus tard, au service de la méditation du néant des choses et pour combattre l'orgueil et l'égoisme, une specula-

tion de tendance nihiliste s'attaque à l'idée de l'âme et aboutit, suivant les écoles, soit au concept hybride du pudgala, soit à la thèorie du moi-série" (*Nirvāṇa*, p. 131).

But this strongly subjective solution of the main problem does not blur the clearsightedness of his scholarly inquiry, which does not shun the statement that even among the later Buddhist schools "who deny a soul in itself and admit only an I-series" some consider the Nirvāṇa as a real entity, "comme qui dirait le lieu ou l'état dans lequel la douleur et l'existence sont à jamais détruites...... ce qui ne nait pas, ce qui ne change pas......" (p. 68 f.). How can this apparent anomaly be explained?

The scholar seems near enough to descry the subjective nature of the difficulty when he states: "pour les bouddhistes, les problèmes du Nirvāṇa et de l'âme ne sont pas connexes."

But he stops at that and does not attempt a synthesis of his present and former observations: (a) that the primitive Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa reflects the Upanishadic notion of the immortal reality, and (b) that already the primitive Buddhist conception of karman does not seem to require the assumption of a permanent I; a synthesis that could have led, this inferential way too, up to the conclusion that the data of ātman and karman might have even originally been, not concomitant, but rather essentially disjoint and pertaining to opposite planes of reality, thus allowing of coherent doctrinal systems based on their reciprocal exclusion: a statement that can be reached on the direct way of an unprejudiced analysis of the extant texts, Upanishadic and Buddhistic alike.

At this point of the development of La Vallée's views the question was inevitable whether Buddhism, a coherent and satisfactory religious system in its origins, lost this character just at the time when it made the triumphant conquest of a vast portion of humanity?,

The unsolved problem is consequently shifted to an antinomy between later Buddhism as a speculative construction on one hand

and as a way of religious realization on the other: in this shape we find it again in La Vallée's last analytico-historical studies, mainly in the *Réflexions sur le Madhyamaka* (1932-1933).

The recent explanation of nairātmya as a tenet secondarily superposed on original Buddhism did not modify the line of interpretation of the evolution of later Buddhistic doctrines: namely that the antinomy produced by the introduction of this tenet eventually led to a theoretical negation of karman as well, along with that of any conceivable reality. Such is, according to La Vallée, the purport of Nāgārjuna's absolute truth: a nihilism distinguished from that of the Nāstikas by a discrimination of two planes of reality: the relative one, comprising impurity, purification and ensuing Nirvāṇa—admitted as means of attaining true reality—, and the absolute one of which nothing can be predicated: the eternal absence of any process. Thus the Madhyamaka apparently avoids the *antas* of *śāśvata* and *uccheda*, or rather of *samāropa* and *apavāda*, as it refrains from proclaiming the asaṃskṛta either as an abandonment of the inexistent relative reality or as the latter's eternal immanent nature. In fact, he argues, speculative Nāgārjunism betrays itself as an unstable synthesis of the two Buddhisms: the scholastic one of the Hīnayāna (this refers evidently to the Sautrāntika conception of Nirvāṇa as pure non-entity) and the ontological one of the Prajñāpāramitās asserting a *dharmadhātu*. The synthesis is established by a definition of absolute Reality in terms of void (pp. 25 ff., 30, 34 ff., 37 f.).

Thus failing to appreciate the specific issue of Madhyamaka exclusivism, our author agrees with the Yogācāra criticism of the Madhyamaka to the effect that the latter's Absolute, not being the immanent absolute nature of relative reality as asserted by the Yogācāras (and which, in his opinion, cannot be distinguished from the ātman), is not even a dialectic entity, but "un simple trompe-l-oeil" (52). In reality however,—he concludes—, the Madhyamaka misunderstands itself. Its relative truth, its provisional assertion

of the apparatus leading to deliverance, is in fact its real truth. Its "absolute truth" is only a means, a methodical negation for the practical purpose of purification. The Hīnayāna had proposed as the aim of religious life the aspiration to Nirvāṇa. But Nāgārjuna holds that, in order to destroy desire, we must abolish the belief in any reality, Nirvāṇa not excepted. Thus the idea of existence will be destroyed by that of non-existence, and the latter, as founded only on the opposition, will destroy itself—thus giving way to Nirvāṇa. Hence the absurd position of Nāgārjuna's metaphysical denial and practical affirmation of experience is to be explained by admitting that his *paramārthika* is not a metaphysical truth but a meditation-rule for the purpose of deliverance, a self-suggestion analogous to the *adhimukti-manaskāra* known to the Hīnayāna. In such forms of meditation the author sees the very essence of yoga, and finally revises his definition, derived from Dharmapāla's criticism of the Mādhyamika's *tattva* as a reality based on non-existence,—to the effect that Nāgārjunism has no ultimate philosophical bearing (26 f., 54-8).

Thus the two planes of the Madhyamaka theory of reality have been reduced unawares to the two platforms of La Vallée's evaluation of Buddhism: as speculation and as religion. The real truth of the Madhyamaka, as well as that of the Yogācāra and of the prescholastic popular Hīnayāna—the truth of Buddhism as conquering religion is that of the bondage and deliverance of an immortal soul-essence: the philosophies based on or derived from the negation of this principle are mere intellectual exercises prompted and hampered by the incongruity of their premises, at best, pious exercises of self-destructive dialectics intended to eradicate intellectual hankerings.

In his last publication on the subjects connected with his life-long problem (*The Ātman in the Pāli Canon, Indian Culture,* 1936, pp. 820-824)—not a "last word", but only the latest epitome of "provisional" conclusions—styled by himself "a native expression of his views"—,La Vallée resumes as "seemingly certain" the point;

maintained throughout the stages, that "the Buddhist faith in transmigration and in a beatific Nirvāṇa is logically repugnant to the canonical tenet that Man is only a compound of transitory elements (physical and mental), for it implies that Man is more than body and mind", and the point, determined upon at a comparatively later stage, that primitive Buddhism, not yet equipped with a philosophy of its own, simply assumed "a something" as subject of bondage and deliverance (as defined by our author, p. 822, this something is very like an individual soul). The well-known passages on the anātmatā of the skandhas as explained by their anityatā-duḥkhatā are understood to deny only the universal ātman but to postulate a transcendent individual one. The Jetavana parable is interpreted, with Mrs. Rhys Davids, as implying that man is chiefly soul or self, and contrasting with the teachings of the Majjhima where the I is flatly denied. But this latest "provisional" position not merely resumes the previous formulation of the problem as born of a conflict between earlier faith and later philosophy, it also traces a duality of views as implicit in the former: that of an immanent individual soul connected with karmic reality, and that of a transcendent though immanent one, essentially unconnected with contingency. If now the assumption of a soul as an element thus extraneous to the mechanism of contingency is avowedly located in the primitive strata of Buddhism as r e l i g i o n, is not the conclusion imposing itself that the elimination of such an element could not undermine the validity of the religious system of contingency? The conclusion had been practically drawn, by an approach from the other end, since 1902 when La Vallée had stated (see above, p. 653) that the saṃtāna, foreshadowed even in the oldest texts, was a perfect non-ātmic substitute of the Sāṃkhyan puruṣa and that no distinction could be actually made between the uccheda of the saṃtāna and the viveka of the puruṣa. But in 1936 he would no more have subscribed to this statement; since the point he was now intent on revindicating

for religious truth was not the Buddhist system of contingency, but the Buddhist system of transcendency. The new understanding of Buddhism acquired in three decades of earnest personal investigation had brought home to him that the notion of Nirvāṇa is based, not on the concept, however subtly formulated, of an unconscious and senseless unimaginable condition or of absolute non-existence, but, primarily and throughout the history of Buddhist thought, on the experience of the fulness of salvation. How is this conception possible without the admission of an immortal soul? This was the problem now unhusking itself to its nakedness before the mind of the thinker who had lovingly devoted his life to the subject of his research and was now preparing to justify it, along with his life, before his Creator.

When, after the publication of the last volume of his *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, I questioned him on the outstanding concluding part of his *Réflexions sur le Madhyamaka*, he pointed smilingly to his forehead and went out for a solitary walk along familiar pathways facing the snowy range. This much appeared from his casual hints, that it was to be, as usual, not only a conclusion but a revision. (What second conclusion could there be, after all, in the same line of "reflections" already so expressly concluded?). He had lately reverted to considerations of the various aspects of *paramārthasatya* in Buddhistic thought.[6] He had been scaling, in his sketch *Muśila and Nārada*,[7] the relative contributions of speculation and ecstacies to the Buddhist realisation of truth. Was he not preparing a new approach from within to the last phase of his problem? And while serenely proceeding onwards, in the face of his rapid physical decline, to a further extension of his life's work already so uncommonly extensive, of the field of this "petite philologie" as he would call it,—was he not most personally verifying in

6 *Documents d'Abhidharma. Les deux, les quatre, les trois vérités. MCB.*, V, pp. 159 ff.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 189 ff.

this imperturbable growth the growing realization *diṭṭheva dhamme* of another plane of existence unconcerned with life or death? As so many Christian saints had found it on the shorter way of rapture, he, a new Nārada, would have finally found in the most comprehensive vision crowning his life of intellectual effort the solution of the problem, reduced to its ultimate terms: how the fulness of salvation can be experienced as the very annihilation of conscious individual life—had but the birthplace of his vastest thoughts been also the resting-place of his last.

The problem itself: is it one?

In referring above to the deep divergency of mental attitude forming the chief obstacle to an adequate comprehension of ancient Indian ways of thought, I did not by any means associate myself with the battered slogan about East and West, but intentionally specified as terms of the contrast the ancient Indian and the modern Western outlook.[8] In fact, by virtue of the same mental revolution through which the era of "modern" or "objectively scientific" thought was inaugurated (how shortlived its "scientific" character was, how utterly unscientific it already appears in the light of the postulates of present-day science imposing a revision of all customary categories, is too known a fact to require further elaboration),—the West has also broken off from its own multisecular tradition of thought and of thinking. The nature of the break can be briefly stated to consist in a definite and programmatic cleavage between the intellectual and the emotional functions of the psyche, carrying in its wake in the domain of spiritual activity a complete separation of the fields of philosophy and religion—a phenomenon unwitnessed

8 The latter is not confined to the geographical "West." Apart from its general diffusion in practical life and science in India as well, the matter-of-factness with which some exponents of contemporary Indian Sanskrit Philology and exegetic literature operate with the westernized redaction of the ancient categories is largely due to the sifting of this science through European media.

before the 18th century in Europe as it had never been witnessed in India—,and under the concomitant objective aspect in the reduction of outward reality to a dual mechanism of "substances" and "active forces" designed with proud terms thinly shrouding their ultimate nature of incognitae. As no innovation is ever altogether new, we may discern to a certain extent in this reform a renewal of the Scholastic movement of the early Middle Ages, which, in reaction to the contemporary mystic currents encompassing the whole cosmos as a vast psyche in a conception of religious psychology (the universal science of early mystic naturalism, which, if condemned as "unscientific", may at any rate claim the merit of having formed the living foundation of the great scientific discoveries of the Renaissance), postulated a sharp division between the soul on one hand and, on the other hand, soulless matter ruled and moved by abstractions extraneous to both. This Scholastic attitude has outlived its age and continued a shady existence in the substrata of the reactionary movements obstructing now and then the continuous flow of religious speculation (which in the Christian West descended directly both from orthodox sources like the Fourth Gospel, the Epistles to the Corinthians, the Romans and the Ephesians and the mystical writings of the Fathers soaked with Neo-Platonism and Eastern mysteriosophic ideologies, and from heretic sources like Gnosticism, Hermetism and Alchemistic doctrines—all more or less indirectly connected with repeated impacts of ancient Indian thought); on it were still based the recent spurious attempts at a "rational" reconciliation of the religious dogma with the then up-to-date standpoint of astronomy, geology and physics; in the domain of religion itself, by which this intellectual dualism has been partly adopted as an antidote against the excrescences of emotional modernism obliterating the dogma and confusing rather than comparing historically different creeds susceptible of mystically esoteric interpretation,—similarly as the Scholastic view had been adopted

to counter the overriding impulse of monistic mysticism—, it finds its expression in a prudent reserve against any emotional revaluation of accepted positions, against any mystic psychification of soulless creatural substance, whose natural concomitant is inevitably an extension of the limits of the created soul to God-like dimensions and its active connection with natural laws—an implicit negation of its individuality and its creaturality. Thus in both the domains of research and religion the limits between emotion and knowledge are sharply drawn, forming a barrier between the modern West and its past, barring modern European Indology from the forms of experience and vision underlying the subject of its research.

The rôle of European Scholasticism was played in India by its counterpart, Jainism: it introduces *substance* as a dominant category of thought. Before the diffusion of its philosophy the categories of Indian speculation were purely *functional*, i.e., psychological. The contrasts between the positive and negative aspects and values of reality, whatever form they may assume, are not reducible to the contrast of active forces and passive substances, but throughout to the contrast of opposite functions, of opposite psychic tendencies. Hence the contrast is absolute, i.e. exclusive, hence the problem of *mokṣa* is not that of a separation but that of a transfiguration, the bonds being self-imposed by a "wrong" orientation of the potential force of freedom: the process of deliverance consists in the inversion of its functionality. Hence the axiom of a coexistence of karman, the anti-ātman function *kat' exochen*, welding the bond of saṃsāra, and the ātman as such, was not at all formulated in the Upanishads and is not even conceivable from their point of view, for the simple reason that it would have been tantamount to the assertion of a simultaneity of *bandha* and *mokṣa*. Of all the classical passages, neither the pañcāgnividyā (*Bṛh.* III, 2, 13) nor Yājñavalkya's secret teaching of man's survival as karman alone[9], nor the lapidary defini-

9 As to the ātmā proceeding after death into ākāśa, see fn. 25.

tion of the mechanism of karman in *Bṛh.-Ār.-Up.* IV, 4, 5—this pratītyasamutpāda *in nuce*—include any implication of the ātman at all. An apparent exception to this consequential position will be pointed out in the famous text *Bṛh.* IV, 4, 1-4, in which a migrating *ātmā* is referred to. What is this ātmā? Is it an individual soul, as most modern translators and exegetists of the Upanishads, Indian and Western, are all too ready to admit and to assume? Or is it, as Śaṅkara would have it, the true ātman, the paramātman, fallaciously fettered by the extraneous bond of action through the ignorance of his true self-entity? Before having recourse to Śaṅkara, let us rather have recourse for an adequate explanation to the text itself. The habit of isolating passages relative to a particular element of doctrine from their context was here, as in so many other cases, responsible for rendering quite explicit data problematic and obscure. The fourth Adhyāya of our Upanishad is an indivisible whole, the doctrines expounded in it complete and illustrate one another. Now, even with regard only to the Brāhmaṇa immediately preceding, what is "this ātmā" (*ayam ātmā*) to which our text constantly refers? It is the prajñātman (3, 35), styled at the beginning of the same Brāhmaṇa *vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hṛdyantarjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ*. True, Śaṅkara identifies this entity with the Ātman *kat' exochen* and instructs us that *vijñānamayá* is to be understood as "(wrongly) identified with vijñāna." As, however, for the present we are not concerned with Śaṅkara's theory laboriously forced upon the text but with the theory of the *Bṛhadâraṇyaka* itself, we may safely take the meaning for what the term simply conveys, and understand *vijñānamaya puruṣa = prajñātmā* as "the ātmā (or puruṣa) whose essence is consciousness." Now, does our 4th Adhyāya directly or indirectly identify this entity (very significantly introduced by the question "which ātmā, (*katama ātmā?*)" with the *neti nety ātmā* proclaimed at the culminating point of its teaching? By no means. On the contrary, it very neatly defines the relation of this entity to

the ātman *kat' exochen*, namely as one of its potential constituents. For this we must go back to the 2nd Brāhmaṇa, expounding the doctrine of the post-mortal voyage of the sage endowed with the supreme *upaniṣad*. "This puruṣa in the right eye is called Indha; although he is Indha, they call him "Indra" for the sake of implication, because the gods love the implicit and hate the explicit. Whereas that puruṣa in the left eye is his wife Virāj. The (place of) their union is the space within the heart, their food is the blood-clump in the heart, their covering is that net-like in the heart, the path of their common procession is the nāḍi ascending upwards from the heart; within the heart are located the nāḍis called *hitāḥ*, equal (in thinness) to the thousandth part of a hair: through them that perennial flux flows on.[10] Therefore *His* alimentation is more exquisite than that of the body-ātman." From the dual number the text has very significantly passed to the singular. In fact we have been shown how the two, separate when perceived in the eyes, in the heart melt into one and follow their common path of *mukti* ascending through the *suṣumnā*. "The eastern region is His eastern *prāṇas*, the southern region His southern prāṇas, the western region his western prāṇas...........the totality of the regions the complex of his prāṇas: this inded is the ātman called "no, no".........The Fearless thou hast reached, O Janaka."

In the 3rd Brāhmaṇa we are told that such a transfiguration of the vijñānamaya puruṣa resting in dreamless sleep within the fluid contained in the heart-nāḍis takes place through a process culminating in universal self-consciousness, the "form" in which that transfiguration results being that of the psycho-cosmic Androgyne, the perfect union of the two puruṣas, the "form" of an all-awareness whose subject and object are indistinguishable, both being the All.

10 *etad āsravad āsravati.* See in my *"Mito Psicologico nell'India Antica"*, pp. 62, 64 and n. 2, 308, 309 *f.*, 363, 369 f., the explanation of the origin and meaning of the later Buddhistic term *āsrava*.

In the following Brāhmaṇa this same event of a union of the two entities instead of their separation is referred, with a definite soteriological value, to the death-instant of the sage delivered from desire. In the concluding paragraph of our first Brāhmaṇa it is attributed to him who has realized the supreme *upaniṣad*. The reader conversant with the analogous technical symbolism of this same conception as expounded in so many other Upanishadic texts can entertain no doubt as to the condition in which this realization of the true *upaniṣad* is meant by our text to take place: it is the culminating stage of the yoga-process. This state of all-consciousness, actualized by means of an intimate *union* of two constituent principles and their common inward ascension, this "fearless" state sensed in our Adhyāya to take place in three conditions: dreamless sleep, yogic extasis and final mukti, is identified with, or rather revealed as, the Ātman *kat' exochen*, the *neti nety ātmā*, the all-embracing cosmic Puruṣa. In fact, the Ātman similar in this respect to all other entities and principles of Upanishadic speculation is not a substance, but a psychic function or condition: different however from all the others by the fact of its being a limitary function, a stasis produced by the ecstatic superlation of emotional consciousness, which, through utmost intensification, and the concomitant absorption of the total range of objective possibilities of awareness, has expanded to universal self-consciousness. If terminological data be considered more convincing than ideological ones, they can be had in abundance: The other most classical terms designating the ātman are *ānanda* (*Bṛh*. IV, 3, 32, II, I, 19—*Taitt.-Up*. II and III), *saṃprasāda* (*Ch.-Up*. VIII, 3, 4; 12, 3), *turīya*:[11] all of them most explicitly terms of psychic condition, not of substance. Amongst these designations revealing the nature of the designed entity as the hypostasis of a psychic state, does the fundamental

11 Turiya always explained as *turiyaṃ sthānam* (*Māṇḍūkyop*., *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinyup*. etc.). See also *prabhavāpyayau*—*Kaṭha*. VI, 11—*Māṇḍ*. 6, etc.

term *ātman* alone form an exception? Its corollaries are eloquent enough: *yatra tv asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt* (*Bṛh*. IV, 5, 15); *aham evedaṃ sarvam iti* (*Ch*. VII, 25, 2); *aham evedaṃ sarvo 'smīti manyate* (*Bṛh*., IV, 4, 20); etc. The unvarying trend of these definitions is the notion: "The All is myself"; "I am the All". The most characteristic feature of the hypostasis of this ecstatic experience consists in the fact that the All as object of the universal consciousness is united and identified with the now all-embracing subject. The term abstracted from this notion is naturally the one most laden with the meaning of the mystery experienced, the one expressive of the psychic immanence of the universal unity. The ātman is originally neither an individual nor a cosmic soul-substance, nor a transcendent substance essentially extraneous to both individual and cosmos: it is the realisation of the psychic unity of the I and the All. By a symbolism specific to the mysticism of all the ages (or rather perpetuated in all the mystic formulations derived from this common source), this realisation is represented as a nuptial union. The female part is assigned to the prajñātman or vijñānamaya puruṣa, Virāj = Vāc;[12] and who is Indha-Indra? As to this point too, contemporary texts furnish ample information:[13] he is Prāṇa, the vital force and quintessence of all vital faculties—the potential winner of Brahman, the mate of Umā Haimavatī, the divine Vāc (see *Śatap.-Br*. V, 5, 2, 9 f.; *Kauṣ.-Up*. III, 2; *Kena* 25 ff. *Bṛh.-Ār.-Up*. I, 5, 12; cf. *Śatap.-Br*. VII, 5, I, 7: Prāṇa is the male, the mate of Vāc). Indha-Prāṇa-Vaiśvānara, the "enkindler" of the mortal fire of individual life (cf. *Śatap.-Br*. VI, I, I, etc.), is liable to turn into the enkindler of the "yogic fire-body" (*Śvet.-Up*. I, 12d) which transcends mortality and individuation, The function of Prāṇa in his conquest of, and elevation with, Kuṇḍalinī called *Vāg*

12 Cf. *Atharva-Veda*, IX, 2, 5b; *Ch.-Up*. I, 13, 2; *Bṛh*. IV, 1, 2.

13 For a full survey of the relative texts and a history of the ideology see *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 91 ff., 123, 126 ff., 131, 390 ff., 337 ff., et passim (v. Index s.v. *Indra*).

devī (*Śiva Saṃh*. II, 21 ff.) is a well-known motive of yoga-symbolism, only the antiquity of this "tantric" doctrine has been greatly underestimated: in fact I have been able to show that it is not only Upanishadic but Vedic and one of the fundamental doctrines of the oldest speculation.[14]

If now we return to our eschatological text, we shall be bound to admit that its doctrine is exposed with an amount of clarity that can dispense with any outside commentaries: The bodily ātmā groans under the weight of the prajñātmā when a man is about to breathe his last (3, 35). This puruṣa (the prajñātmā) detaches himself from the members and again, retracing the way of his former entrance and according to the fundamental mode, drives towards (a new) prāṇa. As, when the king is about to come, the village-chiefs and ministers of the law make ready to wait upon him saying "he is coming, he is approaching" thus all the elements (ready to constitute a new body) wait (upon this puruṣa): "lo, the brahman[15] is coming, is approaching (37). As around the king, when he is about to leave, they assemble, so do all the prāṇas assemble around this ātman when one is about to breathe his last (38). And when man is overcome by debility and confusion, this is the moment when the prāṇas assemble in that one (in the prajñātman), and he, collecting (from them) those particles of light (that are their consciousness powers deriving from his own essence, see below, 2, *ad finem*) and proceeds to the heart; but the eye-puruṣa turns away beyond (to the sun); then one is no more able to perceive rūpas" (4, 1). Who is the *cākṣuṣaḥ puruṣaḥ*, which of the two mentioned in IV, 2? Evidently Prāṇa, the factor of *rūpa* (cf. *Bṛh*. III, 9, 15; the "shape-

14 *Op. cit.*, pp. 49 ff., *Nāma-rūpa and dharma-rūpa, Origin and Aspects of an Ancient Indian Conception*, ch. I; *Le Serpent et l'Oiseau* (XX. Intern. Congr. Or., Brussels 1938).

15 Prajñātman is one of the specific aspects of brahman manifested in contingency. Detailed study of these aspects in *Nāma-rūpa*. See also *Il Mito Psicologico*, passim (v. Index s. vv. brahman, vijñānātman).

less" core of shape *Bṛh.* II, 3, 3-4)—for this purely psychological outlook a function tantamount to that of the perception of rūpas. Thus we are shown that in this case of unenlightened dying the mystic union of both puruṣas in the heart does not take place. "He becomes single[16] and they say "he does not see...he does not smell... taste...speak...hear...sense...touch...cognize. Then the top of the heart flares up and in this flare the ātmā steps forth, either through the eye or through the head or through other parts of the body." Up to here the text is an unbroken account; only the successive phrase (4, 2 *tam utkrāmantaṃ prāṇo 'nūtkrāmati prāṇam anūtkrāmantaṃ sarve prāṇā anūtkrāmanti*), inserted from a parallel but slightly varying doctrine, according to which the prajñātman is the first to abandon the body, his egression being only succeeded by that of prāṇa followed by all the sensorial functions,—which, according to our main text, are on the contrary absorbed in the prajñātman (4, 1)—interrupts incidentally the otherwise strict and linear sequence, which is immediately taken up again: "he is of consciousness-essence, and all that is provided with consciousness follows him". In this condition intermediary between two lives "the past prajñā" —the sum total of prajñā as it comes down from the previous life—is accompanied by its acquirements of *vidyā* and *karman* that "clasp each other". The force of karman, of the anti-vidyā, prevails: in fact it is the *avidyā* that becomes the guide to the successive life (3; cf. its epithet *netrī* in Yoga philosophy and *bhavanetti* in Pāli Buddhism). "Like a caterpillar that has reached the end of one stalk, starting on a new outset contracts itself, even thus this ātmā, throwing off the body and prompting forward the avidyā, starting on another outset, contracts himself"(3).

This ātmā, the subject of the individual life and of the process

16 This *ekībhāva* resulting from separation is essentially opposed to the absolute unification described IV, 3, 22 ff. and IV, 5, 25 ff., though similar in its biological effects.

of metensomatosis—not as a constant entity, but as an ever new result of past dispositions (3, 2 *in fine*),—is the vijñāna which cannot be transfigured into the true ātman, universal self-consciousness, as long as avidyā, individual self-consciousness, the essence of differentiation and thus of karman, prevents him from actuating the innermost nuptial union which is at the same time the union of the I and the All—from assuming the supreme form of Brahman as Ātman. "For, indeed, that Ātman = Brahman is consciousness and manas and prāṇa and seeing and hearing and earth and water and space and light and desire and its contrary and anger and its contrary and dharma and its contrary, it is All. Therefore, according as one is this or that, as one acts, as one lives, so one becomes: the well-doer becomes good, the evil-doer evil: fortunate by propitious deed, wretched by wretched deed. In this connection, in fact, it is stated: 'This puruṣa is essentiated of desire': for according to his desire is his psychic tendency, according to his tendency he enacts the deed, according to the deed enacted is his lot." Truly a formula of pratītyasamutpāda *avant la lettre*. What, in fact, is the substratum of this causal chain? *Kāma* the essence of mortal man. The preceding passage shows us as the substratum of metensomatosis the *vijñānātman* guided by his *avidyā*, his self-consciousness, i.e. his own specific entity. While in the *sandhyasthāna* of dream —so analogous to the *sandhyasthāna* of reincarnation—he experiences in virtue of his avidyā the terrors and the elations to which waking consciousness is liable (IV, 3, 20), and attains the highest state only when, abandoning along with the sandhyasthāna of dream his avidyā-nature, he realizes the all-consciousness of dreamless sleep. Thus also in virtue of his avidyā-nature, of individualizing consciousness, he "becomes this or that" in desire and will, in action and destiny. Kāma is coincident with avidyā—as desire does not exist apart from individuation,— it is the actuality-aspect of the same function of which avidyā is the potentiality. The two successive doctrines

concerning the process of saṃsāra and the mechanism of karman agree as two formulations of the same notion. The saṃsāra has no substratum extraneous to itself, extraneous to its essence, the karman: for its substratum, the vijñānamaya puruṣa, is *kāmamaya*. The process is as autonomous as that of the pratītyasamutpāda. What indeed is the "substratum" of the Buddhist causal chain? Evidently and expressedly nothing but *avidyā*, the first *nidāna* and essence of all the other nidānas, or, according to the shorter versions, *vijñāna*, which in so many Suttas appears as the principle connecting successive lives. That the *saṃskāras* are karman in the form of volition, *cetanā* (= the *kratu* of our Up.), the first specification of subconscious avidyā, that vijñāna is its manifestation on the conscious plane, that *tṛṣṇā*, standing for avidyā in the third *āryasatya* (whose longer formulation is the pratītyasamutpāda *pratilomam*) is the latter's specified actualisation in the developed individual consciousness stream, are facts which need not be elaborated here.[17]

But this Buddhistic vijñāna, essentiated of avidyā, is not liable to a transfiguration into Ātman, whereas the vijñānamaya puruṣa is: here, and here only, lies the divergence between the position of ancient Buddhism and that of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, and we may for the present accept it as such.

The Ātman *kat'exochen* has no part in the mechanism of karman, which is on the contrary the negation of his static nature, he is not implicated in the process of saṃsāra, which, on the contrary, excludes the possibility of his realization and is perpetuated by this exclusion. But the vijñānamaya puruṣa, the "substratum" of this mechanism, the "subject" of this process, can be turned, as we have seen, to the realization of the Ātman. By what means can this total reversion and transformation be brought about? The technical aspect of this mystery has been exposed in the 2nd

17 See *Il Mito Psicologico*, pp. 328 ff. (v. Index s.v. pratītyasamutpāda).

Brāhmaṇa. Its moral aspect is now defined in the 4th: "he who is undesiring, exempt from desire, fulfilled in his desire, his desire being turned towards Ātman: his prāṇas do not proceed forth; by being sheer Brahman he attains Brahman. On this are the verses: when all the desires nesting in man's heart are dissolved, then the mortal becomes immortal, here he attains Brahman. As the thrown-off hide of the serpent[18] lies on an ant-hill, thus indeed lies this body: but the bodiless immortal Prāṇa is identified with Brahman, is identified with (hypercosmic) Light.[19] A subtle path extends, an ancient one; it penetrates into me, and indeed, I have found it; on it the steadfast ones proceed, the brahman-knowers, to the heaven-world and hence upward, delivered. In it, they say, is the white and the blue and the fiery and the green and the red (the many coloured heart-liquid filling the suṣumnā, the microcosmic aspect of the hypercosmic *tejas*, the "formless form" of the hṛdyākāśa = vijñāna;[20] this path is found by the brahman (in me), this way proceeds the brahman-knower who has fulfilled the auspicious act, the luminous one" (6-9). How has the *kāmamaya* turned into the *tejomaya*, how has the chain of karman and the circle of saṃsāra been resolved into the ascending line of mukti? The text says it clearly enough: by the extinction of kāma. But is not this singular transformation of the "subject" an elimination of his own essence, an extinction rather than an elation? It is not taken as such by our text, on the good ground that he is not a "substance" but a function. A substance can only be destroyed to yield to its contrary. A func-

18 See *Le Serpent et l'Oiseau*.

19 Paramam brahma = universal and transcendent Vāc = hypercosmic Light, see *Il Mito Psicologico* pp. 43 (*A.-V.* VIII, 9, 9, *Kaṭha* V, 25, *Muṇḍ*. II, 10, *Śvet*. VI, 24, *Gītā* XV, 6), 46 (*A.-V.* II, 1), 50 (*A.-V.* IV, 1), 93 f. (*Bṛh*. 1, 3, 17; 1, 6, 3), 95 ff. (*Bṛh*. II, 3, *Ch*. VIII, 11-12), 142 (*Kaṭha* VI, 6), 168 ff. (*Muṇḍaka*), 182 ff. (*Śvetāśvatara*), 195 ff. (*Gītā*), 221 ff. (*Maitrāyaṇa*), 235 f. 242 (*Nṛsiṃhottaratāpini*), etc., v. Index s. vv. Luce transcendente and *lampo*. See further *Nāma-rūpa and Dharma-rūpa*.

20 See *Mito*, Ind. s. vv. *hṛdyākāśa*, *tejas*, colori, *vijñāna*, Vāc.

tion can be inverted and thus transformed into the opposite function, as in our case has been instanced by the descriptions of the mystic union. The prajñātman, the individualizing principle of self-consciousness, becomes the universalizing principle by virtue of which "the outward is not distinguished from the inward" (*Bṛh.* IV, 3, 21), for there is nothing "other" with regard to the perceiver (3, 31, *Ait.-Up.* III, 13), "the All has become himself" (*Bṛh.* IV, 5, 15, II, 4, 14). The "subject" of the karmic process is not the Ātman, his function is even that of the anti-ātman, but it can be inverted, "turned upwards" to Ātman-realization. He is therefore potentially ātman ("Indeed that Great Unborn Ātman is latent in that among the functions which is of consciousness-essence, in that which is the ākāśa within the heart", IV, 4, 22), and actually such, when kāma-karman, his contingent nature, is no more. This is the initial position of the fully developed Upanishadic immanentism; a synthetic position, resulting from a conciliation based on data derived from the analysis of yogic experience of the two axiomatic certitudes: (1) the Ātman is the All, the most real, most intense of realities; (2) the essence of life is desire and suffering experienced in, and as, individual consciousness, extraneous and contrary to the all-conscious extasy of ātman. In one phrase: the first doctrinal conciliation of t h e a n t i n o m y ā t m a n←→k a r m a n.

But the position does not remain the same throughout the whole history of Upanishadic thought.[21] As the attempts at *demonstrating* theoretically the psychic and cosmic immanence of ātman, and hence the implicit ātman-nature of psyche and cosmos multiply, speculation eventually coming in contrast with the data derived from the analysis of contingent experience, the gulf between the two axioms widens, for the theoretical standpoint cannot admit the experimental truth of the dynamic genesis of the static

21 Analysis and history of the successive positions in their genetic development in *op. cit.*

reality of the One-and-All. Hence the evolutional doctrines represented by the *Taittirīya-Up.* and *Aitareya-Ār.* II, 3, 2-3 give way to the acosmistic position of the absolute identity represented by *Kaṭha-Up.*, *Īśā-Up.* and the later portion of *Bṛh.* IV, 4, 10-20, and the doctrine of *error* is more nominally than effectively superposed on the doctrine of karman; successively, divine soteric intervention is postulated and accounted for by the introduction of a new hypostasis of the Ātman as primeval and perennial "intimate Teacher" and Saviour, the ātmā-subject of saṃsāra being conceived as different from or coincident with Him according to the direction of its own essential functionality.[22] Thus the position of Upanishadic immanentism, epitomized by the doctrine of absolute identity in the formula *asti* (*Kaṭha* VI, 12-13), is progressively attenuated to the formula *asti ca nāsti ca* (*Mokṣadharma* 217_{34} also *na nāsti* 203_7), until the most extreme advocates of a psychocosmic theory based on the immediate data of life-experience arrive at the conclusion implying *nāsti*, a nairātmya-doctrine represented by *Maitri* III[23] and

22 The Sāṃkhyan or pre-Sāṃkhyan sub-tones of a "distinction" theory as soteric method are echoes of the Kāṭhaka-doctrine of primeval "error" (as is evident even from the circumstances of the apparition of this doctrine in the *Kaṭha*); only on the Epic stage do they develop into a dualism of principles no more exclusive, but simultaneous. But in their portions relative to the way of deliverance even these texts fully evidence the persistence of the older standpoint: their process of mokṣa is not a mere "separation", but an essential transfiguration of the whole being into its opposite by a progressive remanation or *nivṛtti* of existence into the Puruṣa.

The incidental assertion of the vijñānamaya puruṣa's *asaṅgatva Bṛh.* IV, 3, 26 (and in the obvious interpolation 25) merely implies that he is not followed (*ananvāgatas*) by his dream objects (nor by those of his waking experience), and is to be connected with the further assertions *savijñānam evānvavakrāmati tam, vidyākarmaṇī samanvārabhete pūrvaprajñā ca* 4, 2 and the statement that, on the contrary, in the ecstatic condition of dreamless sleep *ananvāgataṃ puṇyenānanvāgataṃ pāpena*, similarly as 4, 22 the Great Ātman is *na sādhunā karmaṇā bhūyān no evāsādhunā kanīyān*. A term torn from its context is verily too slender a foothold for pointing out a theory not formulated until centuries later.

23 See my recomposition of the original structure of the chapters disjoined in the extant redaction, *Il Mito Psicologico*, pp. 211 ff.

Mokṣadharma 218-219 (the doctrine of Pañcaśikha), a position still quite authentically Upanishadic—so much so that even centuries later Kumārila could affirm that the Buddhists had appropriated the nairātmya-doctrine from the Upanishads. Does it imply a denial of the Ātman? Nor in the least: it simply and very explicitly asserts the non-immanence of the Ātman in the contingency of psyche and cosmos, and postulates the necessity of the extinction of the function productive of this contingency, the false ātman and real anātman, as the indispensable condition for the realization of the transcendent Ātman; and advocates as means for this purpose the very same form of yoga which had been advocated by the older Upanishads as means of realization of the Ātman's all-immanence. The dangerous error obstructing the way of mukti,—according to Pañcaśikha, the most "Buddhistic" amongst the Upanishadic teachers, although only accentuating and paraphrasing the teaching of Yājñavalkya,[24] —is the assumption of an ātmic entity immanent in life: the entity mistaken for such, the *bhūtātman = jñānātman,* is only the buddhi, truly anātman, to be utterly suppressed. This "cessation", this *nirodha* of the "guṇa" vijñānātman, preached by the author of the *Maitrāyaṇa* as well as by the Epic teachers of nairātmya and pointed out as the penultimate stage of the dhyānic progression of yoga—described with a terminology entirely consonant and partly even coincident with that of Buddhist dhyāna—is the faithful counterpart of the *viññāṇassa nirodha* described by the oldest Suttas as the ultimate condition of attainment of the Nibbāna described in the same passage as *viññāṇam anidassanam anantaṃ sabbato pabham,* i.e. as the very entity for which the old Upanishads had chosen the term *ātman* to intimate its mystic immanence.

24 Similarly as the *Maitrāyaṇa* takes up again the phraseology of the *Ch.-Up.* (*Mito,* pp. 218, 223, 275).

Buddhistic nairātmya is no more a denial of the reality of Ātman than Upanishadic nairātmya: it is a denial of the immanence of ātman in contingent existence.[25]

25 The comparatively late term *nairātmya* denotes however also another, quite distinct tenet of Buddhist doctrine: the denial of the reality of the individual unit as such. As can be seen even in a cursory glance at the relative texts, the term *ātmā* or *puruṣa* was very largely used, in the older period—before the first attempts at a simultaneistic dualism (see above footnoe 22) introduced the abstract term *tattva*, and finally substantialistic speculation introduced the abstract term *dravya*—to design "principles", principles being at that time nothing else but hypostases, i.e., personifications, as for the genuinely psychological view of reality any principle is "personal". Practically every cosmic or microcosmic phenomenon is considered as the manifestation of such a "principle" or *puruṣa*. As has been observed long ago, ancient Indian speculation counts the "whole" in addition to its parts. And the complexive unit is again, quite consequentially, and characteristically, conceived as "principle" or *puruṣa* (=*ātmā*): in specie, it is the unit of the human individual, encompassing all the particular principles (functions and their manifestations), of which it is composed. It is not identical with the *śarīrātmā*, which is the complexive unit of the sensous manifestations only (let alone any possibility of the latter's identification with the Ātman, which is expressly pointed out as the *asurāṇam-upaniṣat, Ch.-Up.* VIII, 8, 5). Its true character can be gathered from the passages in which it is co-ordinated with its cosmic counterpart, ākāśa (*Bṛh.* III, 2, 13, *Ch.* III, 14, 2, etc.): as ākāśa encompasses all the phenomena of the cosmos, so does this principle encompass all the phenomena of the microcosmos, man: at the dissolution of the microcosmic unit, at death, this "man" unit returns into its cosmic counterpart, ākāśa, as all its constituent principles return to the corresponding cosmic phenomena (*Bṛh.* III, 2, 13); this "ego" is no more immortal than its constituent parts. But already at this time there are doctrines which—in the interest of the pursuit of Ātman which requires the abandonment of the ego-conceit, as in Ātman there is "no distinction of inward and outward (of subject and object), He being the Totality as sheer consciousness" (*Bṛh.* IV, 5, 13)—deny the existence of such a separate "individual" unit: "the skin is the unit of all touch, the nose of all flavours, the tongue of all tastes, the eye of all forms...as one has arisen from the elements, thus one recedes unto them on dying: there is no *connotation* (self-conscious perception or awareness) after death, so, indeed, I say" (5, 12-13). The Buddhistic teaching of *pudgalanairātmya*, the Piṭaka-polemics against the notion of *sakkāya*, have exactly the same purport: a unit "individual" does not exist, it is only the complex of impermanent khandhas. The scholastics interpret this dynamic "impermanence" from the extremist point of view of the *kṣaṇikatva* and translate the *skandhavāda* into a *dharmavāda*, until finally substantialist notions conceive the *dharmas* as *dravyas*. The confusion of nairātmya (ancient *śūnyatā*

As the Upanishadic Ātman was never in any way implicated in the mechanism of karman and in the process of saṃsāra, the elimination of its hypostasis, actual or potential, from the vision of contingent reality, could by no means conflict with the continued assertion of that mechanism and process. The reality of karman and saṃsāra is anātmic in the doctrinal position of Buddhism as it was ever since the oldest doctrinal position of the Upanishads. The difference could at best consist in the premise that it does not contain even a potential faculty of realizing the essence of Ātman or Nirvāṇa. In fact, such a position (epitomized in the formula *suñño loko......attena vā attanīyena vā—Sam. Nik.* IV, p. 54), even assuming that it was consequentially maintained throughout the purely theoretical portions of the Suttas, is distinctly attenuated or even implicitly abandoned in the portions relative to the theory and technology of deliverance. Who in fact is the agent of *nivṛtti* in this complex of skandhas "devoid of Ātman or anything ātmic," so utterly devoid of any element of Nirvāṇa that no reference whatever can be derived from it to adumbrate the condition of the Tathāgata?[26] The evidence of the texts is very explicit: this agent is the *citta* or *viññāṇa* itself, which in the process of dhyānic superlation soars above contingent existence up to that highest state of *upekkhāsatipārisuddhi*

vāda) and this pudgalanairātmya (*skandhavāda*) is relatively late, it presupposes a stage of mere formal memorizing of inherited doctrines, oblivious of the two distinct theoretical positions against which they are directed—one against the atta-vāda or Upanishadic immanentism (largely refuted as well in Upanishadic texts contemporaneous with ancient Buddhism), the other against the sakkāyavāda. The conception of pudgalanairātmya interpreting the unreal pudgala as a compound of real dharmas is impugned by the Mahāyānic *dharmanairātmya* or assertion of the "non-entity" of the dharmas, being the complementary aspect of the assertion of the exclusive all-reality of the one Dharma or Tathatā.

26 In my genetic reconstruction and survey of the development of the skandha-theory (in: *Nāma-rūpa and Dharma-rūpa;* chapter read at the Xth All-India Oriental Conference) I have shown that in its original position and purport it is not a skandhamātravāda.

that represents Nirvāṇa-in-life; which in the *satipaṭṭhānas* detaches itself from itself so far as to analyse every motion of the citta; which grasps the Holy Truths and realizes the mechanism of inversion or progressive suppression of the pratītyasamutpāda. It thus appears that the viññāṇa of karmic essence, vehicle of the continuity of saṃsāra, possesses the faculty of producing its opposite, of inverting its beginningless functionality of *pravṛtti* and actualizing the ascensional process of *nivṛtti*, the final stage of which is *viññāṇassa nirodha*, a limit beyond which the radiant viññāṇa-Nibbāna takes place: through the mere cessation of the yet contingent viññāṇa or through its final transfiguration? The dominating theory rather points to the former solution, but texts are not too rare whose implication is rather that in the act of "conversion" out of the saṃsāracitta the bodhicitta is revealed, the agent which will finally "realize" (*sacchikarissati*) the Nibbāna. The *sammā paṇihita citta* is the same that formerly was the *micchā paṇihita citta*, and yet its opposite, as its functionality has assumed the contrary direction and development.[27] It was not a concern about logic that produced this half-immanentistic position (how in fact could the inversion take place, if no potentiality of it was inherent in saṃsāric existence?), but a registration of data found in experience. The latter position is in fact predominant in texts directly or indirectly relative to the dhyānic path, and in the premises of the doctrine of the *mārga* and the *phalas*, nay, even most concretely reminiscent of oldest Upanishadic position in that remnant of the oldest

27 This growing bodhicitta, this pledge of the future realization of Nirvāṇa = Ātman, is the "subject" of the Jetavana-parable: it is not concerned with the saṃsāric nature of the skandhas nor is it their immanent-self-nature, as they are not congenital to him, who is the progressive actualization of the function opposite to theirs. For similar reasons he is not comparable with the Sāṃkhyan puruṣa the individual, transcendent ātmaic entity connected *ab origine* with the anātmāic complex of the Prakṛti. The Jetavana I was not there while the skandha-plane was the only plane of being: it appears while this plane is being transcended, through its being transcended.

Buddhistic literature figuring the event of *bodhi* by the simile of the nuptial union (*DN* II, p. 267).[28] The conclusion is at hand that the radiant viññāṇa-Nibbāna is potentially latent within the contingent saṃsāric viññāṇa. And, in fact, it has been drawn. *Pabhassaram idaṃ bhikkhave cittam āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakiliṭṭham,* runs the teaching of *AN* I, v, 9-10, vi, 1-2, p. 10. From the strictly orthodox doctrinal point of view doubtlessly a semi-heretic statement, but intimately consonant with the ideology evidenced in all the remnants of the oldest strata of Buddhistic doctrine incorporated in the Nikāyas and for which Nibbāna was a concrete experience, practically coincident with Bodhi (the latter, even under the designations *sambodhi* and *sammāsambodhi*, being attributed to all disciples reaching arhatship) and realized in life through a definite cessation of contingent existence. The problemology being entirely psychological, the notion of a conflict between the full realization of Nibbāna and the continuation of biologic existence did not arise at all at this stage and not until the introduction of physico-cosmological and biological viewpoints, when the distinction of *sopadhisesa* and *nirupadhisesa* was derived to cope with the newly arisen difficulty.

Only the next step, due to the consideration that, as the Uncreated can by no means *become*, its transcendent reality must be immanent *ab initio* or rather *sine initio,* renders this position decidedly heretical. The Mahāsaṃghika modification of the old canonic doctrine, stating that the prabhāsvara citta, conditionally offuscated, is *ādiśuddha,* marks the transition to the full immanentism of Mahāyāna, whose earlier stages from the Prajñāpāramitās to the Madhyamaka are a new recurrence of the acosmistic position of absolute identity represented by the *Kaṭha,* the doctrine of dharmanairātmya (= °śūnyatā) or absolute unreality of any particular existence enforcing the view of the absolute immanence of

28 *Il Mito Psicologico,* pp. 340 f., *Le Serpent et l'Oiseau.*

Nirvāṇa, the one Dharma, the Tathatā reproducing the ātman of the Upanishads[29] along with the complementary theoretical tenet of unreality of karman and saṃsāra, primeval "error" taking the place of primeval desire. Thus it is not the denial of the immanence of Ātman that brought about as ultimate consequence the negation of karman, but on the contrary the reassertion of the Ātman's absolute immanence directly resulted in the negation of its opposite.

Far from being the necessary condition of the validity of the karman-conception as an interpretation of existence, the Ātman-conception has been in conflict with the latter ever since the beginning of Upanishadic thought, and the successive attempts at a solution of this conflict of the two fundamental data of Upanishadic analysis of experience as existence, in the successive synthetic or exclusivistic theories of reality, mark the successive stages of Upanishadic as well as Buddhistic speculation, the latter starting at the terminal point of the former and covering its stages in a regressive direction. This fertile contrast is not that of conflicting theories or dogmas, producing logical antinomies and prompting theoretical devices to enforce untenable issues, but the contrast of two forms of experience, equally true on different planes of psychic life; and the successive ontological solutions building up the history of Upanishadic and Buddhistic thought are but the different theoretical readings of the same complex of experience. The practical, technological solution of the soteriological problem as adopted by this unbroken current of religious ideologies is but the technics of systematic realization and reproduction of one of these two planes, that of universal self-consciousness, and remains effectively unchanged throughout the whole development: it is yoga.

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29 Quite consequentially, the term *ātman* reappears in the Prajñāpāramitās *Saptaśatikā*, p. 18, etc.).

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